Hilda Kennedy v. New Jersey Court System

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 24-2826
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2826 __________

HILDA T. KENNEDY, Appellant

v.

THE NEW JERSEY COURT SYSTEM ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 1:22-cv-05797) District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 17, 2025 Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 6, 2026) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Hilda Kennedy appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing her amended

complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Kennedy brought suit against the “New Jersey Court System,” properly known as

the State of New Jersey Judiciary, for violations of Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq. She maintained that she is

legally blind and physically impaired, and alleged that the New Jersey Judiciary and its

employees discriminated against her based on her disabilities during litigation of four

state court actions in the New Jersey Superior Court in Atlantic County. 1 Kennedy

sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief.

The New Jersey Judiciary moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The District Court granted the motion in

part, concluding that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Kennedy’s NJLAD claims

and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 2 barred her ADA claims with respect to the two

state court suits that had concluded. Kennedy was given leave to amend her complaint to

clarify the remaining two ADA claims.

In her amended complaint, Kennedy alleged claims against the New Jersey

1 Kennedy’s four state court suits include (1) Kennedy, et al. v. Mohammad, ATL-L- 2208-16; (2) Kennedy v. Pollock, et al., ATL-L-1167-15; (3) Kennedy, et al. v. ESQ Capital III, LLC, ATL-924-22 (see also ESQ Capital III LLC v. Kennedy, ATL-L-1366- 22); and (4) Kennedy v. Cooper Levenson Law Firm, ATL-L-3744-21. The first suit ended in a settlement, the second in a jury verdict against Kennedy that was affirmed on appeal, and the last two suits were ongoing when the initial complaint here was filed. 2 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 2 Judiciary for violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights “through the non-

compliance of ADA Title II,” and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF

No. 30. In addition to damages, Kennedy sought declaratory and injunctive relief. She

also filed a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a) to include “new relevant information.” See ECF No. 43.

The New Jersey Judiciary again filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and (b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief and that

the claims were barred by either Eleventh Amendment immunity or judicial immunity.

The District Court denied the request to amend the complaint, granted the New Jersey

Judiciary’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed all claims with prejudice. The District

Court also denied Kennedy’s motion for appointment of counsel. Kennedy timely

appealed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review

over the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Free

Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2012). To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We

construe Kennedy’s pro se pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (per curiam).

At the outset, we note that Kennedy devotes much of her appellate brief to raising

new claims; indeed, she requests to amend the complaint to add new defendants. We will 3 consider only those issues that Kennedy raises in her brief and that were before the

District Court. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 251 (3d

Cir. 1998) (recognizing that, “[a]s a general rule, we do not consider on appeal issues that

were not raised before the district court in the absence of exceptional circumstances”);

see also M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir.

2020) (explaining that parties forfeit any argument that they do not raise in their opening

brief); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that

pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants”).

We understand Kennedy to raise two issues on appeal, neither of which has merit

for substantially the reasons provided by the District Court. First, she appeals from the

denial of her First Amendment retaliation claim, which required Kennedy to allege “(1)

that [s]he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government

responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.”

George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 585 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We agree with the

District Court that Kennedy failed to sufficiently allege facts to satisfy the second and

third requirements. Even assuming, as Kennedy claimed, that the “filing of a state case

for [Fair Housing Act violations] and a federal complaint” was constitutionally protected

activity, ECF No. 30 at 13, she did not allege how the New Jersey Judiciary retaliated

against her for her lawsuits. As the District Court observed, Kennedy’s ability to litigate

her cases in state court “demonstrate[es] that her access to the court system itself is

unobstructed.” ECF No. 49 at 12. 4 To the extent Kennedy contended that actions or rulings taken by the state court

judges (as “defendant’s agent[s]”) during the course of her litigation were retaliatory,

such as the denial of a fee waiver application or the dismissal of a case, the District Court

correctly determined that the claims were barred by judicial immunity. See Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (recognizing a judge is immune from suit for all

judicial actions – including those taken “in error,” “in excess of his authority,” or “done

maliciously” – except those taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”). And insofar

as Kennedy attributed judicial actions to court employees or the court system, her claims

were not actionable because the Superior Court and “judicial employees” are part of the

unified state-based court system, see N.J. Const. Art. VI §§ III, VIII, which, as an “arm of

the state,” is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail

Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (recognizing that a state

agency or department is an “arm of the state” when a judgment against it “would have

had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself”

(citation omitted)); see also Gallas v. Supreme Ct., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000)

(explaining that judicial employees acting as intermediaries for judges or “functioning as

an arm of the court” are protected by judicial immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment immunity

protects a state or a state agency from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the

state’s immunity or the state has waived its immunity).

