Hiatt v. . Ritter

25 S.E.2d 756, 223 N.C. 262, 1943 N.C. LEXIS 252

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: June 2, 1943
• Status: Published

Opinion

DeNNY, J.

The only question presented.on the record is whether or not his Honor erred in refusing to grant defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit.

The defendant’s exception to his Honor’s ruling poses this question: Was the defendant negligent in the construction or maintenance of the slide, as alleged in the complaint? We do not think so. “The proprietor of a bathing establishment owes to bis customers a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition; but. be does not insure the safety of bis patrons against accident; and bis duty to patrons is satisfied when be uses reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition for their proper use by the patrons. Rom v. Huber (1919), 93 N. J. L., 360, 108 Atl., 361, affirmed in (1920) 94 N. J. L., 258, 109 Atl., 504.” 22 A. L. R., pp. 635-6.

In 26 R. C. L., p. 721, sec. 20, we find the law stated as follows: “Where a party maintains a bath bouse or a diving or swimming place for the use of the public for hire, and negligently permits any portion of the same or its appurtenances, whether in the bouse or of the depth of the water or in the condition of the bottom or in things thereon, to be in an unsafe condition for its use in the manner in which it is apparently designed to be used, a duty imposed by law is thereby violated; and if an injury to another proximately results from the proper use of the same without contributory negligence, a recovery of compensatory damages may be bad.”

And in 62 C. J., p. 865, sec. 48, it is said: “The proprietor -of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances, and amusement devices are safe for the purposes for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that be does not contract against unknown defects not discovered by ordinary or reasonable means.”

These authorities are in ’accord with the law approved by our own Court in Smith v. Agricultural Society, 163 N. C., 346, 79 S. E., 632, quoting from 38 Oye., 368, as follows: “The owner of a place of entertainment is charged with an affirmative, positive obligation to know that the premises are safe for the public use, and to furnish adequate appliances for the prevention of injuries which might be anticipated from the nature of the performance, and be impliedly warrants the premises to be reasonably safe for the purpose for which they are designed.”

In the instant case the plaintiff used the slide board a number of times, be knew that such a device bad to be firmly supported by braces. He testified: “It was an ordinary slide board like all swimming pools. I went up it sliding down several times and played around under it.” At the point where plaintiff jumped into the water the brace was plainly visible for a distance of two feet between the board and the surface of the water. He and a friend bad been sitting near the end of the board with their feet banging down the side. They bad been engaged in conversation. Upon bearing someone climbing the ladder at the other end of the slide, they elected not to get off at the end of the board, in the usual and customary manner, where sand bad been placed on the bottom of the pool for the protection of patrons, but instead they elected to jump off of the side of said board, and plaintiff was injured.

An amusement device, however simple, may be dangerous if not used in the manner in which it is apparently designed to be used. It is clear, we think, that the plaintiff herein used the slide board in an unusual and unexpected manner. “Injuries, resulting from events taking place without one’s foresight or expectation, or an event which proceeds from an unknown cause or is an unusual effect of a known cause and therefore not expected, must be borne by the unfortunate sufferer.” Martin v. Mfg. Co., 128 N. C., 264, 38 S. E., 816; and in Osborne v. Coal Co., 207 N. C., 545, 177 S. E., 769, this Court said: “The law only requires reasonable foresight, and when the injury complained of is not reasonably foreseeable, in the exercise of due care, the party whose conduct is under investigation is not answerable therefor. Foreseeable injury is a requisite of proximate cause, and proximate cause is a requisite for actionable negligence, and actionable negligence is a requisite for recovery in an action for personal injury negligently inflicted.” Also in Brady v. B.B., 222 N. C., 367, 23 S. E. (2d), 334, this Court quoted with approval from Stone v. R. R., 171 Mass., 536, 41 L. R. A., 794, as follows: “One is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens and what is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him bound in like manner to guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen or what, as it is sometimes said, is only remotely and slightly probable.”

The judgment of the Court below is

Reversed.