Hensley v. Imprivata, Inc.

260 F. Supp. 3d 101
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMay 16, 2017
DocketCase No. 16-cv-10160-LTS
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 260 F. Supp. 3d 101 (Hensley v. Imprivata, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hensley v. Imprivata, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D. Mass. 2017).

Opinion

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DOCS. 39, 40)2

Leo T. Sorokin, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Mark Hensley, on behalf of himself and a putative class of shareholders, alleges multiple Defendants deceived investors into buying Imprivata, Inc.’s (“Imprivata”), stock at artificially high prices from July 30, 2015, through November 2, 2015 (hereinafter, the “class period”), by materially misrepresenting Imprivata’s sales outlook. See Doc. 33 at 1. For the reasons that follow, the Court ALLOWS: (1) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Imprivata, Omar Hussain, Jeffrey Kalqwski, David Orfao, David Barrett, and Paul Maeder (Doc. 39); and (2) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants General Catalyst Group II, L.P. (“GCG”), Highland Capital Partners VI Limited Partnership (“Highland Capital”), and Polaris Venture Partners III, L.P. (“Polaris”) (Doc. 40)(

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

A. Overview of Defendants

1. Imprivata

Imprivata is an “IT security company that provides authentication ... technolo[109]*109gy solutions for the healthcare and other industries in the United States” and internationally. Doc. 33 at 6. It became a public company in June 2014. Id. at 2. Its “flagship product” is OneSign, an authentication system that helps companies manage who can access computer servers and files. Id. at 12. Imprivata “sells its products and solutions” to healthcare and non-healthcare organizations. Id. Sales to large hospitals comprise 75 percent of Imprivata’s total sales, while “the small hospital market and the non-healthcare market comprise 25% of [its] total sales.” Id. at 14. In 2014, 88 percent of Imprivata’s “revenue from new sales were attributable to sales tp healthcare organizations,” Doc. 44-8 at 3, meaning 12 percent of that revenue was attributable to sales to non-healthcare organizations.

For Imprivata’s first four quarters as a public company, i.e., from the third quarter of 2014 through the second quarter of 2015,4 it exceeded its maximum revenue projections. Doc. 44-3 at 2. Indeed, in three of those four quarters, the company exceeded its maximum revenue projections (all of which were under thirty-million dollars) by over one million dollars, and in one of those three quarters it exceeded the maximum by two-million dollars. Id.

In Q3 2015, however, the only full quarter during the class period, the company underperformed its initial minimum revenue projection: it initially projected it would earn at least $31 million, -but only earned $29,282,000. Id.

For at least three straight quarters afterward, from Q4 2015 through Q2'2016, Imprivata agairi exceeded its maximum revenue projections. Id, For Q4 2015, the company projected it would earn $32 million to $34 million, but it ultimately earned $34.2‘ million. Id. For Q1 2016) it projected it would earn $28.5 million to $30 million, but it ultimately earned $31,521,000.' Id. And for Q2 2016, the company projected it would earn $32.5 million to $34 million, but it ultimately earned over $36 million. Id.

2. The Remaining Defendants

Hussain was at all relevant times the CEO .of Imprivata. Doc. 33 at 2.. Kalowski was at all relevant times the CFO of Im-privata. Id.

After Imprivata went public, GCG, Highland Capital,, and Polaris (collectively, “the Controlling Shareholder Defendants”) each owned 19.6 percent of Imprivata stock, meaning they collectively owned 58.8 percent. Id. at 8.

Orfao was employed by GCG; Maeder was.employed by Highland Capital; and Barrett was employed by Polaris. Id. at 7. At all relevant times,' they were members of Imprivata’s board of director's and' had “power and authority to control the contents of [Imprivata’s] public filings with the SEC.” Id.

[110]*110B. Relevant Information About the Healthcare Industry

On August 4, 2014, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a rule stating that, on October 1, 2015, nearly all hospitals would need to switch from using codes in the International Classification of Diseases 9 (“I CD-9”) to using codes in the ICD-10, for purposes of medical billing. See 79 Fed. Reg. 45,128 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 162). This switch was a “significant change” that was “well known by those in the healthcare community for some time.” Doc. 33 at 14. Indeed, well before the August 4, 2014, rule was announced, “[a]ll segments of the health care industry ha[d] invested significant time and resources in financing, training, and implementing necessary changes to systems ... in order to prepare for ICD-10.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,129; see also Andrew Pollack, Who Knows the Code for Injury by Orea?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2013, at B1 (article about hospitals’ preparations to switch to ICD-10).

The Amended Complaint also alleges that the healthcare industry was undergoing “consolidation (i.e., smaller hospitals were getting bought by larger hospitals),” Doc. 33 at 4, but does not state when this consolidation began.

C. Imprivata’s Acquisition of HT Systems

On April 30, 2015, Imprivata acquired the company HT Systems, which makes a “palm-vein based identification technology” called PatientSecure. Id. at 2. PatientSe- ■ cure “is able to distinguish vein patterns in patients’ hands and thereby retrieve their correct medical records in a healthcare provider’s electronic health record system when a patient checks into a hospital.” Id at 13. “Imprivata represented the acquisition of HT Systems ... as an opportunity for [it] to enter the emerging $2 billion patient identification market.” Id In 2014, HT Systems’ revenue was $6.1 million and it generated an operating profit. Doc. 44-10 at 5. Imprivata paid $19.1 million for the acquisition, which was 16.2% of its assets as of December 31, 2014. Doc. 33 at 13.

The Amended Complaint relies, in part, on information from various unnamed former employees (“FEs”) at Imprivata. One such employee (“FE5” in the Amended Complaint) was an Imprivata sales manager in Florida from April 2015 through April 2016. Id at 10. In terms of seniority, FE5 was three levels down from CEO Omar Hussain — such that she reported to someone who reported to someone who reported to Hussain. Id However, she still “frequently interacted and met” with Hus-sain. Id. According to FE5, Imprivata acquired HT Systems “not simply for its PatientSecure product but for the pipeline of HT’s many sales prospects who were supposedly interested in buying PatientSe-cure.” Id at 18. However, FE5 states, Imprivata eventually discovered that “prospective customers had not even seen the device, much less agreed to purchase it,” so “the sales pipeline was false.” Id According to the Amended Complaint, FE5 “had frequent conversations with Hussain ... and confirmed” that, “at least by the beginning of July of 2015,” “all of the top executives at Imprivata were fully aware, ... that in acquiring HT [Systems,] Impri-vata had spent a tremendous amount of cash in reliance on a sales opportunity that did not exist and for a product that customers were not interested in buying.” Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 18 (“FE5 stated that Defendant Hussain in particular was keenly aware that the acquisition of HT Systems and PatientSecure was a disaster by at least by the beginning of July of 2015.”). According to FE5, “as of July [111]

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