Hill, Peterson, Carper, Bee & Deitzler, P.L.L.C. v. XL Specialty Insurance

261 F. Supp. 2d 546, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, 2003 WL 21074078
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedMay 13, 2003
DocketCIV.A. 2:02-1437
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 261 F. Supp. 2d 546 (Hill, Peterson, Carper, Bee & Deitzler, P.L.L.C. v. XL Specialty Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill, Peterson, Carper, Bee & Deitzler, P.L.L.C. v. XL Specialty Insurance, 261 F. Supp. 2d 546, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, 2003 WL 21074078 (S.D.W. Va. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GOODWIN, District Judge.

Pending is a motion to remand to state court filed by the plaintiff, Hill, Peterson, Carper, Bee & Deitzler, P.L.L.C. (Hill) [Docket 21].- For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the motion and REMANDS the case to state court.

I. Background

On November 12, 2002, Hill filed a complaint in Kanawha County Circuit Court against its insurer, XL Specialty Insurance Company (XL Specialty), XL Specialty’s aviation insurance manager, W. Brown & Associates Property & Casualty Insurance Services (W.Brown), and Hill’s local insurance agent, The Hoxton Agency, Inc. (Hoxton). Hill’s complaint alleged state tort and contract claims against the defendants arising out of the crash of Hill’s Piper Navajo Chieftan airplane, which resulted in the death of the pilot, R. Edward Pinney, and the total loss of the aircraft. Hill had purchased aircraft or “hull” insurance in the amount of $350,000 and liability insurance in the amount of $10,000,000 from XL Specialty though its local agent, Hoxton. -

Following the fatal crash, XL Specialty denied Hill’s claim for payment pursuant to the hull insurance policy. XL Specialty claimed that the validity of the hull policy was conditioned on the pilot’s annual completion of a training program, and that the pilot in this case had not received the required training in the past twelve months. XL Specialty therefore denied coverage on the ground that the pilot’s failure to maintain the required training rendered the hull coverage invalid. Hill brought this suit against XL Specialty as well as the local insurance agent, Hoxton. The defendants removed the case to this court on the ground of diversity of citizenship, claiming that Hoxton had been fraudulently joined in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Hill has filed a motion to remand the case to state court, arguing that Hoxton is a valid defendant and was not fraudulently joined.

II. Discussion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), this court has jurisdiction over a case in *548 volving purely state-law claims when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and all of the adverse parties are citizens of different states. Here, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a West Virginia limited liability company, XL Specialty is an Illinois corporation, W. Brown is a California corporation, and Hoxton is a West Virginia corporation. Ordinarily, then, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a remand to state court, because complete diversity of citizenship is not present. However, when the non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined by the plaintiff in order to defeat federal jurisdiction, “a district court [may] disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain jurisdiction.”, Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir.1999). To show fraudulent joinder, the removing party must show that “there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court.” Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999). “The party alleging fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden — it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and fact in the plaintiffs favor.” Id.

To establish fraudulent joinder in this case, the defendants must prove that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against Hoxton. Accordingly, the court will examine the plaintiffs claims against Hoxton in order to determine whether those claims have any possibility of success. The complaint alleges that Hoxton had a duty “to notify the plaintiff of any reason that any aspect of plaintiffs aircraft insurance might be considered invalid by its insurer,” and that Hoxton breached that duty by failing to notify Hill that its pilot’s training had fallen out of compliance with the hull policy. (Comply 14.) In support of its allegation of a duty to inform, Hill alleges that Hoxton has served as its insurance agent for at least ten years and was aware prior to the crash that Mr. Pinney’s training was no longer in compliance with the policy. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The defendants argue that the law imposes no duty on Hoxton to monitor Hill’s compliance with the terms of their policy or to inform Hill of any non-compliance.

Many courts have recognized the general rule that “absent special circumstances, an insurer or its agent has no duty to advise an insured as to the insured’s insurance coverage needs.” Gary Knapp, Annotation, Liability of insurer of agent of insurer for failure to advise insured as to coverage needs, 88 A.L.R.4th 249, § 3, 1991 WL 741640 (1991) (citing, inter alia, Peter v. Schumacher Enters., Inc., 22 P.3d 481, 485 (Alaska 2001); Marlo Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 227 Mich.App. 309, 575 N.W.2d 324, 327 (1998); Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 57 Cal. App.4th 916, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 452 (1997)). However, these same courts acknowledge that an insurance agent may have a duty to advise an insured on its coverage needs if (1) a special relationship exists between the insured and the agent, (2) the agent holds itself out as a specialist in the particular field, or (3) the agent misrepresents the scope or nature of the insured’s coverage. See Peter, 22 P.3d at 485; Marlo Beauty Supply, 575 N.W.2d at 327; Fitzpatrick, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d at 452. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently provided the following examples of special circumstances giving rise to a duty to inform an insured of coverage needs:

express agreement, long established relationships of entrustment in which the agent clearly appreciates the duty of giving advice, additional compensation *549 apart from premium payments, ... the agent holding out as a highly-skilled expert coupled with reliance by the insured, ... or where there is a course of dealing over time putting the agent on notice that his advice is being sought and relied upon.

Sintros v. Hamon, 148 N.H. 478, 810 A.2d 553, 556 (2002). Neither party has cited, nor has the court found, caselaw from West Virginia addressing how and if West Virginia might adopt and apply these factors in determining whether a duty existed in this case. In the absence of any West Virginia state law directly on point, the court will consider the above-cited analogous authority from other jurisdictions to determine whether the plaintiffs claims may have merit.

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261 F. Supp. 2d 546, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, 2003 WL 21074078, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-peterson-carper-bee-deitzler-pllc-v-xl-specialty-insurance-wvsd-2003.