Held v. Stanback

2025 IL App (1st) 250307

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 1-25-0307
• Status: Published

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 250307 No. 1-25-0307 Opinion filed November 25, 2025 Second Division ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ROBERT S. HELD, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) No. 24 M1 014125 CEDRICK STANBACK, FREDERICK STANBACK, ) ISAIAH D. STANBACK, ISHMAEL STANBACK, ) MYESHA GARRETT, and NICOR GAS COMPANY, ) Honorable ) Aileen Bhandari, Defendants ) Judge, presiding. ) (Nicor Gas Company, Defendant-Appellee). )

PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McBride and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff Robert S. Held appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his complaint against

defendant Nicor Gas Company (Nicor). Plaintiff alleged that Nicor charged him for natural gas

service at a property that he neither owned nor lived at and then terminated gas service at his actual

residence based on his refusal to pay the added charges to his gas bill. The court dismissed

plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS No. 1-25-0307

5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2024)), finding that the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) had

exclusive jurisdiction over his claims against Nicor. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 The record on appeal does not include reports of proceedings. We take the following facts

from the common law record. Plaintiff has proceeded pro se throughout this case, including in this

appeal.

¶4 On August 22, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court against Nicor and five

individual defendants: Cedrick Stanback, Frederick Stanback, Isaiah Stanback, Ishmael Stanback,

and Myesha Garrett. Nicor is a public utility company that supplies natural gas throughout northern

Illinois. Plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants resided on the 2200 block of Hutchinson

Road in Flossmoor, Illinois, as tenants of Maestro Properties, LLC (Maestro). Plaintiff’s wife and

children were members of Maestro, but plaintiff was not. Plaintiff lived on the 3100 block of

Redwood Court in Flossmoor and never resided at the Hutchinson Road property.

¶5 According to plaintiff, in October 2023, the individual defendants stole his wife’s identity

and, posing as her, asked Nicor to initiate a payment plan under her name. Nicor did so and added

charges for gas service at the Hutchinson Road property to plaintiff’s gas bill for the Redwood

Court property. When plaintiff refused to pay the additional charges, Nicor disconnected gas

service at Redwood Court even though plaintiff was current on his gas bill for that property.

¶6 Plaintiff’s complaint pled two counts. Count I named all defendants and alleged that (1) the

individual defendants should pay for their own gas usage at the Hutchinson Road property,

(2) Nicor should stop billing plaintiff for gas usage at the Hutchinson Road property, and (3) Nicor

should reconnect gas service at the Redwood Court property. Count I also sought plaintiff’s “legal

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fees” and “exemplary damages.” Count II, which is not at issue in this appeal, named only the

individual defendants and sought $786.44 for unpaid water bills at the Hutchinson Road property.

¶7 Nicor moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code

of Civil Procedure. Nicor argued that plaintiff’s claims arose from billing disputes and

disconnection of gas service, which fell under the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction. Nicor

contended that the circuit court would have jurisdiction only if plaintiff first obtained an order

from the Commission and Nicor refused to comply with it.

¶8 As to the individual defendants, only Myesha Garrett appeared. She moved to dismiss the

four other individual defendants, arguing that she was the only tenant on the lease for the

Hutchinson Road property.

¶9 While the motions to dismiss were pending in the circuit court, plaintiff filed a pro se

complaint against Nicor before the Commission. That complaint alleged that Nicor disconnected

gas service at plaintiff’s Redwood Court property even though he was current on his gas bill.

Plaintiff requested the Commission to order Nicor to reconnect his gas service.

¶ 10 Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion in the circuit court seeking an injunction ordering

Nicor to reconnect gas service at the Redwood Court property. Plaintiff contended that the circuit

court had jurisdiction to issue an injunction pursuant to section 2-209 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2024)) because Nicor transacts business in Illinois. In

response to plaintiff’s emergency motion, Nicor again argued that the Commission, not the circuit

court, had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint regarding the disconnection of gas

service to his Redwood Court property. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s emergency motion,

finding that it had “no jurisdiction to require Nicor to turn on gas service.”

