OPINION
DALLY Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder. The punishment is death.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred: in overruling his motion for continuance, in overruling his motion to attach absent vemre members, m permitting an incompetent witness to testify, in allowing the State to question the incompetent witness by asking her leading questions, and in refusing to submit the third punishment issue of Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. to the jury. Also, the appellant complains of six instances of allegedly improper jury selection.
The appellant was convicted for the murder of Oscar Martin Frayre. The evidence establishes that in the early morning hours of June 20, 1980, the appellant entered a closed gas station in El Paso and robbed and fatally shot Frayre, a mechanic at the gas station. Frayre, who had been staying overnight in the quarters provided for him in- the back of the gas station, was shot three times. Lucila Sanchez, a friend of the appellant, was present outside the gas station during the commission of the offense and she testified against the appellant at trial. The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.
The appellant first complains of the overruling of his motion for continuance. The motion urged that appointed counsel had not been given enough time to investigate and prepare for trial. The granting or denial of a motion for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and reversal of a judgment is justified only when it is shown the trial court has abused its discretion. Corley v. State, 582 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ashabranner v. State, 557 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Nelson v. State, 505 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Bryant v. State, 423 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).
The record in the present case shows that other counsel had been first appointed to represent the appellant, but on August 15, 1980, the two attorneys who tried the case and who now represent the appellant on appeal were appointed. The case was set for trial on September 8,1980. Although this is a relatively short time for preparation in a case where the State is seeking the death penalty, no specific, serious matter has been raised by the appellant [400]*400and the record does not otherwise show that the appellant’s defense was prejudiced by counsel not having more time to prepare for trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action. Furthermore, since the appellant himself did not want a continuance he did not sign the motion for continuance as required by Art. 29.08, V.A.C.C.P., and for this reason nothing is presented for review. Kemner v. State, 589 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Zanders v. State, 515 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ikner v. State, 468 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
Complaint is next made that the appellant’s motion to attach absent veniremen was erroneously overruled. In Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), it was said:
“Appellant relies upon Article 35.01, Y.A.C.C.P., to support his claim that the court erred in refusing his motion for attachments to issue against absent prospective jurors who had been summoned and not properly excused from jury duty. The statute is directory, not mandatory, and any failure of the court to observe a literal compliance will not constitute reversible error in the absence of a showing of injury.”
The appellant in the instant case has failed to show any injury resulting from the trial court’s action in overruling the motion. This ground of error is therefore overruled. See Stephenson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Dent v. State, 504 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Moreno v. State, 587 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
In his next two grounds of error, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting Lucila Sanchez, who he says was an incompetent witness, to testify and in permitting the State to ask her leading questions over objection.
The record discloses that Lucila Sanchez was 24 years old and a high school graduate of 1975; she attended special education classes in high school. It is apparent from the record that it was difficult for her to articulate in English certain responses to questions and that many questions had to be rephrased before she understood them. Nevertheless, she answered all the questions, her answers were understandable, and her answers reflect an ability to observe intelligently the events in question.
The issue of a witness’ competency is a question for the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown by a review of the entire record, including the witness’ trial testimony. Watson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Clark v. State, 558 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Provost v. State, 514 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Melton v. State, 442 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). We conclude from a review of Lucila Sanchez’s trial testimony that the, court did not abuse its discretion in permitting her to testify.
Complaint is also made of the trial court’s action in permitting the State to ask Lucila Sanchez certain leading questions over the appellant’s objections. This was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless a defendant can show that he was unduly prejudiced by virtue of such questions, no reversal of his conviction will result. Navajar v. State, 496 S.W.2d 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Ortega v. State, 493 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Uhl v. State, 479 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Linton v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 213, 346 S.W.2d 320 (1961). As one of the exceptions to the rule excluding leading questions, it has been said that leading questions may be permitted when the witness has difficulty in understanding the English language. See Ray, Texas Evidence, Sec. 578 at 534 (3d ed. 1980).
The record in the instant case discloses that Lucila Sanchez had difficulty in understanding certain questions and in articulating certain responses in the English language. In some instances, the court’s interpreter was used. In other instances, leading questions were allowed. We find no error in the court’s actions, especially since substantially the same testimony, elicited through leading questions, was obtained from Lucila Sanchez in response to ques[401]*401tions by the appellant’s counsel on cross-examination; the appellant was not prejudiced by virtue of the leading questions. See Ortego v. State, supra; Davis v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 617, 272 S.W. 480 (1925); Dave Lehr, Inc. v. Brown, 58 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1933).
