UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ___________________________________ ) VICTOR HERNANDEZ, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 21-01374 (RCL) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint (“MTD”), ECF No. 19, pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below,
the Court grants the Motion and dismisses all claims against the District of Columbia, and it also
dismisses all claims against the former Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
and its current Deputy Director.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Victor Hernandez, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), is a D.C.
Code offender, see Compl., ECF No. 1, at 5, currently designated to USP Canaan, see generally
docket; see also Pl.’s Not. Change of Address, ECF No. 23 (dated Oct. 3, 2022); Federal Inmate
Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2023). Hernandez filed this lawsuit
on May 17, 2021, against the DOC and DOC correctional officers “Corporal Dove,” and “T.
William,” for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred while Hernandez was
in DOC custody. See Compl. at 1, 3–6.
1 On February 25, 2022, the DOC moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, ECF
No. 9, in response to the Complaint. On March 31, 2022, Hernandez moved for extension, ECF
No. 13, to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, in which he also expressed his intention to imminently
file an amended complaint. On April 18, 2022, the Court granted, by Minute Order, Hernandez’s
Motion as to the request for an extension, ordering him to file, by May 9, 2022, either an opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss, or alternatively, an amended complaint of right, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(B).
Hernandez opted to file an Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), now operative, with a
Supporting Memorandum (“Mem.”), ECF No. 16, on May 11, 2022, seeking damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see Am. Compl. at 2, 4; Mem. ¶¶ 4, 213–17. A few days later he filed a Supplement,
ECF No. 17, to the Amended Complaint, which contains nearly identical allegations to those
already set forth in the Supporting Memorandum. Although neither the Federal nor the Local Rules
of Civil Procedure allow for such a Supplement, and Hernandez did not seek leave to file it, the
Court has nonetheless considered it. See Brown v Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., 789 F.3d 146,
151–52 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (finding that a district court must consider a pro se litigant’s
complaint “in light of all filings”).
The Amended Complaint again names, as Defendants, correctional officers Dove (in his
individual capacity only) and T. William (in her individual capacity only)––now referred to as “T.
Williams,” and it substitutes the District of Columbia for the DOC. Mem. ¶¶ 7, 10–12, 14. It also
names, as new Defendants, former DOC Director, Quincy Booth (in both his official and individual
capacities), and current DOC Deputy Director, Wanda Patten (in both her official and individual
capacities). Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 13.
2 On May 18, 2022, the Court denied, by Minute Order, the pending Motion to Dismiss
and/or for Summary Judgment without prejudice as moot, and after a single brief extension, see
Def.’s Mot. for Extn., ECF No. 18; Minute Order (dated June 21, 2022), the District of Columbia
filed its pending Motion to Dismiss on June 21, 2022.
On June 27, 2022, the Court entered an Order directing Hernandez to file a response to the
District’s Motion to Dismiss by July 24, 2022, and forewarned him that, should he fail to timely
respond, the Court may rule on the Motion without the benefit of his position and/or may also
dismiss the case. See Fox Order, ECF No. 20. Since that time, the Court granted Hernandez three
extensions to his response deadline, see Order (dated Aug. 17, 2022) (granting Pl.’s First Mot. for
Extn., ECF No. 21); Minute Order (dated Oct. 6, 2022) (granting Pl.’s Second Mot. for Extn., ECF
No. 23); Minute Order (dated Dec. 16, 2022) (granting Pl.’s Third Mot. for Extn., ECF No. 25),
based on his contention that he was facing hardships accessing his legal mail and materials during
and after his transfer to USP Canaan. On the latter two occasions, the Court also directed the Clerk
of Court to mail Hernandez additional courtesy copies of all of the pertinent documents, see Minute
Order (dated Oct. 6, 2022); Minute Order (dated Dec. 16, 2022). His most recent deadline to file
a response to the Motion to Dismiss elapsed on February 3, 2023, see Minute Order (dated Dec.
16, 2022), and to date, he has neither filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, nor has he requested
another extension.