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¶ 11 Thereafter, plaintiff filed a response to Nicor’s section 2-619(a)(1) motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff argued that his complaint did not allege a billing dispute. Rather, it alleged (1) breach of

contract for Nicor billing the individual defendants’ gas usage to plaintiff and (2) illegal

disconnection of plaintiff’s gas to coerce him to pay the individual defendants’ gas bills. In

addition, plaintiff contended that the circuit court and the Commission had “concurrent

jurisdiction,” so he could bring his claims in either or both forums.

¶ 12 Nicor’s reply argued that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction because plaintiff’s

complaint alleged only “a billing dispute for utility service”; namely, Nicor’s “transfer of an unpaid

balance from” the Hutchinson Road property to the Redwood Court property “and the subsequent

disconnection of gas service at the Redwood address due to [plaintiff’s] non-payment of the

outstanding balance.” Nicor also argued that plaintiff implicitly conceded that the Commission

was the proper forum for this billing dispute, as he filed a complaint with the Commission,

“participated in three [Commission] status hearings,” and was awaiting an evidentiary hearing

before the Commission.

¶ 13 On December 16, 2024, the circuit court entered the following order:

“Motion to Dismiss as to all claims and counts of the complaint as to Nicor Gas

Company is hereby granted. Plaintiff has indicated the relief he prayed for, having the Gas

turned on at the Redwood Address has been granted and a complaint has been filed with

the Illinois Commerce Commission regarding the billing issues.

This order is Final and Appealable as to Defendant Nicor Gas Co.

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This matter is continued to January 24, 2025 at 11AM for remaining defendant’s

[sic] for hearing pursuant to Rule 286.” 1

¶ 14 On January 3, 2025, plaintiff moved to modify the December 16, 2024, order by adding

language pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Specifically, plaintiff

asked the court to add language that “there [was] no just reason for delaying either enforcement or

appeal or both.” See id. Plaintiff cited Palmolive Tower Condominiums, LLC v. Simon, 409 Ill.

App. 3d 539 (2011), for the proposition that merely stating that the December 16, 2024, order was

“[f]inal and [a]ppealable” was insufficient to invoke Rule 304(a). In addition, plaintiff requested

that the court delete the characterization of his complaint before the Commission as addressing

“billing issues” because that complaint actually addressed disconnection of gas service.

¶ 15 On January 17, 2025, the circuit court denied plaintiff’s request to add language that

“[t]here [was] no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal or both.” The court cited In re

Application of the Du Page County Collector, 152 Ill. 2d 545 (1992), as its basis for denying Rule

304(a) language but did not otherwise explain its decision. In addition, the court granted plaintiff’s

request to delete the language characterizing his complaint before the Commission as raising

“billing issues.”

¶ 16 On January 24, 2025, the circuit court entered an agreed order dismissing the individual

defendants except for Myesha Garrett, whom the court ordered to pay plaintiff $2,700. The court

retained jurisdiction to enforce the order and took the case off call.

1 Rule 286 governs trials and hearing in small claims cases. Ill. S. Ct. R. 286 (eff. Feb. 2, 2023).

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¶ 17 On February 18, 2025, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), which challenged the circuit court’s orders of December 16, 2024,

January 17, 2025, and January 24, 2025.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the circuit court’s dismissal of his claims against Nicor

pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 20 A. Appellate Jurisdiction

¶ 21 Nicor has moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that plaintiff failed

to file a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 22 An appellant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). A final judgment “terminates the litigation between the

parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a

separate part thereof.” R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998).

The 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal can apply, in some circumstances, when an order

is final as to some, but not all, of the parties or claims. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). In

any case, without a timely filed notice of appeal, we have no jurisdiction over the appeal and must

dismiss it. Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213-18 (2009).

