Higgins v. Blessing Hospital

2024 IL App (4th) 231531, 251 N.E.3d 1013

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-1531
• Status: Published

Opinion

2024 IL App (4th) 231531 FILED September 12, 2024 NO. 4-23-1531 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

CARRIE HIGGINS, as Administrator of the Estate of ) Appeal from the Jazmin Malson, Deceased, ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Adams County v. ) No. 22LA22 BLESSING HOSPITAL, an Illinois Not-For-Profit ) Corporation; BLESSING HEALTH SYSTEM, an ) Honorable Assumed Name of Blessing Corporate Services, Inc., an ) Scott D. Larson, Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; MARK BAKER, ) Judge Presiding. M.D.; AMJAD MUSLEH, M.D.; MUHAMMAD ) FARAZ MASOOD, M.D.; and THE WASHINGTON ) UNIVERSITY, a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation, ) Defendants ) ) (Amjad Musleh, M.D., Muhammad Faraz Masood, M.D., ) and The Washington University, a Missouri Nonprofit ) Corporation, ) Defendants-Appellees). )

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Steigmann and Vancil concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION ¶1 In July 2022, plaintiff, Carrie Higgins, a representative of the estate of Jazmin

Malson, deceased, filed her initial complaint against defendants Blessing Hospital, Blessing

Health System, Dr. Mark Baker, Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Dr. Amjad Musleh, and Dr. Muhammad Masood. Plaintiff subsequently served defendant the Washington University with an

amended version of the complaint in October 2022. Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood moved to

dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction or for failure to state a cause of

action. See 735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-615 (West 2022). Washington University filed a motion to

dismiss on similar grounds. After a hearing, the circuit court granted their combined motions to

dismiss. Plaintiff appeals.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. The Underlying Events

¶4 On September 22, 2020, Malson went to Blessing Hospital in Quincy, Illinois,

complaining of headaches; pain in her back, chest, and shoulder; and vision problems. Dr. Baker,

Malson’s attending physician, determined she would require extracorporeal membrane

oxygenation (ECMO). Dr. Baker sought to transfer Malson to Barnes-Jewish Hospital in St.

Louis, Missouri, due to its advanced ECMO capabilities. During the transfer process, Dr. Baker

conducted several phone calls with Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood, who were the on-call physicians

at Barnes-Jewish Hospital. Barnes did not have a bed immediately available, so Dr. Baker asked

for input regarding how to stabilize Malson until a bed became available. Dr. Musleh suggested

giving her esmolol, and Dr. Baker did so. After the esmolol was administered, Malson went into

cardiac arrest, and Dr. Baker subsequently stopped the administration. Malson was transferred to

Barnes-Jewish Hospital on September 22, 2020, where she died the following day.

¶5 On July 21, 2022, plaintiff filed her first complaint in Adams County against

Blessing Hospital, Blessing Health System, Dr. Baker, Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Dr. Musleh, and

Dr. Masood. The complaint alleged Malson’s death resulted from the advice Dr. Baker received

-2- from Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood to administer esmolol. Plaintiff subsequently sought leave to

file an amended complaint adding Washington University as a defendant.

¶6 Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood moved to dismiss all claims against them for lack of

jurisdiction, or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim. See 735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-615 (West

2022). Soon after, Washington University filed a combined motion to dismiss counts III and IV

of the amended complaint on similar grounds. See 735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-615(a) (West 2022).

¶7 B. Dr. Musleh

¶8 Dr. Musleh is an emergency medicine and critical care physician employed by

Washington University. He lives in Missouri and maintains his professional office there. He is

licensed to practice medicine in Illinois, but he does not advertise himself as actively practicing

there. He has practiced in Illinois just once. He did not provide care to patients in Illinois at any

point from September 2020, when plaintiff’s claim arose, through October 2022, when he was

served with the initial complaint. Dr. Musleh has never been to Blessing Hospital, and he does

not have clinical privileges there. The phone calls at issue in this case constituted Dr. Musleh’s

only interactions with a physician or nurse regarding a patient at Blessing Hospital.

