UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOYCE HENDERSON,
Plaintiff, v. No. 19-cv-1765 (EGS) AMERICAN EAGLE PROTECTIVE SERVICES CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Joyce Henderson (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Henderson”)
brings this action against Defendant American Eagle Protective
Services Corporation (“Defendant” or “AEPS”) alleging
discrimination on the basis of sex/gender under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et
seq., (Count I) and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C.
Code § 2-1402.11, et seq., (Count III); and retaliation in
violation of Title VII (Count II) and the DCHRA (Count IV).
Pending before the Court is AEPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Ms.
Henderson’s: (1) gender discrimination claims under Title VII
and DCHRA arising from a hostile work environment; and (2)
gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the DCHRA
arising from a discriminatory pay differential.1 Upon careful
1 Defendants updated the claims for which they seek dismissal based on Plaintiff’s clarification of her claims in her Opposition briefing. See Def.’s Reply, ECF 12-1. consideration of the motion, the opposition, the reply thereto,
the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART AEPS’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts reflect the allegations in the
operative complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the
purposes of deciding this motion and construes in Ms.
Henderson’s favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 2015). Ms. Henderson began working for AEPS in or
about October of 2013, as a security officer/special police
officer and eventually became a lieutenant. Compl., ECF No. 1 at
3 ¶ 6.2 Ms. Henderson alleges that in April of 2016, a
subordinate officer made sexual advances towards her, which she
rebuffed. See id. at 3 ¶ 7. After the rebuff, the subordinate
officer filed an internal complaint against Ms. Henderson
alleging that she was “spending too much time with a [another
officer].” Id. Thereafter, Ms. Henderson alleges that the
subordinate officer became a “continuing problem at work,”
because he was “routinely insubordinate” in refusing to follow
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed document. 2 Ms. Henderson’s instructions. Id. According to Ms. Henderson,
whenever she would report the issues involving the subordinate
officer to her superiors, she was “ignored, insulted, and/or
harassed.” Id. Specifically, Ms. Henderson alleges that when she
reported the subordinate officer to Captain Brooks, one of her
superiors, he responded that “there was a report that [Ms.
Henderson] was having sex with a co-employee at work.” Id. Ms.
Henderson believes that Captain Brooks repeated the accusation
as if he adopted the statement as fact, but noted that it still
would not justify the subordinate officer’s insubordination.
Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3-4 ¶ 7. Ms. Henderson found the statement
“demeaning and insulting.” Id. at 4 ¶ 8. During a later 2016
meeting between Ms. Henderson, the subordinate officer, and Mr.
Covington, her direct supervisor, the subordinate officer stated
to Ms. Henderson, “you came down here [i.e., work] in a dress
with no underwear on.” Id. at 4 ¶ 9. Ms. Henderson later
reported the incident to AESP’s Human Resources department, but
nothing was done. Id. Over the years, the subordinate officer
continued to make comments, similar to the “no underwear”
comment, towards Ms. Henderson. Id. Ms. Henderson expressed her
frustration to Mr. Covington, who told her that if she filed a
charge against the subordinate officer, she “could be fired for
using profanity.” Id. at 4-5 ¶ 9. Ms. Henderson alleges that
“Mr. Covington, on multiple occasions, sexistly [sic] and
3 inappropriately, referred to [her] as ‘Joey’s girl’ (‘Joey,’
presumably being a reference to Joe Ortman [a project manager])”
and sexually propositioned her by asking “when are you going to
let me come to Waldorf?” Id. at 5 ¶ 10.
Ms. Henderson alleges that “Mr. Covington treated women
differently than men,” and as an example alleges that he shouted
at her improperly, saying “you need to stay your ass here, to
complete two schedules,” even though it was his job to complete
the schedules. Id. at 5 ¶ 11. According to Ms. Henderson, Mr.
Covington was reprimanded by Mr. Ortman. Id. In a separate
incident, Ms. Henderson alleges that when she advised Captain
Brooks that she could not work past her shift due to a family
obligation, he stated to her, “you’re full of shit,” and Mr.
Covington later told her that if she was asked to work past her
shift, she had to work past her shift. Id. at 5 ¶ 12. Ms.
