Hill-Colbert v. City of Roseville

Opinion

----oo0oo---- MARCUS HILL-COLBERT, JENNIFER No. 2:22-cv-1651 WBS SCR TIMMONS, HERMINIO LeBRON, DANIEL McMARLIN, and JAMES THOMPSON, on behalf of themselves and a class MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR of similarly situated persons, PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT Plaintiffs, v. POLICE DEPARTMENT, TYLER CANTLEY, and DOES 1-20, Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiffs Marcus Hill-Colbert, Jennifer Timmons, Herminio LeBron, Daniel Reed, Vincent Barnao, Erin McMarlin, and James Thompson (collectively, “plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, brought this putative class action against municipal government defendants City of Roseville (“the City” or “Roseville”), the Roseville Police Department, Roseville Officer Tyler Cantley, and twenty fictitiously named “Does” (collectively, “defendants”) alleging various torts and constitutional rights violations. (See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 17).) Before the court is the parties’ joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. (See Docket No. 40.) I. Background In 2010, the City adopted Roseville Municipal Code § 8.02.316, which allows officers of the Roseville Police Department to exclude individuals from the City’s parks for violating “any applicable ordinance.” (FAC ¶¶ 19-20; see also Docket No. 40-2 Ex. A (same).) Roseville Municipal Code § 8.02.020 defines a “park” as “any park, dog park, town square, library, museum, stream bed area, bicycle trail, open space, or other facility owned or operated by the city for park or recreation purposes.” (FAC ¶ 21; see also Docket No. 40-2 Ex. B (same).) The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims is that defendants enforced § 8.02.316 against “involuntarily homeless persons without access to shelter,” including themselves, in contravention of federal and state law. (FAC ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs brought federal and state claims for unconstitutional searches and seizures, false imprisonment, violations of due process, cruel and unusual punishment, violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. (See FAC ¶¶ 200-77.) After extensive negotiations involving former Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman during his time with the court and after as a private mediator, the parties reached a settlement involving modifications of the City’s municipal code and practices and payments to class members. The putative class consists of “all homeless persons who were excluded from a City of Roseville park facility pursuant to Roseville Municipal code section 8.02.316, but not arrested at the time, within two years before September 20, 2022.” (Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C ¶ 12.) The parties estimate that the putative class has at most 250 members. (Docket No. 40-1 at 3.) The parties propose a gross settlement fund which includes the following: (1) $250 incentive awards for the seven named plaintiffs, for a total of $1,750 in plaintiff incentive awards; (2) a payment of $50 to $1,000 to each class member depending on how long he or she was excluded from Roseville parks; (3) a supplemental payment of $150 to $1,500 to each class member who claims loss of property in connection with that exclusion depending on the lost property’s value; and (4) a “reasonable amount of fees and costs incurred by class counsel to handle the claims administration.” (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at ¶¶ 43-44.) The settlement would also release defendants from any and all class claims that were pled or could have been pled based on the factual allegations in the operative or prior complaints. (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at ¶¶ 30, 63.) A hearing on the instant motion for preliminary approval was set for April 14, 2025. (Docket No. 40.) II. Discussion Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (cleaned up). This Order is the first step in that process and analyzes only whether the proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary approval. See Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 473 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Shubb, J.). Preliminary approval authorizes the parties to give notice to putative class members of the settlement agreement and lays the groundwork for a future fairness hearing, at which the court will hear objections to (1) the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the terms of the settlement. See id.; see also Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). The court will reach a final determination as to whether the parties should be allowed to settle the class action on their proposed terms after that hearing. Where the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, the court must first assess whether a class exists. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2003). “Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.” Id. (cleaned up). The parties cannot “agree to certify a class that clearly leaves any one requirement unfulfilled.” Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 473. Consequently, the court cannot blindly rely on the fact that the parties have stipulated that a class exists for purposes of settlement. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621-22 (1997) (“Federal courts, in any case, lack authority to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard never adopted -- that if a settlement is ‘fair,’ then certification is proper.”). “Second, the district court must carefully consider ‘whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable,’ recognizing that ‘it is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness . . . .’” Staton, 327 F.3d at 952 (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)) (cleaned up). A. Class Certification The putative class consists of “all homeless persons who were excluded from a City of Roseville park facility pursuant to Roseville Municipal code section 8.02.316, but not arrested at the time, within two years before September 20, 2022.” (Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C ¶ 12.) To be certified, the putative class must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013). 