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OPINION
DALLY Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder. The punishment is death.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred: in overruling his motion for continuance, in overruling his motion to attach absent vemre members, m permitting an incompetent witness to testify, in allowing the State to question the incompetent witness by asking her leading questions, and in refusing to submit the third punishment issue of Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. to the jury. Also, the appellant complains of six instances of allegedly improper jury selection.
The appellant was convicted for the murder of Oscar Martin Frayre. The evidence establishes that in the early morning hours of June 20, 1980, the appellant entered a closed gas station in El Paso and robbed and fatally shot Frayre, a mechanic at the gas station. Frayre, who had been staying overnight in the quarters provided for him in- the back of the gas station, was shot three times. Lucila Sanchez, a friend of the appellant, was present outside the gas station during the commission of the offense and she testified against the appellant at trial. The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.
The appellant first complains of the overruling of his motion for continuance. The motion urged that appointed counsel had not been given enough time to investigate and prepare for trial. The granting or denial of a motion for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and reversal of a judgment is justified only when it is shown the trial court has abused its discretion. Corley v. State, 582 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ashabranner v. State, 557 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Nelson v. State, 505 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Bryant v. State, 423 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).
The record in the present case shows that other counsel had been first appointed to represent the appellant, but on August 15, 1980, the two attorneys who tried the case and who now represent the appellant on appeal were appointed. The case was set for trial on September 8,1980. Although this is a relatively short time for preparation in a case where the State is seeking the death penalty, no specific, serious matter has been raised by the appellant [400]*400and the record does not otherwise show that the appellant’s defense was prejudiced by counsel not having more time to prepare for trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action. Furthermore, since the appellant himself did not want a continuance he did not sign the motion for continuance as required by Art. 29.08, V.A.C.C.P., and for this reason nothing is presented for review. Kemner v. State, 589 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Zanders v. State, 515 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ikner v. State, 468 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
Complaint is next made that the appellant’s motion to attach absent veniremen was erroneously overruled. In Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), it was said:
“Appellant relies upon Article 35.01, Y.A.C.C.P., to support his claim that the court erred in refusing his motion for attachments to issue against absent prospective jurors who had been summoned and not properly excused from jury duty. The statute is directory, not mandatory, and any failure of the court to observe a literal compliance will not constitute reversible error in the absence of a showing of injury.”
The appellant in the instant case has failed to show any injury resulting from the trial court’s action in overruling the motion. This ground of error is therefore overruled. See Stephenson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Dent v. State, 504 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Moreno v. State, 587 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
In his next two grounds of error, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting Lucila Sanchez, who he says was an incompetent witness, to testify and in permitting the State to ask her leading questions over objection.
The record discloses that Lucila Sanchez was 24 years old and a high school graduate of 1975; she attended special education classes in high school. It is apparent from the record that it was difficult for her to articulate in English certain responses to questions and that many questions had to be rephrased before she understood them. Nevertheless, she answered all the questions, her answers were understandable, and her answers reflect an ability to observe intelligently the events in question.
The issue of a witness’ competency is a question for the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown by a review of the entire record, including the witness’ trial testimony. Watson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Clark v. State, 558 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Provost v. State, 514 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Melton v. State, 442 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). We conclude from a review of Lucila Sanchez’s trial testimony that the, court did not abuse its discretion in permitting her to testify.
Complaint is also made of the trial court’s action in permitting the State to ask Lucila Sanchez certain leading questions over the appellant’s objections. This was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless a defendant can show that he was unduly prejudiced by virtue of such questions, no reversal of his conviction will result. Navajar v. State, 496 S.W.2d 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Ortega v. State, 493 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Uhl v. State, 479 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Linton v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 213, 346 S.W.2d 320 (1961). As one of the exceptions to the rule excluding leading questions, it has been said that leading questions may be permitted when the witness has difficulty in understanding the English language. See Ray, Texas Evidence, Sec. 578 at 534 (3d ed. 1980).