Henderson alleges that she is not aware any of her male
colleagues being spoken to in the same manner or being held to
the same standard, noting that her male colleague, Lieutenant
Sims, “rarely if ever worked [past his shift]” and was
“repeatedly and consistently given scheduling preferences” even
though Ms. Henderson was more senior. Id. Though Lieutenant Sims
was hired in “approximate 2016-17,” he was paid “more (or the
same) for less work performance duties than [Ms.] Henderson
performed,” and Ms. Henderson alleges that AEPS’s “‘night
4 differential’ [pay] was discriminatory ....” Id. at 6 ¶ 13.
Ms. Henderson alleges that “[o]n January 18, 2018, [she]
filed a written internal complaint of sexual discrimination with
[AEPS].” Id. at 6 ¶ 14. Ms. Henderson alleges that, after filing
the internal complaint, AEPS immediately began to retaliate
against her, and ostracize her by assigning her tasks without
her knowledge, which would cause her to either have to hurriedly
complete the task or fail to complete the task. Id. at 6 ¶ 15.
Ms. Henderson alleges that, on March 8, 2018, for the first
time, AEPS failed to advise her of a “lock-out” at work, which
she found out about by chance; but had she failed to perform her
“lock-out” duties, she would have been subject to discipline.
Id. at 6-7 ¶ 16. Ms. Henderson alleges that Mr. Covington
continued to “engage[] in verbally threatening and/or harassing
conduct towards” her, such on March 15, 2018, when he and AEPS
terminated her without providing a reason. Id. at 7 ¶ 17. Ms.
Henderson alleges that her “male colleagues were not terminated
for committing such significant infractions as sleeping at work,
negligently discharging a weapon at work, and leaving a loaded
weapon unattended; [and she] had never been disciplined before
her termination.” Id. Finally, Ms. Henderson notes that, during
her termination meeting, AEPS stated that her “unemployment
[benefits] will not be contested.” Id. at 7 ¶ 18.
Ms. Henderson filed a Charge with the Equal Employment
5 Opportunity Commission(“EEOC”) on or about June 29, 2018 and was
issued a Right-to-Sue Notice on March 20, 2019. Id. at 2 ¶ 3.
B. Procedural History
On June 18, 2019, Ms. Henderson filed the operative
complaint, see Compl., ECF No. 1, in response to which AEPS
filed its Partial Motion to Dismiss on August 16, 2019. See
Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 (“Def.’s Mot.”). Ms.
Henderson filed her Opposition to Partial Motion to Dismiss on
September 5, 2019, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 11 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), and AEPS filed its Reply to
Opposition to Partial Motion to Dismiss on September 12, 2019.
See Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12
(“Def.’s Reply”).
The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court will
dismiss a claim if the complaint fails to plead “enough facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), “in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the
6 ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if it
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
[a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint alleging facts which are
“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The “doors of discovery” should not be opened for a “plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 679.
III. Analysis
AEPS initially argued that Ms. Henderson’s claims of gender
discrimination should be dismissed because, outside of her
termination, she failed to identify any adverse employment
actions to support her claims of discrimination” and that any
“claims of discrimination . . . based upon discrete acts or
episodes” that occurred in 2016 should be dismissed as untimely
under both Title VII and the DCHRA. Def.’s Mot, ECF No. 9-1 at
6-9.
7 In her Opposition, Ms. Henderson states that each of her
“[d]iscrimination counts has three components: (i)
discriminatory employment discharge; (ii) hostile work
environment; and (iii) discriminatory pay differential.” Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF 11 at 1. Ms. Henderson then argues that “(1) AEPS’s
attempt to dismiss foundational factual allegations under Rule
12(b)(6) is legally improper ....;” (2) her complaint “states
viable claims for hostile work environment and discriminatory
pay differential; and (3) “even if Plaintiff has not stated a
viable claim for hostile work environment and/or discriminatory
pay differential, allegations sought to be dismissed should not
be ordered removed from the [c]omplaint because they provide
pertinent ‘background information’ and/or are the subject of
proof and discovery in this case.” Id. at 1.
In its Reply, AEPS “clarifies that its Motion for Partial
Dismissal should be read to seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
for ‘hostile work environment’ and ‘discriminatory pay
differential.” Def.’s Reply, ECF 12 at 7-8. AEPS then argues
that Ms. Henderson’s hostile work environment claims under Title
VII and the DCHRA are untimely, see id. at 8-13, and reiterates
that her pay differential claim should be dismissed (1) under
Title VII for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and (2)
under the DCHRA because it is untimely. See id. at 14-17.
