IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1769 Filed March 19, 2025
HENRY LAMONT MYLES, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Lawson,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Leah Patton of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
CARR, Senior Judge.
Henry Lamont Myles appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR), arguing the district court wrongly denied the
application because (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to explain the
meaning of an “open” plea agreement to him and in failing to file a motion in arrest
of judgment after it became clear that Myles misunderstood the plea agreement,
and (2) he is actually innocent of the charge of kidnapping in the third degree. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In January 2021, Myles was charged by trial information in FECR413406
with one count of second-degree kidnapping—ransom (count I) and one count of
third-degree sexual abuse (count II). The trial information was later amended in
May to add one count of assault while participating in a felony (count III) and the
habitual offender sentencing enhancement. Also in May, Myles entered into an
omnibus plea agreement with the State that would resolve six separate criminal
cases against him, including FECR413406. In that case, Myles agreed to plead
guilty to a lesser charge of third-degree kidnapping as a habitual offender on
count I and assault while participating in a felony as a habitual offender on count III,
with the State agreeing to dismiss count II of the trial information.
The plea agreement provided for the following sentencing agreement:
“Incarceration is mandatory in FECR413406. It is open whether the counts run
concurrent or consecutive with each other. However, if the defendant accepts the
plea offer by May 17, 2021, the State will recommend that the two sentences in 3
FECR407004 and FECR410852 run concurrent to each other.” Myles timely
accepted the plea offer.
In his plea, Myles provided the following factual basis for his convictions:
Ct. 1 On October 2, 2020, I was in Davenport, IA in Scott County, IA. On that day, I confined [the victim] to the Shell gas station bathroom. I did so with the specific intent to inflict serious injury upon her. I knew that I did not have the authority or consent of [the victim] to do so.
Ct. 3 On October 2, 2020, I was in Davenport, IA in Scott County, IA. At this time, I committed an assault on [the victim], by striking her. At the time of the assault, I was participating in a theft in the first degree. I intended and was in [the] process of taking money from the person of [the victim].
Consistent with the plea agreement, the State recommended concurrent
sentencing in FECR407004 and FECR410852; it recommended consecutive
sentencing for counts I and III in FECR413406. The district court sentenced Myles
to consecutive sentences on counts I and III with each count requiring a three-year
mandatory minimum sentence. Myles appealed that sentence, arguing the
consecutive sentences were an abuse of discretion. We affirmed the district
court’s sentencing, finding no abuse of discretion. State v. Myles, No. 21-0995,
2022 WL1100279, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2022).
Myles then applied for PCR in May 2022, arguing he received “ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel,” an “illegal sentence,” and that he was
“actually innocent.” The district court denied the petition following the October
PCR trial. Myles now appeals. 4
II. Standard of Review
We review PCR proceedings for errors at law but expand the scope of
review to de novo when a denial of constitutional rights is alleged. Everett v. State,
789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion
Myles argues on appeal that the district court wrongly denied his PCR
application because (1) his trial counsel failed to adequately explain the meaning
of an “open” plea agreement to him and failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment
after it became clear that Myles misunderstood the plea agreement, and (2) he is
actually innocent of the charge of kidnapping in the third degree.
A. “Open” Plea Agreement
Myles argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to
adequately explain the terms of the plea agreement to him. In particular, Myles
claims that the meaning of an “open plea” was never explained to him.
To prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Myles must show both that
“(1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) this omission resulted
in prejudice.” State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).
We “may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to
find either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703
(Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).
For the breach-of-duty prong, there is a presumption that trial counsel
“competently performed . . . her duties.” State v. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935
N.W.2d 862, 898 (Iowa 2019). Myles must show that, by a preponderance of the
evidence, “trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 5
reasonableness.” Id. (cleaned up). “Counsel breaches an essential duty when
counsel makes such serious errors that counsel is not functioning as the advocate
the Sixth Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 869 (citation omitted). “Improvident trial
strategy, miscalculated tactics, and mistakes in judgment do not necessarily
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52,
55 (Iowa 1992).
For the prejudice prong, Myles “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Iowa 2019)
(citation omitted). In this case, Myles would need to show “that but for counsel’s
breach of duty, [he] would not have pled guilty and would have elected instead to
stand trial.” State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009).
We reject Myles’s assertion to the contrary and find it was clear to him what
“open” sentencing meant. First, we look to his guilty plea, in which Myles
acknowledged, “I have read and understand the entire [plea agreement]. All of my
questions concerning the plea agreement have been answered by my attorney.”