The record in the instant case discloses that Lucila Sanchez had difficulty in understanding certain questions and in articulating certain responses in the English language. In some instances, the court’s interpreter was used. In other instances, leading questions were allowed. We find no error in the court’s actions, especially since substantially the same testimony, elicited through leading questions, was obtained from Lucila Sanchez in response to ques[401]*401tions by the appellant’s counsel on cross-examination; the appellant was not prejudiced by virtue of the leading questions. See Ortego v. State, supra; Davis v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 617, 272 S.W. 480 (1925); Dave Lehr, Inc. v. Brown, 58 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1933).
The appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing his request to submit the third punishment issue to the jury. Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., provides that at the punishment stage of a capital murder trial and upon conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, “the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
“(1)
“(2) ....
“(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.” [Emphasis added.]
In urging that the third punishment issue was raised by the evidence, the appellant in his brief says, “The evidence to which we make reference in the instant case is testimony that appears in several places in the Statement of Facts to the effect that sounds of a fierce struggle were heard from inside the filling station a moment before the shots were heard. Voices raised in argument were also heard, according to the testimony of Lucila Tercero Sanchez. It is reasonable to draw the inference from this that the decedent was putting up some kind of resistance to whatever was being done to him, and this before he was fatally injured, or injured at all.”
According to the appellant’s brief, “sounds of a fierce struggle were heard from inside the filling station a moment before the shots were heard.” The appellant, however, does not cite us to any evidence in the record to support his contention. Our review of the record discloses that other than loud voices, the only “sounds” heard coming from inside the gas station were sounds of tools falling on concrete. This is not evidence of a fierce struggle. And although the evidence supports the appellant’s contention that Lucila Sanchez heard the appellant and Frayre exchanging words in a tone of voice that sounded as if they were arguing, the only words she could discern were the appellant saying, “Paso el dinero," and Frayre responding, “No tengo dinero yo.” When asked for the English translation, the court’s interpreter stated that “paso el dine-ro” meant “pass the money or hand over the money” and “no tengo dinero yo” meant “I do not have any money.”
In order to raise the issue of provocation, it is necessary that there be evidence of the deceased’s conduct just pri- or to his death; also, that evidence must be sufficient to be considered provocation. The loud voices heard by Lucila Sanchez in this case together with the sounds of tools falling on concrete are not evidence of Frayre’s conduct; they do not show that Frayre may have provoked the appellant to kill him. Therefore we are unable to conclude from our review of the record that the evidence raises the issue of provocation; we also decline the appellant’s invitation to infer “that the decedent was putting up some kind of resistance to whatever was being done to him.” See and compare Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Moreover, at the punishment stage of the trial the appellant did not present any evidence in an attempt to raise the issue of provocation. The appellant, against the advice of his own counsel, testified, but he did so only to request that the jury sentence him to death.
The appellant next complains of six instances of allegedly improper jury selection. In the first of these instances the appellant urges that the trial court erred by excusing venireman Chavez over the appellant’s objection. This 59 year old venireman stated that he had a sick mind, pneumonia, and heart trouble, and that he was on medication. Chavez further expressed doubt about his physical ability to serve on the jury. The trial court excused Chavez on its own motion. ■
A trial court should not on its own motion excuse a venire member on [402]*402grounds which do not show an absolute disqualification. See Art. 35.19, V.A.C.C.P.; Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Valore v. State, 545 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Chavez would have been subject to a challenge for cause under Art. 35.16(a)(4), V.A.C.C.P., on the ground that he had “such bodily or mental defect or disease as to render him unfit for jury service.... ” The appellant has not shown how he was harmed by the exclusion of Chavez nor has he established that he was tried by a jury to which he had a legitimate objection. Esquivel v. State, supra; Bodde v. State, supra; Valore v. State, supra; Henriksen v. State, 500 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Furthermore, that the trial court excused Chavez on its own motion when he was not challenged for cause by the State is not an issue in this case since the appellant did not object on this ground. See Bodde v. State, supra; Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Chavez. See and compare Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Bodde v. State, supra.
Next, the appellant complains that venireman Jose A. Gomez was erroneously excluded for cause over the appellant’s objection. This venireman showed that he would not consider the entire range of punishment provided by law; therefore, he was subject to challenge for cause under Art. 35.16(b)(3), V.A.C.C.P., on the ground that he had “a bias or prejudice against [a] phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.”
