Hemenway-Johnson Furniture Co. v. Commissioner

22 T.C. 43, 1954 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 245
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedApril 12, 1954
DocketDocket No. 27201
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 22 T.C. 43 (Hemenway-Johnson Furniture Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hemenway-Johnson Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 43, 1954 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 245 (tax 1954).

Opinion

OPINION.

Withey, Judge,:

It is conceded that the petitioner’s acquisition of certain of the assets, plus the store location of Johnson, and the opening of three branch stores during the base period years, represents changes in capacity for operation within the import of section 722 (b) (4) of the Internal Eevenue Code.1 It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider the section 722 (b) (2) factor alleged by petitioner as a ground for relief as it is an alternative qualifying factor under the statute; and, since petitioner has qualified on the ground that it changed its capacity for operation, it is not necessary for it also to meet the alternative qualifying factor. Rand Beverage Co., 18 T. C. 275, 287; Fishbeck Awning Co., 19 T. C. 773, 781.

The determination of what is a fair and just amount to be used as a constructive average base period net income calls for a prediction and an estimate of what earnings would have been under assumed conditions, an approximation where an absolute is not available and not expected. Victory Glass, Inc., 17 T. C. 381, 388. The problem requires the use of some imagination and practical judgment. Radio Shack Corporation, 19 T. C. 756, 762. “The statute does not contemplate the determination of a figure that can be supported with mathematical exactness.” Daneo Co., 17 T. C. 1493, 1498.

The petitioner has submitted numerous computations and exhibits purporting to set forth what it believes to be its constructive average base period net income. Eespondent also has submitted several computations which result in a constructive average base period net income substantially less than that allowed petitioner under the provisions of section 713 (f). No useful purpose would be served to discuss here the various arithmetical indices or formulas used in the different reconstructions. We can not agree with all of the assumptions of the petitioner. Nor are we able to find merit in all of respondent’s contentions. However, a consideration of the contentions of the parties in connection with the evidence of record convinces us that the petitioner is entitled to a greater average base period net income than the amount of $46,525.38 allowed by the respondent. From a consideration of the various factors set out in our findings, we have concluded and found as a fact that $71,000 is a fair and just amount to be used as a constructive average base period net income. In accordance with section 711 (b) (1) (A) for the year ending March 31, 1941, the constructive average base period net income for that year is to be reduced by the amount of petitioner’s income tax for said year.

Reviewed by the Special Division.

Decision will be entered, under Bule 50.

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Hemenway-Johnson Furniture Co. v. Commissioner
22 T.C. 43 (U.S. Tax Court, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
22 T.C. 43, 1954 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 245, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hemenway-johnson-furniture-co-v-commissioner-tax-1954.