¶9 C. Dr. Masood

¶ 10 Dr. Masood is a cardiothoracic surgeon employed by Washington University. He

lives in Missouri and maintains his professional office there. He provided backup cardiothoracic

surgical coverage at Blessing Hospital on two occasions pursuant to a lease agreement between

Washington University and Blessing Hospital. During those instances, Blessing Hospital billed

the patients or any third-party payors for Dr. Masood’s services, not Washington University, and

Blessing Hospital paid his travel and lodging costs. During the underlying events, Dr. Masood

was in Missouri and not on lease to Blessing Hospital.

-3- ¶ 11 D. Washington University

¶ 12 Washington University is a corporation “created by, organized and existing under

the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri,” and it maintains its principal place of

business in Missouri. It conducts approximately 98% of its business in Missouri. It does not

operate any healthcare facilities in Illinois, nor does it see or treat patients there. Washington

University maintains an agreement under which it will occasionally lease cardiothoracic

surgeons to Blessing Hospital. However, Washington University had only sent cardiothoracic

surgeons to Blessing Hospital on four occasions, all of which occurred in 2021, and no such

surgeon provided care to Malson while she was in Blessing Hospital during the events at issue.

During the relevant times, Blessing Hospital billed, collected, and retained payment from the

patients and third-party payors, and it paid Washington University a per diem for backup

cardiothoracic surgical coverage. Washington University did not bill any patients or third-party

payors for the services provided by the employees it leased to Blessing Hospital. Malson did not

receive any care from a Washington University employee when she was in Illinois.

¶ 13 Washington University Physicians in Illinois (WUPI) is an Illinois not-for-profit

organization affiliated with Washington University that provides services exclusively in Illinois.

WUPI physicians are full-time faculty members of the Washington University School of

Medicine. Neither Dr. Musleh nor Dr. Masood was acting as a WUPI employee during the

relevant times, and plaintiff did not name WUPI as a defendant or raise any claims against it.

¶ 14 E. The Motion to Dismiss

¶ 15 On May 2, 2023, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the combined motion to

dismiss. Defendants argued Illinois lacked general jurisdiction over Washington University

because it is organized in Missouri and its principal place of business is in Missouri. Specifically,

-4- defendants contended WUPI was a separate corporation, its actions are not attributable to

Washington University, the university’s leasing agreements in Illinois were not sufficient

contacts because they represented a small portion of its revenue, and its recruitment of Illinois

students did not grant Illinois general jurisdiction over it. Plaintiff conceded she was abandoning

the argument Illinois had general jurisdiction over Dr. Musleh or Dr. Masood.

¶ 16 Defendants also argued Illinois lacked specific jurisdiction over Washington

University, Dr. Musleh, and Dr. Masood, citing Allen v. Missouri Baptist Medical Center, 2022

IL App (5th) 210263, to assert “an out-of-state healthcare provider’s representation [of] expertise

resulting in patient referrals cannot be enough to establish specific jurisdiction.” Defendants

asserted Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood did not avail themselves of the benefits or protections of the

law of Illinois and neither did Washington University by extension, such that Illinois did not

have specific jurisdiction over them.

¶ 17 Plaintiff insisted contacts between defendants and Illinois during the underlying

events granted Illinois specific jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff argued it was not unfair to expect

Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood—and their employer, Washington University—to defend their

actions in Illinois after providing medical advice that was carried out in Illinois. Plaintiff asserted

the phone calls were “clearly done directly for patient care” and contended Dr. Baker would not

have administered esmolol if Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood did not tell him to do so. Additionally,

plaintiff argued Washington University was subject to general jurisdiction in Illinois because it

“extensively and repeatedly” provided medical care in Illinois and advertised to attract students

from Illinois and because WUPI was a “wholly owned subsidiary” that makes the university

“millions of dollars.”

