318 Ga. 752 FINAL COPY
S24A0092. HENDERSON v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A DeKalb County jury found Gavin Henderson (“Henderson”)
guilty of malice murder, cruelty to children in the first degree, and
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection
with the fatal stabbing of his sister, Kiara Henderson.1 Henderson
contends the trial court erred in admitting prior-acts evidence,
failing to charge the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter, and
1 On September 11, 2018, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Henderson for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2-3); aggravated assault (Count 4); cruelty to children in the first degree (Counts 5 and 7); and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 6). Following a jury trial that ended on July 9, 2021, the jury found Henderson guilty on all counts. On that same date, the court sentenced Henderson to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; 20 years in prison for cruelty to children in the first degree (consecutive to Count 1); five years in prison for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (consecutive to Count 5); and 20 years in prison for cruelty to children in the first degree (consecutive to Count 6). The felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault count merged with the malice murder count. Henderson filed a motion for a new trial on August 3, 2021, and new counsel amended it on June 1, 2023. Following a hearing held on June 21, 2023, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on July 10, 2023. Henderson filed a notice of appeal on July 12, 2023. The case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. committing cumulative errors that require reversal. Because
Henderson’s claims of error are without merit, we affirm the trial
court’s order denying Henderson’s motion for a new trial.
The evidence adduced at trial shows the following. In June
2018, 27-year-old Henderson lived in the Lacota Apartments in
DeKalb County with his mother, Trayshelle Henderson, and his
three siblings, 21-year-old Ceaira Henderson, 15-year-old Kiara,
and 11-year-old Z. G. On June 18, Trayshelle and Ceaira left for
work, leaving Kiara and Z. G. at home with Henderson. That
afternoon, Henderson went to use the only bathroom in the
apartment, but Kiara was in it. When Kiara did not leave the
bathroom immediately, the siblings argued. Z. G., who was in a
nearby bedroom, heard the argument.
As Henderson tried to force the bathroom door open, he wedged
a clipboard (to which his cell phone was attached) between the door
and the door frame. Kiara pushed the door closed, which knocked
Henderson’s cell phone to the floor, damaging it. When Kiara left
the bathroom, the argument with Henderson escalated. Henderson
2 told the police that, at some point during the argument, he went to
his bedroom to retrieve a knife. Z. G. heard the argument and heard
Kiara threaten to call their mother; Kiara called her sister, Ceaira,
instead and told her that Henderson had hit her. Z. G. then heard
Kiara scream, so she left her room to see what was happening. Z. G.
followed the sound of screaming to the apartment’s front door.
When Z. G. peered outside to the apartment’s breezeway, she
saw Henderson striking Kiara in the abdomen with a “black metal
thing.” Z. G. yelled for her brother to stop, then she called the police
and her mother. Neighbors also called the police. The neighbors
reported hearing screaming in the breezeway and Kiara knocking
on their doors for help. When officers responded to the apartment
complex, they found Kiara lying on the breezeway floor. Her body
was covered in stab wounds, and she was surrounded by large pools
of blood.
Officers also received a 911 call from the manager of a
convenience store located about a half mile from the apartment
complex. The store manager said that Henderson, who had walked
3 into his store covered in blood and holding a bloody knife, told the
manager to call the police because he had just “killed someone.”
After the manager called the police, Henderson put the knife on the
store’s front counter and began wandering around inside the store.
When Henderson heard the sirens of the approaching police cars, he
walked out of the store with his hands raised, surrendering.
As he was taken into custody, Henderson told the police to “just
take him straight to county” and that if anyone in jail tried to “mess[
] with him there, he would kill them, too.” Officers retrieved the
bloody knife — an all-black Bowie hunting knife with a ten-inch-
long blade — from the store. Officers took Henderson to the precinct,
where he later waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be
interviewed. When the interviewing detective informed Henderson
that his sister did not survive, he responded: “Thank God.”
Henderson went on to tell the detective that he had “blacked out”
and was “in a trance” during the stabbing; however, he recounted in
detail events leading up to and following the stabbing. He said that
Kiara threw a glass bottle at him during their argument and that
4 when Z. G. called his name, he came out of his trance. Photographs
of the scene admitted at trial showed an unbroken bottle on the floor.
