Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co. v. Fredman Bros. Furniture Co.

330 F. Supp. 978, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11916
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedAugust 24, 1971
DocketCiv. A. No. P-3170
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 330 F. Supp. 978 (Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co. v. Fredman Bros. Furniture Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co. v. Fredman Bros. Furniture Co., 330 F. Supp. 978, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11916 (S.D. Ill. 1971).

Opinion

[979]*979OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT D. MORGAN, District Judge.

This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. By its motion, plaintiff requests that claim 3 of United States Letters Patent No. 3,118,151 be declared invalid, and that claim 4 of said patent be held not infringed by plaintiff’s accused product. Both defendants subsequently moved for a stay of all proceedings in the case to allow defendant Harry Fred-man to obtain a reissue of his patent. At the hearing July 1, 1971 on said motions, the motion for stay was amended to specify until September 1, 1971, and on August 11, 1971, a new motion for stay was filed asking that action be withheld until September 21, 1971, on which date reissue is expected.

This court has jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338 and 2201.

The court has had the benefit of scholarly briefs, and after careful consideration of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the authorities cited, it is the decision of this court that the motion for summary judgment on the invalidity of claim 3 should be granted, and that it must be denied on the asserted non-infringement of claim 4. It is further the determination of this court that the motion for a stay of proceedings should be denied.

Due to other court business, the motion for stay of proceedings has become almost moot, but intentional delay does not appear justified and, accordingly, such motion should be denied.

Defendants assert in support of their motion to stay that defendant Harry Fredman is seeking to obtain an expedited reissue of the patent in suit and that the issues to be litigated may be altered substantially. The purpose of the motion for stay is to allow Fredman to obtain reissue and to permit him to substitute the granted reissue letters patent for the original letters patent involved in this ease. Thereby it is asserted that judicial economy would be achieved through a full adjudication of all the issues between the parties in this one law suit.

The affidavit of defendants’ counsel states that Fredman filed his application for reissue on June 7, 1971, under title 35 U.S.C. § 251. It further states that in the reapplication, claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 were carried over, claim 3’s scope was narrowed, and claims 6, 7 and 8 were new claims added. Subsequent affidavits of defendant’s counsel show that all eight reissue claims have been allowed by the patent examiner and that the patent will reissue on September 21, 1971. Upon reissue, defendants assert that the court will be faced not only with deciding the infringement and validity of claim 4 of the patent in suit, but also infringement and validity of reissue claims 3, 6, 7 and 8.

This court fails to see how the issues before it will be significantly simplified, or how judicial economy will be promoted, by delay of decision on the issues now joined. After reissue and substitution, this court would still be charged with the duty of determining whether plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of infringement of claim 4 of the patent. With claim 4 of the patent in suit the same as claim 4 of the reissue patent, the question with regard to summary judgment on the non-infringement of claim 4 will not be changed.

Furthermore, it is not clear at all that the court will have to decide the questions of infringement and validity of reissue claims 3, 6, 7 and 8 if and when the court does allow the substitution of the reissue patent for the patent in suit. It is apparent from the record that there will be a prior question regarding any intervening rights that plaintiff may have acquired under 35 U.S.C. § 252. Decision on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment therefore should not be stayed.

The sole question to be answered on the motion for summary judgment is whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, [980]*980* * * show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

It is undisputed that United States Letters Patent No. 3,118,151 (hereinafter “the patent”) was issued on January 21, 1964 to defendant Harry Fredman, and has been owned by him continuously since issue. Also undisputed is that defendant Fredman Brothers Furniture Company, Inc. has been and is authorized by defendant Harry Fredman to market and sell devices under the patent. It has been marketing and selling bed rails purported conforming to the patent under the trade name of “Glideaway Bed Firming Rails” since 1962.

The patent is entitled “One-Piece Belt-Type Bedding Carrier,” and the alleged invention is described as follows.

The patented device is an arrangement in which one-piece metallic bed rails with an interconnecting belt or strap locks the bedding, securely retaining the spring frame on the bed rails and rigidifying the bed to provide a single interlocked assembly. The one-piece bed rails of the patent have a right angular construction with the horizontal flange flared downwardly at each end into a platelike vertical end portion. The vertical end portion is capable of resiliently flexing laterally and may be more easily flexed laterally than the portion of the rail having an angular cross-sectional configuration. While the width of spring assemblies has been standardized at 52% inches, the distance between the headboards and footboards will vary considerably from this standard. The flexing of the platelike vertical end portion may be as much as one inch, and thus the end portions of the bed rails may accommodate headboards having variations of two inches more than or less than the standard width of the spring assemblies. With this manner and degree of flexing at the end portions, the horizontal flange of the rail of the patent in suit constantly supports the spring assembly throughout its length, and the vertical flanges of the side rails are held snug against the bedding throughout a major portion of the rail. The cross-member is of a predetermined length and should be such that the distance between the vertical flanges of the two side rails is equal to the width of the bed spring assembly with which the cross-member is to be used.

The plaintiff contends that claim 3 of the Fredman patent1 is invalid by application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. In Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 56 S.Ct. 645, 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), the Court held that a determination of patent invalidity is not res judicata against the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant. In the recent decision of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971), however, the Court overruled Triplett to the extent that it had foreclosed “a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid.”

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330 F. Supp. 978, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11916, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hickory-springs-manufacturing-co-v-fredman-bros-furniture-co-ilsd-1971.