B. Factual Background
Hernandez contends that, on the morning of August 31, 2018, while in the custody of the
DOC, see Mem. ¶¶ 6, 17, 120–21, he was scheduled for a non-emergency medical appointment at
Howard University Hospital for a cyst removal, see id. ¶¶ 6, 116–17. Officers Dove and Williams
were responsible for transporting Hernandez to this appointment; Dove was the driver of the
transport vehicle, a 4-door Chevrolet Impala police cruiser, and Williams accompanied them in 3 the front passenger seat. See id. ¶¶ 115, 118–19. Hernandez alleges that he was placed in the
backseat of the vehicle without a seatbelt. See id. ¶¶ 35, 38, 121. Then, while en route, Dove
allegedly began driving recklessly, turning on the vehicle’s emergency lights and siren despite the
non-emergency nature of the trip, so that he could run red lights without caution. See id. ¶¶ 32,
122–24. Hernandez maintains that Williams witnessed all of Dove’s alleged unlawful behavior
and sat by silently, declining to intervene, and “appearing at ease and unconcerned.” See id.
¶¶ 123–24, 143, 148–52.
The transport vehicle eventually collided with a civilian vehicle at the intersection of 9th
Street and Florida Avenue N.W. See id. ¶ 33–34, 47–49, 125. Hernandez contends that he, Dove,
and Williams were all injured, and that he was initially unconscious and transported to the hospital
by ambulance. See id. ¶¶ 37, 126. He alleges that, once he awoke, Dove instructed him to lie to
any investigators about the cause of the accident, more specifically, to concoct a story that Dove
used his emergency lights and siren because Hernandez underwent a seizure. See id. ¶¶ 46, 126.
Hernandez also alleges that Dove subsequently somehow interfered with his ability to seek
administrative relief, see id. ¶ 51, and that Williams failed to report any of Dove’s alleged
misconduct, see id. ¶¶ 143, 148–52.
As a result of the accident, Hernandez alleges that he suffered permanent injuries to his
head, face, neck, back, torso, and left leg, and that he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder and generalized emotional distress, both of which require medication. See id. ¶¶ 37–39,
158–78.
4 II. LEGAL STANDARD
A plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he]
is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court “must construe
the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1088 (2013);
see Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
However, the Court “need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are
unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. Nor must the Court
accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor “naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And although a pro se complaint “must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it still “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the
court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct,’” Atherton v. District
of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678–79), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1039 (2010). Additionally, a court shall sua sponte dismiss a
complaint filed by a pro se and IFP litigant when his pleading fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), including and specifically those filed by
prisoners, see id.; see also id. § 1915A(b)(1); Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 5 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (affirming trial court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to
Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against the District of Columbia, Booth, and Patten
Hernandez sues the District for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Am. Compl. at 2–4;
Mem. ¶¶ 4, 190–93, 195, 197–99, 201–05, 213–17, which allows an individual, under specific
circumstances, to sue a municipality for policies or practices that result in constitutional violations,
see Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). He also sues Booth and Patten
in their official capacities, see Am. Compl. at 2, 4; Mem. ¶¶ 4, 8–9, 13, 190–93, 195, 197, 198–
99, 201–05, 213–17, but notably, an “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity[,]” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985);
Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that official capacity
claims are “equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself.”). Consequently, the official-
capacity claims against Booth and Patten must be dismissed as “redundant and an inefficient use
of judicial resources.” Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D.D.C. 2005)
(collecting cases). Furthermore, the Court finds that Hernandez has fundamentally failed to state a
municipal liability claim against the District, Booth, or Patten.
Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights; rather, it is a method of
vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.” Melton v. District of Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d
6 183, 192 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 269–70 (1994); Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)), aff’d, 2015 WL 9012019 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015) (per
curiam).
To state a claim for municipality liability, a plaintiff must first properly allege both (1) “a
predicate constitutional violation” and (2) “that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the
violation.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992)). Additionally, that “policy or custom” must itself be
the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. Carter v. District of Columbia, 795
F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and
only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question.”); Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985) (requiring a plaintiff
to allege that a municipality deliberately pursued by the city establishing an affirmative link
between the city’s policy and the alleged constitutional violation).
