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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 HENRY JAMES, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01781-JHC 8
Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 H-MART NORTHWEST 11 HEADQUARTERS OFFICE ET AL.,
12 Defendants. 13
14 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte on pro se Plaintiff Henry James’s 15 Amended Complaint. Dkt. # 13. 16 As stated in this Court’s previous Order, 17 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Richardson v. United States, 18 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction.” Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, 19 Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). This includes establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. 20 If, at any time, a “federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 21 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
22 Dkt. # 7 at 1. Accordingly, this Court can review Plaintiff’s claims only if it is first convinced 23 that it has federal subject matter jurisdiction. As this Court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s 24 claims for lack of diversity jurisdiction, see Dkt. # 7 at 5, and Plaintiff contends that federal 1 question jurisdiction forms the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, see generally Dkt. ## 10 & 13, 2 the Court limits its analysis to whether it has federal question jurisdiction. 3 District courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the
4 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As explained by the 5 Supreme Court, “[i]t is the settled interpretation of these words . . . that a suit arises under the 6 Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause 7 of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.” Louisville & Nashville R. 8 Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Federal question jurisdiction thus requires a federal 9 question to be “presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar 10 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152 (“It is not enough 11 that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the 12 defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.”). And
13 unsupported conclusions of law and frivolous federal claims cannot support a finding of subject 14 matter jurisdiction. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962); see also McCarthy v. Mayo, 15 827 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under Washington state law and the 17 First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. See Dkt. # 13 at 4. As 18 Plaintiff’s state-law claims do not “arise” under a federal law, these claims cannot confer 19 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, the Court can assert federal question jurisdiction only 20 if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint properly pleads a constitutional violation under the First, 21 Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that he has done this, alleging that: (1) 22 Defendant employees violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him with unreasonable
23 force; and (2) Defendant Orlosky violated his First Amendment rights by coercing Defendant 24 employees to file theft charges against him. See Dkt. # 13 at 2. He also contends that although 1 Defendant employees are private parties, the Court can and should view them as state actors 2 under the state action doctrine. Id. at 3. 3 But Plaintiff’s arguments cannot be squared with the caselaw governing constitutional
4 claims against private parties. The Constitution protects citizens from arbitrary governmental 5 action, not from the acts of private individuals. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment, which 6 incorporates the First and Fourth Amendments against the states, “applies only against acts of a 7 state, i.e., ‘state action.’” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989) (First 8 Amendment); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (Fourth Amendment). 9 Although a private entity can sometimes be treated as a state actor for constitutional purposes, 10 such treatment is reserved for “exceptional cases” where the party could “fairly be said to be a 11 state actor[.]” Child.’s Health Def. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 112 F.4th 742, 754 (9th Cir. 12 2024), cert. denied, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1130 (2025) (citations omitted). For a private party to satisfy
13 this requirement, it must “meet one of four tests: (1) the private actor performs a traditionally 14 public function; (2) the private actor is a ‘willful participant in joint activity’ with the 15 government; (3) the government compels or encourages the private actor to take a particular 16 action; or (4) there is a ‘sufficiently close nexus’ between the government and the challenged 17 action.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 18 Here, the Court cannot find that Defendant employees engaged in state action such that 19 they could fairly be described as “state actors” under any of the applicable tests. As for the 20 public function test, courts have held that private security guards and other individuals exercising 21 the shopkeeper’s privilege are not state actors. See Okunuga v. Yakima Cnty., Wash., 2008 WL 22 2937560, at *5 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 2008); see also Collins, 878 F.2d at 1150 (collecting cases).
23 They have also concluded that such arrests do not convert private citizens into state actors under 24 the joint action or nexus test, see Okunuga, 2008 WL 2937560, at *5 (collecting cases); Collins, 1 878 F.2d at 1154–55 (collecting cases), as state action requires “pervasive entwinement” 2 between governmental actors and the ostensibly private entity. See Brentwood Acad. v. 3 Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001). This is true even where, as
4 here, a private citizen works with the police to file charges against the suspected shoplifter, see 5 Collins, 878 F.2d at 1155 (collecting cases), as “‘[c]oercion’ and ‘encouragement’ are like 6 ‘entwinement’ in referring to kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private 7 action as public instead.” Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 HENRY JAMES, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01781-JHC 8
Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 H-MART NORTHWEST 11 HEADQUARTERS OFFICE ET AL.,
12 Defendants. 13
14 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte on pro se Plaintiff Henry James’s 15 Amended Complaint. Dkt. # 13. 16 As stated in this Court’s previous Order, 17 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Richardson v. United States, 18 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction.” Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, 19 Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). This includes establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. 20 If, at any time, a “federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 21 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
22 Dkt. # 7 at 1. Accordingly, this Court can review Plaintiff’s claims only if it is first convinced 23 that it has federal subject matter jurisdiction. As this Court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s 24 claims for lack of diversity jurisdiction, see Dkt. # 7 at 5, and Plaintiff contends that federal 1 question jurisdiction forms the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, see generally Dkt. ## 10 & 13, 2 the Court limits its analysis to whether it has federal question jurisdiction. 3 District courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the
