Herman v. Mercantile Bank

137 F.3d 584
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 9, 1998
Docket97-2197
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 137 F.3d 584 (Herman v. Mercantile Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Herman v. Mercantile Bank, 137 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1998).

Opinion

137 F.3d 584

21 Employee Benefits Cas. 2574

Alexis M. HERMAN, Secretary of the United States Department
of Labor, Appellee,
v.
MERCANTILE BANK, N.A., Defendant,
Timothy J. Schwent, Appellant,
Lenco, Inc., Employees Stock Ownership Plan & Trust, Defendant,
The Plan of Medical Care Benefits of Lenco, Inc., Defendants.

No. 97-2197.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1998.
Decided Feb. 25, 1998.
Rehearing Denied April 9, 1998.
As Amended on Grant of Clarification April 2, 1998.

John J. Gazzoli, St. Louis, MO, argued (Eric D. Paulsrud, on the brief), for Appellant.

Michael Schloss, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC, argued (Maria Makris-Gouvas, Karen Handorf, and Leslie C. Perlman, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before BOWMAN and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and JONES1, District Judge.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

The Secretary of the United States Department of Labor ("Secretary") filed suit against Timothy J. Schwent and several other officers of Lenco, Inc. ("Lenco"), a bankrupt company, because Lenco failed to pay certain health care claims. At the time in question, Schwent served as the administrator for Lenco's health plan. The district court ruled in favor of the Secretary, entering judgment against Schwent in the amount of $137,770.41 and granting the Secretary part of the injunctive relief requested. On appeal, Schwent argues that the district court erred in (1) determining that he breached his fiduciary duty to the health plan under ERISA;2 (2) finding him personally liable for a "loss to the plan;" and (3) taking judicial notice of another portion of this case. We reverse and conclude that the district court erred in determining the underlying facts relating to the conclusion that Schwent breached his fiduciary duty.

I. BACKGROUND

Lenco sponsored a health plan for its employees from 1952 until March 1, 1988. Lenco self-insured its employees from 1983 until March 1, 1988. General American Life Insurance Company provided administrative services and "stop-loss" coverage for yearly claims of any particular claimant exceeding $35,000 in the aggregate. From mid-1986 to September 14, 1989, Schwent, a vice president of Lenco, served as the designated health plan administrator and trustee for Lenco's health plan.

Paul Leonard, one of Lenco's founders, owned and operated Lenco until his death on April 16, 1983. In 1983, Lenco's Board of Directors decided to sell Lenco, with the asking price of $10 million. On April 5, 1984, Jerry Ford acquired the controlling stock in Lenco through a highly leveraged buy-out which left the company in a difficult financial position. The buy-out caused Lenco's liabilities to increase from less than $2 million to over $6 million. As part of the buy-out, Ford obtained an asset-based line of credit eventually bought and serviced by Marine Midland Bank ("Midland"). Under the terms of the Midland loan, Midland required Lenco to have all cash coming in to Lenco first available to Midland through what amounted to a "lock-box" arrangement. Therefore, Lenco could only utilize funds for operating expenses including the health care plan after the funds passed through the Midland procedure.3

Ford occasionally made the business decision that Lenco would pay certain operating expenses before paying health plan claims. Therefore, the health care trust account at times did not cover the amount due for medical claims.

Lenco employees received health care coverage at no charge. Employees, through a payroll deduction, could also receive subsidized dependant coverage. Employee payroll deductions totaled $66,775.22 for the 1986-88 plan years. Stop-loss payments and money from employee contributions obviously did not cover the entire expense of the health plan. During the period at issue, Lenco deposited a total of $979,061 into the health plan. Lenco designed the health plan to operate at a loss, providing it as a heavily subsidized benefit to Lenco's employees.

Ford informed Schwent of his business decisions to pay other operating costs before fully funding the health plan. Schwent did not bring a lawsuit or other legal claim on behalf of the health plan to recover unpaid claims. Instead, Schwent testified that he pressured Ford at least twice per week to pay the medical claims. Ford testified that Schwent talked to him daily about making money available to pay health care claims.

When Lenco filed bankruptcy, $143,166.00 in health plan claims remained unpaid. Lenco's bankruptcy estate satisfied $5,395.59 of this amount leaving $137,770.41 in unpaid medical claims.

The Secretary released Ford and Scott Goodson, vice president of financing of Lenco, from suit when they agreed to consent judgments which required no monetary payment from them for the alleged health plan losses. On February 28, 1997, the district court entered judgment against Schwent for $137,770.41 and entered a portion of the injunctive relief requested by the Secretary.

II. DISCUSSION

The district court's determination that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred represents a legal ruling reviewed de novo. Barker v. American Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1402 (9th Cir.1995). Here, the district court found that the failure of Schwent to sue his employer resolved the legal issue of a breach of a fiduciary duty. The underlying factual question whether Schwent should have filed a lawsuit against his employer constitutes a fact question reviewed for clear error. Clear error exists when " 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)).

Federal law requires that ERISA fiduciaries perform "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims...." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). The ERISA prudent person standard is an objective standard. Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir.1994). When a fiduciary fails to satisfy the prudent person standard, the fiduciary may bear personal liability for losses to the plan resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty. Id.

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