Here, Hernandez asserts that these Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Am. Compl. at 4; Mem. ¶ 190. At the outset, the Court
finds that neither the District nor its officials may be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the District of Columbia is not a state. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);
Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Robinson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 200 F. Supp. 3d 104, 107 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 686 Fed. Appx. 1 (2017).
Notwithstanding, the protections of the Fifth Amendment extend to the District of Columbia, so
7 the Court will instead construe Hernandez’s due process claims thereunder. See Bolling, 347 U.S.
at 498–99.
Apart from this distinction, see MTD at 6–7, the District does not dispute that Hernandez
failed to allege a predicate constitutional violation, focusing instead on “step 2” of the Monell
inquiry, see id. at 2–7; see also Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Therefore, the primary question is whether
the complaint state a claim against the District “that a custom or policy of the municipality caused
the [alleged] violation.” See Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Although a complaint “need not plead law
or match facts to every element of a legal theory,” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d
1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), it shall “include some factual basis for the
allegation of a municipal policy or custom,” Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 422.
There are four ways in which a plaintiff may establish that a municipal policy caused a
constitutional violation:
(1) the municipality adopts a policy that itself violates the Constitution; (2) the unconstitutional action was taken by a ‘policy maker’ within the government; (3) the employees’ unconstitutional actions ‘are so consistent that they have become [a] custom’ of the municipality of which the supervising policymaker must have been aware; or (4) the municipality knew or should have known of a risk of constitutional violations, but showed ‘deliberate indifference’ to that risk by failing to act.
Hurd v. District of Columbia, 997 F.3d 332, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Baker, 326 F.3d
at 1306) (other citation omitted). Hernandez does not contend that the District formally adopted
an express policy, see Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, instead relying
on an amalgamation of latter three theories of municipal liability. He alleges that Booth and Patten
exhibited “silent acquiescence,” and “encouraged, promoted, or had otherwise tacitly authorized”
employees to improperly use their emergency lights and sirens, see Mem. ¶¶ 191–93, in other
words––an alleged adoption by municipal policymakers, see Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306; Triplett v.
8 District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997), of an unofficial policy or custom, see
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. He also alleges that the District, Booth, and Patten were all
deliberately indifferent to his “health and safety” in emboldening those unsafe driving practices,
see Mem. ¶¶ 190, 197, and by subjecting him to “substantial risk of harm” by allowing for his
transport without a seatbelt, see id. ¶ 205, compounded by a “failure to provide [s]upervision or
adequate policies,” see id. ¶¶ 194–96, 199, 201–03, 205, in violation of their general purported
responsibilities to inspect and monitor DOC vehicles and their operators, see id. ¶¶ 19, 21–31.
First, Hernandez fails to sufficiently allege the existence of an unofficial policy or custom,
which “is considerably easier to define than it is to prove.” Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 273
F.R.D. 314, 321 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Carter, 795 F.2d at 122). A policy or custom must be
“confined to those practices that have become . . . permanent and well settled[.]” Id. (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691) (other citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must
“present concentrated, fully packed, precisely delineated scenarios,” Parker v. District of
Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1065 (1989), and a “catalog of disquieting events is not sufficient to demonstrate a
pervasive pattern” where the “occurrences . . . do not coalesce into a discernible ‘policy[.]’” Carter,
795 F.2d at 123–24.
The Amended Complaint is devoid of any details indicating that either the alleged non-
emergency use of lights and sirens, or the transportation of prisoners without a seatbelt, was
consistent enough to constitute a policy or custom. The only example that Hernandez provides is
his own accident, and “a single incident of [alleged] unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to
impose liability under Monell[.]” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no suggestion in the Amended Complaint of any other supporting scenarios. See Trimble
9 v. District of Columbia, 779 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting the District and its
officials’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where plaintiffs failed to “cite any incident other than the
events alleged in [their] complaint that might provide a basis for concluding that MPD has any
[unconstitutional] policies, practices, or customs”); Thomas v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-
584, 2021 WL 5769443, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2021) (granting the District’s 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss and finding that “[a] long line of cases in this district have found similarly sparse
allegations of a policy or custom to be inadequate to state a claim”) (citing Wells v. Hense, 235 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 12–13 n.11 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases)).
