OP ALA, Justice.
The single issue of which we take original cognizance
is whether the Governor has forfeited his office by failure to take an oath in the form prescribed by the provisions of 51 O.S.1961 § 2 [§ 2 or the statutory
oath].
We pronounce that the passage of State Question No. 466, Legislative Referendum No. 178, adopted by the people on September 9,1969, Art. XV, § 1, Okl. Const, [the constitutional oath], effected a repeal by substitution of the statutory oath.
No public official
is hence required to take an oath in that form
to qualify for office
and no
vacancy
stands created by a public official’s failure to file a § 2 oath.
We conclude that the Governor has
not
forfeited his office.
I.
THE COURT’S ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL COGNIZANCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF A SINGLE ISSUE
Petitioner Howard Hendrick [Petitioner or the Senator] tenders a public-law controversy the resolution of which will determine the legitimacy of the governor’s incumbency and settle the issue whether public officials are required to take an oath in the form prescribed by the provisions of 51 O.S.1961 § 2.
Generally, forfeiture of office may be pressed in a civil action which does not depend upon any particular remedial variant and can be accommodated by
judicial determ
ination
within the framework of any suitable rubric.
Since a forfeiture cannot be remitted by the Legislature, a judicial declaration of whether one has occurred is imperative.
Art. V, § 46, Okl. Const.
We
have chosen the method most effective procedurally, isolating for consideration and decision a single issue which — although not in the precise form advanced by Petitioner — is dis-positive of this public-law controversy and will put to rest any concerns articulated by the parties.
We hence take today original cognizance of this justiciable controversy in which no other court can afford speedy and adequate relief.
II.
PETITIONER, A STATE SENATOR, HAS STANDING TO TENDER THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION
Respondent challenges Petitioner’s
standing
to bring the tendered issue.
Standing refers to a person’s legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum.
It may be raised as an issue at any stage of the judicial process by any party or by the court sua sponte.
When a member of the law-making assembly initiates legal proceedings
in a representational capacity
as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives, that legislator can claim no elevated status in establishing standing. The lawmaker must meet the same threshold criteria
required of any other litigant.
An initial inquiry must reveal that (1) an actual or threatened injury (sometimes called injury-in-fact) has occurred, (2) some relief for the harm can be
given, and (3) the interest to be guarded is within a statutorily or constitutionally protected zone.
Not only is standing confined to those whose interest in the controversy is “direct, immediate and substantial”,
a litigant must also have a personal stake in the outcome.
Legislative process requires a substantial quantum of
interaction
by governor with legislator, whether the latter is a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Our Constitution gives to a governor the duty (a) to call the Legislature into special session and specify the subject to be acted upon,
(b) to approve or to veto an enrolled bill,
(c) to approve or disapprove appropriations,
(d) to communicate to the Legislature the condition of the State,
and (e) to make appointments,
some of which require Senate confirmation.
Governor and legislators are also linked by the former’s adjournment powers
and by shared pardon and parole
responsibilities.
The Senator’s interacting contacts vis-á-vis the Governor include (a) giving and receiving constitutionally mandated communications, (b) confirming or refusing to confirm the Governor’s appointees, (c) serving on appropriations and other committees, (d) voting on bills and (e) overriding vetoes. Whether the Senator’s vote in the confirmation process or to override the Governor’s veto is an exercise of futility or an effective governmental act depends upon the outcome of today’s controversy.
If the office is indeed vacant by forfeiture upon Respondent’s failure to take an oath in the form prescribed by 51 O.S.1961 § 2, then the Senator’s confirmation votes would be invited, and indeed cast, to place an imprimatur upon invalid appointments; and his vote to override the Governor’s veto would be in vain. The Senator clearly has shown
both
a plain, direct and legitimate interest in having this court’s declaration upon the tendered issue
and
a personal stake in the outcome.
The controversy is lively, real and the requirement of justiciability hence clearly met.
III.
ART. XV, § 2’S FORFEITURE-OF-OFFICE CLAUSE TARGETS SOLELY FAILURE TO TAKE THE CONSTITUTIONAL OATH REQUIRED OF ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS
The Oklahoma Constitution, this state’s highest law to which all statutes must yield, must be so construed as to give effect to the intent of its framers and of the people adopting it.
When a
declaration of forfeiture
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OP ALA, Justice.
The single issue of which we take original cognizance
is whether the Governor has forfeited his office by failure to take an oath in the form prescribed by the provisions of 51 O.S.1961 § 2 [§ 2 or the statutory
oath].