¶ 23 Nicor argues that the December 16, 2024, order specified that it was “[f]inal and

[a]ppealable,” so plaintiff’s notice of appeal was due 30 days thereafter, on January 15, 2024.

Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2025, which Nicor contends was untimely and

deprives this court of jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that the December 16, 2024, order was not

appealable because it did not resolve all claims against all defendants and it lacked proper Rule

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304(a) language. Plaintiff maintains that the January 24, 2025, order was the final and appealable

order, and he timely appealed from that order.

¶ 24 We must determine which of the circuit court’s orders started the 30-day clock for plaintiff

to file his notice of appeal. The first candidate is the December 16, 2024, order. That order

dismissed “all claims and counts of the complaint as to Nicor” (emphasis added), but Nicor was

not the only defendant in this case. The individual defendants were still in the case, and the

December 16, 2024, order contemplated further proceedings involving them. Generally, “where a

final judgment relates to fewer than all of the parties or claims involved in an action, that judgment

is not appealable.” Navigators Specialty Insurance Co. v. Onni Contracting (Chicago), Inc., 2022

IL App (1st) 210827, ¶ 12 (citing Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496,

502-03 (1997)). Applying that general rule, the December 16, 2024, order was not appealable and

did not start the 30-day clock.

¶ 25 The exception to the general rule is Rule 304(a), which Nicor contends applies here. Rule

304(a) provides that

“[i]f multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may

be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims

only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for

delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. *** In the absence of such a finding, any

judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than

all the parties is not enforceable or appealable ***.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R.

304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

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¶ 26 Consistent with the final sentence of Rule 304(a), a “circuit court order accompanied by

language indicating that it is ‘final and appealable,’ but not referencing immediate appeal, the

justness of delay, or Rule 304(a),” does not invoke Rule 304(a). Palmolive Tower Condominiums,

LLC, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 544. Rather, “a circuit court’s declaration that an order is ‘final and

appealable’ amounts to nothing more than a nonbinding interpretation.” Id. The December 16,

2024, order stated only that it was “[f]inal and [a]ppealable” as to Nicor. It did not mention Rule

304(a), an immediate appeal, or the justness of delay of enforcement or appeal. Therefore, the

December 16, 2024, order did not invoke Rule 304(a), was not appealable, and did not start the

30-day clock for plaintiff to file a notice of appeal. See id.

¶ 27 Importantly, when plaintiff filed a motion asking the circuit court to include proper Rule

304(a) language, the court declined to do so. The circuit court’s denial of plaintiff’s request to add

Rule 304(a) language suggests that whatever the court meant by “[f]inal and [a]ppealable,” it did

not intend to invoke Rule 304(a). See Gateway Auto, Inc. v. Commercial Pallet, Inc., 2023 IL App

(1st) 230185, ¶ 25 (“Although reviewing courts allow for some leeway in the language that a trial

court may use to invoke Rule 304(a), the record must include some indication that the trial court’s

intent was to invoke that rule.”).

¶ 28 The only order that could have started the 30-day clock for plaintiff to appeal was the

January 24, 2025, order. That order resolved all remaining claims against the individual

defendants, entered a money judgment against Garrett, and removed this case from the circuit

court’s call. Therefore, the January 24, 2025, order was the final and appealable order. See Schaffer

v. Greenview Home Builders & Cabinetry Designers, Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 190230, ¶ 30 (an

order is final and appealable if it “dispose[s] of all remaining claims as to all remaining parties in

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the lawsuit”). Even if the December 16, 2024, order was final as to Nicor, it did not become

appealable until all claims in this multiclaim litigation were resolved, and that occurred on January

24, 2025. See Gateway Auto, 2023 IL App (1st) 230185, ¶ 24. Plaintiff had to file his notice of

appeal within 30 days of that order, by February 24, 2025. 2 See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1,

2017). Plaintiff timely filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2025.