During voir dire examination by the prosecutor, venireman Gomez expressed his bias against the minimum punishment for the lesser included offense of murder and unequivocally stated that he was unable to consider such punishment in a murder case. The State challenged Gomez for cause. Thereafter, the appellant’s counsel sought to rehabilitate Gomez by demonstrating the wide range of fact situations that may fall within the murder statute. The trial court then intervened to ask:
“THE COURT: Now, Mr. Gomez, again I am not criticizing you. You told us two different things. You told the District Attorney you couldn’t conceive of a murder case where you felt like five years punishment was in order; do you recall saying that?
“A. Yes, Ido.
“THE COURT: Now, you told the defense attorney you could conceive of one where you felt five years would be in order; which is it please?
“A. If I can say something. He said to think of a certain case. What if it’s self-defense?
“THE COURT: If it’s self-defense, you wouldn’t find the man guilty.
“A. They could have been fighting or something.
“THE COURT: Again, I will ask you as everybody else has, and we are entitled to know whether you could consider the full range of punishment for the offense of murder which starts at a low of five years and goes on up to a possible ninety-nine years or life. That’s the range of punishment. Is that understood, Mr. Gomez?
“A. Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Well, could you conceive of a case, I’ll ask you again, where your conscience would permit you to consider five years as punishment for murder?
“A. No.
“THE COURT: All right. You are disqualified. You will be excused. You are excused, sir.
“[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: For the record, may we have an objection to that, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Sure.”
We find no error in the trial court’s exclusion of Gomez; his answers certainly reflect a bias against the minimum punishment. See Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Further[403]*403more, the appellant has not shown that he was tried by a jury to which he had a legitimate objection. See Henriksen v. State, supra.
In four grounds of error, the appellant also complains that the trial court erred by excluding venire members Michael Knapp, Virginia Gonzales, Charlotte Smith and Frances Bradley “on grounds of inability to consider imposition of the death sentence.” This case was tried after the decision of the Supreme Court in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); our review consists of determining whether any of the venire member’s exclusions were inconsistent with Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).
The appellant first complains of the trial court’s action in excusing venireman Knapp. When the prosecutor asked Knapp whether he could think of any case in which he could consider sentencing another human being to death, Knapp answered in the negative and added that nothing would change his mind. The prosecutor then challenged Knapp under Witherspoon. Thereafter, counsel for the appellant attempted to rehabilitate Knapp but Knapp never equivocated in his opposition to the imposition of the death penalty; he continued to answer that he would never sentence another human being to death. We find that Knapp’s exclusion was consistent with Witherspoon. Compare Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); O’Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
The appellant next directs our attention to the examination of venire members Gonzales, Smith and Bradley. We will set out the pertinent portion of each of these examinations.
During voir dire examination by the prosecutor, Virginia Gonzales was asked:
“Q. Is your opposition to the death penalty so strong inside of you that no matter what the facts were in any kind of criminal case, no matter how horrible the facts might be, because you feel the way you do, you could never vote in such a way that another person would receive the death penalty; is that what you are telling me?
“A. That’s true.
“THE COURT: Speak up loudly.
“A. Yes, Your Honor.
“Q. So, no matter what the crime is, you could never vote for the death penalty because that’s the way you feel?
“A. That’s true.
“Q. No matter what the evidence, you have to vote against the death because of the way you feel inside?
“A. That’s true.
“Q. There is nothing I can say to change your mind, is that correct?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. And there is nothing the Defense lawyers can say to change your mind?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. And there is nothing that the Judge can say to change your mind, is that correct?
“A. That’s correct.
“[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, ma’am. I challenge under Wither-spoon, Your Honor.”
In subsequent questioning by the appellant’s counsel, Gonzales seemed to equivocate, leading the trial court to ask:
“THE COURT: Let me ask you again so we can get it definite. Are there some cases in which your conscience would permit you to vote for the death penalty?
“A. I don’t know.
“THE COURT: Ma’am.
“A. I don’t know. I am confused. I am very confused.
“THE COURT: Well, I don’t think what I am asking you is very confusing, now, is it? Are there some situations that would enable you to conscientiously vote for the death penalty; do you understand what I am asking?
“A. Yes, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: How do you answer?
[404]*404“A. No.
“Q. You can’t conceive of any? You can’t think of anything that would permit you conscientiously to vote for the death penalty?
“A. No, sir.”
Continued questioning by the court seemed to confuse Gonzales and the court thereafter asked the following series of questions:
“THE COURT: I’m going to ask you again. Try to understand me because it is really not too difficult. You know what the death penalty is?
