Helmut Mueller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

First Circuit

Helmut Mueller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

338 F.2d 1015, 14 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6008, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3716

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedDecember 2, 1964

Docket6388_1

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 338 F.2d 1015 (Helmut Mueller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Helmut Mueller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 338 F.2d 1015, 14 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6008, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3716 (1st Cir. 1964).

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Opinion

ALDRICH, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to review a determination of income tax deficiency by the Tax Court. Petitioners, hereafter taxpayers, are scientists who received during the tax years payments from a nonprofit organization, The Institute for Muscle Research, Inc., hereafter Institute. Throughout the periods in question taxpayers were engaged in research, at the Institute’s laboratory in Woods. Hole, Massachusetts. They were paid,, monthly, what the Institute termed “awards.” While taxpayers were undoubtedly chosen initially on the basis, of their experience and achievements, their selection was not based upon any formal competition, or as a result of any contest. Their research activity at the-laboratory was required to be, according to the undisputed testimony of the Institute’s director of research, “something-which contributed to our common ideas.” If it did contribute, the “awards” might, continue indefinitely. On the other hand if performance failed to live up to the director's “expectations,” or if a taxpayer chose to work elsewhere, his “award” terminated forthwith.

The Tax Court held that the-payments received from the Institute were not tax exempt within 1954 I.R.C. § 74 because it found that they were conditioned on the “rendering of] substantial future services.” Sec. 74(b) (2). This finding was warranted. The court was not obliged to take at its face value taxpayers’ claim that they were not rendering services to the Institute, but were simply engaged in research that would benefit, as one of them put it, “mankind.” Obviously within the meaning of this statute, cf. Robertson v. United States, 1952, 343 U.S. 711, 72 S.Ct. 994, 96 L.Ed. 1237, it could benefit both. It is equally clear that taxpayers could be found to be receiving wages for work currently performed as distinguished from a true award, prize or gift for past performance.

We have reviewed taxpayers’ procedural and evidentiary questions and do not find them to call for discussion.

Judgment will be entered affirming the decision of the Tax Court.

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ALDRICH, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to review a determination of income tax deficiency by the Tax Court. Petitioners, hereafter taxpayers, are scientists who received during the tax years payments from a nonprofit organization, The Institute for Muscle Research, Inc., hereafter Institute. Throughout the periods in question taxpayers were engaged in research, at the Institute’s laboratory in Woods. Hole, Massachusetts. They were paid,, monthly, what the Institute termed “awards.” While taxpayers were undoubtedly chosen initially on the basis, of their experience and achievements, their selection was not based upon any formal competition, or as a result of any contest. Their research activity at the-laboratory was required to be, according to the undisputed testimony of the Institute’s director of research, “something-which contributed to our common ideas.” If it did contribute, the “awards” might, continue indefinitely. On the other hand if performance failed to live up to the director's “expectations,” or if a taxpayer chose to work elsewhere, his “award” terminated forthwith.

The Tax Court held that the-payments received from the Institute were not tax exempt within 1954 I.R.C. § 74 because it found that they were conditioned on the “rendering of] substantial future services.” Sec. 74(b) (2). This finding was warranted. The court was not obliged to take at its face value taxpayers’ claim that they were not rendering services to the Institute, but were simply engaged in research that would benefit, as one of them put it, “mankind.” Obviously within the meaning of this statute, cf. Robertson v. United States, 1952, 343 U.S. 711, 72 S.Ct. 994, 96 L.Ed. 1237, it could benefit both. It is equally clear that taxpayers could be found to be receiving wages for work currently performed as distinguished from a true award, prize or gift for past performance.

We have reviewed taxpayers’ procedural and evidentiary questions and do not find them to call for discussion.

Judgment will be entered affirming the decision of the Tax Court.

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Bluebook (online)

338 F.2d 1015, 14 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6008, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3716, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/helmut-mueller-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca1-1964.

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