SHRUM, Judge.
The movant, Danny Wayne Hight, appeals from an order denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief following his guilty pleas on two counts of possession of a controlled substance. The movant claims the motion court erred when it failed to resentence him; in support, he presents two points on appeal.
First, the movant contends that he was improperly sentenced as a persistent offender under § 558.016, RSMo 1986, and as a prior, persistent, and class X offender under § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989, because the guilty plea court did not make “specific findings” of the factual basis for sentencing under those statutes. This claim of error has no merit.
Second, the movant contends that he was improperly sentenced under § 558.019, RSMo 1989, because that statutory provision applies only to repeat offenders convicted of class “A” and “B” felonies, whereas his guilty pleas were to class “C” felonies. The movant’s claim is correct, but resentencing is not required. Pursuant
to Rules 24.035(i)
and 84.14
we correct the judgment and sentence to eliminate application of § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989, to the movant’s sentences.
FACTS
On January 26, 1990, the movant pled guilty to two felony counts of possession of a schedule II controlled substance in violation of § 195.020 (now repealed), for offenses occurring December 4, 1988.
In each count, the state alleged that the mov-ant had three prior felony convictions and, as a result, was a prior, persistent, and class X offender subject to extended terms of imprisonment under §§ 558.016, RSMo 1986, and 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989. For convenience, applicable statutory provisions are set out marginally.
At the guilty plea hearing, the court twice read, in their entirety, the allegations in the information concerning the movant’s prior convictions. Following each reading, the movant said it was his intention, pursuant to the plea agreement, to plead guilty to each count, including the allegations concerning his prior convictions. The court then questioned the movant about the factual basis for both counts and about the
prior offenses.
The court asked the movant how he pled “to Count I ... including the prior offender allegation ...” and “to Count III ... together with the three prior, persistent, and class X offender allegations.... ” The movant answered “guilty” to each question.
The court stated at the guilty plea hearing that it found there was “a factual basis” for the movant’s guilty plea on each count “including the prior, persistent, and class X offender allegations.” The court sentenced the movant to two concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment, pursuant to the plea agreement. Both the docket sheet and the formal judgment and sentence state, “Court finds Defendant to be a prior, persistent and Class X offender.”
The movant filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion to set aside the convictions. In paragraph 8 of Form 40, he alleged these grounds:
(A) I was improperly sentenced as a persistent, & class X offender, absent adjudication of that fact at guilty plea hearing.
(B) I was improperly sentenced, under “the extended term procedures statute.”
The court appointed an attorney for the movant; the attorney filed an unverified amended motion alleging the same grounds for relief as did the pro se motion.
See Hight v. State,
813 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Mo. App.1991).
On June 29, 1990, the motion court conducted a hearing to determine if an eviden-tiary hearing was necessary on the motion for post-conviction relief. Following a review of the record, including the guilty plea hearing transcript, the motion court dismissed the motion and made these findings:
1. That this [movant] is indeed a persistent and class X offender.
2. That at the time of the Movant’s plea of guilty, this court held a complete and separate hearing to make and determine
the classification of Movant as a persistent offender and a class X offender,
3. That all things that were necessary to be done in completing the hearing to make determination of the Movant was done as required by
Scharnhorst v. State, 775
S.W.2d 241 (Mo.App.1989).
The movant appealed from that judgment claiming his post-conviction counsel abandoned him. We reversed and remanded, directing the motion court to determine if post-conviction counsel had complied with the requirements of Rule 24.035(e).
Hight,
813 S.W.2d at 370.
On remand, the motion court determined that the movant’s original post-conviction relief counsel had “effectively abandoned” him. The court appointed new counsel who filed a second amended Rule 24.035 motion that incorporated the allegations of the pro se and first amended motions and additionally alleged “there was never a valid adjudication of whether movant is a persistent or class X offender in that specific findings as to the basis of finding defendant a persistent or class X offender, as required by Section 558.021.1(3) and
State v. Thompson,
629 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.App.1981),
[approved subject to
629 S.W.2d 369 (Mo.banc 1982),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Missouri v. Kane,
459 U.S. 1193, 103 S.Ct. 1172, 75 L.Ed.2d 424 (1983),] were never made.”
On January 13, 1992, the motion court denied the second amended motion without an evidentiary hearing and issued amended findings of fact and conclusions in which it restated its June 1990 findings and added the particulars of the movant’s prior convictions as described
supra
note 5. The movant appeals from the judgment denying his second amended Rule 24.035 motion.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Specificity of Findings
In Point I the movant asserts that the motion court erred in dismissing his second amended Rule 24.035 motion without resen-tencing him because
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SHRUM, Judge.
The movant, Danny Wayne Hight, appeals from an order denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief following his guilty pleas on two counts of possession of a controlled substance. The movant claims the motion court erred when it failed to resentence him; in support, he presents two points on appeal.
First, the movant contends that he was improperly sentenced as a persistent offender under § 558.016, RSMo 1986, and as a prior, persistent, and class X offender under § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989, because the guilty plea court did not make “specific findings” of the factual basis for sentencing under those statutes. This claim of error has no merit.
Second, the movant contends that he was improperly sentenced under § 558.019, RSMo 1989, because that statutory provision applies only to repeat offenders convicted of class “A” and “B” felonies, whereas his guilty pleas were to class “C” felonies. The movant’s claim is correct, but resentencing is not required. Pursuant
to Rules 24.035(i)
and 84.14
we correct the judgment and sentence to eliminate application of § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989, to the movant’s sentences.
FACTS
On January 26, 1990, the movant pled guilty to two felony counts of possession of a schedule II controlled substance in violation of § 195.020 (now repealed), for offenses occurring December 4, 1988.
In each count, the state alleged that the mov-ant had three prior felony convictions and, as a result, was a prior, persistent, and class X offender subject to extended terms of imprisonment under §§ 558.016, RSMo 1986, and 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989. For convenience, applicable statutory provisions are set out marginally.
At the guilty plea hearing, the court twice read, in their entirety, the allegations in the information concerning the movant’s prior convictions. Following each reading, the movant said it was his intention, pursuant to the plea agreement, to plead guilty to each count, including the allegations concerning his prior convictions. The court then questioned the movant about the factual basis for both counts and about the
prior offenses.
The court asked the movant how he pled “to Count I ... including the prior offender allegation ...” and “to Count III ... together with the three prior, persistent, and class X offender allegations.... ” The movant answered “guilty” to each question.
The court stated at the guilty plea hearing that it found there was “a factual basis” for the movant’s guilty plea on each count “including the prior, persistent, and class X offender allegations.” The court sentenced the movant to two concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment, pursuant to the plea agreement. Both the docket sheet and the formal judgment and sentence state, “Court finds Defendant to be a prior, persistent and Class X offender.”
The movant filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion to set aside the convictions. In paragraph 8 of Form 40, he alleged these grounds:
(A) I was improperly sentenced as a persistent, & class X offender, absent adjudication of that fact at guilty plea hearing.
(B) I was improperly sentenced, under “the extended term procedures statute.”
The court appointed an attorney for the movant; the attorney filed an unverified amended motion alleging the same grounds for relief as did the pro se motion.
See Hight v. State,
813 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Mo. App.1991).
On June 29, 1990, the motion court conducted a hearing to determine if an eviden-tiary hearing was necessary on the motion for post-conviction relief. Following a review of the record, including the guilty plea hearing transcript, the motion court dismissed the motion and made these findings:
1. That this [movant] is indeed a persistent and class X offender.
2. That at the time of the Movant’s plea of guilty, this court held a complete and separate hearing to make and determine
the classification of Movant as a persistent offender and a class X offender,
3. That all things that were necessary to be done in completing the hearing to make determination of the Movant was done as required by
Scharnhorst v. State, 775
S.W.2d 241 (Mo.App.1989).
The movant appealed from that judgment claiming his post-conviction counsel abandoned him. We reversed and remanded, directing the motion court to determine if post-conviction counsel had complied with the requirements of Rule 24.035(e).
Hight,
813 S.W.2d at 370.
On remand, the motion court determined that the movant’s original post-conviction relief counsel had “effectively abandoned” him. The court appointed new counsel who filed a second amended Rule 24.035 motion that incorporated the allegations of the pro se and first amended motions and additionally alleged “there was never a valid adjudication of whether movant is a persistent or class X offender in that specific findings as to the basis of finding defendant a persistent or class X offender, as required by Section 558.021.1(3) and
State v. Thompson,
629 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.App.1981),
[approved subject to
629 S.W.2d 369 (Mo.banc 1982),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Missouri v. Kane,
459 U.S. 1193, 103 S.Ct. 1172, 75 L.Ed.2d 424 (1983),] were never made.”
On January 13, 1992, the motion court denied the second amended motion without an evidentiary hearing and issued amended findings of fact and conclusions in which it restated its June 1990 findings and added the particulars of the movant’s prior convictions as described
supra
note 5. The movant appeals from the judgment denying his second amended Rule 24.035 motion.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Specificity of Findings
In Point I the movant asserts that the motion court erred in dismissing his second amended Rule 24.035 motion without resen-tencing him because
the court’s original findings of fact and conclusions of law were deficient in that specific findings as to the basis of the court’s finding [the movant] a prior, persistent and class X offender were not made at the time of sentencing[;] thus [the movant] was improperly sentenced as a persistent offender to extended ranges of punishment, and improperly sentenced as a prior, persistent, and class X offender to serve an enhanced percentage of his sentences prior to eligibility for parole, and the court’s amended findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to correct the error because the findings alone do not constitute a resentencing of [the movant].