-5- ¶ 18 On October 30, 2023, the circuit court entered a written order granting

defendants’ respective motions to dismiss counts III and IV of the first amended complaint,

finding it lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Musleh, Dr. Masood, and Washington University. It

asserted “the issue before the court is whether communicating with Dr. Baker over the telephone

gives Illinois specific jurisdiction over the Missouri doctors.” In its order, the court made the

following findings:

“Here, the court finds that Drs. Musleh and Masood were on call and therefore

were the recipients of a call placed by Dr. Mark Baker seeking a transfer of his

patient. Drs. Musleh and Masood did not initiate or procure the phone call in any

manner. The doctors were not specifically requested by Dr. Baker. There was no

prior relationship between the doctors. The Missouri doctors had no prior

relationship with the Illinois patient. Dr. Baker was the patient’s treating

physician seeking information on a difficult case and preparing the patient for

transfer. Simply communicating via phone with Dr. Baker in Illinois does not give

the Missouri doctors fair warning that the informational phone call could be used

as the basis to hale the doctors into court in Illinois. [Citation.] Dr. Baker was

under no order or requirement to implement any advice or recommendations

provided during the phone call(s). A finding by this court that specific jurisdiction

would attach to the out of state doctors under these facts would violate

defendants’ due process rights.”

The court also found it did not have general jurisdiction over Washington University.

-6- ¶ 19 On November 29, 2023, the circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion requesting a

Rule 304(a) finding, determining no just reason existed to delay plaintiff’s appeal from the

dismissal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. March 8, 2016).

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in granting the combined motion

to dismiss, contending the court had specific personal jurisdiction over defendants because,

inter alia, plaintiff’s claims arose from defendants’ contacts with Illinois or, alternatively,

Washington University made Illinois its second home, thereby submitting itself to general

personal jurisdiction here. We disagree.

¶ 23 “Before an Illinois court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,

that court must ensure its exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unterreiner v. Pernikoff, 2011 IL

App (5th) 110006, ¶ 5, 961 N.E.2d 1. A circuit court must consider the following:

“(1) whether the nonresident defendant had ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum

State such that it had ‘fair warning’ that it may be required to defend there;

(2) whether the action arose out of or relate[d] to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum; and (3) whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the

forum State.” Culligan International Co. v. Wallace, Ross, & Sims, 273 Ill. App.

3d 230, 231, 650 N.E. 565, 567 (1995).

“It is settled that the plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie basis to exercise personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Russell v. SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 28, 987 N.E.2d

778. When the court bases its personal jurisdiction determination solely on documentary

-7- evidence, without an evidentiary hearing, we review the decision de novo. Unterreiner, 2011 IL

App (5th) 110006, ¶ 5.

¶ 24 The Illinois long-arm statute authorizes Illinois courts to exercise personal

jurisdiction over nonresident defendants “on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the

Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West

2022). Under this provision, “the issue is whether a nonresident defendant’s contacts with

Illinois are sufficient to satisfy federal and Illinois due process standards.” Solomon v. Center for

Comprehensive Services, Inc., 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 38, 217 N.E.3d 1079.

¶ 25 “The ‘minimum contacts’ required for personal jurisdiction differ depending upon

whether general jurisdiction or special jurisdiction is asserted.” Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th)

210391, ¶ 39. General jurisdiction is considered “all-purpose,” and it exists when a nonresident

defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “so continuous and systematic” they render him

“essentially at home” in the forum state. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon, 2023 IL

App (5th) 210391, ¶ 40. “Specific jurisdiction is case-specific,” and it exists when a “cause of

action arises out of or relates to a defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 41. Where a defendant “has purposely

directed his activities at the forum’s residents and the cause of action arose out of or related to

those activities,” the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 41. “There must be some act by which the

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 41. The purposeful availment requirement “protects a

nonresident defendant from being brought into a jurisdiction based on random or attenuated

-8- contacts or the unilateral activity of another person.” Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 41.