And in the plea he later acknowledged the following: “I understand the judge can
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1769 Filed March 19, 2025
HENRY LAMONT MYLES, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Lawson,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Leah Patton of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
CARR, Senior Judge.
Henry Lamont Myles appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR), arguing the district court wrongly denied the
application because (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to explain the
meaning of an “open” plea agreement to him and in failing to file a motion in arrest
of judgment after it became clear that Myles misunderstood the plea agreement,
and (2) he is actually innocent of the charge of kidnapping in the third degree. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In January 2021, Myles was charged by trial information in FECR413406
with one count of second-degree kidnapping—ransom (count I) and one count of
third-degree sexual abuse (count II). The trial information was later amended in
May to add one count of assault while participating in a felony (count III) and the
habitual offender sentencing enhancement. Also in May, Myles entered into an
omnibus plea agreement with the State that would resolve six separate criminal
cases against him, including FECR413406. In that case, Myles agreed to plead
guilty to a lesser charge of third-degree kidnapping as a habitual offender on
count I and assault while participating in a felony as a habitual offender on count III,
with the State agreeing to dismiss count II of the trial information.
The plea agreement provided for the following sentencing agreement:
“Incarceration is mandatory in FECR413406. It is open whether the counts run
concurrent or consecutive with each other. However, if the defendant accepts the
plea offer by May 17, 2021, the State will recommend that the two sentences in 3
FECR407004 and FECR410852 run concurrent to each other.” Myles timely
accepted the plea offer.
In his plea, Myles provided the following factual basis for his convictions:
Ct. 1 On October 2, 2020, I was in Davenport, IA in Scott County, IA. On that day, I confined [the victim] to the Shell gas station bathroom. I did so with the specific intent to inflict serious injury upon her. I knew that I did not have the authority or consent of [the victim] to do so.
Ct. 3 On October 2, 2020, I was in Davenport, IA in Scott County, IA. At this time, I committed an assault on [the victim], by striking her. At the time of the assault, I was participating in a theft in the first degree. I intended and was in [the] process of taking money from the person of [the victim].
Consistent with the plea agreement, the State recommended concurrent
sentencing in FECR407004 and FECR410852; it recommended consecutive
sentencing for counts I and III in FECR413406. The district court sentenced Myles
to consecutive sentences on counts I and III with each count requiring a three-year
mandatory minimum sentence. Myles appealed that sentence, arguing the
consecutive sentences were an abuse of discretion. We affirmed the district
court’s sentencing, finding no abuse of discretion. State v. Myles, No. 21-0995,
2022 WL1100279, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2022).
Myles then applied for PCR in May 2022, arguing he received “ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel,” an “illegal sentence,” and that he was
“actually innocent.” The district court denied the petition following the October
PCR trial. Myles now appeals. 4
II. Standard of Review
We review PCR proceedings for errors at law but expand the scope of
review to de novo when a denial of constitutional rights is alleged. Everett v. State,
789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion
Myles argues on appeal that the district court wrongly denied his PCR
application because (1) his trial counsel failed to adequately explain the meaning
of an “open” plea agreement to him and failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment
after it became clear that Myles misunderstood the plea agreement, and (2) he is
actually innocent of the charge of kidnapping in the third degree.
A. “Open” Plea Agreement
Myles argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to
adequately explain the terms of the plea agreement to him. In particular, Myles
claims that the meaning of an “open plea” was never explained to him.
To prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Myles must show both that
“(1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) this omission resulted
in prejudice.” State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).
We “may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to
find either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703
(Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).
For the breach-of-duty prong, there is a presumption that trial counsel
“competently performed . . . her duties.” State v. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935
N.W.2d 862, 898 (Iowa 2019). Myles must show that, by a preponderance of the
evidence, “trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 5
reasonableness.” Id. (cleaned up). “Counsel breaches an essential duty when
counsel makes such serious errors that counsel is not functioning as the advocate
the Sixth Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 869 (citation omitted). “Improvident trial
strategy, miscalculated tactics, and mistakes in judgment do not necessarily
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52,
55 (Iowa 1992).
For the prejudice prong, Myles “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Iowa 2019)
(citation omitted). In this case, Myles would need to show “that but for counsel’s
breach of duty, [he] would not have pled guilty and would have elected instead to
stand trial.” State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009).
We reject Myles’s assertion to the contrary and find it was clear to him what
“open” sentencing meant. First, we look to his guilty plea, in which Myles
acknowledged, “I have read and understand the entire [plea agreement]. All of my
questions concerning the plea agreement have been answered by my attorney.”
