Hew Corp. v. Tandy Corp.

480 F. Supp. 758, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8427
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 21, 1979
DocketCiv. A. 73-2654-F
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 480 F. Supp. 758 (Hew Corp. v. Tandy Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hew Corp. v. Tandy Corp., 480 F. Supp. 758, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8427 (D. Mass. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

FREEDMAN, District Judge.

This case is presently before the Court on the substitute application of Harold Brown and Brown, Prifti, Leighton & Cohen for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. Petitioners seek a total award of $571,098.60 1 *760 for services rendered and expenses incurred in connection with the litigation and the ultimate settlement of this antitrust action. After having considered the memoranda, affidavits and exhibits proffered by the parties in light of the pertinent authorities, I have decided that an award of $351,666.23 represents fair and just compensation for petitioners’ fees and disbursements. 2

The complaint commencing this civil action, alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, was filed on August 9,1973. Plaintiffs averred that defendant Tandy Corporation (“Tandy”) conspired with its own subsidiaries and divisions to fix prices for Radio Shack merchandise. This activity, which plaintiffs contend had both vertical and horizontal aspects, was alleged to have occurred in contravention of a franchise agreement provision authorizing each franchisee to determine its own retail prices. The complaint charged further that Tandy conspired to illegally restrict the alienability of plaintiffs’ franchises. Both injunctive relief and treble damages were requested.

In its counterclaim, Tandy asserted that plaintiffs had conspired in violation of antitrust laws. The case was certified as a class action on August 12, 1974. On January 16,1979 this Court approved an amended stipulation of settlement; the matter of attorneys’ fees remaining outstanding. On July 16, 1979 an evidentiary hearing, at which all interested parties were given an opportunity to be heard, was held on the application for fees. The application was taken under advisement as of July 30,1979.

Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P. contains no provision concerning an award of attorneys’ fees in class action litigation. Moreover, section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 3 which does speak to the fees issue, is applicable where a case ends in a judgment on the merits for the plaintiff, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation, 495 F.2d 448, 468-9 (2d Cir. 1974), thus it is of little assistance where a compromise settlement has been struck. Any award of attorneys’ fees here, therefore, must be a product of this Court’s exercise of its equitable power to “make fair and just allowances for expenses and counsel fees” from a class fund 4 to those whose efforts have benefitted the fund. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881). The purpose of such an award in this case then, would be to compensate the attorneys for the reasonable value of their services which benefitted the class by establishing, preserving or protecting the fund. See Grinnell, supra at 470, quoting Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation, 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3rd Cir. 1973) (“Lindy I”).

While it is well-settled that what will constitute a reasonable attorney’s fee in a particular case shall rest within the sound discretion of the Court, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974), it is nevertheless true that fee awards must be “made with moderation and a jealous regard for the rights of those who are interested in the fund.” Trustees v. Greenough, supra, 105 U.S. at 536, 26 L.Ed. 1157. In any event, this Court has a mandate to avoid awarding any amount that would constitute a “windfall fee” for the attorneys and, likewise, must avoid even the appearance of having done so. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell, supra, 495 F.2d at 469.

Recognizing then, that a court’s role in equity is to establish a reasonable and just *761 fee award so as to compensate petitioners for services and expenditures that have benefitted the class fund, this Court must determine what has been referred to as the “lodestar” figure. In order to establish this lodestar amount, the Court must initially study petitioners’ time sheets in order to calculate the number of hours reasonably worked during the case. Having arrived at this figure, the Court must then seek to place a value on those hours. See Grinnell, supra at 470-1.

This Circuit has adopted twelve factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra, as the criteria to be considered by a court seeking to award attorney’s fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended. King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1st Cir. 1977). Although the matter presently before this Court is not directly on point with King in that an award here would be pursuant to the equitable fund doctrine, the Johnson factors nevertheless facilitate the attempt to place a value on time expended by the attorneys.

1) Time Expended

Petitioners have provided time records which I find to have satisfied the strictures set forth in King v. Greenblatt, supra. However, this Court would be remiss in its duty if it were merely to “rubber stamp” the time charged. The hours worked must be evaluated in light of this Court’s experience; time should not be valued at a uniform rate. Rather, work that is more ministerial or clerical than it is legal should be compensated at a lower rate than that which is purely legal. Furthermore, hours charged that do not benefit the fund in any way should not be compensated at all.

With regard to this petition, I have carefully studied the time charged in relation to the time and labor reasonably required for the litigation and settlement of this case. I have determined that Harold Brown should be compensated for 1,773.10 hours of work, 5 1,493.35 hours of which should be assessed at the full value of his hourly rate. Of the remaining time, 229.05 hours should be valued at a lower rate because they represent general labor; work that was in large part ministerial or clerical. An additional 48.70 hours should be valued at a lower rate because they represent work done after the compromise settlement was approved by this Court. Mr. Brown should receive no compensation for 42.60 hours.

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480 F. Supp. 758, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hew-corp-v-tandy-corp-mad-1979.