Moreover, even if Hernandez had provided any additional scenarios, his existing
allegations consist of only labels and conclusions, which fail to illustrate an “‘affirmative link,’
such that these alleged municipal policies were the ‘moving force’ behind the [alleged]
constitutional violation[s].” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 389 (1989)); see Hernandez v. Dist. of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2012)
(granting 12(b)(6) the District’s motion to dismiss municipal liability claims where plaintiff’s
“mere allegation that” an officer acted pursuant to the District’s “employment policies or
procedures” was “insufficient to provide an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy and the injury”).
Hernandez frequently mentions the term “affirmative link,” along with other legal elements and
buzzwords, but he does not present any colorable facts in support of the authority cited. See, e.g.,
Mem. ¶¶ 7–11, 17, 22, 27, 53–56, 190–205. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not sufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. It is unclear––apart from Hernandez’s own assumptions and speculation––where,
why, when, and most importantly, how, the District and its officials acquiesced, encouraged,
promoted, or otherwise authorized, see Mem. ¶¶ 191–93, these alleged customs or policies.
10 These bare assertions, without more, are “too nebulous to support a claim against the
District[.]” Nelson v. Dist. of Columbia, 928 F. Supp. 2d 210, 216 (D.D.C. 2013) (granting the
District’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to state a custom or policy by broadly
alleging that the District failed to exercise oversight over jail policies, and failed to train its guards–
–whose “custom” was disregarding prison cell inspections) (citing Gabriel v. Corr. Corp. of Amer.,
211 F. Supp. 2d 132, 140 (D.D.C. 2002); see Miller v. Barry, 698 F.2d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (“The mere assertion that the [employee] ‘was acting fully within the scope of his
employment and pursuant to the policies of defendant’ is not specific enough to withstand
dismissal.”). Put differently, Hernandez has failed to plead that Dove and Williams followed “a
course deliberately pursued by the city, as opposed to an action taken unilaterally by a
nonpolicymaking municipal employee[.]” Carter, 795 F.2d at 122 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Second, Hernandez has failed to sufficiently plead his claims through deliberate
indifference. Deliberate indifference is “[c]losely related to and in many instances
indistinguishable from the concept of municipal custom[.]” Lightfoot, 273 F.R.D. at 321. “The
critical question[s]” are (1) whether the government failed to respond to a need, resulting in
constitutional violations, and (2) whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk
of those constitutional violations. Id. (quoting Baker, 326 F.3d at 1307; citing Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994)). Mere negligence does suffice; deliberate indifference “does not require
the city to take reasonable care to discover and prevent constitutional violations,” but “simply
means that, faced with actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate
constitutional rights, the city may not adopt a policy of inaction.” Warren v. District of Columbia,
353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). Here, there is no inference that the District
11 and its officials were aware of the alleged unsafe practices in advance of the motor vehicle
accident, and a municipality must receive “notice of the risk before the constitutional tort
occurred.” Williams v. Ellerbe, 317 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D.D.C. 2018) (emphasis in original);
see Nelson, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 216 (dismissing plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims for the
same defect). Therefore, his deliberate indifference claims cannot survive because Hernandez
“fails to allege that the District had any advance notice or reason to believe” that the constitutional
torts alleged here would later occur. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 149.
Seemingly anticipating this problem, Hernandez attempts to alternatively plead deliberate
indifference through an alleged failure to train and supervise. See Mem. ¶¶ 194–96, 199, 201–03,
205. But again, regardless of the theory of municipal liability, Hernandez is still required to plead
“actual facts that would constitute such deliberate indifference or put District officials on notice
that its training program would cause a violation of constitutional rights.” Prince v. Dist. of
Columbia, No. 22-cv-746, 2022 WL 17415058, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2022) (emphasis added)
(quoting Bell v. District of Columbia, 82 F. Supp. 3d 151, 157 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). And again, a pattern of “similar constitutional violations by . . . employees is
‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train,” see
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Bryan Cty., Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)), or alternatively, Hernandez must raise specific allegations that
the District failed “to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious
potential for such a violation[,]” Brown, 520 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). Hernandez does not
provide any of those required examples or details.
