Henderson v. Anderson

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 23, 2019
• Docket: 2:19-cv-00789
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 DONALD HENDERSON and GLORIA 9 HENDERSON, 10 Case No. 2:19-cv-00789-RAJ Plaintiffs,

11 ORDER GRANTING v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 12 DISMISS JUDGE KRISTEN ANDERSON, 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and 17 Plaintiffs’ motion for clarification. Dkt. ## 10, 16. 18 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 19 # 16. The Court also DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s motion for clarification. Dkt. # 10. 20 II. BACKGROUND 21 The allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint stem from a contested traffic hearing that 22 occurred on April 7, 2017. Dkt. # 1-1. Plaintiffs claim that during the hearing Judge Pro 23 Tem Anderson indicated support for the officer’s report of the traffic stop and knowingly 24 made additional statements about Plaintiff Donald Henderson’s conduct during the event. 25 Plaintiffs claim that Judge Anderson’s statements about Mr. Henderson were of the type 26 that constitute elder abuse. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs further claim that this hearing was 27 unprecedented, illegal and personal as Judge Anderson did not permit Plaintiffs to put forth 1 a defense to rebut her understanding of the events. Id. at 3. 2 Plaintiffs bring this action arguing that several of their constitutional rights were 3 violated. Id. at 2. Specifically, plaintiffs claim Judge Anderson violated their rights to an 4 impartial jury, to confront witnesses, to speedy trial, to have witnesses appear, and to equal 5 protection under the law. Id. 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) 8 Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to assume the truth of the complaint’s factual 9 allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. 10 Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations 11 that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 12 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is 13 “any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint” that would entitle the 14 plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“When there are 15 well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 16 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). The court typically cannot 17 consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, although it may rely on a 18 document to which the complaint refers if the document is central to the party’s claims and 19 its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). 20 The court may also consider evidence subject to judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 21 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 Because Plaintiffs are pro se, the court must construe the complaint liberally when 23 evaluating it under the Iqbal standard. See Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 24 1011 (9th Cir. 2011). Although the court holds the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs to “less 25 stringent standards than those of licensed attorneys,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 26 (1972), “those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a 27 defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the 1 Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the court should “not supply essential 2 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 3 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, “[l]eave to amend should be granted 4 unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should 5 be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs.” McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 6 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)) 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Even construing Plaintiffs’ complaint liberally, the Court finds it proper to grant 9 Defendant’s motion. All of the alleged conduct complained about here occurred while 10 Judge Anderson presided in open court. Dkt. # 1-1 at 1. “Judges are immune from suit 11 arising out of their judicial acts, without regard to the motives with which their judicial acts 12 are performed, and notwithstanding such acts may have been performed in excess of 13 jurisdiction, provided there was not a clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject 14 matter.” Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1963); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 15 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (explaining that a judge will not be deprived of immunity because 16 the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority). 17 Because Plaintiffs allege here that Judge Anderson was carrying out duties related to the 18 judicial process (namely, presiding over a contested hearing), she is entitled to judicial 19 immunity. 20 Ordinarily, leave to amend a complaint should be freely given following an order of 21 dismissal, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 22 cured by amendment.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 23 citations omitted). Because all of the acts complained about here occurred while Judge 24 Anderson presided in court, there are no viable alternative claims for this set of facts where 25 relief could be granted. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 26 1992) (“A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment 27 would be futile.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion without leave 1 to amend. 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 4 Dkt. # 16. The Court also DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s motion for clarification. Dkt. # 5 10. 6 7 DATED this 23rd day of August, 2019. 8 A 9

10 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 11 United States District Judge 12

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27