Whether “sufficient minimum contacts” exist for the exercise of personal jurisdiction “depends

upon the facts of each case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th)

110006, ¶ 5.

¶ 26 A. Specific Jurisdiction

¶ 27 First, we address plaintiff’s claim the circuit court had specific personal

jurisdiction over Dr. Musleh, Dr. Masood, and Washington University. Plaintiff argues the cause

of action arose directly out of Dr. Musleh’s and Dr. Masood’s contacts with Illinois, which are

attributable to their employer Washington University, and therefore personal jurisdiction existed.

Plaintiff contends Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood “directed their activities at Illinois” and those

activities gave rise to the issues raised in the amended complaint. Below we review several of the

cases cited by the parties.

¶ 28 1. Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C.

¶ 29 In Kostal, the plaintiff was an Illinois resident who visited her physician in

Illinois. Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., 357 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383, 827

N.E.2d 1031 (2005). The plaintiff’s physician obtained tissue samples from her and sent those

samples to the defendants, who were doctors working at a pathological laboratory incorporated

in Michigan. Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 383. The laboratory operated on a national basis,

providing expert diagnostic analysis by mail. Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 383. The defendants

processed and analyzed the samples in Michigan, drafted reports in Michigan, and sent the

reports to the plaintiff’s physician in Illinois. Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 383. The plaintiff filed

suit, alleging those reports were inaccurate and she suffered severe and permanent physical

injury as a result of the defendants’ negligence. Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 383. On appeal, the

-9- reviewing court emphasized the defendants “accepted a pathology sample of a patient,

subsequently sent a diagnostic report to the physician in the forum state, and knew that the report

would be the basis of further treatment in the forum state.” Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 397-98.

Based on the quality and nature of the defendants’ actions relating to Illinois, and the interests

affected by those actions, the reviewing court found personal jurisdiction over the defendants

existed. Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 398.

¶ 30 2. Allen v. Missouri Baptist Medical Center

¶ 31 In Allen, the plaintiff filed suit against a medical center located in Missouri on

behalf of a decedent who was an Illinois resident. Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶¶ 3-4.

During the underlying events, an Illinois physician performed surgery on the decedent, who

subsequently developed further complications. Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 4. The Illinois

physician contacted a Missouri physician with practicing privileges at the defendant medical

center and arranged for the patient’s transfer to the defendant medical center. Allen, 2022 IL App

(5th) 210263, ¶ 4. On appeal, plaintiff argued personal jurisdiction existed because the defendant

medical center “ ‘purposely directs its activities to Illinois facilities and patients, and it agreed to

a request by the Illinois defendants to accept [the decedent] as a patient.’ ” Allen, 2022 IL App

(5th) 210263, ¶ 5. The plaintiff also alleged the defendant medical center “ ‘was engaged in the

business of providing medical care and accepting referrals of patients in Madison County,

Illinois[,] by and through its officers, *** employees[,] and representatives’ ” during all relevant

times. Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 5. The reviewing court found Illinois did not have

personal jurisdiction over the defendant medical center because the alleged tortious conduct

occurred in Missouri, the plaintiff put forth no evidence the medical center induced the decedent

to leave Illinois to come to Missouri, and there was no evidence the medical center induced the

- 10 - attending Illinois physician to refer the decedent there. Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 26.

Based on this, the reviewing court found “the subsequent alleged medical negligence of a health

care provider, without more, does not ‘arise out of’ the acceptance of the transfer of patient.”

Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 26.