And in the plea he later acknowledged the following: “I understand the judge can
order each sentence to be served consecutively or concurrently to any other. . . .
My attorney has explained the terms consecutive and concurrent to me.” Myles
acknowledged that he knew the difference between concurrent and consecutive
sentencing, and the plea makes clear that the district court could use either type
of sentencing—the essence of an open plea. And his plea agreement was clear
in that it only required the State to recommend concurrent sentencing in 6
FECR407004 and FECR410852, which it did, but did not prohibit the State from
otherwise recommending consecutive sentencing.
And we next observe that Myles was so comfortable with the plea
terminology that, at the sentencing hearing, he expressly requested that he “should
get a concurrent sentence . . . . I’m just asking the judges please, please get a
concurrent sentence.” Having made multiple requests for concurrent sentences,
Myles thus clearly understood that consecutive sentencing was on the table. He
even acknowledged that his attorney “didn’t promise [him] anything” as it related
to concurrent sentencing and requesting the court show him “mercy.”
Additionally, it cannot be argued that Myles skimmed his plea and was
unaware of its contents. His trial counsel testified, “We went through [the plea] in
its entirety. And he had had to initial under every single page. . . . We went
through every paragraph.” Myles did write a letter to his trial counsel expressing
dissatisfaction with her work, saying she was working with the prosecutor and
against him. However, his counsel met with him after his plea was filed and before
his sentencing hearing. She testified that when she receives letters requesting
withdrawal of a plea “I follow up with the client directly. I have a conversation about
whether or not they want me to withdraw the guilty plea. And if they instruct me
personally to withdraw the guilty plea, and I explain the motion in arrest of
judgment, then I go ahead and do so.” At the conclusion of her meeting with Myles,
no such motion was filed.
Accordingly, we do not credit Myles’s claims that he did not know the
meaning of an “open” plea agreement and did not know the prosecutor would 7
recommend consecutive sentencing. Like the district court, we conclude Myles
failed to prove his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to withdraw his plea.
B. Actual Innocence
Myles next argues he is actually innocent of the charge of kidnapping in the
third degree. “Specifically, [Myles] did not confine [the victim] in the bathroom of
the Shell gas station.”
Freestanding claims of actual innocence are permitted under our state
constitution. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018). A guilty plea
does not “automatically mean the defendant is actually guilty.” Id. at 788. We
recognize that innocent defendants sometimes choose “the lesser of two evils:
pleading guilty despite his or her actual innocence because the odds are stacked
up against him or her, or going to trial with the risk of losing and the prospect of
receiving a harsher sentence.” Id. But actual innocence claims have limits. Id. at
793.
Myles must show “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the
evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict
the applicant.” Id. at 797. To prevail on an actual innocence claim, Myles must
also provide clear and convincing evidence that he is factually innocent of any
lesser included offense. See Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2019).
Here, false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of third-degree kidnapping.
See Iowa Code § 710.7 (2020) (“A person commits false imprisonment when,
having no reasonable belief that the person has any right or authority to do so, the
person intentionally confines another against the other’s will. A person is confined 8
when the person’s freedom to move about is substantially restricted by force,
threat, or deception.”).
Because we can affirm on the lesser included offense of false imprisonment,
we will analyze Myles’s actual innocence claim under that charge. The victim
locked herself in the Shell gas station bathroom following Myles’s threat to “kill her
and beat her ass.” Myles argues that the victim chose to retreat to the bathroom
of her own volition after he attacked her. He claims she locked the door because
the gas station clerk told her to. But the gas station clerk told the victim to go to
the bathroom after the victim had silently mouthed “call the police” to her. And no
part of the false imprisonment statute requires Myles to have physically placed the
victim in a location that she could not escape—only that he confined her. And
since her freedom to move was substantially restricted, he indeed confined her.
By standing outside the locked bathroom immediately following his attack on the
victim and screaming, “Bitch, I’m going to kill you,” and “I’m going to fuck you up,”
he restricted her ability to leave—her freedom of movement. Myles concedes he
attacked the victim, which a reasonable fact finder could find gave her reason to
be in fear of further attacks. It is irrelevant that she had her keys and cell phone
with her. Neither of those items would remove Myles from the doorway. And it
does not matter that he walked away shortly after. The victim would not be able
to see through the door or walls to ascertain if the path of escape was clear. She
would not be able to assess her chances of escape without potentially risking her
own safety. Her freedom to move about was substantially restricted by his prior
use of force and later threats. 9
Because Myles failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he was
factually innocent of false imprisonment, his actual innocence claim must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Myles’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.