Hill 345396 v. Heidenreich

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

EDWARD DUANE HILL,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:23-cv-982

v. Honorable Sally J. Berens

STACIE HEIDENREICH et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 5.) When Plaintiff initiated this action, he paid $375.00 toward the filing fee. In an order (ECF No. 4) entered on September 20, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to pay the remaining $27.00 towards the $402.00 filing fee within 28 days. Plaintiff was advised that if he failed to do so, the case would be dismissed for failure to comply. The Court did not receive the $27.00 from Plaintiff; accordingly, in an order and judgment (ECF Nos. 6 and 7) entered on October 23, 2023, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that he never received a copy of the Court’s September 20, 2023 order. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) Plaintiff submitted the remaining $27.00 with his motion for reconsideration. In an order (ECF No. 11) entered on November 20, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion, reopened the matter, and vacated the October 23, 2023 order and judgment. In a separate order (ECF No. 12) entered that same day, the Court stayed the case and referred it to the Prisoner Civil Rights Early Mediation Program. On December 11, 2023, Defendant Suzanne Groff filed a statement (ECF No. 16) asking to exclude this case from mediation. Accordingly, in an order (ECF No. 17) entered on December 12, 2023, the Court removed the matter from early mediation. The Court will lift the stay imposed for mediation

purposes in a separate order. This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a

court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C.

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss the following claims against Defendants: (1) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims; (2) Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims for declaratory relief; and (3) Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth Amendment claims for damages against Defendants, premised upon the provision of inadequate medical care, will remain in the case. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (JCF) in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred during his prior incarceration at the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) in Coldwater, Branch County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Nurse Practitioner Suzanne Groff and Registered Nurses Stacie Heidenreich, Michael Travis, and Raeann McIntosh in their official and individual capacities.

On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with another inmate. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) During that altercation, Plaintiff “fell to the cement floor, injuring his knee.” (Id.) He was taken to the healthcare department in a wheelchair, where he told staff that he could not stand and thought his leg was broken. (Id.) Defendant Heidenreich examined Plaintiff, and Plaintiff told her that “he could barely raise his knee while sitting in the wheelchair without excruciating pain.” (Id.) Defendant Heidenreich noted that Plaintiff had a dime-sized abrasion below his knee cap. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff also had some minor swelling. (Id.) Plaintiff was then taken to administrative segregation “without receiving any medication for pain.” (Id.) The next day, Defendant McIntosh examined Plaintiff while in segregation. (Id.) Plaintiff complained that his pain was 8 out of 10. (Id.) Defendant McIntosh noted that Plaintiff had “significant swelling at [left] knee and lower thigh area.” (Id.) She told Plaintiff to get over the counter pain medication; Plaintiff responded that “he was in segregation and did not have access to the prisoner store to obtain pain medication.” (Id.)

Plaintiff continued to complain about pain. (Id.) He was seen by Defendant Groff on April 22, 2023. (Id.) Defendant Groff ordered x-rays and provided Plaintiff a detail for ice, ACE bandages, and knee stretches. (Id.) She told Plaintiff that he had to obtain over the counter pain medication from the store. (Id.) Plaintiff saw Defendant Travis on April 26, 2023. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff indicated that he needed pain medication for his knee. (Id.) Defendant Travis told Plaintiff that “his visit was for the x-ray transit that had been ordered and that he would have to see someone when he returned from his off-site.” (Id.) Plaintiff saw non-party Nurse Practitioner Tamara Kelly on April 27, 2023, and was finally

given “325mg APAP tablets” for his pain. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was forced to endure the pain for 10 days before being given pain medication. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that his “injury has beg[u]n to heal err[a]ntly, causing permanent displacement.” (Id., PageID.5.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He seeks declaratory relief, as well as damages. (Id., PageID.5–6.) II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Official Capacity Claims As noted above, Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their official and individual capacities. Although an action against a defendant in his or her individual capacity intends to impose liability on the specified individual, an action against the same defendant in his or her official capacity intends to impose liability only on the entity that they represent. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Thus, a suit against an individual in his or her individual capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the entity that he or she represents—in this case, the MDOC and the private company that has contracted with the MDOC to provide healthcare to inmates. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). First, with respect to official capacity claims against any Defendants who are employed by the company that has contracted with the MDOC to provide healthcare to inmates, the requirements for a valid Section 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of Section 1983. See Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the holding in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), has been extended to private corporations); Street, 102 F.3d at 817– 18 (same). “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while a municipality can be held liable for a constitutional

violation, there is no vicarious liability based on the acts of its employees alone.” Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726, 747 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 690–91). Instead, a municipality “can be sued under § 1983 only when a policy or custom of that government caused the injury in question.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he finding of a custom or policy is the initial determination to be made in any municipal liability claim.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). Further, the policy or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury, and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity, and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)); Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d at 508–09. Consequently, because the requirements for a valid Section 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to the private corporation that has contracted to provide healthcare to MDOC inmates, that corporation’s liability “must also be premised on some policy [or custom]