5 Second, Kennedy challenges the denial of her claim for violations of the ADA.

Title II of the ADA forbids public entities, including state court systems, from

discriminating on the basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Tennessee v. Lane, 541

U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (recognizing that Title II applies to the class of cases implicating

the right of access to the courts). The New Jersey Judiciary acknowledged that its

Eleventh Amendment immunity from this claim is not absolute. “[I]nsofar as Title II

creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually

violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (emphasis in original). Thus, courts

must determine “on a claim-by-claim basis” whether Congress has abrogated immunity

for the alleged conduct. Id. Here, the first step in determining whether the New Jersey

Judiciary is immune to Kennedy’s ADA claim is to determine “if any aspect of [its]

alleged conduct forms the basis for a Title II claim.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2007). We agree with the District Court that

Kennedy’s allegations failed to make that threshold showing.

To state a claim for relief under Title II, “a party must sufficiently plead that ‘(1)

[s]he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of h[er]

disability.’” Geness v. Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, 974 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). “[T]he phrase ‘service, program, or activity’ under Title II . . . is 6 ‘extremely broad in scope and includes anything a public entity does.’” Id. at 275

(citation omitted).

Kennedy alleged that “defendant’s agent,” which, as previously noted, is an

apparent reference to a New Jersey Superior Court judge who presided over her state

court proceedings, “denied me access to the court and the appellate court made it too

difficult to access court (sic) by not implementing ADA . . . measures.” ECF No. 30 at

10, ⁋31. As for how she was denied access, Kennedy provided few specifics. She

alleged that the judge failed to comply with her request for “extra assistance” and to

“please speak slowly, loudly, and clearly.” Id. at ⁋32. However, she did not allege that

she was denied such assistance on the basis on her disability. Kennedy also cited the

judge’s adverse rulings as a basis for her ADA claim, including, inter alia, the dismissal

of her complaint, the denial of a stay, and the denial of eight fee waiver applications.

Beyond conclusory allegations, such as her assertion that “my pronounced rights [under

Title II] were blatantly ignored,” Kennedy did not allege facts to suggest that the judicial

rulings were the result of intentional discrimination. 3 Id. at 17, ⁋62; see Durham v.

Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023) (recognizing “[w]here compensatory damages

3 The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability, but does not provide relief based on disagreement with judicial rulings. In that regard, Kennedy’s arguments on appeal underscore the failure to plead a viable Title II claim. For example, she maintains that (1) the “ADA claims should have a lower threshold to support disabled litigants, ensuring fairness”; and (2) the judges “violated New Jersey Judiciary ADA rules by pursuing summary judgment, which is not in accordance with ADA requirements.” Br. at 7, 9 of 25. 7 are sought, a plaintiff must also show intentional discrimination under a deliberate

indifference standard”).

Kennedy further alleged that the New Jersey Judiciary denied her access to the

courts “by not implementing any ADA Title II measures.” ECF No. 30 at 10, ⁋31. In

particular, she stated that it failed to provide services similar to those adopted by “[m]ost

colleges,” such as “special offices” like a “Center for Disability Services” Id. at ⁋36.

Kennedy also stated that the New Jersey Judiciary did not make available resources that

“schools” offer to “protect[ ] people with disabilities from discrimination,” such as

“[a]ssistive listening systems” and “Braille materials.” Id. at 11, ⁋40. She asserted

generally the need for “cost reduction[s], ease of filing . . . complaint[s] . . . [and] real-

time solutions for . . . rapidly changing barriers . . . [to] compliance [with] ADA Title II

. . . .” Id. at 12, ⁋42. However, Kennedy did not state how the lack of resources or

services, or the failure to make accommodations, interfered with her ability to access the

courts or meaningfully participate in the state court proceedings. Moreover, she wholly

failed to allege that the New Jersey Judiciary acted or discriminated against her based on

her disability. We thus agree with the District Court that Kennedy did not plausibly plead

a Title II ADA claim and that the New Jersey Judiciary is entitled to immunity from the

claim.

8 Based on the foregoing, the amended complaint was properly dismissed with

prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 4

4 Kennedy’s motion to expedite the appeal is denied. 9