8 A. AEPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is Appropriate.
In her Opposition, Ms. Henderson argues that AEPS’s
“Partial” Dismissal Motion is legally improper. See Pl.’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 11 at 4. Citing several cases from district courts
outside this Circuit, Ms. Henderson contends that “[f]ederal
District Courts have recognized that it is legally improper to
dismiss component allegations of an otherwise proper cause of
action.” Id. AEPS counters that the Court is not precluded from
granting a Motion for Partial Dismissal and notes that the Court
has granted similar motions on multiple occasions. See Def.’s
Reply, ECF 12 at 6.
To support her argument, Ms. Henderson cites Charles v.
Front Royal Volunteer Fire & Rescue Dep't, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d
620, 629 (W.D. Va. 2014), where the court ruled that a motion
for partial dismissal cannot be based on the type of relief
requested. However, this case is not persuasive because AEPS’s
motion does not seek dismissal based on the type of relief Ms.
Henderson is requesting, but instead seeks dismissal of the
actual claims alleged in her complaint. See Def.’s Reply, ECF
No. 12. Indeed, as AEPS points out, this Court has granted
motions for partial dismissal in several cases. See, e.g., Brown
v. Vilsack, 866 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd, No. 13-
5051, 2013 WL 4711192 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2013); Alston v. Whole
9 Foods Mkt. Grp., No. CV 17-2580 (EGS), 2018 WL 2561041, at *1
(D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2018). Accordingly, the Court finds AEPS’s
Motion for Partial Dismissal to be appropriate.
B. Ms. Henderson’s Gender Discrimination Claims under Title VII and the DCHRA arising from a Hostile Work Environment are Timely
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the DCHRA
prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual
on the basis of a sex. See D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1). Because
the legal standards for establishing discrimination claims under
Title VII and the DCHRA are substantively the same, the Court
will analyze Ms. Henderson’s claims under these statutes
together. See Burrell v. Shepard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C.
2018) (Sullivan, J.) (citing Carpenter v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, 165 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). To state a claim for
hostile work environment under both Title VII and the DCHRA, “a
plaintiff must show that [her] employer subjected [her] to
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”
Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal
10 quotation marks and citations omitted). However, to succeed “on
a motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to establish a prima
facie case.” Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the D.C., 113
F. Supp. 3d 297, 310 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Gordon v. U.S.
Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
Nonetheless, Ms. Henderson “must allege facts that, if true,
would establish the elements of each claim.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Before commencing an action based on Title VII, a plaintiff
must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Lewis v. City
of Chicago, Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 210(2010). Generally, “a Title
VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or
retaliatory acts must file his charge within the appropriate
time period . . . 300 days – set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1).” Nat'l. Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 122 (2002). The lawsuit following the EEOC charge is
“limited in scope to claims that are like or reasonably related
to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such
allegations.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir.
1995). Specifically, a plaintiff's claims “must arise from the
administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to
follow the charge of discrimination.” Id. To be actionable under
the DCHRA, the plaintiff must file a claim “within one year of
11 the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof . . .
.” D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a).
Because “[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of
a series of separate acts that collectively constitute ‘one
unlawful employment practice,’” the timeliness analysis for
those claims is different than claims involving discrete acts.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. For a hostile work environment claim to
be timely, “the employee need only file a charge within ... 300
days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment”
claim. Singletary v. Dist. of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (emphasis in the original); see also Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 122 (“A charge alleging a hostile work environment claim ...
will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the
claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at
least one act falls within the time period.”).
AEPS argues that Ms. Henderson’s hostile work environment
claims are untimely since they “arise from sexual advances and
hostile remarks that allegedly took place over several months in
2016 and centered around Plaintiff’s relationship with” the
subordinate officer. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 8-9.
Specifically, AEPS contends that because Ms. Henderson “filed
her EEOC Charge on June 29, 2018, the limitations period
applicable to her Title VII claims reaches back 300 days to
September 2, 2017.” Id. at 9. AEPS also argues that Ms.
12 Henderson’s hostile work environment claims under the DCHRA
should exclude any incidents taking place before September 28,
2017. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 12.
Ms. Henderson argues that the “‘timely filing provision
only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a
certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened
[and] [i]t does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that
some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall
outside the statutory time period.’” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at
9-10 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117). In reply, AEPS, argues
that “‘the Morgan principle is not an open sesame to recovery
for time-barred violations’” and that Ms. Henderson “may not
recover under a hostile work environment theory based upon
nothing more than an amalgamation of loosely related discrete
acts.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 11 (quoting Baird, 662 F.3d
at 1251).
