George E. Johnson and Sylvia v. Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

673 F.2d 262, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1136, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20666
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 26, 1982
Docket80-7570
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 673 F.2d 262 (George E. Johnson and Sylvia v. Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George E. Johnson and Sylvia v. Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 673 F.2d 262, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1136, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20666 (9th Cir. 1982).

Opinion

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

George and Sylvia Johnson appeal a United States Tax Court determination of a $168,060 deficiency in their federal income tax for 1971. This additional tax liability, asserted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under the minimum tax provisions of Internal Revenue Code § 56, arose when taxpayers exercised certain employee stock options. Taxpayers dispute the Commissioner’s position that the mean New York Stock Exchange trading price of the stock appropriately measured the stock’s fair market value for purposes of determining the minimum tax, even though undisclosed violations of securities laws inflated the exchange price when the options were exercised. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner. 74 T.C. 89 (1980). We affirm.

I

In 1971, Mr. Johnson exercised qualified employee stock options granted by Mattel, Inc. Mattel’s employee stock option plan met the requirements of §§ 421 and 422 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 1 The *264 dates of exercise, the number of shares acquired, the option price, and the mean price of the stock on the New York Stock Exchange on the date of exercise of the options were as follows:

Date Shares Option Price Mean Price Per

Exercised Acquired Per Share Share on N.Y.S.E.

1/5/71 7,370 $1.98502 $35.6875

2/8/71 29,478 $1.98502 $43.25

When taxpayers filed their 1971 income tax return, they ignored I.R.C. §§ 56 and 57(a)(6), 2 which required them to report as a tax preference item the amount by which the fair market value of the shares, on the dates the stock options were exercised, exceeded the option price. The Commissioner determined that the excess constituted a tax preference item under §§ 56 and 57(a)(6) and computed the amount to be taxed as the difference between the option price and the mean New York Stock Exchange price on the dates the options were exercised. 3 Implicit in the computation was the Commissioner’s determination that the mean trading price represented the fair market value of the shares.

The Johnsons appealed to the Tax Court, arguing that securities laws violations committed by Mattel’s officers had inflated the trading price, so that the stock exchange price on the dates the options were exercised did not accurately represent the fair market value of the shares. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination that the fair market value of Mattel stock was the mean New York Stock Exchange price on the dates the stock options were exercised.

II

In 1973, former Mattel shareholders filed a class-action suit against Mattel, alleging violations of federal securities laws. In August 1974, Mattel was enjoined from violating antifraud and corporate reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On September 6, 1974, trading of Mattel shares on the New York Stock Exchange and the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange was suspended. At that time, Mattel common stock traded at $1 per share.

In 1977, the federal district court approved a settlement in the class-action litigation. The settlement provided for a $34 million fund consisting of cash and securi *265 ties to be distributed to current and former shareholders of Mattel who acquired stock between May 1, 1968 and December 31, 1975. The Johnsons shared in the distribution.

In 1978, five persons who were officers, directors, and employees of Mattel pleaded nolo contendere to numerous criminal securities law violations.

Ill

Qualified employee stock options receive tax preference treatment under I.R.C. §§ 421 and 422. An employee granted qualified stock options may acquire the employer’s stock at below-market prices without realizing taxable income either when the option is granted or when it is exercised. An employee who holds the stock for at least three years and meets the other requirements of §§ 421 and 422 may defer all tax liability until ultimate sale or disposition of the stock. I.R.C. §§ 422(a)(l)-(2), 422(b)(l)-(7). Upon final disposition, income or gain is measured by the difference between what the employee paid for the stock (the option price at time of exercise) and the amount realized upon final disposition. The gain is taxed at long-term capital gains rates.

To prevent excessive deferment of tax liability under §§ 421 and 422 through qualified stock options and other tax preference items, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code §§ 56 and 57. The minimum tax provisions of § 56 apply to a stock option’s “bargain element.”

Section 57(a)(6) defines the bargain element as “the amount by which the fair market value of the share at the time of exercise exceeds the option price.” The parties in this case disagree on the fair market value of the stock at the time the Johnsons exercised their options.

The Johnsons argue that the fair market value of the stock was actually much lower than the New York Stock Exchange price because Mattel’s illegal practices had artificially inflated the market. A lower fair market value would have lowered the amount of minimum tax the Johnsons owe under § 56.

Neither the legislative history of § 57(a)(6) nor the applicable Treasury Regulations specify how fair market value is to be determined. Treasury Regulation 1.57-1(f) (1978) provides only that fair market value is to be determined “as of the date the option is exercised.”

IV

Although the stock exchange price generally is the best indicator of fair market value, United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551, 93 S.Ct. 1713, 1716, 36 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973), courts have recognized limited exceptions to this general principle when no open market exists. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943, 87 S.Ct. 2076, 18 L.Ed.2d 1330 (1967); MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1956); Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1928); Phillips v. United States, 12 F.2d 598 (W.D.Pa.1926), rev’d on other grounds, 24 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.1928); Walter v. Duffy, 287 F. 41 (3d Cir. 1923).

In arguing that this case should be treated as an exception, the Johnsons rely on the Board of Tax Appeals’s decision in Wallis Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 981 (1926). The Johnsons’ reliance on Wallis Tractor is misplaced. Although, in that case, the shares were traded on the Chicago Stock Exchange, a syndicate, by fixing the price and by determining who was eligible to buy, actually controlled the entire market for the shares.

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673 F.2d 262, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1136, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20666, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-e-johnson-and-sylvia-v-johnson-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca9-1982.