Heiner v. Crosby

24 F.2d 191, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7285, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 1995, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 276
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJanuary 24, 1928
Docket3494, 3516
StatusPublished
Cited by68 cases

This text of 24 F.2d 191 (Heiner v. Crosby) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F.2d 191, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7285, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 1995, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 276 (3d Cir. 1928).

Opinion

DAVIS, Circuit Judge.

These eases concern the taxes paid as income on the increase in value of the stock of the Pure Oil Company under the provisions of section 1200 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 329 [Comp. St. § 6336b, subd. (a)], and section 2, subdivision (c) of the Revenue Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 758 [Comp. St. § 6336b, subd. (c)]). They were argued together, involve the same question of the fair market price or value of the stock, and will be disposed of in a single opinion.

On July 21, 1913, Mrs. Crosby received from the estate of her deceased husband 13,-157 shares of stock. She sold them on July 26, 1917, for $24.50 per share. She placed a value of $22.50 per share on the stock at the time she received it, and so in her return for the year 1917 she reported a gain of $2 per share. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on the other hand, valued the stock at $14.37% per share when acquired, and *193 so determined that she sold it at an increase of $10.12% per share. He assessed the tax accordingly, and demanded payment within 10 days, on threat of penalty for nonpayment. She paid the tax and brought suit for its recovery. A jury was waived and the ease tried to the court without a jury. It found that the fair market price or value of the stock at the time it was received was $22.50 per share.

In the Anderton Case, Thomas A. Anderton, executor of the estate of Thomas Anderton, deceased, acquired 10,807 shares of the common stock of the Pure Oil Company on August 20, 1915. He sold the stock on July 26, 1917, for $24.50 per share. He reported in his tax return for 1917 an increase in the value of the stock of $2 per share from August 20, 1915, to July 26, 1917. The Commissioner determined the fair market price or value of the stock when received to be $17 per share, an increase in value of $7.50 per share, and assessed the. tax ae-" cordingly. This was paid under protest, and suit was brought to recover the additional tax paid on the Commissioner’s determination. The learned District Judge before whom the case was tried without a jury found, as in the Crosby case, that the fair market price or value of the stock on August 20, 1915, was $22.50 per share, and so entered judgment for the plaintiff.

The collector has brought both cases here for review on writ of error. The sole question for determination, as stated above, is the fair market price or value of the stock in the Crosby ease, on July 21, 1913, and, in' the Anderton ease, on August 20, 1915. Defendant says that the court erred in resorting to evidence of the intrinsic value of the stock, when its fair markét price or value was evidenced by sales, and that the evidence in support of intrinsic value is insufficient to support the findings of fact and the judgments.

The determination of the fair market price by the Commissioner was based on the price' paid for the stock on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange on the dates in question. On July 21, 1913, the date Mrs. Crosby received her stock, 60 shares were sold on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange at $14% per share. On August 20, 1915, the date Mr. Anderton acquired' his stock, 1,185 shares were sold .and the price ranged from $16% to $17 per share.

The fair market price or value of stock at a particular time is a question of fact, to be determined from all the circumstances. Market price implies the existence of a mar-ket, of supply and demand, of sellers and buyers. Sales are always evidence of a market price, but the statute requires that, in “ascertaining the gain derived from the sale,” there must be not simply a “market price,” but a “fair market price.” Sales made at a particular time and place may be significant, but the price paid is not necessarily decisive of fair market price or value. The fact of sales, in itself and without regard to the circumstances under which the sales were made, does not conclusively establish either statutory fair market price or value. Sales made under peculiar and unusual circumstances, such as sales of small lots, forced sales, and sales in a restricted market, may neither signify a fair market price or value, nor serve as the basis on which to determine the amount of gain derived from the sale. In such cases resort must be had to evidence to determine “fair value.”' Offers made in good faith and opinions of intelligent men experienced in the business are admissible to show fair value. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (C. C. A.) 249 F. 385; North American Telegraph Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. (C. C. A.) 254 F. 417; Walter v. Duffy (C. C. A.) 287 F. 41; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53, 77, 33 S. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063.

Were the circumstances under which the stocks in question were sold peculiar, showing a restricted market, in which the sellers and buyers were limited, so that the sales did not evidence a “fair market price or value”?

The evidence shows, as the learned District Judge found, that the independent oil operators of Western Pennsylvania had for a long time suffered from monopolistic control, which interfered with and restricted every means of disposing of oil stock. The Pure Oil Company was organized in 1895, with the express purpose of protecting and maintaining what are known as “the independent interests in the petroleum industry.” The organizers entered 'into a trust agreement whereby more than 50 per cent, of the common stock originally and subsequently issued was to be vested in a board of 15 trustees, who were to have control of the company, regardless of the legal or equitable ownership of the stock. This trust agreement could not be changed, except with the consent of three-fifths of the trustees and of the equitable owners of three-fifths of the shares held in trust.

On March 1,1913, the Pure Oil Company *194 had 907,049 shares of stock, outstanding. For the six months period from February 1, 1913, to July 31, 1913, the percentage of the average monthly sales on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange to the total shares outstanding was 1.17 per cent. A large majority of the stockholders held their stock from the beginning until the final sale on June 26, 1917. On March 1, 1913, because of the existence of the trust agreement, it was not possible to purchase a controlling interest in the company on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, where only a limited-number of shares at any time were offered, or anywhere else. This fact alone, during the existence of the agreement, made the selling price on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange of little weight as a gauge of fair value.

The company extended its property throughout a number of other states, and established oil-distributing stations throughout this country and in Europe. By March 1, 1913, they had organized and controlled the following seven subsidiary companies: Pure Oil Operating & Producing Company, Northwestern Oil & Gas Company, United States Pipe Line Company, Quaker Oil & Gas Company, Producers’ & Refiners’ Company, Pure Oil Pipe Line Company, and the Pure Oil Steamship Company. These various properties, by reason of their geographical position, had great strategic value.

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Bluebook (online)
24 F.2d 191, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7285, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 1995, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 276, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heiner-v-crosby-ca3-1928.