Hignight v. Knepp

2023 Ohio 4855

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 29, 2023
• Docket: L-23-1305
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Hignight v. Knepp, 2023-Ohio-4855.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio, ex rel. Stephanea Hignight Court of Appeals No. L-23-1305

Relator

v.

Linda M. Knepp, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: December 29, 2023

*****

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} This case is before the court on the December 26, 2023 complaint for a writ

of prohibition filed by relator, Stephanea Hignight. Hignight alleges that respondents,

Judge Linda Knepp and the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division

(“juvenile court”), lack jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) to proceed with a custody action relating to Hignight’s

children, Z.H. and M.H. She seeks a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Knepp and the juvenile court from hearing and adjudicating the custody case. Because it appears that

Hignight’s complaint may have merit, we grant an alternative writ as to Judge Knepp to

allow the parties to more fully develop the facts underlying the complaint. However,

because the juvenile court cannot sue or be sued, we dismiss the complaint against the

juvenile court.

I. Background

{¶ 2} In her complaint, Hignight alleges that she is the adoptive mother of Z.H.

and M.H. Before Hignight adopted the children, they were in foster care and placed with

Hignight and her then-girlfriend, Jill Hoffman. Hignight’s adoption of Z.H. was finalized

in August 2020, and her adoption of M.H. was finalized in April 2021. Hoffman is not

listed as a petitioner on the decrees of adoption that Hignight attached to her complaint.

In July 2020, before either adoption was finalized, Hignight ended her relationship with

Hoffman. Although Hignight contends that she was not in a relationship with Hoffman

after July 2020, the adoption decrees show that the children’s surname includes both

Hignight’s last name and Hoffman’s last name. In her affidavit, Hignight says that

Hoffman had “sporadic and infrequent contact” with the children after July 2020. She

also notes in the complaint that Hoffman was “on military duty” from October 2021 to

July 2022.

{¶ 3} In June 2021, Hignight and the children moved to Michigan to live with

Hignight’s now-wife, Rachael Varga. Soon after, in September 2021, Hoffman filed the

2. custody case underlying this action, juvenile court case No. 21286267. She asked for

custody of the children, or, alternatively, for parenting time. At some point, the juvenile

court granted Hoffman temporary visitation.

{¶ 4} Two years later, in August 2023, Hignight and Varga married. Three weeks

after marrying, Hignight and Varga filed petitions for a stepparent adoption of each child

in the 22nd Judicial Circuit, Family Division, in Washtenaw County, Michigan. Hoffman

moved to intervene in the Michigan adoption case. It appears that Hoffman’s motion is

still pending and that the Michigan court is aware of the Lucas County custody case, but

Hignight did not include much information about the Michigan case in her complaint.

{¶ 5} After filing the adoption petitions, Hignight filed a motion to stay the

juvenile court proceedings and terminate the temporary visitation orders. The juvenile

court’s September 15, 2023 judgment entry denying her motion indicates that Hignight

argued there, as she does here, that the juvenile court was required to cede jurisdiction

over its case or stay its proceedings once she filed the Michigan adoption petitions. The

juvenile court disagreed with Hignight’s position. It found that an out-of-state court’s

adoption proceedings filed nearly two years after its custody case did not have priority

over the custody case.

{¶ 6} In her complaint, Hignight asks us to issue a writ of prohibition preventing

Judge Knepp and the juvenile court from continuing to hear the custody case so that the

3. Michigan court can make its adoption determination, and argues that the juvenile court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case under the UCCJEA.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 7} “The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from

exceeding their jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Kerr v. Kelsey, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-19-

047, 2019-Ohio-3215, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701

N.E.2d 1002 (1998). To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that

“(1) [the respondent] is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise

of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause injury for

which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.” State ex rel.

Henry v. McMonagle, 87 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 721 N.E.2d 1051 (2000). If the

respondent patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, the relator need not

demonstrate that she lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex

rel. Davis v. Kennedy, 2023-Ohio-1593, --- N.E.3d ----, ¶ 10.

