Henning v. Romeo, No. Fa 96 0070932 (Dec. 4, 1997)

1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13622
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedDecember 4, 1997
DocketNo. FA 96 0070932
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13622 (Henning v. Romeo, No. Fa 96 0070932 (Dec. 4, 1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henning v. Romeo, No. Fa 96 0070932 (Dec. 4, 1997), 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13622 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Background

The parties in this case are adjoining landowners on Candlewood Lake in New Milford, CT. The plaintiffs' home and and land is generally south of the defendants' home and land. The plaintiffs are seeking:

1. An injunction, both temporary and permanent, enjoining the CT Page 13623 defendants from blocking or impeding their right of way over and across the property of the defendants whether by closing a gate, or verbally accosting the plaintiffs, or by communicating to third parties that they have no right to use the easement to obtain access to the plaintiffs' property.

2. An injunction, both temporary and permanent, enjoining the defendants from interfering with or attempting to interfere with the right of the plaintiffs and their agents to come onto the property of the defendants for the purpose of cleaning, repairing, or renewing the septic system serving the plaintiffs' property.

On August 21, 1987, the plaintiff, Peter R. Henning, purchased the Henning property, and on March 22, 1995 he quit-claimed it to himself and to the co-plaintiff, Donna Henning.

The septic system which serves the plaintiffs' property is located on the defendants' property.

The plaintiffs claim that the defendants are interfering with their easement right to pass over the defendants' property for the purpose of gaining access to the public highway. (First Count)

The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants are interfering with their easement rights to go onto the defendants' property to maintain, repair and renew their septic system. (Second Count)

Discussion

After considering the testimony given at trial, the various exhibits introduced into evidence, and the briefs submitted by counsel, the court, having evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, finds the following facts.

A. Right of Way To Public Highway

The plaintiffs have a right of way ten feet wide to pass and repass from their property across the defendants' property to the public highway. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8). There is a gate with gateposts at the boundary line between the two properties, so situated that at least one of the gateposts is in the right of way, and the gate itself, if closed, interferes with the CT Page 13624 plaintiffs' passage over the right of way. The defendants have been closing the gate, thereby interfering with the plaintiffs' right of way. The presence of the gateposts, even if the gate itself is open, has narrowed the plaintiffs' use of the right of way to fewer than ten feet. Counsel for the defendants agreed, in final argument at trial, that the defendants would move one post so that neither post encroaches upon the ten feet right of way. The defendants have also admitted, in paragraph 2 of their Amended Answer the existence of this easement benefitting [benefiting] the plaintiffs' property, and burdening theirs.

The defendants have occasionally been closing the gate at the property line and have attempted verbally and by use of signs to discourage and prevent delivery and repair people from having access to the plaintiffs' property. The closing of the gate also interferes with the plaintiffs' unencumbered use of the right of way. Frequently, when it snows or is muddy, the gate cannot be fully opened. The plaintiff Donna Henning, is an airline hostess, and she occasionally arrives home late at night alone. When the gate is closed, Mrs. Henning has to get out of her car to open it, and because this property is in a wooded, secluded area, she is concerned about her safety and security.

The defendant Romeo has placed rocks in front of the gate on the right of way and has used abusive language toward the plaintiffs.

The gate, when closed, does not benefit the defendants at all. The only effect is to obstruct the plaintiffs' right of way.

B. The Septic system Easement

The plaintiffs have an easement to maintain "a septic tank, pipes, drains and fields used in connection" with their dwelling, which is located on the defendants' property, and a further right to enter upon the defendants' property "at any time, for the purpose of repairing or renewing said septic tank." This easement was granted to the plaintiffs' predecessor in title in a warranty deed from Adrian Van Muffling to Joseph C. Lynch, dated May 21, 1938 and recorded in Vol. 95, Page 176 of the New Milford Land Records, also on May 21, 1938. The language granting the easement reads as follows:

Together with the right and privilege to the grantee, his heirs, administrators and CT Page 13625 assigns, to maintain as presently located the septic tank, pipes, drains and fields used in connection with the dwelling house on the premises herein contained and located on other premises of the grantor immediately adjoining the within described premises on the north, and to enter upon said premises at any time for the purpose of repairing or renewing said septic tank, pipes, drains and fields and to do such digging and to make such excavations as may be necessary therefor, provided no unnecessary damage shall be occasioned thereby and the soil replaced in reasonable manner so that there may be no unsightly condition occasioned thereby. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4)

Approximately ten years later, the same grantor as above (Adrian Van Muffling) made reference to the Plaintiffs' septic system easement, in a deed of the servient property to the defendants' predecessors in title, William A. O'Leary, dated September 8, 1948 and recorded on September 9, 1948 in the New Milford Land Records, Vol. 113, Page 241. This deed did not create the easement, but repeats the language which created the easement ten years before in the deed to the plaintiffs' predecessor in title. This deed of the servient property also contained the following descriptive language:

The septic tank and the effluent drain is located as follows: The center of the septic tank, which is four feet in diameter, is marked by the intersection of two radii, one measured eighteen (18) feet from the southerly boundary of the property described herein and perpendicular thereto and the other measured 47 feet 10 inches from the iron bolt in the corner monument, marking the southwestern boundary of the property described herein. The tile effluent line from the septic tank extends 17 feet to the north end of the tank.

The above quoted language was not contained in the deed creating the easement.

The septic system has failed and must be replaced. It cannot be repaired. On January 31, 1996, the Town of New Milford sent CT Page 13626 the Plaintiffs a notice of violation for the "failing subsurface sewage disposal system," and the plaintiffs were ordered to correct the condition by April 1, 1996. A replacement system cannot be placed on top of the present one. It is likely that a new system can be designed for location in the same general area. To prepare for this, both percolation and deep hole tests must be conducted, which requires the use of a backhoe.

The cost of construction of a new septic system on the plaintiffs' property would be astronomical and prohibitive.

The defendants claim that the "existing septic tank is an illegal installation" on their property, and have demanded that the plaintiffs "remove the septic system and install it on their own property." The plaintiffs therefore are being prevented from replacing the septic system on the defendants' property.

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Bluebook (online)
1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13622, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henning-v-romeo-no-fa-96-0070932-dec-4-1997-connsuperct-1997.