Citing
Thompson,
629 S.W.2d 361, the movant argues that on January 26, 1990, the date he was sentenced, the guilty plea court failed to make the findings of fact required by § 558.021.1(3) and, therefore, “there was no valid adjudication of extended terms under Section 558.016 [and] minimum prison term provisions under Section 558.019_” Absent such valid adjudication, “all [the movant] should be legally serving at this time is two seven year sentences, running concurrent....”
The version of § 558.021.1(3) applicable in
Thompson
was enacted in 1977 and effective January 1, 1979. It provided:
1. The court shall not impose an extended term under section 558.016 unless
(3) The court determines the existence of the basis for the extended term and makes specific findings to that effect. By a 1981 amendment the legislature revised § 558.021.1(3) to provide:
1. The court shall find the defendant to be a prior offender, persistent offender, or dangerous offender, if
(3) The court makes findings of fact that warrant a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by the court that the defendant is a prior offender, persistent offender, or dangerous offender.
In applying the then-applicable version of § 558.021.1(3), the
Thompson
court stated, “The statute contemplates that the [prior] convictions be found according to indictment, that the proof shall conform with the charge, and that
the findings describe the offenses which constitute the proof.”
629 S.W.2d at 369 (our emphasis). Under the present version of § 558.021.1(3), “so long as there is evidence to support findings of fact required to meet the present definition of persistent offender, the failure of the trial court to make specific findings has been labeled a ‘procedural deficiency....’ ”
State v. Barnard,
678 S.W.2d 448, 453 (Mo.App.1984) (quoting
State v. Bryant,
658 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Mo.App.1983)).
In the case now before us, the guilty plea court formally arraigned the movant on Counts I and III, twice reading to him the allegations in the information about his prior convictions. The court then questioned the movant about the particulars of each prior conviction, and the mov-ant admitted they were true. The court stated there was “a factual basis” not only for the movant’s guilty pleas on Counts I and III, but also on “the prior, persistent, and class X offender allegations.” In both a docket sheet entry and the formal judgment and sentence, the guilty plea court stated its finding that the movant was “a prior, persistent and Class X offender.”
We find apropos this passage from
State v. Greathouse,
694 S.W.2d 903 (Mo.App. 1985):
In the case before us, the findings could have been more specific, but the concern for due process is focused upon the existence of independent evidence sufficient to support the enhancement of the defendant’s sentence and not upon the particularity of the trial court’s finding. The trial court’s finding is sufficient to show it relied on the evidence.
Id.
at 911[18].
Having concluded the guilty plea court's oral finding on the record and the expression of its finding in the docket sheet entry and the judgment and sentence satisfy the requirements of § 558.021.1(3), RSMo 1986, we turn briefly to the evidence to see if it supports the finding.
See Barnard,
678 S.W.2d at 453. The movant admitted that the allegations of the three prior felony convictions were true. Such admissions are sufficient. § 558.021.5, RSMo 1986;
Kelly v. State,
623 S.W.2d 65, 68[4,5] (Mo. App.1981).
The movant’s reliance on
Scharnhorst,
775 S.W.2d 241, is misplaced. In
Scharn-horst,
“[t]he guilty plea court made no determination or entry that Scharnhorst was a persistent offender, nor findings of fact upon which the adjudgment rests.”
Id.
at 243. In contrast, here the guilty plea court stated it determination not only orally, but also in a docket sheet entry and in the judgment and sentence that the movant was a persistent offender; the court stated on the record that a factual basis existed for the movant’s admissions concerning the three prior convictions; and the record supports the court’s finding about the mov-ant’s persistent offender status. Point I is denied.
Nonapplicability of § 558.019 to Class C Felonies
In Point II the movant challenges his sentencing under § 558.019, RSMo Supp. 1989, which requires him to serve minimum prison terms. Section 558.019, RSMo Supp. 1989, pertinent portions of which are set out
supra
note 4, does not apply to class C felonies, the class of felonies to which the movant pled guilty. To the extent that the judgment purports to apply § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989, to the movant’s sen
tences, it is illegal. In its brief, the state concedes the inapplicability of § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989.
It was the obligation of the motion court to correct the judgment and sentence. Rule 24.035(i). However, resentencing is not required because the two 15-year terms were permitted by § 558.016.6(3), RSMo 1986, and were unaffected by the guilty plea court’s error in applying § 558.-019, RSMo Supp.1989. Therefore, under Rule 84.14, we dispose finally of the case.
We correct the judgment and sentence in State v. Danny Wayne Hight, Case No. 389CF1485, Greene County Circuit Court, by ordering § 558.019, RSMo Supp.1989, to be inapplicable. The judgment of the guilty plea court and the sentencing of the movant as a persistent offender under § 558.016, RSMo 1986, is unaffected by this opinion.
As corrected, the judgment is affirmed.
PARRISH, C.J., and CROW, P.J., concur.