Henderson v. Hunter

59 Pa. 335, 1869 Pa. LEXIS 22
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 2, 1868
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 59 Pa. 335 (Henderson v. Hunter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 335, 1869 Pa. LEXIS 22 (Pa. 1868).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 4th 1869, by

Agnew, J.

This was an action of trespass by church trustees. [340]*340under a deed of trust made by Thomas Pillow in 1836, for talcing down, and removing the materials of a church building in 1867. The case turns on the limitation in the deed. The legal estate of the trustees clearly has no duration beyond the use it was intended to protect. The word “successors” is used to perpetuate the estate, but as the trustees are an unincorporated body having no legal succession, there is nothing in the terms of the grant to carry the trust beyond its appropriate use. This brings us to the limitation of the use itself.

It is for the erection of “ a house or place of worship for the use of the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States of America (so long as they use it for that purpose, and no longer, and then to return back to the original owner), according to the rules and discipline which, from time to time, may be agreed upon and adopted by the ministers and preachers of the said church at their General Conference in the United States of America.” This is the main purpose of the trust, the other portions of the deed relating to the use being ancillary only to this principal object. The interjected words, “ so long as they use it for that purpose and no longer, and then to return back to the original owner,” are terms of undoubted limitation, and not of condition. They accompany the creation of the estate, qualify it, and prescribe the bounds beyond which it shall not endure.

The equitable estate is in the members of the church so long as they use the house as a place of worship in the manner prescribed, and no longer. This is the boundary set to their interest, and when this limit is transcended the estate expires by its own limitation, and returns to its author. The words thus used have not the slightest cast of a mere condition. No estate for any fixed or determinate period had been granted before these expressions were reached, and they were followed by no proviso or other indication of a condition to be annexed.

“A special limitation,” says Mr. Smith, in his work on Executory Interests, p. 12, “ is a qualification serving to mark out the bounds of an estate, so as to determine it ipso faeto in a given event without action, entry or claim, before it would, or might, otherwise expire by force of, or according to, the general limitation.” A special limitation may be created by the words “until,” “ so long,” “ if,” “ whilst” and “ during,” as when land is granted to one so long as he is parson of Dale, or while he continues unmarried, or until out of the rents he shall have made 5001.: 2 Black. Com. 155; Smith on Exec. Int. 12; Thomas Coke, 2 vol., 120-21; Fearne on Rem. 12, 13 and note p. 10. “ In such case,” says Blackstone, “the estate determines as soon as the contingency happens (when he ceases to be parson, marries a wife or has received the 5007), and the subsequent estate which depends [341]*341on such determination becomes immediately vested, without any act to be done by him who is next in expectancy.”

The effect of the limitation in this case was that the estate of the trustees terminated the moment the house ceased to be used as a place of worship according to the rules and discipline of the church, by the members to whose use in that manner it had been granted; and the reversion ipso facto returned to Thomas Pillow, the grantor. The abandonment of the house as a place of worship, therefore, became a chief question in the cause, because the title of the trustees to the property, and consequently their right to maintain this action, hinged upon this event. Then, as the use of the members of this church was to be according to the rules and discipline from time to time adopted by the General Conference, it became a question whether the alleged abandonment of the house as a place of worship was by church authority, and according to the rules and discipline then existing; for a mere temporary suspension of services there, or a discontinuance of the use without authority, would not, ipso facto, determine the use. Hence an inquiry both into the fact of abandonment and the authority of the church became essential.

According to the constitution and discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, its preachers, denominated deacons and elders, are not called by the societies to which they preach, but are appointed to stations, and to travel in circuits, by the presiding bishop of the annual conference. The power is lodged in him, but from a practical necessity he acts with the advice of his council of presiding elders assembled at the annual conference. The government of the church is clerical and not lay. It has no admixture of the laity, excepting in the quarterly conference of the circuit or station, in which certain lay official members are admitted to seats ex necessitate rei. The annual conferences are composed of the deacons and elders in the travel-ling ministry within the respective conferences, presided over by a bishop or superintendent, as originally termed, assigned to hold the conference by the board of bishops. The general conference consists of delegates, elected by all the annual conferences from among the travelling preachers, presided over by the bishops in turn, and holding its sessions quadriennially.

The annual conferences are divided into districts, composed of the circuits and stations within their respective boundaries. Over each district the bishop, at the annual conference, appoints an elder to preside, who travels his district four times a year, and presides at the quarterly conferences in each circuit or station, composed of the travelling and local preachers, exhorters, stewards, class leaders, trustees and first male superintendent of Sunday schools. A station has a single place of stated public service, while a circuit has several. It is to these circuits and stations [342]*342the travelling preachers are assigned at every annual conference. In his circuit or station the preacher in charge arranges or “ plans” the appointments of service during the term of his own appointment. In planning the circuit he may take the advice of the stewards, if he choose to ask it; and in arranging the appointments for service it is his duty to give the local preachers within his charge regular and systematic employment on the Sahbath.

Ho specific directions are found in the discipline as to the arrangement of the appointments, and the whole subject seems in a great measure committed to the sound discretion of the travelling preacher in charge, subject only to the discipline duty of preaching where there is the greatest number of quiet, willing hearers, the most fruit, and where the Spirit most abounds; and subject to the superintending control of the presiding elder, whose duty it is to oversee the spiritual and temporal business of the church; to take charge of all elders and deacons in his district, and to take care that the discipline shall be enforced in his district.

As to the particular building or house in which services shall be statedly held, there is nothing definite in the discipline, and the authority over it seems to be only inferential, arising out of the power of the preacher in charge to arrange the appointments of service, which must include places as well as times of appointment.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 Pa. 335, 1869 Pa. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henderson-v-hunter-pa-1868.