¶ 29 The circuit court cited Application of Du Page County Collector, 152 Ill. 2d 545, when it

denied plaintiff’s request to add proper Rule 304(a) language. In that case, our supreme court held

that a Rule 304(a) “finding is sufficient to establish appellate jurisdiction if it refers to either the

judgment’s immediate enforceability or its immediate appealability.” (Emphases added.) Id. at 550.

The December 16, 2024, order did not mention immediacy. It stated only that the circuit court’s

order with respect to Nicor was “[a]ppealable.” As this case illustrates, the December 16, 2024,

order was eventually appealable—as we consider its merits below—but not immediately

appealable because it did not resolve all claims in the case and did not include the requisite Rule

304(a) language. This court has consistently followed Palmolive’s holding that “a circuit court

order accompanied by language indicating that it is ‘final and appealable,’ but not referencing

immediate appeal, the justness of delay, or Rule 304(a), does not trigger the rule” (Palmolive, 409

Ill. App. 3d at 544). See, e.g., Gateway Auto, 2023 IL App (1st) 230185, ¶ 29; In re Marriage of

Sanchez, 2018 IL App (1st) 171075, ¶ 27. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. We

deny Nicor’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 30 B. Dismissal Pursuant to Section 2-619(a)(1)

2 Thirty days after January 24, 2025, was Sunday, February 23, 2025, so the appeal deadline fell on the next business day, Monday, February 24, 2025. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2024).

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¶ 31 Plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the Commission had exclusive

jurisdiction over his claims against Nicor. Specifically, plaintiff argues that his complaint alleged

“tortious conduct (negligence, wrongful termination of gas service) and s[ought] exemplary

damages outside the [Commission’s] jurisdiction.”

¶ 32 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against Nicor pursuant to section 2-619 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the

complaint but raises defects, defenses, or other matters that defeat the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619

(West 2024); Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 27. Section 2-619(a)(1) allows a circuit court to

dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2024). We

review de novo a circuit court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section

2-619(a)(1). Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2011 IL 110166, ¶ 23.

¶ 33 The Public Utilities Act created the Commission and charged it with “general supervision

of all public utilities.” 220 ILCS 5/2-101, 4-101 (West 2024). The Commission “is the

administrative agency responsible for setting the rates utilities charge their customers.” United

Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 163 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1994). The Commission has

exclusive jurisdiction to hear complaints regarding excessive charges for utilities. 220 ILCS 5/9-

252 (West 2024). In such cases, the Commission can order a utility company to pay a customer

“reparation[s]” or refunds for charging excessive rates. Id. §§ 9-252, 9-252.1; Sheffler, 2011 IL

110166, ¶ 41. Because the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over such cases, a utility

customer must first seek relief before the Commission before suing the utility company in court.

Sheffler, 2011 IL 110166, ¶¶ 41-42.

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¶ 34 In addition, the sections of the Illinois Administrative Code that regulate utilities and

govern proceedings before the Commission define the Commission’s jurisdiction. Greenside

Properties, LLC v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162821, ¶¶ 17-19. The

Administrative Code regulates what utility companies may and may not do, and it implicitly places

disputes regarding those issues within the Commission’s jurisdiction. For example, the

Administrative Code prohibits a utility company from holding a “landlord/property manager

responsible for an amount owing to the utility by any tenant.” 83 Ill. Adm. Code 280.35(d) (2014).

Therefore, a claim that a utility company improperly billed a landlord instead of a tenant falls

within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Greenside Properties, 2017 IL App (1st) 162821, ¶ 17.

¶ 35 By contrast, the circuit court has jurisdiction over relief beyond “reparations” for excessive

utility charges. 220 ILCS 5/5-201 (West 2024). In addition, if a utility company does not comply

with the Commission’s order to pay reparations, the utility customer can sue the utility company

in the circuit court. Village of Evergreen Park v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 810,

813 (1998).