{¶ 8} Here, Hignight argues that the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over the

custody case for two reasons. First, relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Davis, she contends that Judge Knepp or the juvenile court issuing temporary orders in

the custody case would interfere with the Michigan court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the

adoption case. Her argument is misplaced.

4. {¶ 9} In Davis, the Supreme Court determined that the jurisdiction of a juvenile

court to issue visitation orders relating to a child was subordinate to a probate court’s

jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. Id. at ¶ 24. Underlying this decision is Ohio’s

statutory scheme that gives probate courts jurisdiction—exclusive of all other state

courts—to determine a child’s preadoption placement. See id. at ¶ 23, 26. Considering

that Davis is heavily based on juvenile and probate courts’ statutorily-granted

jurisdiction, we do not believe that its holding regarding a jurisdictional dispute between

two Ohio courts can simply be extrapolated to cover a jurisdictional dispute between an

Ohio court and an out-of-state court that does not draw its jurisdiction from the Ohio

Revised Code. Nothing in Hignight’s complaint convinces us otherwise.

{¶ 10} Second, Hignight alleges that the juvenile court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the custody case under the UCCJEA, as adopted in R.C. Chapter 3127,

which “address[es] interstate recognition and enforcement of child custody orders * * *.”

R.C. 3127.01(A). Whether an Ohio court has jurisdiction over a custody case that

involves, or potentially involves, custody determinations from other states is outlined in

R.C. 3127.15(A)(1) to (4).

{¶ 11} Before looking at the jurisdictional statute, some definitions are necessary.

An “initial custody determination” is “the first child custody determination concerning a

particular child.” R.C. 3127.01(B)(8). A “child custody determination” is, generally

speaking, a court order that “provides for legal custody, physical custody, parenting time,

5. or visitation with respect to a child.” R.C. 3127.01(B)(3). A child’s “home state” is “the

state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six

consecutive months immediately preceding the commencement of a child custody

proceeding * * *.” R.C. 3127.01(B)(7). Any “temporary absence” is counted as part of

the six-month period. Id. Finally, a “person acting as a parent” is someone other than a

parent who (1) at the time the custody action is filed, has physical custody of the child or,

within one year before filing, had physical custody of the child for six consecutive

months (including any temporary absence) and (2) has been awarded or claims a right to

legal custody of the child. R.C. 3127.01(B)(13).

{¶ 12} Under R.C. 3127.15, an Ohio court has jurisdiction to make an initial

custody determination only if, as potentially applicable here, (1) Ohio is the child’s home

state on the day the custody action is filed; (2) Ohio was the child’s home state within six

months before filing and the child is no longer in Ohio, but a parent or person acting as a

parent still lives here; or (3) another state’s court does not have home-state jurisdiction,

as defined in R.C. 3127.15(A)(1), the child and at least one parent or person acting as a

parent have a “significant connection” with Ohio that is beyond mere physical presence,

and there is “substantial evidence” in Ohio regarding the child’s “care, protection,

training, and personal relationships.” R.C. 3127.15(A)(1)-(2). The rules outlined in R.C.

3127.15(A) are “the exclusive jurisdictional basis * * *” for an Ohio court to make a

child custody determination under the UCCJEA. R.C. 3127.15(B).

6. {¶ 13} Hignight claims that Hoffman filed the juvenile court custody case on

September 22, 2021. Hignight presented evidence in her complaint that she moved out of

Ohio in June 2021, several months before Hoffman filed her case. Thus, because the

children had not lived in Ohio for six consecutive months before September 22, 2021,

Ohio was not their home state at the time of filing. R.C. 3127.01(B)(7); R.C.

3127.15(A)(1). However, the children had lived in Ohio until June 2021, which was

“within six months before” filing, and were absent from the state, so jurisdiction is proper

here if “a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.” R.C.

3127.15(A)(1). Hignight does not live in Ohio, so the question becomes whether

Hoffman, who still lives here, is considered a “person acting as a parent.”