We pronounce that the passage of State Question No. 466, Legislative Referendum No. 178, adopted by the people on September 9,1969, Art. XV, § 1, Okl. Const, [the constitutional oath], effected a repeal by substitution of the statutory oath.
No public official
is hence required to take an oath in that form
to qualify for office
and no
vacancy
stands created by a public official’s failure to file a § 2 oath.
We conclude that the Governor has
not
forfeited his office.
I.
THE COURT’S ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL COGNIZANCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF A SINGLE ISSUE
Petitioner Howard Hendrick [Petitioner or the Senator] tenders a public-law controversy the resolution of which will determine the legitimacy of the governor’s incumbency and settle the issue whether public officials are required to take an oath in the form prescribed by the provisions of 51 O.S.1961 § 2.
Generally, forfeiture of office may be pressed in a civil action which does not depend upon any particular remedial variant and can be accommodated by
judicial determ
ination
within the framework of any suitable rubric.
Since a forfeiture cannot be remitted by the Legislature, a judicial declaration of whether one has occurred is imperative.
Art. V, § 46, Okl. Const.
We
have chosen the method most effective procedurally, isolating for consideration and decision a single issue which — although not in the precise form advanced by Petitioner — is dis-positive of this public-law controversy and will put to rest any concerns articulated by the parties.
We hence take today original cognizance of this justiciable controversy in which no other court can afford speedy and adequate relief.
II.
PETITIONER, A STATE SENATOR, HAS STANDING TO TENDER THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION
Respondent challenges Petitioner’s
standing
to bring the tendered issue.
Standing refers to a person’s legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum.
It may be raised as an issue at any stage of the judicial process by any party or by the court sua sponte.
When a member of the law-making assembly initiates legal proceedings
in a representational capacity
as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives, that legislator can claim no elevated status in establishing standing. The lawmaker must meet the same threshold criteria
required of any other litigant.
An initial inquiry must reveal that (1) an actual or threatened injury (sometimes called injury-in-fact) has occurred, (2) some relief for the harm can be
given, and (3) the interest to be guarded is within a statutorily or constitutionally protected zone.
Not only is standing confined to those whose interest in the controversy is “direct, immediate and substantial”,
a litigant must also have a personal stake in the outcome.
Legislative process requires a substantial quantum of
interaction
by governor with legislator, whether the latter is a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Our Constitution gives to a governor the duty (a) to call the Legislature into special session and specify the subject to be acted upon,
(b) to approve or to veto an enrolled bill,
(c) to approve or disapprove appropriations,
(d) to communicate to the Legislature the condition of the State,
and (e) to make appointments,
some of which require Senate confirmation.
Governor and legislators are also linked by the former’s adjournment powers
and by shared pardon and parole
responsibilities.
The Senator’s interacting contacts vis-á-vis the Governor include (a) giving and receiving constitutionally mandated communications, (b) confirming or refusing to confirm the Governor’s appointees, (c) serving on appropriations and other committees, (d) voting on bills and (e) overriding vetoes. Whether the Senator’s vote in the confirmation process or to override the Governor’s veto is an exercise of futility or an effective governmental act depends upon the outcome of today’s controversy.
If the office is indeed vacant by forfeiture upon Respondent’s failure to take an oath in the form prescribed by 51 O.S.1961 § 2, then the Senator’s confirmation votes would be invited, and indeed cast, to place an imprimatur upon invalid appointments; and his vote to override the Governor’s veto would be in vain. The Senator clearly has shown
both
a plain, direct and legitimate interest in having this court’s declaration upon the tendered issue
and
a personal stake in the outcome.
The controversy is lively, real and the requirement of justiciability hence clearly met.
III.
ART. XV, § 2’S FORFEITURE-OF-OFFICE CLAUSE TARGETS SOLELY FAILURE TO TAKE THE CONSTITUTIONAL OATH REQUIRED OF ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS
The Oklahoma Constitution, this state’s highest law to which all statutes must yield, must be so construed as to give effect to the intent of its framers and of the people adopting it.
When a
declaration of forfeiture
is sought, the general principles of constitutional and statutory construction may be applied. The court must be
mindful of this
state’s strong statutory policy (as well as that of the surviving common law) which disfavors both private-
and public-law
forfeitures.
Courts will neither search for a construction that will bring about a forfeiture,
nor adopt a meaning which would produce that effect, unless the language of the statute or constitutional provision under consideration — giving due respect to its purpose and to extant circumstances — clearly demonstrates the legislature intended that a forfeiture take place.