To be timely, at least one act contributing to the claim
must fall within the statutory filing period, but the incidents
must be “adequately linked into a coherent hostile environment
claim.” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1251. To determine if a link exists,
the Court examines whether the incident “involve[s] the same
type of employment actions, occur relatively frequently, and are
perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). AEPS argues that Ms.
13 Henderson “cannot rescue her time-barred hostile work
environment claims under Title VII or the DCHRA, because the
only hostile work environment [actions] described in the
Complaint pre-dated the limitations periods, and there is no act
falling within the limitations periods . . . .” Def.’s Reply,
ECF 12 at 11.
Giving Ms. Henderson the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the alleged facts, see Kowal v. MCI Comm’cns
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the Court is
persuaded that she has sufficiently stated a timely claim for
hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII and the DCHRA.
Ms. Henderson’s EEOC charge, filed June 29, 2018 alleges sex
discrimination and retaliation beginning on April 10, 2016 and
continuing through March 15, 2018. Ex., ECF No. 9-3 at 5. In
that charge, she alleges that the sexual harassment and/or
discrimination began in April 2016 when she rejected the
subordinate officer’s sexual advances, and “[f]rom then on”
whenever she complained to her supervisors about the subordinate
officer’s insubordination, she was “ignored, insulted, and
harassed.” Id. She further alleges that on January 18, 2018, she
filed an internal complaint of sexual discrimination. Id. Ms.
Henderson further alleges that her supervisor was verbally
threatening and harassing towards her and that she was
terminated on March 15, 2018. Id.
14 In her Complaint, Ms. Henderson alleges that: (1) a
subordinate officer began harassing her in 2016 and continued
making improper comments of a sexual nature “over the years,”
see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ 9; (2) Captain Brooks restated the
subordinate officer’s allegations that she was having sex with a
co-employee at work as facts, see id. at 3 ¶ 7; told her “you’re
full of shit” after she could not work beyond her shift, but he
did not make similar comments to her male colleagues, see id. at
5 ¶ 12; and (3) Mr. Covington (i) refused to discipline the
subordinate officer when he made demeaning comments to Ms.
Henderson in front him, see id. at 4 ¶ 9; (ii) referred to her
as “Joey’s Girl,” on multiple occasions, id. at 5 ¶ 10; (iii)
made sexual propositions to her, see id.; (iv) yelled to her
“you need to stay your ass here, [and] complete two schedules,”
id. at 5 ¶ 11; (v) forced her to complete extra duties while her
male colleagues were not required to do the same, see id. at 5 ¶
16; and (vi) she filed an internal complaint of sex
discrimination on January 18, 2018, id. at 6 ¶ 14.
Though Ms. Henderson does not provide specific dates for
most of her allegations, she does allege that they occurred over
the years. Critically, Ms. Henderson filed her internal
complaint on January 18, 2018, which is within the statutory
time period. Based on the filing of the internal complaint, the
Court can make the reasonable inference that the incidents were
15 continuing through that date. Accordingly, since Ms. Henderson
has alleged that at least one act contributing to the claim
falls within the statutory filing period, Baird, 662 F.3d at
1251, she has stated a timely claim at this juncture.
Furthermore, many of the incidents involved her direct
supervisor, many of the comments are of a sexual nature, and
they are alleged to have been uttered frequently. Ms. Henderson
has alleged that after she rebuffed a subordinate officer’s
sexual advances, he became routinely insubordinate to her,
routinely made comments of a sexual nature to her, and that her
direct supervisor and another superior refused to discipline
him. Accordingly, these incidents are “adequately linked into a
coherent hostile environment claim.” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1251.
Although at this juncture, the Court cannot conclude that Ms.
Henderson’s hostile work environment claims should be dismissed,
it is her burden to put forward evidence supporting the
timeliness of her claims as the case moves forward. See
Bartlette v. Hyatt Regency, 208 F. Supp. 3d 311, 326-27 (D.D.C.
2016) (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claim even though he “faces an uphill battle” based on his
allegations of sexual harassment, constant denial of breaks, and
constant unwarranted disciplinary action).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES AEPS’s Motion to Dismiss as
to Ms. Henderson’s gender discrimination claims under Title VII
16 and the DCHRA arising from a hostile work environment.