The medical examiner documented 47 major stab wounds
covering Kiara’s entire body, including two to her face and several
on her back. The medical examiner testified that the wound pattern
indicated that Kiara was stabbed with rapid, repetitive motions. The
shape of some of the wounds also indicated that the blade had been
twisted while inside Kiara’s body, either from her movements or her
assailant’s. The medical examiner also observed extensive defensive
wounds to Kiara’s hands and legs. The cause of death was
determined to be multiple stab wounds to the face, torso, and
extremities. The manner of death was homicide.
The State also presented evidence through the testimony of
Ceaira and her mother that Henderson had violently attacked
Ceaira a few months prior to the attack against Kiara. Ceaira
testified that, after she had apparently offended Henderson by
ignoring him, he argued with her, punched her, threw her to the
floor, and then left the room briefly. When he returned, he was
5 holding a black hunting knife. Ceaira went to her bedroom and tried
to call her mother, but Henderson followed her, took her phone, and
put the knife to her face. Henderson then told Ceaira to “call the
police, he was ready to go.” When Ceaira started crying, Henderson
left the apartment.
Trayshelle returned to the apartment when Ceaira called her
and told her that Henderson had attacked her. When Trayshelle
learned what had happened, she called Henderson back to the
apartment and told him that Ceaira could press charges against
him. Henderson, who was holding the knife he had used to threaten
Ceaira, started “raging.” Trayshelle took the knife from him and told
him he could not be in the house with a weapon. She hid his knife,
as well as the kitchen knives, in her bedroom closet.
1. Henderson contends that the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of the previous “unrelated altercation” between Henderson
and his sister Ceaira pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404
(b)”). Because evidence that Henderson had assaulted Ceaira with a
knife following a petty argument two months prior to the charged
6 offense was admissible for purposes of proving Henderson’s intent,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.2
“We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence
pursuant to Rule 404 (b) for a clear abuse of discretion.” Hood v.
State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020). “Rule 404 (b) is a
rule of inclusion, but it does prohibit the introduction of other acts
evidence when it is offered for the sole purpose of showing a
defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime.” Booth
v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 682 (3) (804 SE2d 104) (2017). Therefore, “[i]t
is well established that other acts evidence is not admissible ‘to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith,’” but “such evidence is admissible for other purposes,
2 Henderson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the prior act evidence to be admitted for the purposes of showing absence of mistake or accident. However, before Trayshelle and Ceaira testified, the trial court noted that it had not heard anything during the pretrial motion-in-limine hearing demonstrating how the proffered evidence was relevant for the purposes of showing absence of mistake or accident; consequently, it ruled that the evidence would be admitted only for the purpose of showing Henderson’s intent. The court gave the jury limiting instructions consistent with this ruling prior to both Trayshelle’s and Ceaira’s testimony. Thus, Henderson’s arguments on this point are not supported by the record and are without merit. 7 including ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Hood, 309
Ga. at 499 (2) (quoting Rule 404 (b)).
A party offering evidence pursuant to Rule 404 (b) must demonstrate three things: (1) that the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s character; (2) that the evidence’s probative value is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3) that sufficient proof exists for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other act.
Id.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence for the purpose of proving intent. “Because [Henderson]
entered a plea of not guilty, [he] made ‘intent a material issue, and
the State may prove intent by qualifying Rule 404 (b) evidence
absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an
issue.’” (Citation omitted.) Hood, 309 Ga. at 499-500 (2). “The
relevance of other acts evidence offered to show intent is established
when the prior act was committed with the same state of mind as
the charged crime.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 500
8 (2). “Where the intent required for the charged offenses and other
acts is the same, and intent is at issue, the first prong of the Rule
404 (b) test is satisfied.” Booth, 301 Ga. at 683 (3).
In this case, in addition to malice murder, Henderson was
charged in the indictment with committing an aggravated assault
against Kiara by assaulting her and stabbing her with a knife, “an
object which when used offensively against a person did result in
serious bodily injury.” See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (“A person
commits the offense of aggravated assault when he . . . assaults . . .
[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object . . . which, when used
offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in
serious bodily injury[.]”).3 Henderson’s prior incident with Ceaira
also involved acts which would constitute an aggravated assault
with a knife, an “object . . . which, when used offensively against a
person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”
3 OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) defines a simple assault as when a person either:
“(1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” 9 Id. The acts as alleged in the aggravated assault count of the
indictment and the acts as testified to by Ceaira concerning the prior
assault against her have in common the same general intent.
Although aggravated assault can be charged in other ways that
make the offense a specific intent crime, the way it was charged here
is a general intent crime, requiring proof only that Henderson had
the intent to (1) assault Kiara (2) with a knife, an object which, when
used offensively against a person, is likely to or does result in serious
bodily injury. See Booth, 301 Ga. at 684 (3). That Henderson
intentionally assaulted another sister with a knife, a weapon which
is likely to cause serious bodily injury, was relevant to show that he
committed a similar act with the same sort of intent as alleged in
the instant indictment. Because the intent required for the prior act
and the charged offense of aggravated assault is the same, the first
prong of the Rule 404 (b) test was satisfied. Id. at 686 (3).
Having concluded that the other-acts evidence satisfies the
first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test, we turn to the test’s second prong,
which is controlled by OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”).
10 Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence where “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” In other words, other acts evidence should be excluded if it constitutes matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. Factors to be considered in determining the probative value of other act evidence offered to prove intent include its overall similarity to the charged crime, its temporal remoteness, and the prosecutorial need for it.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hood, 309 Ga. at 500-501 (2).
We recognize that the other-acts evidence was certainly
prejudicial to Henderson, given that he was not charged with any
crimes arising from his assault on Ceaira, which can increase the
prejudicial impact of this evidence. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95,
105 (786 SE2d 648) (2016) (noting that the admission of other-acts
evidence poses greater danger where “the extrinsic activity was not
the subject of a prior conviction” because “the jury may feel that the
defendant should be punished for that activity even if he is not guilty
of the offense charged” (citation and punctuation omitted)). “But in
a criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; ‘it is
11 only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value
that the rule permits exclusion.’” (Citation omitted; emphasis in
original.) Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337 (3) (806 SE2d 573) (2017).
“Rule 403’s exclusionary force is meant to be applied sparingly —
primarily when the other-acts evidence has scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial
effect.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hounkpatin v. State,
313 Ga. 789, 796 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 201) (2022).
In this case, the prior-acts evidence was not required to be
excluded under Rule 403 because it was not substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice. The prosecutorial need was
significant because Henderson claimed to have “blacked out” during
the aggravated assault. He also argued that Kiara provoked him by
attacking him with a bottle. Thus, the State needed evidence from
which the jury could infer that his acts were intentional rather than
defensive or committed while “blacked out” or “in a trance.” See
Harrison v. State, 310 Ga. 862, 868 (3) (855 SE2d 546) (2021).
Further, the prior-acts evidence had significant probative value in
12 showing Henderson’s criminal intent to violently assault his sister
with a deadly weapon. The similarity of the acts against Ceaira to
the charged crimes was strong — Henderson overreacted to petty
arguments with his sisters by assaulting both with a large hunting
knife. Finally, the prior act was not temporally remote. The incident
with Ceaira occurred less than two months prior to the charged
crimes. Given the strong probative value of the evidence in showing
Henderson’s intent and in rebutting any claim of self-defense, we see
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that the probative
value of the other-acts evidence was not substantially outweighed
by any unfair prejudice. See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 868 (3). “This is
particularly true given that the trial court instructed the jury, both
prior to [Trayshelle’s and Ceaira’s] testimony and at the close of the
evidence, that this evidence was to be considered only for the limited
purposes for which it was admitted.” Id.
As to the third and final prong of the Rule 404 (b) test, Ceaira’s
and Trayshelle’s testimony was sufficient to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Henderson did in fact commit
13 the acts about which they testified. Thus, we see no clear abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s admission of the other-acts evidence.
See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 869 (3). This claim of error therefore fails.
2. Henderson contends the trial court erred in refusing to
charge the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary
manslaughter is the killing of another person under circumstances
that would otherwise be murder when the killer “acts solely as the
result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from
serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
person[.]” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).4 At trial, Henderson submitted a
written request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
Following arguments made by the defense and prosecution during
4 OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) provides in full:
A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person; however, if there should have been an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as murder. 14 the charge conference, the trial court denied Henderson’s request.
After the jury was charged, Henderson renewed his objection.
Because there was no evidence that would support giving an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in
denying the request.
“A trial court is required to grant a defendant’s request for a
charge on voluntary manslaughter if there is any evidence, however
slight, supporting the theory of the charge.” O’Neal v. State, 316 Ga.
264, 268 (3) (888 SE2d 42) (2023). “It is a question of law for courts
to determine whether the defendant has presented sufficient
evidence to warrant a requested charge.” Hudson v. State, 308 Ga.
443, 445 (2) (841 SE2d 696) (2020). Although slight evidence will
support giving the requested charge, “neither fear that someone is
going to pull a weapon nor fighting are the types of provocation that
demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Rountree v. State, 316 Ga. 691, 694 (2) (889
SE2d 803) (2023). Further, “words alone generally are not sufficient
provocation to excite the passion necessary to give rise to voluntary
15 manslaughter.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
Additionally, this Court has held that “the voluntary manslaughter
statute establishes an objective standard; the provocation required
to mitigate malice is that which would arouse a heat of passion in a
reasonable person.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in
original.) Watkins v. State, 313 Ga. 573, 577 (2) (872 SE2d 293)
(2022).
Henderson contends that the following evidence is sufficient to
warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter: 15-year-old Kiara
argued with Henderson about his efforts to oust her from the
bathroom; when Henderson tried to force open the door, Kiara
caused his cell phone case to break; during the argument, Kiara
threw a bottle at him; and Henderson believed Kiara was going to
the kitchen to get a knife with which to attack him, which is why he
got his own knife. He also contends that the “extreme” and “frenzied”
nature of his conduct in stabbing Kiara 47 times in a public area
suggests that he was “not acting out of conscious deliberation, but
rather out of intense anger or rage, which also would support a
16 voluntary manslaughter conviction.”
Although this evidence may have supported Henderson’s
motive for attacking Kiara, it is not sufficient as a matter of law to
establish the slight evidence required to support giving a charge on
voluntary manslaughter. The evidence does not show a “sudden,
violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.” OCGA § 16-
5-2 (a). That Henderson and Kiara argued prior to the stabbing
about access to the bathroom is not the type of provocation used to
support voluntary manslaughter under Georgia law. Therefore, this
heated exchange of words, without more, is insufficient provocation
to warrant a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. See Johnson
v. State, 297 Ga. 839, 844 (2) (778 SE2d 769) (2015) (“As a matter of
law, angry statements alone ordinarily do not amount to ‘serious
provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). Nor was Kiara’s act of knocking a clipboard
and cell phone out of Henderson’s hand the kind of act that would
excite the level of irresistible passion required under the law. See id.
17 at 842-844 (2). Further, there is no evidence that Kiara possessed or
used a weapon against Henderson. Even if Kiara threw a bottle at
Henderson and he acted to defend himself, “acting out of fear of
bodily harm is not the same as acting in the heat of passion, and
only evidence of the latter supports a voluntary manslaughter
conviction.” Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 790-791 (2) (809 SE2d 765)
(2018).
Because Henderson has not pointed to any evidence that 15-
year-old Kiara provided any serious provocation that would have
resulted in a reasonable person committing such a deadly act, we
conclude that the trial court properly found that “[t]he argument
between [Henderson] and his teenage sister over the use of the
bathroom . . . was insufficient to generate in a reasonable person a
sudden and irresistible passion to kill.”
3. Finally, Henderson contends that the trial court’s
cumulative errors were not harmless and require reversal. To
demonstrate cumulative prejudice that warrants a new trial,
Henderson must show that “at least two errors were committed in
18 the course of the trial; [and] considered together along with the
entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation
that they denied [Henderson] a fundamentally fair trial.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838
SE2d 808) (2020). Because Henderson has not carried his burden of
showing that at least two errors were committed during the trial,
this claim must fail. See id. We note that, because Henderson has
failed to demonstrate any trial court error, we need not decide what
type of error has been alleged, whether prejudice or harm has been
shown under the standard applicable to that type of error, or how
those standards may interact under a cumulative error review
involving different types of errors. See id.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
19 Decided April 16, 2024.
Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge LaTisha Dear
Jackson.
Pearce, LLC, Forrest G. Pearce, for appellant.
Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Deborah D. Wellborn, Tabitha
V. Pazmino, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan
H. Hill, Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,
Chelsea S. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.