that caused a deprivation of [a prisoner’s] Eighth Amendment rights.” Starcher, 7 F. App’x at 465. Moreover, the corporation’s liability cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts alleging the existence of such a custom or policy, let alone that any custom or policy was the moving force behind his alleged constitutional injury. Where a plaintiff fails to allege that a policy or custom existed, dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim is appropriate. Rayford v. City of Toledo, No. 86-3260, 1987 WL 36283, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1987); see also Bilder v. City of Akron, No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 action when plaintiff’s allegation of policy or

custom was conclusory, and plaintiff failed to allege facts tending to support the allegation). Consequently, because Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a custom or policy, any official capacity claims against any Defendants who are employed by the corporation that has contracted to provide healthcare to MDOC inmates will be dismissed. With respect to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against any Defendants employed by the MDOC, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a Section 1983 suit under the Eleventh

Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and monetary damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5–6.) An official capacity defendant is absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to

sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex parte Young for prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that unconstitutional acts cannot have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered done under the state’s authority. Id. Importantly, however, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Here, Plaintiff is no longer confined at LCF. The Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to another correctional facility moots a prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996). Underlying this rule is the premise that such

relief is appropriate only where a plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury as the result of the challenged official conduct. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., id.; Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 649 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 614, 618 (S.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). Plaintiff is no longer confined at LCF and fails to allege facts that show that he would be subject to further future conduct by Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek relief properly

characterized as prospective. See Ladd, 971 F.3d at 581. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against any Defendants employed by the MDOC will be dismissed in their entirety.2 B. Individual Capacity Claims 1. Eighth Amendment Claims Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to provide adequate medical care for his injuries, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison

2 To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief against Defendants in their individual capacities, those claims will also be dismissed for the reasons set forth above. authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide medical care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by a doctor’s failure to

respond to the medical needs of a prisoner, or by “prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the

seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay

in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a]

plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained: [A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate

medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster, 749 F.3d at 448; Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’”

Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 604-05 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). He must demonstrate that the care he received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff alleges that he injured his knee in an altercation with another inmate after falling to the cement floor and had to be taken to the healthcare department in a wheelchair. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges further that he could not stand, could barely raise his knee while

sitting in the wheelchair, and was in excruciating pain. (Id.) Plaintiff also notes that he suffered significant swelling. (Id., PageID.3.) The Court therefore assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate the existence of a sufficiently serious medical need. Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants did not provide medication for his pain. Although Plaintiff was told on multiple occasions that he needed to obtain over-the-counter medication, Plaintiff told Defendant McIntosh that he had no access to the store to get such medication while in segregation. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants Heidenreich, Groff, and Travis did not provide pain medication to Plaintiff despite his repeated complaints about pain. (Id., PageID.3–4.) Plaintiff alleges that he finally received pain medication from non-party Nurse

Practitioner Kelly 10 days after the incident. (Id., PageID.4.) According to Plaintiff, the lack of pain medication caused him to suffer continuous pain, and he avers that his “injury has beg[u]n to heal err[a]ntly.” (Id., PageID.5.) Although Plaintiff has by no means proven deliberate indifference, at this stage of proceedings, taking Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most favorable to him, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth Amendment claims for damages against Defendants may not be dismissed on initial review. 2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims Plaintiff also contends that Defendants’ failure to provide adequate medical care violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Plaintiff’s claims, however, are protected by the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has noted that procedural due process protection is not the type of protection afforded to the right to medical care. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–200 (1989) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, any procedural due process claims premised upon the failure to provide adequate medical care will be dismissed. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that, to the extent the right to medical care is a due process

right, it is a “substantive due process right.” Colson v. City of Alcoa, Tenn., 37 F.4th 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 2022). However, convicted inmates, like Plaintiff, do not need to rely on a substantive due process right with regard to medical care. Critically, “[w]here a particular [a]mendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that [a]mendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process, provides the standard for analyzing claims involving unreasonable search or seizure of free citizens, and the Eighth Amendment provides the standard

for such searches of prisoners); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”); Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1455 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that, “plaintiff’s section 1983 claim in a [deliberate indifference] case such as this must be for redress of eighth amendment, not fourteenth amendment substantive due process, rights” (citations omitted)); O’Brien v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 F. App’x 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2014) (“O’Brien’s allegations concerned the denial of medical care, thus, ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is the primary source of substantive protection’ available to him . . . not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process[.]’”). Accordingly, because the Eighth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of protection against the alleged deliberate indifference premised on the failure to provide adequate medical care, any substantive due process claims asserted by Plaintiff will be dismissed as well. Conclusion

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that the following claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c): (1) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims; (2) Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims for declaratory relief; and (3) Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth Amendment claims for damages against Defendants, premised upon the provision of inadequate medical care, remain in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: January 8, 2024 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge