Henry Sahagun v. Deputy Thompson, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HENRY SAHAGUN, Case No. 25-cv-10675-PCP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART AND SERVING COMPLAINT IN 9 v. PART; GRANTING IFP APPLICATION

10 DEPUTY THOMPSON, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 5 Defendants. 11

12 13 Henry Sahagun filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding events 14 that occurred at West County Detention Facility. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). For the reasons stated 15 below, Mr. Sahagun’s Complaint is DISMISSED in part and SERVED in part. 16 Background 17 As defendants, Mr. Sahagun sues Deputies Thompson and Wright, Sergeants Chan and 18 Smally, Lieutenant Ryan, and Sheriff Livingston. Compl. at 1, 2. 19 At all relevant times, Mr. Sahagun appears to have been housed in protective custody in 20 West County Detention Facility. See generally id. On November 20, 2025, “during transportation 21 Deputies Thompson [and] Wright failed to lock a door that separates [general population] from 22 [protective custody] inmates.” Id. at 2. As a result of defendants’ failure to separate these groups, 23 Mr. Sahagun and other inmates were attacked. See id. 24 Mr. Sahagun alleges that defendants Chan and Smally did not satisfactorily respond to his 25 grievances regarding the incident. See id. at 3. 26 Legal Standard 27 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 1 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 2 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 3 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 4 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 5 Analysis 6 I. Deputies Thompson and Wright 7 For screening purposes, Mr. Sahagun states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim that 8 defendants Thompson and Wright failed to protect him from assault. 9 The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates violates the 10 Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, 11 sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate 12 health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The mental state required to 13 establish a deliberate indifference claim is well-established. A prison official is deliberately 14 indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to 15 take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which 16 the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw 17 the inference. See id. An Eighth Amendment claimant need not show, however, that a prison 18 official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that 19 the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. 20 at 842; see also Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439–40 (9th Cir. 1995) (bystander-inmate 21 injured when guards allegedly used excessive force on another inmate need not show that guards 22 intended to harm bystander-inmate). A plaintiff may meet his burden of showing awareness of a 23 risk by presenting evidence of obvious and blatant circumstances indicating that the prison official 24 knew the risk existed. Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 2009) (“risk that an inmate 25 might suffer harm as a result of the repeated denial of meals is obvious”). 26 Here, Mr. Sahagun alleged that defendants Thompson and Wright failed to lock a door 27 separating general population and protective custody inmates and that Mr. Sahagun was attacked 1 injured by general population inmates when the two groups encounter one another. See Jones v. 2 Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing a California policy of housing sex offenders 3 in administrative segregation); Byerly v. Deputy Warden, 246 F. App’x 512, 513 (9th Cir. 2007) 4 (considering claim that sex offender was attacked when held in general population). 5 Liberally construed, Mr. Sahagun has stated a cognizable claim that the failure to separate 6 the two groups may demonstrate deliberate indifference to Mr. Sahagun’s safety. 7 II. Sheriff Livingston, Sergeants Chan and Smally, and Lieutenant Ryan 8 Mr. Sahagun does not state a cognizable claim against defendants Livingston, Chan, 9 Smally, or Ryan, and the facts reveal that he cannot. 10 Mr. Sahagun alleges only that Sergeants Chan and Smally did not respond to his 11 grievances in a satisfactory manner. See Compl. at 3. It is well-settled that the denial or 12 mishandling of a grievance does not constitute a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See 13 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Ramirez’s claimed loss of a liberty 14 interest in the processing of his appeals does not satisfy this standard, because inmates lack a 15 separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”); accord Young v. 16 Voong, 738 F. App’x 509, 510 (9th Cir. 2018) (same). Accordingly, Mr. Sahagun cannot sue 17 defendants Chan and Smally merely based on how those defendants handled (or did not handle) 18 Mr. Sahagun’s grievance against defendants Thompson and Wright. 19 The Complaint does not reveal any actions taken by defendants Livingston and Ryan that 20 had any effect on Mr. Sahagun whatsoever. Rather, Mr. Sahagun appears to have sued these 21 defendants merely because they are supervisors at the West County Detention Facility. See Compl. 22 at 2 (listing their supervisory roles). This is impermissible; under no circumstances is there 23 liability under section 1983 on the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of 24 another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“There is no respondeat superior 25 liability under section 1983.”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (“In a § 1983 26 suit … each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own 27 misconduct.”). Accordingly, Mr. Sahagun cannot sue defendants Livingston and Ryan merely 1 Because these defects cannot be cured by amendment, Mr. Sahagun’s claims against 2 defendants Livingston, Chan, Smally, and Ryan are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 3 AMEND. 4 Conclusion 5 1. Liberally construed, Mr. Sahagun states an Eighth Amendment deliberate 6 indifference claim against defendants Thompson and Wright. All other claims and defendants are 7 DISMISSED. 8 2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 9 Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint, 10 Dkt. No. 1, all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Defendants Deputies 11 Thompson and Wright at the West County Detention Facility (5555 Giant Highway, 12 Richmond, CA 94806). The Clerk shall also mail a copy of this Order to Mr. Sahagun. 13 3. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14 requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and the 15 complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4, if defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the 16 Court, on behalf of Mr. Sahagun, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be 17 required to bear the cost of such service unless good cause shown for their failure to sign and 18 return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if defendants had been 19 served on the date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), defendants 20 will not be required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the day on which the 21 request for waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if 22 formal service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at 23 the foot of the waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to 24 waiver of service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but 25 before defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the 26 date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is 27 filed, whichever is later. 1 shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the claims in 2 the complaint found to be cognizable above. 3 a. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate factual 4 documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 5 Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified 6 immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the opinion that this case 7 cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the 8 summary judgment motion is due. 9 b. In the event Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, the Ninth 10 Circuit has held that a plaintiff must be concurrently provided the appropriate warnings 11 under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See Woods v. Carey, 684 12 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 c. If any defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by 14 summary judgment, he or she shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment 15 motion is due. Information regarding the Court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Program is 16 available on the website for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 17 5. Mr. Sahagun’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 18 and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date Defendants’ motion 19 is filed. Mr. Sahagun is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 20 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come 21 forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his 22 claim). 23 6. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after Mr. 24 Sahagun’s opposition is filed. 25 7. All communications by Mr. Sahagun with the Court must be served on defendants 26 or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document 27 to defendants or defendants’ counsel. ] No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the 2 || parties may conduct discovery. Mr. Sahagun is advised to read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 37, which requires each party to “in good faith confer[] or attempt[] to confer with” the opposing 4 || party regarding a discovery dispute, before seeking court action to resolve such a dispute. 5 9. It is Mr. Sahagun’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Mr. Sahagun must keep 6 || the Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed 7 || “Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 8 || Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 9 || Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 10 10... Mr. Sahagun’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. See Dkt. 11 No. 5. The initial partial filing fee is $4.00. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring a court to 12 || assess an initial filing fee of 20 percent of a prisoner’s average monthly deposits or monthly 13 || balance, whichever is greater) with Dkt. No. 5 (identifying Mr. Sahagun’s average monthly 14 || balance). A copy of this order and the attached instructions will be sent to Mr. Sahagun via U.S. 3 15 || mail, to the West County Detention Facility, and to the court’s financial office via email at a 16 || CAND Finance@cand.uscourts.gov.

Z 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: June 30, 2026 20

P. Casey Pitts 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PRISONER’S FILING FEE 3

4 The prisoner shown as the plaintiff or petitioner on the attached order has filed a civil 5 action in forma pauperis in this court and owes to the court a filing fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the fee is to be paid as follows: 6 The initial partial filing fee listed on the attached order should be deducted by the prison 7 trust account office from the prisoner’s trust account and forwarded to the clerk of the court as the 8 first installment payment on the filing fee. This amount is twenty percent of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding 9 the filing of the complaint/petition or (b) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint/petition. 10 Thereafter, on a monthly basis, 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the 11 prisoner’s trust account should be deducted and forwarded to the court each time the amount in the 12 account exceeds ten dollars ($10.00). The prison trust account office should continue to do this until the filing fee has been paid in full. 13 If the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the initial partial 14 filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, and carry the balance forward each month until the amount is fully paid. If the prisoner has filed more than one 15 complaint, (s)he is required to pay a filing fee for each case. The trust account office should make 16 the monthly calculations and payments for each case in which it receives an order granting in forma pauperis and these instructions. 17 The prisoner’s name and case number must be noted on each remittance. The initial partial 18 filing fee is due within thirty days of the date of the attached order. Checks should be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court and sent to Prisoner Accounts Receivable, U.S. District 19 Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36060, San Francisco, CA 94102. 20 cc: Plaintiff/Petitioner 21 Court’s Finance Office United States District Judge 22

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