¶ 32 The reviewing court in Allen rejected the implication that the medical center’s

alleged routine acceptance of patients from Illinois, on its own, provided a basis for specific

jurisdiction. Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 27. While the court noted “the number of

patients a health care facility sees would be evidence of business activity within a state,” it

emphasized “the acceptance of other individuals unrelated to the lawsuit is not relevant unless it

demonstrates activity that would be directed at Illinois residents or the injured party or that the

defendant is availing itself of Illinois laws or protections.” Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263,

¶ 27. The court observed “the relationship between [the defendant medical center] and [the

decedent] began with an unsolicited and unilateral phone call from [the decedent’s] Illinois

physician to [the defendant medical center].” Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 27. The court

concluded

“[w]hile it is true that [the defendant medical center] accepted an Illinois resident

as a patient, it did so at its Missouri facility. This is simply not a case of [the

defendant medical center] doing anything that might be construed as availing

itself of the benefits or protections of Illinois laws.” Allen, 2022 IL App (5th)

210263, ¶ 27.

¶ 33 Further, the Allen court distinguished Kostal, highlighting that, in Kostal, “the

plaintiff did not travel out of the State of Illinois to receive medical care and *** [the] defendants

purposefully directed activities to Illinois through their mail-based diagnostic services.” Allen,

- 11 - 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 28 (citing Kostal, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 397-98). Conversely, in Allen,

the decedent “physically traveled to Missouri for medical treatment,” the defendant medical

center did not render treatment in Illinois, the defendant medical center did not have an ongoing

relationship with the referring Illinois physician, and “[t]he only contact with Illinois is [the

defendant medical center’s] acceptance of the transfer of an Illinois resident to its facility.” Allen,

2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 29. The Allen court determined “the mere fact that the reputation

and expertise of an institution lead to referrals from out of state cannot be enough to establish

specific jurisdiction.” Allen, 2022 IL App (5th) 210263, ¶ 29.

¶ 34 3. Solomon v. Center for Comprehensive Service, Inc.

¶ 35 In Solomon, the defendant physician at issue was licensed in Indiana, his medical

office was in Indiana, and his contacts with the plaintiff took place in his office. Solomon, 2023

IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 42. The physician “did not target advertising to Illinois residents or

otherwise promote their business in Illinois.” Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 42. The

reviewing court noted the defendant physician did not have a business relationship with the

primary Illinois-based defendant medical organization, he did not refer the plaintiff to that

organization, he did not consult with that organization’s employees, and he did not treat plaintiff

while she was at that organization’s facility. Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 43. Based on

this, the reviewing court found the plaintiff “did not establish that [the defendant physician and

his employer] purposefully directed their activities toward Illinois residents and that the cause of

action arose out [of] those activities” and therefore the circuit court lacked specific personal

jurisdiction. Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 44.

¶ 36 4. Clemens v. Greenberg

- 12 - ¶ 37 In Clemens, the plaintiff was an Illinois resident, while the defendant physician at

issue and his employer were based in Wisconsin. Clemens v. Greenberg, 2022 IL App (1st)

201129, ¶¶ 1, 7, 224 N.E.3d 762. The physician argued the Illinois circuit court lacked personal

jurisdiction over him because he provided care to the plaintiff exclusively in Wisconsin, he did

not practice in Illinois, he was not licensed to practice medicine in Illinois, he “did not have a

significant number of Illinois patients compared to his Wisconsin patient population,” and he

neither advertised his services in Illinois nor solicited business in Illinois from Illinois residents.

Clemens, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129, ¶ 4. On May 9, 2017, the defendant physician received a

phone call from an Illinois-based physician who was treating the plaintiff. Clemens, 2022 IL App

(1st) 201129, ¶ 14. During the “ ‘brief’ ” call, which lasted “ ‘maybe a couple minute[s],’ ” the

defendant learned the plaintiff was in the emergency room, and he received an update on the

plaintiff’s status. Clemens, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129, ¶ 14. The defendant did not receive

enough information to provide a consultation, he was not asked to review any records, and he did

not request additional information. Clemens, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129, ¶ 14.