Likewise, in raising a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege that the “failure
to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by
12 our prior cases—[and only then] can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.” City of
Canton, 489 at 389. “That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice
to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other
than a faulty training program.” Id. at 390–91 (citations omitted). Thus, it is not enough that
Hernandez solely implicates Dove and Williams, or “point[s] to something the city ‘could have
done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” Id. at 392. “Rather, [he] must show that ‘in light of the
duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need[,]’” Caldwell v. Dist. of Columbia, 901 F. Supp. 7, 11 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting the District’s
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that prison officers were inadequately trained,
and that its emergency policy was inadequate, as those boilerplate legal conclusions were
unsupported by facts) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390), appeal dismissed, 1996 WL
587652 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 1996) (per curiam), but Hernandez has not done so. He neither
provides any illustrative facts as to the District’s training and supervision program, nor as to its
alleged defects and instances of their recurrence.
Without these required facts, the District cannot be held liable for the alleged
unconstitutional actions of Dove and Williams because there can be no vicarious liability for
constitutional violations. See Graham v. Davis, 880 F.2d 1414, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.7). “This point of law is incontrovertible; it is
directly established by Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent.” Powers-Bunce v. District of
Columbia, 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 157 (D.D.C. 2007); see McRae v. Olive, 368 F. Supp. 2d 91, 96
13 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that the District is not responsible for the actions of its law enforcement
officers “on a theory of respondeat superior.”).
Third, Hernandez predicates his individual capacity claims against Booth and Patten on
these same nebulous policymaking and failure to train/supervise allegations, see Mem. ¶¶ 21–26,
64–82, 90–107, 190–205, but aside from generally relying on their supposed generalized
responsibilities to oversee DOC vehicles and staff, police reports, and medical records, see id., the
Amended Complaint contains no facts that pinpoint their personal involvement with Dove and
Williams, or their actual involvement in any of the alleged circumstances. See Jones v. Horne, 634
F.3d 588, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal of individual capacity
claims against warden where plaintiff failed to allege that defendant had any personal involvement
in the incident or policies at issue, outside of his high-ranking position); Jefferies v. District of
Columbia, 917 F. Supp. 2d 10, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2013) (granting District official’s 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss individual capacity claims where no facts implicated her direct personal involvement in
the circumstances “outside the mention of her official capacity as the Chief of Police who generally
oversees all police activity”). Furthermore, “high-level public officials[,]” like Booth and Patten,
“are not employers of their subordinates but rather are fellow governmental servants, and it is thus
inappropriate to hold them liable on the basis of respondeat superior.” Haynesworth v. Miller, 820
F.2d 1245, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds, Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250
(2006). The Court also notes the heightened pleading required of individual capacity claims
brought against public officials, see Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1987), but
Hernandez does not set forth sufficient facts to elevate his claim above conclusory allegations to
meet the minimal pleading standard. See Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 276 (D.D.C. 1995).
14 Finally, Hernandez’s assertions that he will be able to provide more specificity by and
through discovery, see Mem. ¶¶ 40–44, 83–88, 108–113, 134, 154, “does not cure” these “pleading
defect[s].” Stoddard v. Dist. of Columbia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 213, 220 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting the
District’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss municipal liability claims and denying leave to amend the
complaint as futile where plaintiff failed to clearly allege the existence of a municipal policy or
custom or its direct causal link to alleged Eighth Amendment deprivations).
In sum, Hernandez’s supporting allegations are too general and conclusory to state a
municipal liability claim against the District, Booth, or Patten, or to state an individual capacity
claim against Booth or Patten. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). For all of the stated reasons, and because Hernandez has already had
an opportunity to amend his complaint, all of the claims against those Defendants will be dismissed
with prejudice.