“A. Yes, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Now, we are here today, we are trying to get jurors, that’s what you are doing here to sit on this case. They have to be fair and impartial both to the State and to the Defendant. Now, it is possible that in this case, the death penalty could be assessed. So, we are asking you, Mr. Weiser, Mr. Lovelace, and myself, how you feel about the death penalty? That’s what we are asking. Okay. Now, are you following me so far?
“A. Yes, uh-huh.
“THE COURT: Now, you told Mr. Weiser before and I’m going to ask you again, are you opposed to the death penalty as a punishment for crime?
“A. Well, at the time I didn’t understand. I didn’t understand.
“THE COURT: I don’t care what you understood at the time. You answer me now, please.
“A. If he did something wrong, yes.
“THE COURT: If what?
“A. What I meant was if he did something wrong, of course, he has to be punished for what he did.
“THE COURT: I guess we would all agree with that. I’ll get back to the question again. Do you think that Virginia Gonzalez, that’s you, isn’t it?
“A. Yes.
“THE COURT: Could you ever vote to send a man to his death?
“A. No, I don’t think so.
“THE COURT: This juror will be excused under the doctrine of Wither-spoon. You have your objection and exception. Thank you, ma’am. You will be excused.”
Venire member Charlotte Smith was at first equivocal in stating her position on capital punishment. She did not know whether she could consider the death penalty under the appropriate facts. The prosecutor then explained the procedure followed under Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., and towards the end of the voir dire examination asked Smith:
“Q. Are you telling me then no matter what the instructions were from the Court, your feelings inside — you have a right to disagree with the law. Because we live here, we have the right to disagree with the law. Are you telling me your feelings inside would say to you no matter what the facts are I hear in this case or in a case of capital murder, I would either have to answer one of those questions no or refuse to answer the question because I don’t want the person to be executed? If that’s the way you feel, that’s fine. If you don’t feel that way, then tell me.
“A. I don’t know. I don’t know how to answer you.
“THE COURT: Well, Mrs. Smith, let me ask you this: You have told us you have a deep feeling against the death penalty?
“A. That’s right.
“THE COURT: Isn’t that what you said?
“A. Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. Let me make it simple. Could you ever sit on a jury and vote in such a way that a man would be executed?
“A. I don’t think so.
“THE COURT: All right.
“Q. When you say I don’t think so, you mean you could not do that, is that correct?
“A. That’s right.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I pass on Wither-spoon and challenge on that point.”
[405]*405Further examination of Smith by the appellant’s counsel reveals the following:
“Q. Mrs. Smith, can you think of no crime that is so damaging to society or to the individual against whom it is done that the person who did it should die for it?
“A. No, I don’t think I do.
“Q. No crime.
“A. No.
“Q. Not even to someone’s children or someone who is very helpless and dear to someone else, babies?
“A. Well, that depends if somebody is sick and do something like that, you know what I am saying?
“Q. Mentally ill?
“A. Mentally ill, mentally sick, then it isn’t right but then there is an excuse.
“Q. But suppose someone were not mentally ill or at least not in the sense the law deals with that subject, or just is sane as a dollar, just really nasty, just a really bad person, but not mentally ill and does some really horrible thing?
“A. Well, if there is no help for anybody anymore, I guess the law has to do something about it.
“THE COURT: Let me interrupt you here. You told us several times you are so against the death penalty you could not vote for it?
“A. Yes, that’s right.
“THE COURT: Now, which is it? Is that what your feeling is?
“A. That’s what my feeling is. If somebody proved to me that somebody would do it over again, then I am really not sure of myself.
“THE COURT: I don’t understand what you are talking about now. Are you so against the death penalty that you could not vote to send a man to death under any circumstances? How do you feel about that.
“A. Under any circumstances?
“THE COURT: That’s what I asked you before.
“A. I just don’t feel it is my place to put anybody to death.
“THE COURT: You will be excused, ma’am. Thank you very much.”
Like Smith, venire member Frances Bradley was at first equivocal in her answers concerning capital punishment, leading the trial court to ask:
“THE COURT: Are there some circumstances or can you conceive of some cases in which your conscience would permit you to vote for the death penalty?
“A. No, I don’t think so. I will be honest with you. I don’t think I could.
“THE COURT: We are not being critical of any attitude you may have but we do have to know this.