¶ 38 On appeal, the reviewing court determined the phone call was the only connection

between the defendant physician and the plaintiff’s cause of action, and it fell “well short of a

substantial connection with Illinois.” Clemens, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129, ¶ 40. The court

described the defendant’s participation as “extremely limited,” and it noted he “did not provide

any input into the treatment plan.” Clemens, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129, ¶ 40. Accordingly, the

court found the defendant “did not have sufficient minimum contacts for an Illinois court to

exercise personal jurisdiction.” Clemens, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129, ¶ 40.

¶ 39 5. Unterreiner v. Pernikoff

- 13 - ¶ 40 In Unterreiner, the plaintiffs were Illinois residents, while the defendant physician

was a Missouri resident. Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3. The defendant was

licensed to practice in Missouri but not Illinois. Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3. The

defendant never advertised for clients in Illinois, nor did he own or lease any real or personal

property in Illinois. Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3. The defendant treated one of

the plaintiffs in Missouri. Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3. In September 2008, one

of defendant’s employees called the patient’s home and left a voice message conveying her test

results. Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3. The patient returned the call and was

instructed to take more medication before returning to the defendant’s office a month later.

Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3. Before the patient’s return appointment, she

suffered a stroke, which resulted in serious injuries. Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3.

The plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendant in Illinois, alleging negligent care. Unterreiner,

2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 3.

¶ 41 On appeal, the reviewing court found no personal jurisdiction, noting the

defendant physician was licensed to practice only in Missouri, his office was in Missouri, he

never advertised for clients in Illinois, and the plaintiffs “unilaterally sought out the defendants

and traveled to Missouri to receive treatment.” Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 9. The

court asserted

“[a]lthough it is true *** that the defendants could have required [the plaintiff] to

visit their office in Missouri to receive the advice to adjust her [medication]

levels, we do not believe the fact that the defendants chose to so advise her, in a

solitary phone call, can be equated with the defendants having ‘voluntarily

invoked the protections and benefits of the laws of the [S]tate’ of Illinois. See,

- 14 - e.g., Muffo v. Forsyth, 37 Ill. App. 3d 6, 9 (1976).” Unterreiner, 2011 IL App

(5th) 110006, ¶ 9.

The court described the defendant physician’s contact with Illinois as “far too attenuated and

fortuitous to support jurisdiction.” Unterreiner, 2011 IL App (5th) 110006, ¶ 9.

¶ 42 6. This Case

¶ 43 Based on the foregoing body of caselaw and the principles therein, the circuit

court properly found it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants. Both Dr. Musleh and Dr.

Masood live in Missouri and maintain their professional offices there. Neither physician owns or

leases any real or personal property in Illinois. Neither advertises themselves as actively

practicing medicine in Illinois. Neither physician ordered any medication to be administered to

Malson while she was in Illinois. Their only connection to Illinois relating to the cause of action

was phone calls with Dr. Baker, Malson’s attending physician at Blessing Hospital, to coordinate

Malson’s transfer to Barnes-Jewish Hospital for ECMO treatment. When the doctors learned it

would be several hours before Barnes-Jewish Hospital could receive Malson, Dr. Baker asked

for advice on how to stabilize Malson while they waited for a bed to become available. The

advice provided by Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood was focused solely on facilitating Malson’s

transfer. Neither Dr. Musleh nor Dr. Masood initiated these phone calls, nor did any other

employee of Washington University. We cannot say that, by offering suggestions aimed at

stabilizing Malson in anticipation of transferring her to Barnes-Jewish Hospital for further

treatment, Dr. Musleh and Dr. Masood—and by extension their employer, Washington

University—purposely availed themselves of the of the benefits and protections of the laws of

Illinois. See Solomon, 2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 41.