The oath prescribed by Art. XV, § 1, Okl. Const, [the constitutional oath], which
all public officers
must take before entering upon their duties of office, provides:
All public officers,
before entering upon the duties of their offices, shall take and subscribe to the following oath or affirmation:
I, [blank], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, and that I will not, knowingly, receive, directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing, for the performance or nonperformance of any act or duty pertaining to my office, other than the compensation allowed by law; I further swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully discharge my duties as [blank] to the best of my ability.
The Legislature may prescribe further oaths or affirmations.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The forfeiture clause in Art. XV, § 2, Okl. Const., provides in pertinent part:
“The
foregoing
oath shall be administered by some person authorized to administer oaths, and in the case of State officers and judges of the Supreme Court, shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State ... any person refusing to take
said oath, or affirmation,
shall forfeit his office, and any person who shall have been convicted of having sworn or affirmed falsely, or having violated
said oath, or affirmation,
shall be guilty of pexjury, and shall be disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit within the State.... ”
This provision unmistakably refers to the constitutional oath in Art. XV, § 1. It targets solely the failure to take that oath.
Although Art. XV, § 1, permits the Legislature to prescribe other oaths or affirmations, we
cannot
infer from the constitution’s
forfeiture clause
that failure to take
some statutory oath
would similarly result in forfeiture of office. We hence hold that, even if we were to conclude today that the text of the § 2 (51 O.S.) oath does remain viable as a legislatively transformed mandatory supplemental oath, Art. XV, § 2 targets solely an official’s failure to take the constitutional oath.
IV.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE THE OATH PRESCRIBED BY 51 O.S.1961 § 2.
A.
PASSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL OATH IN 1969 EFFECTED A REPEAL BY SUBSTITUTION OF THE § 2 OATH IN ITS THEN-EXISTING FORM
According to Petitioner, the Governor is (a) required to take an oath in the form prescribed by § 2, (b) his failure to do so has resulted in forfeiture of office and (e) the Lieutenant Governor has succeeded him.
The pre-1969 oath regime consisted of (1) the Art. XV, § 1 oath [the first-generation oath],
required of senators, representatives, judicial, state and county officers, and (2) a carbon-copy oath (now found in § 2), enacted in 1910, to be taken by “every state, county, township, city, town, school district, or other officer under the laws of the State, and every deputy or assistant of any such officer.”
The Legislative history of 51 O.S.1961 § 2 shows that (1) it was cast to be in conformity with the first-generation oath and (2) was passed to eliminate the need to repeat that oath or make reference to it with respect to each public office.
A time-honored rule teaches that a revising statute (or, as in this case, a constitutional amendment) takes the place of all the former laws existing upon the subject with which it deals.
This is true even though it contains no express words to that effect.
In the strictest sense this process is not repeal by implication. Rather, it rests upon the principle that when it is apparent from the framework of the revision that whatever is embraced in the new law shall control and whatever is excluded is discarded, decisive evidence exists of an intention to prescribe the latest provisions as the only ones on that subject which shall be obligatory.
The ballot title of the 1969 amendment provides:
“Shall a Constitutional Amendment providing for
the form of oath of office
to be taken and subscribed to by
all public officers of Oklahoma,
be approved by the people ...”
The manifest intent of the 1969 amendment was to provide one mandatory constitutional oath for all public officers in a newly prescribed form.
The people’s grant of authority for the Legislature to
add new oaths
is a strong indication that, in addition to providing the one form of oath, the law
makers’ amendment was intended to (1) eliminate all non-eonforming oaths — including
not only
the text of the constitution’s first-generation oath
but also
that of its mirror-image in 51 O.S.1961 § 2, and (2) allow the lawmakers to decide what, if any, other supplemental oaths would be mandated.
B.
NO INDICIA OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO TRANSFORM 51 O.S.1961 § 2 INTO A MANDATORY SUPPLEMENTAL OATH ARE PRESENT
Petitioner urges that since the § 2 oath was carried forward into each decennial compilation following the constitutional change, an oath in the form prescribed by § 2 before the Constitution’s amendment in 1969 is a mandatory oath — supplemental to the constitutional oath — which every public officer
must take.
Under the constitutional mandate in Art. V, § 43, Okl. Const.,
the Legislature must revise Oklahoma laws every ten years. While a statute’s incorporation in a decennial compilation
purges or cures any procedural
defect
that might otherwise invalidate it,
inclusion in the codification of a statute which has been repealed by substitution does
not
inevitably give the discarded statute untrammeled viability.