“A. The only way I could see a death penalty was if it was a child or minor that couldn’t protect themselves or it was caused — they intended to do it, you know what I mean?
“THE COURT: In our State, you couldn’t hardly find a person guilty of murder unless you found that they intentionally committed the act. That’s part of the very definition of murder. Well, now, at the risk of repeating myself and boring you, do you think of any case or any situation grave enough in your mind which would permit you, Mrs. Bradley, to vote for the death penalty?
“A. No, I don’t think so.
“THE COURT: Now, are you firm in that answer, ma’am?
“A. I guess, yes.”
In subsequent questioning by the appellant’s counsel, Bradley seemed to again equivocate. The trial court then asked:
“THE COURT: You told us about three different things, now, which is understandable but not very helpful.
“A. I just don’t think, to tell you the truth, I would be very good on a murder trial.
“THE COURT: We are trying to find out one little thing. We want to know if Frances Bradley could sit on that jury or a jury and work together with eleven other jurors in any case she [406]*406might conceive and write a death penalty that would spell finish to some old boy. Now, can you do it or can’t you?
“A. No, I don’t think I can. I don’t think I would be good on a jury.
“THE COURT: It’s not whether you would be good or not.
“A. I don’t think I can make the decision.
“THE COURT: Whether you can or could not?
“A. I don’t think I can.”
A continued examination by the appellant’s counsel further reveals the following:
“Q. I am not suggesting it is an easy decision. I am not suggesting that the proponents and opponents of the death penalty don’t have a good argument. They do, I think, but in as far as the way you are, you say in the case of a grave crime that offends you very much such as child killing, intentional child killing or any other intentional planned, done type killing, are you telling us you are not sure that you can or that you cannot?
“A. Well, I would say that I don’t believe I could make the decision for a person’s death.
“Q. Which means not sure?
“A. That’s right.
“THE COURT: Which means to me I’m going to excuse you. Thank you, Mrs. Bradley. You will be excused.”
This Court has previously recognized the troublesome area of the “equivocating venireman,” and we have held that Witherspoon, supra, does not require specific formalized answers. Brandon v. State, supra; Villarreal v. State, supra; White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). See also Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Granviel v. State, supra. With only a “cold” record before us, it is difficult to say in many instances whether certain venire members are unequivocally committed to vote against imposition of the death penalty. Certainly the trial judge, who is present to hear the tone of voice and observe the demeanor of the- venire members as they answer questions, is better situated to determine whether a particular venire member is in fact unequivocally committed to vote against imposition of the death penalty. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we should not disturb the trial court’s ruling, especially if at the very least, serious doubt is cast on the ability of a venire member to be a fair and impartial juror. Villarreal v. State, supra; Granviel v. State, supra; Tezeno v. State, supra.
Reiterating what was said in White v. State, supra, about the troublesome area of the “equivocating venireman,” we adhere to the following statement from Tezeno v. State, supra:
“We cannot believe that Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, requires certain formal answers and none other. We surely feel that the test of Witherspoon is ‘not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.’
“We are aware of a large number of death penalty cases which have recently been reversed in memorandum opinions by the United States Supreme Court3 [Footnote 3 citing cases omitted]. While it is difficult, if not impossible to synthesize a rule from those opinions, we have concluded that the voir dire in the instant case and answers of the veniremen are more unequivocal than those which were set forth in the cases which have been reversed.”
After a careful consideration of the record before us, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to exclude Gonzales, Smith and Bradley from the jury was consistent with Witherspoon; their answers reflect that each would have been unable to serve as fair and impartial jurors consistent with Witherspoon. See and compare Villarreal v. State, supra; Granviel v. State, supra; White v. State, supra; Moore v. State, supra; Tezeno v. State, supra.
We recognize and give due deference to the trial judge’s discretion; to not properly respect the trial court’s discretion would [407]*407constitute a failure to recognize and understand the realities of the voir dire of jurors. The trial judge’s interpretation of the jury voir dire in the instances of which complaint has been made does not show an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, the appellant in oral argument urged that each of these venire members was erroneously excused because the State did not challenge them for cause. The record, however, reflects that only ve-nire member Bradley was excused on the Court’s own motion; the other three venire members were challenged for cause. That the Court excused Bradley on its own motion does not present an issue in this case since no objection on this ground was made in the trial court when Bradley was excused. Moore v. State, supra; Hughes v. State, 562 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). All four grounds of error are overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.