4 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As explained by the 5 Supreme Court, “[i]t is the settled interpretation of these words . . . that a suit arises under the 6 Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause 7 of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.” Louisville & Nashville R. 8 Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Federal question jurisdiction thus requires a federal 9 question to be “presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar 10 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152 (“It is not enough 11 that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the 12 defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.”). And
13 unsupported conclusions of law and frivolous federal claims cannot support a finding of subject 14 matter jurisdiction. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962); see also McCarthy v. Mayo, 15 827 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under Washington state law and the 17 First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. See Dkt. # 13 at 4. As 18 Plaintiff’s state-law claims do not “arise” under a federal law, these claims cannot confer 19 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, the Court can assert federal question jurisdiction only 20 if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint properly pleads a constitutional violation under the First, 21 Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that he has done this, alleging that: (1) 22 Defendant employees violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him with unreasonable
23 force; and (2) Defendant Orlosky violated his First Amendment rights by coercing Defendant 24 employees to file theft charges against him. See Dkt. # 13 at 2. He also contends that although 1 Defendant employees are private parties, the Court can and should view them as state actors 2 under the state action doctrine. Id. at 3. 3 But Plaintiff’s arguments cannot be squared with the caselaw governing constitutional
4 claims against private parties. The Constitution protects citizens from arbitrary governmental 5 action, not from the acts of private individuals. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment, which 6 incorporates the First and Fourth Amendments against the states, “applies only against acts of a 7 state, i.e., ‘state action.’” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989) (First 8 Amendment); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (Fourth Amendment). 9 Although a private entity can sometimes be treated as a state actor for constitutional purposes, 10 such treatment is reserved for “exceptional cases” where the party could “fairly be said to be a 11 state actor[.]” Child.’s Health Def. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 112 F.4th 742, 754 (9th Cir. 12 2024), cert. denied, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1130 (2025) (citations omitted). For a private party to satisfy
13 this requirement, it must “meet one of four tests: (1) the private actor performs a traditionally 14 public function; (2) the private actor is a ‘willful participant in joint activity’ with the 15 government; (3) the government compels or encourages the private actor to take a particular 16 action; or (4) there is a ‘sufficiently close nexus’ between the government and the challenged 17 action.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 18 Here, the Court cannot find that Defendant employees engaged in state action such that 19 they could fairly be described as “state actors” under any of the applicable tests. As for the 20 public function test, courts have held that private security guards and other individuals exercising 21 the shopkeeper’s privilege are not state actors. See Okunuga v. Yakima Cnty., Wash., 2008 WL 22 2937560, at *5 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 2008); see also Collins, 878 F.2d at 1150 (collecting cases).
23 They have also concluded that such arrests do not convert private citizens into state actors under 24 the joint action or nexus test, see Okunuga, 2008 WL 2937560, at *5 (collecting cases); Collins, 1 878 F.2d at 1154–55 (collecting cases), as state action requires “pervasive entwinement” 2 between governmental actors and the ostensibly private entity. See Brentwood Acad. v. 3 Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001). This is true even where, as
4 here, a private citizen works with the police to file charges against the suspected shoplifter, see 5 Collins, 878 F.2d at 1155 (collecting cases), as “‘[c]oercion’ and ‘encouragement’ are like 6 ‘entwinement’ in referring to kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private 7 action as public instead.” Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303. The Court thus concludes that Defendant 8 employees’ detention of Plaintiff under RCW 4.24.220 and subsequent filing of charges with the 9 police cannot be fairly characterized as “state action.”1 Plaintiff has thus failed to plead a proper 10 Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant employees. 11 Plaintiff has also failed to plead a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Orlosky. 12 Although Defendant Orlosky is a state actor, the Amended Complaint (as well as Plaintiff’s prior 13 submissions) indicate that Defendant Orlosky did not arrive at the scene of the incident until 14 after Defendant employees allegedly used excessive force. See generally Dkt. # 13; see also 15 Dkt. # 5. The Amended Complaint thus fails to plead any facts that would suggest that 16 Defendant Orlosky engaged in excessive or unreasonable force against Plaintiff in violation of 17 the Constitution. As unsupported conclusions of law and frivolous federal claims are insufficient 18 to confer federal question jurisdiction, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s statement of his 19 own cause of action presents a federal question under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by 20 the Fourteenth Amendment. 21
22 1 The Court also notes that none of Plaintiff’s cited cases suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (holding that the plaintiffs did not establish state action); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974) (same); Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298 (finding 23 an association is a state actor because its members consist of public institutions and public officials); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (holding that the exercise of a peremptory 24 challenge in a courtroom is state action). 1 The Court also does not find that Plaintiff's case “arises” under the First Amendment, as 2. || incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Plaintiffs First Amendment argument is 3 not entirely clear on the face of the Amendment Complaint, the Court notes that the First 4 || Amendment protects citizens from government intrusions into their individual rights to associate 5 || speak. See U.S. Const. amend I. Plaintiff thus cannot assert a First Amendment claim based 6 || on Defendant Orlosky’s right to associate or Defendant employees’ right to file a police report. 7 || See Dkt. # 13 at 3-4. The Court is also aware of no caselaw that would support a First g || Amendment claim based on Defendant Orlosky, 1-e. an individual state actor, allegedly coercing 9 Plaintiff to confess to theft. 10 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's suit does not arise under the First, 11 Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment, nor any other federal law. It thus concludes that Plaintiff's 12 Amended Complaint does not establish federal question jurisdiction and must be dismissed for 13 lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1). As the Court has 14 already granted Plaintiff leave to amend, see Dkt. ## 7, 12, and the Court believes that further || leave to amend would be futile given the nature of the jurisdictional issues identified in this 16 || Order and its Order to Show Cause (Dkt. # 7), the Court DISMISSES this action without 17. || prejudice. 18 Dated this 14th day of January, 2026. 19 Cok. Chas 20 John H. Chun United States District Judge 21 22 23 24