The text of Art. XV, § 1, provides that “the Legislature
may ’prescribe
further oaths or affirmations” in addition to the constitutional oath. From the mere failure of the codifiers to excise § 2 from the next succeeding decennial compilations, we
cannot infer the Legislature’s intent to destroy
that section’s pedigree as a carbon-copy of the Art. XV, § 1 oath and to recast it into a totally new and different role as a viable mandatory supplemental oath. As we review the question before us, Petitioner
has the burden
to show the Legislature’s postamendment intent to transform § 2’s text from a mirror image of yesteryear’s first-generation,
supplanted
oath into an independently viable
supplemental
oath.
In the wake of the ’69 vote by the people, 51 O.S.1961 § 2 stood
replaced
by implied repeal by substitution and was brought into
conformity with the new constitutional oath.
The Legislature unquestionably had the
power
to give § 2’s pre-amendment text an independent existence as the state’s new mandatory supplemental oath; if that was indeed its intent, that goal could not be accomplished without some affirmative action.
Neither textually demonstrable indicia nor any legislative history has been advanced here in support of § 2’s intended transformation by a conscious legislative recognition.
C.
THE LONG-STANDING ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT OF 51 O.S.1961 § 2 (AS HAVING BEEN MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE LANGUAGE APPROVED BY THE 1969 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT) IS REASONABLE; WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO COGENT REASONS TO UNSETTLE THAT CONSTRUCTION
Until today, this court has never considered the postamendment status of § 2 nor has it decided whether the 1969 Amendment brought it into conformity status with the new constitutional text.
A 1987 opinion of the Attorney General construes the § 2 oath
as having been modified to so conform.
Although the state constitution establishes the office of the attorney general,
its duties and responsibilities are prescribed by statute.
As the state’s chief law officer, the attorney general has been entrusted with the duty of providing legal guidance to public officers and of advising them on questions of law which relate to their official duties.
An Attorney General’s opinion, though
always
merely advisory on a constitutional issue,
is nonetheless binding upon the state officials whom it affects.
Public officers have the duty to follow those opinions until they are judicially relieved of compliance.
Since a public officer’s failure to
heed
the attorney general’s
advice to perform a duty required by law
can result in
civil penalties,
it also follows from the sound principles of policy that one who
acts in conformity with the A. G.’s advice
should be afforded
the law’s protection from civil liability as well as from forfeiture of office,
at least until a clear judicial pronouncement would indicate a different course of conduct.
Acting on the Attorney General’s advice, state officials have followed the long-standing administrative construction that rendered ineffective the provisions of § 2. Of the most recent oaths filed with the Secretary of State by executive, judicial and legislative branch members, only those filed in the pre-1969 form of § 2 are (with one exception) from a handful of lawmakers who may have identified with the Petitioner’s lawsuit. Their newly delivered § 2 oaths were filed,
not
when they originally took office, but rather,
after
Petitioner had initiated this proceeding in November 1993.
A construction placed upon a statute or upon a constitutional provision by those charged with its administration — especially one of a long and continued duration — while not controlling, is entitled to be given great weight.
Unless that construction is found clearly wrong, it should not be east aside.
The Governor has complied with the Attorney General’s 1987 opinion.
This court has
not
found the A.G.’s construction of § 2 to be unsound, given the intent of the 1969 Constitutional Amendment which reconstituted the entire oath regime.
SUMMARY
When assuming original cognizance this court may choose but one of multiple issues tendered for its resolution of an urgent public-law controversy. As a lawmaker, the Senator has an interest in knowing whether the Senate’s official interdepartmental affairs with the Governor are being carried out legitimately, in accordance with the Constitution. The Senator hence has standing to seek this court’s pronouncement on whether the governor’s office stands occupied or became vacant by forfeiture due to the incumbent’s failure to take an oath in the form prescribed by 51 O.S.1961 § 2.
The 1969 Amendment of the provisions of Art. XV, § 1, Okl. Const., was intended to revamp the oath regime, repealing by substitution the § 2 oath and requiring the Legislature to act
affirmatively
in an effort to transform the text of § 2 into a mandatory supplemental oath. No indicia for this intended transformation have been advanced by the burden-bearing Petitioner and none have been found through our research. Post-1969 administrative interpretation of § 2, coupled with our own analysis, compels the conclusion that public officials are not required to take the oath which was last effectively prescribed by 51 O.S.1961 § 2.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; THE COURT PRONOUNCES THE GOVERNOR HAS NOT FORFEITED HIS OFFICE BY FAILURE TO TAKE AN OATH IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY THE PROVISIONS OF 51 O.S.1961 § 2.
HODGES, C.J., LAVENDER, V.C.J., and SIMMS, HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., concur.
SUMMERS, J., concurs in result.
WATT, J., disqualified.