{¶ 14} The evidence in Hignight’s complaint shows that Hoffman is not the

children’s parent, claimed the right to legal custody of the children by filing her action in

the juvenile court, and did not have physical custody of the children at the time of filing.

R.C. 3127.01(B)(13). Although the complaint is not as clear on this point, the evidence

also tends to support a finding that Hoffman did not have physical custody of the children

for six consecutive months (inclusive of any temporary absences from the children) in the

year immediately before filing. Id. Specifically, Hignight said that she ended her

relationship with Hoffman in July of 2020—more than a year before filing—and that

Hoffman had only “sporadic and infrequent contact” with the children after that. If that is

7. the case, Hoffman would not qualify as a “person acting as a parent,” and the trial court

would not have jurisdiction under R.C. 3127.15(A)(1).

{¶ 15} It also appears that the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction under R.C.

3127.15(A)(2). At the time of filing, the children had lived in Michigan for

approximately three months, which was not long enough for Michigan to become the

children’s home state. R.C. 3127.01(B)(7). Thus, Michigan did not have home-state

jurisdiction under section (A)(1). But for jurisdiction to be proper in Ohio under section

(A)(2), the children and either Hignight or Hoffman must have a significant connection to

Ohio (beyond mere physical presence) and there must be substantial evidence of the

children’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships that is available in Ohio.

Hignight and Varga each said in her affidavit that Hignight and the children were living

in Michigan at the time of filing and that Hignight had taken actions indicating that the

move was permanent, such as enrolling the children in a Michigan daycare and buying a

house with Varga. Hignight included evidence of the children’s enrollment in a

Michigan daycare in June and July 2021, Hignight’s other child enrolling in a Michigan

school in August 2021, and Hignight’s agreement to sell her Toledo home in September

2021. This supports a finding that the children and Hignight have a significant

connection to Michigan, and the evidence required under (A)(2)(b) is located in

Michigan.

8. {¶ 16} Based on the potential lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the juvenile

court, we issue an alternative writ and order that Judge Knepp, within 14 days, either do

the act requested by Hignight in the petition or show cause why she is not required to do

so by filing an answer to Hignight’s petition pursuant to Civ.R. 8(B) or a motion to

dismiss Hignight’s petition pursuant to Civ.R. 12. Thereafter, this case shall proceed

pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.

{¶ 17} With respect to Hignight’s complaint for a writ of prohibition against the

juvenile court itself, however, we find the complaint not well-taken because the common

pleas court is not a proper party. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v.

Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 296 N.E.2d 544 (1973) (“A court is

defined to be a place in which justice is judicially administered. * * * Absent express

statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right.’’ (Internal

quotation omitted.)); State ex rel. Andrews v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 170

Ohio St.3d 354, 2022-Ohio-4189, 212 N.E.3d 914, ¶ 1, fn. 1 (“Because a court is not sui

juris and may not be sued in its own right, the court of common pleas is not a properly

named party in this case.”). Accordingly, we dismiss Hignight’s complaint as to the

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 18} Because the juvenile court is not a proper party, we dismiss Hignight’s

complaint against the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Judge

9. Knepp has 14 days from the date of this entry to either do the act requested by Hignight

in the petition or show cause why she is not required to do so by filing an answer to

Hignight’s petition pursuant to Civ.R. 8(B) or a motion to dismiss Hignight’s petition

pursuant to Civ.R. 12. Thereafter, this case shall proceed pursuant to the Ohio Rules of

Civil Procedure.

{¶ 19} Additionally, all proceedings in the underlying custody case, case No.

21286267, are hereby stayed pending the outcome of this action.

{¶ 20} To the clerk: Manner of service.

{¶ 21} The sheriff of Lucas County shall immediately serve, upon the respondent

by personal service, a copy of this alternative writ.

{¶ 22} The clerk is further directed to immediately serve upon all other parties a

copy of this alternative writ in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B).

{¶ 23} It is so ordered.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

10.