- 15 - ¶ 44 In so holding, we reiterate our findings in Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial

Hospital, 277 Ill. App. 3d 80, 660 N.E.2d 235 (1996). There, an attending pediatrician conducted

a phone conversation with another physician, during which the former shared the patient’s

condition and the events precipitating the patient’s hospital admittance, and the latter asked

clarifying questions before suggesting a specific diagnostic procedure. Reynolds, 277 Ill. App. 3d

at 81-83. We held the phone conversation did not create a physician-patient relationship between

the patient and the nonattending physician. Reynolds, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 86. We observed that

finding a physician-patient relationship under those circumstances would “have a chilling effect

upon the practice of medicine” and “stifle communication, education[,] and professional

association *** to the detriment of the patient.” Reynolds, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 86. We concluded

such a ruling would likely curb or eliminate informal conferences between physicians, which

“would inhibit the exchange of information and expertise among physicians and would not

benefit the medical profession or persons seeking treatment.” Reynolds, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 86-

87. The same is true here. To find Illinois has specific personal jurisdiction over defendants

would be to punish physicians, and their employers by extension, for assisting in a patient’s

transfer to their facility for specialized treatment. Such a finding might motivate a healthcare

provider to cease making its physicians available via teleconference to other jurisdictions’

facilities to avoid risking liability there. As in Reynolds, we refuse to inhibit the exchange of

information and expertise between physicians to the detriment of patients seeking treatment and

the medical profession writ large. See Reynolds, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 86-87.

¶ 45 B. General Jurisdiction

¶ 46 Plaintiff also argues Illinois has general jurisdiction over Washington University

because its “substantial contacts with Illinois make it essentially at home” here. Plaintiff

- 16 - contends the university’s “continuous, systematic, and substantial contacts with Illinois make

Illinois its chosen second home.” Plaintiff argues Washington University “has repeatedly taken

steps to make itself at home in Illinois” by “continuously providing healthcare services

throughout Illinois” and “specifically target[ing]” Illinois residents to attend the university.

Plaintiff also contends WUPI’s connections to Illinois are attributable to Washington University

for jurisdictional purposes.

¶ 47 For a court to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, that

corporation’s contacts in the foreign state must be more than “continuous and systematic”—

those contacts must render the corporation “essentially at home in the forum State.” (Emphasis in

original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate

Warehousing, Inc., 2017 IL 121281, ¶ 16, 90 N.E.3d 440. A corporation is “essentially at home”

in its place of incorporation and its principal place of business. Aspen American Insurance Co.,

2017 IL 121281, ¶ 17. In certain exceptional cases, such as when a corporation is forced to

relocate temporarily due to extreme circumstances, the new location acts as a “surrogate for the

place of incorporation or head office.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aspen American

Insurance Co., 2017 IL 121281, ¶ 17 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 130 n.8

(2014)); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952). Because

Washington University is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Missouri,

plaintiff must show the university’s “contacts with Illinois are so substantial as to render this an

exceptional case” to prevail in his argument the exercise of general jurisdiction over Washington

University is appropriate. See Aspen American Insurance Co., 2017 IL 121281, ¶ 18. Plaintiff

fails to do so.

- 17 - ¶ 48 While Washington University does occasionally lease some of its physicians to

Illinois healthcare facilities, this is not a sufficient basis for general jurisdiction. In Campbell v.

Acme Insulations, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 173051, ¶¶ 15-17, 105 N.E.3d 984, the reviewing

court found no general jurisdiction, even though the foreign corporation’s revenue stemming

from its Illinois operations exceeded $1 billion. In so holding, the reviewing court emphasized

“[t]he record before us reflects that approximately 2% of [the corporation’s] income *** is

generated in Illinois and only approximately 2.4% of its United States workforce is employed in

Illinois.” Campbell, 2018 IL App (1st) 173051, ¶ 15. Similarly, the record here establishes

Washington University conducts approximately 98% or more of its business in Missouri,

meaning the university conducts approximately 2%, or less, of its business in Illinois. Further,

unlike the corporation in Campbell, Washington University does not operate any facilities in

Illinois, and it does not bill patients or their insurers for the medical care provided by its

physicians when they are leased to Illinois healthcare facilities.