¶ 36 To summarize, “if a claim is for reparations, jurisdiction is in the Commission, while

jurisdiction of an action for civil damages lies in the circuit court.” Sheffler, 2011 IL 110166, ¶ 42.

Generally, “a claim is for reparations when the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged

too much for a service, while a claim is for civil damages when the essence of the complaint is that

the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff.” Id. In determining whether the

Commission or the circuit court has jurisdiction, “courts focus on the nature of the relief sought

rather than the basis for seeking relief.” Id. ¶ 50.

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¶ 37 In this case, plaintiff’s complaint sought an order requiring Nicor to bill the individual

defendants for gas at the Hutchinson Road property and to remove those charges from plaintiff’s

gas bill for the Redwood Court property. These forms of relief stemmed from Nicor’s billing

practices. Plaintiff complained that Nicor billed him for gas at a property he did not own or live

at, thereby overcharging him for gas at his actual residence. Such a claim falls within the

Commission’s jurisdiction. See 220 ILCS 5/9-252, 9-252.1 (West 2024); Sheffler, 2011 IL 110166,

¶ 41.

¶ 38 Similarly, a claim that a utility company billed the wrong person falls within the

Commission’s jurisdiction. See Greenside Properties, 2017 IL App (1st) 162821, ¶¶ 16-17. As

explained above, the Illinois Administrative Code clarifies the Commission’s jurisdiction (id.

¶¶ 17-18), and the Administrative Code governs how a utility may “transfer a balance owing from

one premises account to another” (83 Ill. Adm. Code 280.50(f) (2014)). That is what Nicor

allegedly did here: it transferred the individual defendants’ gas bill to plaintiff’s gas bill. The

Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim seeking correction of that bill transfer.

¶ 39 In addition, the Administrative Code governs how, why, and when a utility may disconnect

and reconnect service. 83 Ill. Adm. Code 280.130, 280.170 (2014). Plaintiff’s complaint alleged

that Nicor wrongfully disconnected his gas service at the Redwood Court property. The remedy

he sought (and received) was Nicor reconnecting gas service. The Commission had exclusive

jurisdiction over that claim as well.

¶ 40 Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint sought “damages stemming from the lack of gas at

Redwood,” his “legal fees,” and “exemplary damages,” which are also known as punitive damages.

See Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 138 Ill. 2d 404, 414 (1990). But just because a plaintiff’s

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complaint alleges damages does not place it outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. Sheffler, 2011

IL 110166, ¶ 50. In this case, the relief plaintiff sought was (1) a change in who and how much

Nicor billed for gas at the Hutchinson Road and Redwood Court properties and (2) reinstatement

of disconnected gas service at the Redwood Court property. Both forms of relief were within the

Commission’s jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2014 IL

116844, ¶ 19 (even if a plaintiff seeks “a mix of penalty and damages,” his complaint falls within

the Commissions’ jurisdiction if the essence of his claim is that the utility company charged him

too much for gas service). Therefore, all of plaintiff’s claims and all the relief he sought fell within

the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction, and the circuit court properly dismissed his complaint on

that basis.

¶ 41 Greenside Properties guides our reasoning. In that case, the plaintiff property management

company sued Peoples Gas, characterizing its claims as civil fraud and deceptive trade practices.

Greenside Properties, 2017 IL App (1st) 162821, ¶ 3. Greenside alleged that Peoples Gas ignored

its requests to terminate gas service at multiple rental properties so the tenants who leased those

properties could arrange gas service under their own names. Id. ¶ 4. When Greenside refused to

pay the gas bills that should have been charged to the tenants, Peoples Gas refused to connect gas

service at any of Greenside’s any other properties. Id. ¶ 7. The circuit court dismissed Greenside’s

complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a), finding that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction

and Greenside appealed. Id. ¶ 8. This court affirmed. Id. ¶ 1. We explained that Greenside

essentially alleged “a claim of billing the wrong person—Greenside versus the respective

tenants—then forc[ed] Greenside to pay those erroneous bills.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. ¶ 16. That claim fell within the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction because the Administrative