C. Ms. Henderson Failed to Exhaust Gender Discrimination Claim under Title VII arising from a Discriminatory Pay Differential and her Pay Differential Claim is Time-Barred under the DCHRA
AEPS argues that the gender discrimination claims under
Title VII and the DCHRA arising from a discriminatory pay
differential should be dismissed. Specifically, AEPS contends
that the EEOC Charge does not “contain any allusion to
Lieutenant Sims receiving more money than Plaintiff for the same
work, nor does it mention pay discrimination or males being paid
more than females, [which] leaves the EEOC without any clue or
hint that she – or any other female employees – may be receiving
less money than males.” See Reply, ECF No. 12 at 16. Ms.
Henderson argues that she “exhausted her claim for unlawful pay
differential on the basis of sex” when she noted in the EEOC
Charge that “I was being treated differently than my male
colleagues” and that she had been “discriminated against in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
analogous District of Columbia law.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at
16. AEPS replies the use of “boilerplate or generic language”
does not put the EEOC on notice of the discriminatory act and
“deprive[s] [the] EEOC of the information needed to investigate
and conciliate alleged violations of Title VII, as intended by
Congress.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 15. AEPS further contends
17 that the failure to “include any allegation of pay
discrimination in her EEOC charge causes her discriminatory pay
differential claim to be subject to a shorter DCHRA limitations
period that reaches back only to June 18, 2018.” Id. at 17.
Even giving Ms. Henderson the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the allegations, see Kowal, 16 F.3d at
1276, the Court agrees with AEPS. In reviewing whether a
plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, this Court
examines whether the claims within the complaint are like or
reasonably related to the allegations in the EEOC Charge. See
Park, 71 F.3d at 907. “A court cannot allow liberal
interpretation of an administrative charge to permit a litigant
to bypass the Title VII administrative process.” Id. In
pertinent language Ms. Henderson quotes from her EEOC Charge:
The sexual harassment and/or discrimination began in April of 2016. A subordinate of mine, Officer Jones, had made sexual advances towards me. After I rejected him, he filed a bogus complaint against me for spending too much time with a coworker. From then on, Officer Jones was a constant problem. He was insubordinate. Whenever I complained about it to my superiors, I was ignored, insulted and harassed. A co-worker told me there were rumors that I was having sex at work, which was not true. On January 18, 2018, I filed an internal complaint of sexual discrimination. I was being treated differently than my male colleagues.
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 11; EEOC Charge of Discrimination
570-2018-02700, ECF No. 9-3. The Court notes that “the central
18 question is whether the employee’s complaint contained
‘sufficient information’ to put the agency on notice of the
claim and to ‘enable the agency to investigate’ it.” Crawford v.
Duke, 867 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, nothing in the
quoted language from Ms. Henderson’s EEOC Charge would provide
any notice to the EEOC to investigate any differences in pay
among Ms. Henderson and her male colleagues. In Crawford, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
the plaintiff properly exhausted two claims that were not
mentioned in his EEO complaint because they were mentioned in
accompanying memorandum, but held that the plaintiff failed to
properly exhaust the third claim when it was not included in the
complaint or in the documentation attached to the complaint. See
867 F.3d at 109-11; see also Hicklin v. McDonald, 110 F. Supp.
3d 16, 21 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that plaintiff’s “retaliation
claim is not ‘like or reasonably related’ to his race and
religious discrimination claims in light of the fact that his
amended complaint lacks any indication that the allegedly
unlawful conduct described was motivated by [plaintiff]'s prior
EEO charge.”).
As the Court has found that Ms. Henderson’s discriminatory
pay differential claim was not included in her EEOC Charge, the
Court must also find that the statute of limitations for this
claim under the DCHRA was never tolled. Under the DCHRA, Ms.
19 Henderson was required to bring her pay differential claim
within a year of her termination. See D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a).
As Ms. Henderson was terminated in March 15, 2018, but filed the
instant action on June 18, 2019, she is time-barred under the
DCHRA.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS AEPS’s Motion to Dismiss as
to Ms. Henderson’s gender discrimination claim under Title VII
and the DCHRA arising from a discriminatory pay differential.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART
and DENIES IN PART AEPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. The Court
DENIES AEPS’s Motion to Dismiss as to Ms. Henderson’s gender
discrimination claim under Title VII and the DCHRA arising from
a hostile work environment. The Court GRANTS AEPS’s Motion to
Dismiss as to Ms. Henderson’s gender discrimination claim under
differential. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge March 26, 2020