¶ 49 Likewise, Washington University’s recruitment of Illinois residents to become

students also does not establish general jurisdiction. Plaintiff presents no authority supporting the

conclusion that recruiting students from another state subjects an entity to general jurisdiction in

that state. “[A]dvertising, or the mere solicitation of customers, is insufficient to establish general

jurisdiction.” Bolger v. Nautica International, Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951-52, 861 N.E.2d

666, 670 (2007); see Forrester v. Seven Seventeen HB St. Louis Redevelopment Corp., 336 Ill.

App. 3d 572, 579-81, 784 N.E.2d 834, 838-40 (2002) (finding Illinois did not have general

jurisdiction over a hotel located in Missouri despite the hotel’s advertisement efforts to attract

business from Illinois residents); cf. Adams v. Harrah’s Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App.

3d 745, 748-49, 789 N.E.2d 436, 440-41 (2003) (finding general jurisdiction existed where

- 18 - approximately one-third of the defendant hotel’s gold card holders were Illinois residents,

defendant targeted its advertising efforts toward Illinois, and defendant advertised a free shuttle

service from a city in Illinois). Washington University’s recruitment of Illinois residents does not

provide a basis for general jurisdiction in Illinois.

¶ 50 Finally, plaintiff insists Washington University’s contacts with Illinois via WUPI

are “extensive” but provides no support for the conclusion that WUPI’s actions are attributable to

Washington University for jurisdictional purposes. Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges Washington

University and WUPI are separate corporate entities. “If the nonresident defendant is a parent

corporation of a local subsidiary, Illinois courts cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the

nonresident parent corporation simply because they have personal jurisdiction over the local

subsidiary.” Morecambe Maritime, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, S.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d 707,

711, 821 N.E.2d 780, 784 (2004). Rather, general jurisdiction is permissible “[i]f the subsidiary

is effectively only doing business for the parent corporation.” Morecambe Maritime, Inc., 354 Ill.

App. 3d at 711. Factors to consider include:

“(1) [T]he control exercised by the parent over the subsidiary, (2) obligations of

the subsidiary to service the parent’s products, (3) inclusion of the subsidiary’s

name and address in the parent’s advertising, (4) joint sponsorship of promotional

activities, (5) interlocking directorships, (6) the sites of meeting[s] of the

subsidiary’s board of directors, and (7) whether the subsidiary is authorized to

prosecute trademark infringement suits in the parent’s name.” Wissmiller v.

Lincoln Trail Motosports, Inc., 195 Ill. App. 3d 399, 403, 552 N.E.2d 295, 299

(1990).

- 19 - ¶ 51 Plaintiff presents no evidence showing WUPI is effectively only doing

Washington University’s business. See Morecambe Maritime, Inc., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 711.

Instead, plaintiff broadly alleges Washington University is “in direct control” of WUPI and uses

WUPI to provide medical services in Illinois. Plaintiff also alleged WUPI accounts for a

“significant portion” of Washington University’s economic activity. These vague allegations fail

to illuminate, inter alia, how much, if any, control Washington University exercises over WUPI,

what WUPI’s obligations are to Washington University, or whether Washington University

includes WUPI’s information in its advertising. See Wissmiller, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 403. Thus,

plaintiff has not made the necessary showing to establish the circuit court could exercise general

jurisdiction over Washington University because of WUPI’s contacts with Illinois. See Solomon,

2023 IL App (5th) 210391, ¶ 37 (“A plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie basis for

exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”).

¶ 52 For these reasons, the circuit court did not err when it found it lacked jurisdiction

over defendants and granted their combined motions to dismiss counts III and IV.

¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 55 Affirmed.

- 20 - Higgins v. Blessing Hospital, 2024 IL App (4th) 231531

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County, No. 22-LA- 22; the Hon. Scott D. Larson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Matthew L. Turner and John M. Malone, of Sommers Schwartz, for P.C., of Southfield, Michigan, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Timothy J. Gearin, Maureen O. Bryan, and Nicolas P. Cejas, of for Armstrong Teasdale LLP, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellees. Appellee:

- 21 -