1. Rule 23(a) Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). a. Numerosity “Courts have routinely found the numerosity requirement satisfied when the class comprises 40 or more members.” Collins v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 300 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Wanger, J.). Here, the parties estimate that the proposed class contains at most 250 members. (See Docket No. 40-1 at 3.) This more than satisfies the numerosity requirement. b. Commonality Commonality requires that the class members’ claims “depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of classwide resolution -- which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 350. “All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-20. “So long as there is ‘even a single common question,’ a would-be class can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 358-59). Here, the claims implicate common questions of law and fact because they are premised on policies and practices that allegedly applied to all class members equally. All class members were “homeless persons who were excluded from a City of Roseville park facility pursuant to Roseville Municipal code section 8.02.316, but not arrested at the time, within two years before September 20, 2022.” (Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C ¶ 12.) As a result, the class members share several common factual questions surrounding the circumstances of their exclusions from Roseville parks as well as several common legal questions concerning whether said policies and practices violated federal and California law. Generally, “challenging a policy common to the class as a whole creates a common question whose answer is apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, No. 2:08-cv-567 WBS DAD, 2014 WL 3057506, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2014) (cleaned up). Even if individual members of the class will be entitled to different amounts of damages because, for instance, they were excluded from Roseville parks for different periods of time or lost different kinds of property after being excluded, “the presence of individual damages cannot, by itself, defeat class certification.” Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514. Accordingly, these common questions of law and fact satisfy the commonality requirement. c. Typicality Typicality requires that named plaintiffs have claims “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members,” but their claims do not have to be “substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-20. The test for typicality “is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs and other class members are all homeless persons who were allegedly subject to the same policies and practices in question, including exclusion from Roseville parks and loss of property in connection with that exclusion. Although the facts might differ for individual class members, the basis for their alleged injuries and the parties purportedly responsible for those injuries are the same. The proposed class therefore meets the typicality requirement. d. Adequacy of Representation To resolve the question of adequacy, the court must consider two factors: (1) whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (2) whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel will vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of the class. In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 566-67 (9th Cir. 2019). i. Conflicts of Interest There do not appear to be any conflicts of interest for purposes of preliminary approval. (See Docket No. 40-2 at ¶¶ 9- 10.) The named plaintiffs’ interests are generally aligned with those of the putative class members, who suffered injuries similar to those suffered by the named plaintiffs. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–26. The settlement provides for $250 incentive awards for the named plaintiffs. (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at ¶¶ 43-44.) While the provision of an incentive award raises the possibility that the named plaintiffs’ interest in receiving that award will cause their interests to diverge from the class’s interest in a fair settlement, the Ninth Circuit has specifically approved the award of “reasonable incentive payments.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 977–78. The court, however, must “scrutinize carefully the awards so that they do not undermine the adequacy of the class representatives.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sys., Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013). Incentive awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class,” and “to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has consistently recognized incentive awards are “fairly typical.” Id. In particular, courts have found that even “a $5,000 incentive award is ‘presumptively reasonable’ in the Ninth Circuit.” See Roe v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 14-cv-00751, 2017 WL 1315626, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2017) (quoting Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp., No. 14- cv-02577, 2016 WL 362395, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016)). Here, the incentive awards are $250, placing them well below the upper limit typically deemed reasonable within the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel represents that named plaintiffs have expended significant time participating in this case. (See Docket No. 40-2 at ¶¶ 6-8.) The incentive payments thus appear appropriate at this stage. However, counsel should present further evidence of named plaintiffs’ efforts towards receiving incentive awards at final approval. ii. Vigorous Prosecution The second portion of the adequacy inquiry examines the vigor with which the named plaintiffs and their counsel have pursued the class claims. “Although there are no fixed standards by which ‘vigor’ can be assayed, considerations include competency of counsel and, in the context of a settlement-only class, an assessment of the rationale for not pursuing further litigation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021. Here, plaintiffs’ counsel appear to be experienced civil rights litigators with class action experience which qualifies them to pursue the interests of the class. (See Docket No. 40-2 at ¶¶ 11-34.) This background, coupled with the work performed thus far, suggest that plaintiffs’ counsel are well- equipped to handle this case. (See id. at ¶¶ 4-8.) Further, plaintiffs’ counsel appear to have conducted thorough factual investigation and legal research, and fully considered the strengths and weaknesses of this case in deciding to accept the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. (See id. at ¶¶ 4- 10.) The court finds no reason to doubt that plaintiffs’ counsel is well qualified to conduct the proposed litigation and assess the value of the settlement. Accordingly, the court concludes that Rule 23(a)’s adequacy requirement is satisfied for the purpose of preliminary approval. 