B. Claims Against Dove & Williams
Hernandez raises only individual capacity claims under § 1983 against Dove and Williams.
See Mem. ¶¶ 10–11, 14. As discussed above, he alleges that Dove and Williams’ failure to place
him in a seatbelt, Dove’s reckless driving––including the improper use of lights/sirens––resulting
in the motor vehicle accident, Williams’ failure to intervene, and their mendacious behavior
following the accident, all show “deliberate indifference,” and “wanton disregard for [his] [h]ealth
and safety.” See id. ¶¶ 114–33, 135–53, 182–88, 207–10. He contends that their actions infringed
on his right “to be free from the substantial risk of harm and/or the substantial risk of serious
harm,” as a prisoner under the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment––which the
Court henceforth construes under the Fifth Amendment––thus causing his injuries. See id. ¶ 210.
The Court finds that, at this stage, Hernandez has done enough to survive a sua sponte dismissal 15 of his individual capacity claims against Dove and Williams, see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(delineating the pleading standard for § 1983 individual capacity claims), although the Court
cautions Hernandez that these claims may yet face additional challenges.
The Court notes that, despite ample time and forewarning, Hernandez failed to respond to
the District’s Motion to Dismiss, and he has also failed to otherwise participate in this case for
about three months. Additionally, Dove and Williams have yet to be served. Because Hernandez
is proceeding IFP, the Court is responsible for service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). After
the filing of the original Complaint, the Clerk issued summonses for Dove and Williams, see
Summonses, ECF No. 7, and the United States Marshals Service attempted service, but despite its
efforts, the Marshals could not ultimately serve Dove or Williams, see Unexecuted Returns of
Service, ECF No. 11.
Generally, IFP litigants should not be penalized for a Court officer’s failure to effect service
of process, see Ray v. Experian, Inc., No. 08–cv-0114, 2009 WL 1255114, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2009); Thomas v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 05–cv-2391, 2007 WL 219988, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan.
25, 2007). Nonetheless, the leeway afforded to IFP litigants has its limits. Hernandez has sued
Dove and Williams in their individual capacities so, in addition to service on the District, they
must be served personally, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Super. Ct. Civ. R. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4(j)(3)(E),
and “a district court has no duty to assist a plaintiff in locating a defendant’s address for the purpose
of service of process[,]” Fletcher v. Reilly, No. 07–cv-331, 2007 WL 2111030, at *1 (D.D.C. Jul.
23, 2007); Paolone v. Mueller, No. 05–cv-2300, 2006 WL 2346448, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2006);
Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987). The Marshals’ ability to perfect service
of process is only as good as the information provided, and currently, Hernandez has only provided
the locations of the D.C. Jail and Correctional Treatment Facility as potential service addresses for
16 Dove and Williams. See Mem. ¶¶ 10–11, 15. Indeed, the Court does not even possess Dove or
Williams’ first names. See D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1) (requiring a pro se/IFP litigant to provide the full
name and address of each defendant or suffer dismissal).
Consequently, before the Court devotes its effort and resources in proceeding forward,
Hernandez must show cause why the remaining claims should not be dismissed without prejudice
for failure prosecute due to his noted absence from this case, see D.C. LCvR 83.23, and he must
also submit additional information to better equip the Court to personally serve Dove and
Williams, should the case against them continue.
17 IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant District
of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 19, and DISMISSES all claims against it WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, and it is further
ORDERED that all claims against Defendants Quincy Booth and Wanda Patten are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff Victor Hernandez shall SHOW CAUSE, by March 31, 2023,
why the remaining claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to D.C. LCvR
83.23. Hernandez must also provide, to the best of his knowledge, addresses where Dove and
Williams may be personally served with process, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Super. Ct. Civ. R. Super.
Ct. Civ. R. 4G)(3)(E), and he shall also submit Dove and Williams' full names, badge numbers,
and any other identifying information, if available, see D.C. LCvR 5.l(c)(l). If Hernandez fails to
timely comply with these directives, the remaining claims-the individual capacity claims against
Dove and Williams-will be dismissed without prejudice, and this case will be closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH United States District Judge