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Code governs whether a gas company must bill a property manager versus a tenant. Id. ¶ 17. We

also explained that Greenside’s prayer for “consequential damages” did not take the case outside

the Commission’s jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 42 Just as in Greenside Properties, this case involves a utility company transferring gas bills

that should have gone to tenants—the individual defendants—to another party who was not

responsible for those bills—plaintiff—and then refusing to reconnect gas service based on the

overdue bills. Like in Greenside, that is essentially a billing dispute that falls within the

Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of what other damages the plaintiff might allege.

¶ 43 Plaintiff contends that he “does not claim that Nicor charged too much for gas service at

Redwood.” Rather, he argues that that Nicor (1) “[w]rongfully attributed another customer’s

charges to his account,” (2) “[f]ailed to investigate reported identity theft,” and (3) “[t]erminated

service at Redwood despite full payment as a coercive collection tactic.” The first and third claims

fall within the Commission’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Administrative Code as explained above.

The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims alleging that Nicor billed the wrong person

(83 Ill. Adm. Code 280.50(f) (2014)), improperly disconnected gas service (83 Ill. Adm. Code

280.130 (2014)), and should reconnect gas service (83 Ill. Adm. Code. 280.170 (2014)).

¶ 44 Furthermore, plaintiff’s complaint did not allege that Nicor committed “fraudulent billing,”

“coercive collection tactic[s],” or “negligence in investigating identity theft,” despite what plaintiff

now insists. Those terms appear nowhere in his complaint. Rather, these are after-the-fact

recharacterizations of plaintiff’s claims in an effort to avoid dismissal. We will not consider

plaintiff’s arguments that he pled such tort claims. See Osten v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,

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2018 IL App (1st) 172072, ¶ 22 (a court reviewing a dismissed complaint does not consider or

accept as true unpled facts the plaintiff advances for the first time on appeal).

¶ 45 The cases that plaintiff cites are distinguishable and do not compel reversal. Flournoy v.

Ameritech, 351 Ill. App. 3d 583, 586 (2004), involved a telephone company that intentionally

double-charged prison inmates and their family members for collect calls. Thomas v. Peoples Gas

Light & Coke Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 102868, ¶ 22, involved a utility company attempting to

collect a debt that had already been discharged in federal bankruptcy proceedings. In those cases,

the plaintiffs alleged that the utility companies committed consumer fraud and violated the

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2024)). In

this case, plaintiff’s complaint makes no such allegations. Plaintiff alleges that the individual

defendants committed identity theft, but his claims against Nicor involve billing and disconnection

of gas service, which fall under the Commission’s jurisdiction.

¶ 46 Finally, the fact that the circuit court briefly misunderstood the nature of plaintiff’s

administrative complaint does not compel reversal. It is true that the circuit court initially

mischaracterized plaintiff’s complaint before the Commission as addressing “billing issues” and

later corrected that mischaracterization when plaintiff pointed out that his administrative complaint

sought reconnection of gas service at Redwood Court. But we can affirm the circuit court’s

dismissal on any basis apparent from the record, and we need not adopt the circuit court’s

reasoning. See Zibrat v. City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 241273, ¶ 23. Accordingly, we affirm

the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1).

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION

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¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, we deny Nicor’s motion to dismiss the appeal, and we affirm

the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 49 Affirmed.

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Held v. Stanback, 2025 IL App (1st) 250307

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 24-M1- 014125; the Hon. Aileen Bhandari, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Robert S. Held, of Flossmoor, appellant pro se. for Appellant:

Attorneys John E. Rooney, M. Gavin McCarty, and Amakie Amattey, of for Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP, of Chicago, for Appellee: appellee.

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