2. Rule 23(b) After fulfilling the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a), the proposed class must satisfy the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512. Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1) “the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).1 a. Predominance “The predominance analysis under Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on ‘the relationship between the common and individual issues’ in the case and ‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’” Wang, 737 F.3d at 545 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022). Here, the claims brought by the proposed settlement class all arise from defendants’ same conduct with respect to policies of exclusion from Roseville parks. The class claims thus demonstrate a “common nucleus of facts and potential legal remedies” that can properly be resolved “in a single adjudication.” See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022-23. Although there are differences in the facts pertaining to individual class members and the amount of injury sustained, such as how long each was excluded from Roseville parks and what property they may have lost in the process, there is no indication that those variations are “sufficiently substantive to predominate over the shared claims.” See Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 476-77 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022-23). Accordingly, the court finds common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only

1 Plaintiffs also seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for declaratory and injunctive relief. (See Docket No. 40-1 at 12 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)). However, the court does not reach the issue since it will certify the settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3) instead. individual class members. b. Superiority Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth four non-exhaustive factors that courts should consider when examining whether “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). They are: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Id. The parties settled this action prior to certification, making factors (C) and (D) inapplicable. See Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 477. Rule 23(b)(3) is concerned with the “vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616-17. When, as here, class members’ individual recovery is relatively modest, the class members’ interests generally favor certification. Zinser v. Accufix Res. Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, most if not all class members appear to be indigent and without the means to bring lawsuits on their own. See Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597, 606-07 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (Wanger, J.). Accordingly, the class action device appears to be the superior method for adjudicating this controversy. 3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651, 657-58 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Parties’ counsel has provided the court with a proposed notice to class members. (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C Attach. 2.) It explains the proceedings, defines the scope of the class, and explains what the settlement provides and how much each class member can expect to receive in compensation. (See id. at 1-3.) The notice further explains the opt-out procedure, the procedure for objecting to the settlement, and the date and location of the final approval hearing. (See id. at 4-6.) The content of the proposed notice therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.’” (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 725-26 n.10 (1986))). As for how notice will be provided to class members, the parties provide that “the class notice and claim form will be mailed, posted, or personally delivered to potential class member at the last known address or at service providers at which class members traditionally receive service.” (Docket No. 40-1 at 8 (cleaned up).) Of course, because plaintiffs are homeless, they may lack mailing addresses. As a result, the court cautions that a notice sent via conventional means, such as mail, is unlikely to suffice. See Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019). The court thus advises that class counsel undertake additional measures “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the proposed settlement. See id. at 1046-47. Given these considerations, the court will grant the parties’ notice plan preliminary approval, notwithstanding its concerns about the parties’ notice plan as set forth in the motion for preliminary approval. B. Preliminary Settlement Approval After determining that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), the court must determine whether the terms of the parties’ settlement appear “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1025-26 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)). This process requires the court to “balance a number of factors,” including “the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” Id. at 1026 (cleaned up). Because some of these factors cannot be considered until the final fairness hearing, at the preliminary approval stage, “the court need only determine whether the proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval.” See Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479. In other words, the court must resolve any “glaring deficiencies” in the settlement agreement before authorizing notice to class members. See Ontiveros, 2014 WL 3057506, at *11-12. This analysis requires consideration of “whether the proposed settlement discloses grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or segments of the class, or excessive compensation of attorneys.” Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479. Courts often begin by examining the process that led to the settlement’s terms to ensure that those terms are “the result of vigorous, arms-length bargaining” and then turn to the substantive terms of the agreement. See id. at 479-80. 1. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement On September 20, 2022, plaintiffs initiated this action and moved for a preliminary injunction. (See Docket Nos. 1, 4.) On November 1, 2022, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. (Docket No. 16.) Plaintiffs amended the complaint the next day. (Docket No. 17.) On July 20, 2023, the parties stipulated to a settlement conference, which the court approved within a day. (See Docket Nos. 24-25.) The parties thereafter engaged in months of settlement discussions as well as “extensive investigation and discovery” from August 29, 2023 to January 6, 2025. (See Docket No. 40-2 at ¶¶ 5-8; see also Docket No. 40-1 at 6.) Counsel represents that the parties engaged in thorough informal discovery and discussion during and prior to settlement negotiations, which were adversarial and conducted at arms-length. (See Docket No. 40-1 at 6.) Given the parties’ representation that the settlement reached was the product of arms-length bargaining following thorough informal discovery, the court at this stage does not question that the proposed settlement is the result of informed and non-collusive negotiations between the parties. See La Fleur v. Med. Mgmt. Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-00398, 2014 WL 2967475, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2014). 2. Amount Recovered and Distribution In determining whether a settlement agreement is substantively fair to the class, the court must balance the value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement offer. See Ontiveros, 2014 WL 3057506, at *14. This inquiry may involve consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the case were litigated to trial. “In determining whether the amount offered in settlement is fair, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that the Court compare the settlement amount to the parties’ ‘estimates of the maximum amount of damages recoverable in a successful litigation.’” Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. CV 14-0425, 2015 WL 4698475, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2015) (quoting Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. C-06-4068, 2007 WL 221862, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007), aff’d, 331 F. App’x 452, 455-56 (9th Cir. 2009)). The parties have not yet proposed a gross settlement amount. However, they have proposed a settlement fund which includes the following: (1) $250 incentive awards for the seven named plaintiffs, for a total of $1,750 in plaintiff incentive awards; (2) a payment of $50 to $1,000 to each class member depending on how long he or she was excluded from Roseville parks; (3) a supplemental payment of $150 to $1,500 to each class member who claims loss of property in connection with that exclusion depending on the lost property’s value; and (4) a “reasonable amount of fees and costs incurred by class counsel to handle the claims administration.” (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at ¶¶ 43-44.) Plaintiffs faced numerous risks in the litigation, including proving all elements of the claims, obtaining and maintaining class certification, establishing liability, and the costliness of litigation on these issues. Among other things, after the Supreme Court decided City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 603 U.S. 520 (2024), the strength of plaintiffs’ position came into question. In Grants Pass, the Court held that a state or local government may criminalize “camping . . . for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live” without violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 603 U.S. at 537-38, 560-61. The parties appeared to read Grants Pass, 603 U.S. 520, to have weakened plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims. Thus, plaintiffs’ counsel represents that the settlement and resulting distribution “potentially benefits a substantial number of person who, were it not for the settlement, would likely have received no compensation whatsoever.” (See Docket No. 40-2 at ¶ 8.) In light of the risks associated with further litigation and the relative strength of defendants’ arguments and defenses, the court finds that the projected value of the settlement is within the range of possible approval such that preliminary approval of the settlement is appropriate. The court further finds the method of determining the amount of recovery for each class member claims to be adequate, as each class member’s individual share of the settlement is proportional to the amount of time excluded from Roseville parks and property lost in connection with such exclusion. Counsel are cautioned that because this settlement was reached prior to class certification, it will be subject to heightened scrutiny for purposes of final approval. See In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2022). The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel will not be given a presumption of reasonableness, but rather will be subject to close review. See id. The court will particularly scrutinize “any subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests to infect the negotiations.” See id. 3. Attorneys’ Fees If a negotiated class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees, that fee award “must be evaluated in the overall context of the settlement.” Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 455-56 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). “Courts have an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). If the court does not approve the fee award in whole or in part, that will not prevent the settlement agreement from becoming effective or be grounds for termination. In deciding the attorneys’ fees motion, the court will have the opportunity to assess whether the requested fee award is reasonable by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours counsel reasonably expended. See In re Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 941-42. As part of this lodestar calculation, the court may consider factors such as the “level of success” or “results obtained” by plaintiffs’ counsel. See id. If the court, in ruling on the fees motion, finds that the amount of the settlement warrants a fee award at a rate lower than what plaintiffs’ counsel requests, then it will reduce the award accordingly. The court will therefore not evaluate the fee award at length here in considering whether the settlement is adequate. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties’ joint motion for preliminary certification of a settlement class and preliminary approval of the class action settlement (Docket No. 40) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: (1) The court provisionally certifies the action to proceed as a class action for settlement purposes only pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, with the settlement class defined as follows: (a) All homeless persons who were excluded from a City of Roseville park facility pursuant to Roseville Municipal Code section 8.02.316, but not arrested at the time, within two years before September 20, 2022, and who shall be sent or otherwise notified of the class notice and claim form in the manner approved of and ordered by the court according to the settlement. (2) The court approves the class notice (Docket No. 40- 2 Ex. C Attach. 2) and claim form (Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C Attach. 3) and further approves the method by which notice is proposed in the settlement agreement (Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at 9) to be given to the settlement class. The class notice and claim form shall be distributed to the class pursuant to the notice provisions in the settlement agreement. (3) The court approves the procedure set forth in the settlement agreement and reflected in the class notice, with which settlement class members must comply in order validly to object to the settlement or to exclude themselves from the settlement. (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at 12-13.) (a) Any settlement class member who did not elect to be excluded from the settlement by submitting a request to be excluded by the objection/exclusion deadline may, but need not, submit objections to the proposed settlement by filing and serving an objection to the settlement by the objection/exclusion deadline. (b) Any settlement class member who did not elect to be excluded from the settlement by submitting a request to be excluded by the objection/exclusion deadline may, but need not, enter an appearance in this action through his or her own attorney. Settlement class members who do not enter an appearance through their own attorneys will be represented by class counsel. (4) The court appoints named plaintiffs Marcus Hill- Colbert, Jennifer Timmons, Herminio LeBron, Daniel Reed, Vincent Barnao, Erin McMarlin, and James Thompson as the representative plaintiffs of the settlement class for settlement purposes only, subject to final approval. (5) The court appoints Mark E. Merin, Paul H. Masuhara, and Paul W. Comiskey to serve as class counsel for settlement purposes only, subject to final approval. (6) A final approval hearing is scheduled to be held before this court on July 21, 2025, at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom 5 on the 14th floor of the Robert T. Matsui U.S. Courthouse, located at 501 I Street, Sacramento, California 95814, before the undersigned, to consider the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement; the dismissal, with prejudice, of the instant action against the City of Roseville, the Roseville Police Department, Roseville Officer Tyler Cantley, and Does 1 through 20; and the entry of an order dismissing the defendants in the instant action. Class counsel’s application for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs shall be heard at the time of the final approval hearing. (a) The date, time and location of the final approval hearing shall be set forth in the class notice, but the final approval hearing shall be subject to cancellation or continuation by the court, including in the event the court elects to decide the motion for final approval without a hearing subject to Local Rule 230(g), without further notice to the class other than any notice that the court may issue pursuant to its regular procedures. (b) Only settlement class members who have filed and served timely objections shall be entitled to be heard at the final approval hearing. Any settlement class member who does not timely file and serve an objection to the settlement shall be deemed to have waived any such objection by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise. (c) All settlement class members who do not seek to be excluded from the settlement by submitting a request for exclusion by the objection/exclusion deadline are enjoined from proceeding against defendants, including their present or former elective and/or appointive boards, agents, servants, employees, consultants, departments, commissioners, attorneys, officials and officers, and all other individuals and entities, whether named or unnamed in the instant action, as to the claims asserted. (d) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the court reserves decision on final approval of the settlement pending the final approval hearing, including consideration of any objections to the settlement, and also reserves decision on the final fee and expense award, and the incentive payments for the representative plaintiffs. (7) This action is hereby STAYED pending final approval, except for any activities set forth in the settlement agreement. (See Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C.) nee ee OR OIE I IE IERIE OID RES Oe

(8) In the event the settlement is not finally and fully approved through entry of an order of dismissal of the instant action against defendants which becomes final as of the effective date, and/or if the settlement is not otherwise fully and finally consummated, pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement (Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C), this order granting preliminary approval of the settlement agreement shall be deemed void ab initio and the parties shall be deemed to have reserved all of their respective rights, legal positions, and arguments as of the day before entry of this order granting preliminary approval, and the parties may continue with any litigation, mediation, or settlement that they choose. Dated: April 14, 2025 □□ tteom. Ad. bt—~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23