Heilbroner v. Commissioner

34 B.T.A. 1200, 1936 BTA LEXIS 585
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedOctober 22, 1936
DocketDocket No. 71698.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 34 B.T.A. 1200 (Heilbroner v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heilbroner v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1200, 1936 BTA LEXIS 585 (bta 1936).

Opinions

OPINION.

Sternhagen :

The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $450.75 in petitioner’s individual income tax for 1930. Income was increased because of an omission of $120 in dividends reported. This item is not contested. The petition assails the following determination:

2. Commissions for collecting income, $583.13, and business expenses, $1,200, for keeping records, have been disallowed as deduction from income, inasmuch as you are not engaged in business. The expenses in question are held to be personal.

By amended petition, the income included by the taxpayer on her return is sought to be reduced by $19,109 received under life insurance policies of her deceased husband. The facts as to this item are stipulated and need not be specially found. They are essentially the same

[1201]*1201as those in Edith M. Kinnear, 20 B. T. A. 718; and, following that decision, the amount of $19,109 is held to have been properly included by the taxpayer in her gross income.

The evidence shows that petitioner was a widow who, upon her husband’s death, received a substantial estate, mostly in securities. She had no business experience. She placed some'of her securities with a trust company to collect the income, and paid the trust company $583.13 as its charge or commission for such service. Her brother had an individual office and a secretary or bookkeeper. Petitioner’s accounts and affairs were to some extent looked after by this secretary, and, by arrangement with her brother, petitioner paid $1,200 as her proper share of the secretary’s compensation and the office rent. This she deducted on her return, and the Commissioner disallowed the deduction.

Unless the deduction is within the fair intendment of the statute, Revenue Act of 1928, it may not be taken. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435; Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Insurance Co., 294 U. S. 686. There is no deduction among those set forth in the statute which covers these expenditures. It would be an unwarranted distortion of language to say that they were “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business” (sec. 23 (a)). Petitioner was not carrying on any trade or business. Even the “very comprehensive term” referred to in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, does not reach her for, as shown by this evidence, there was nothing about which petitioner was employed and nothing that occupied her time, attention, or labor for livelihood or profit. She did not manage her estate or direct its management. She merely received income from investments, and this is not a trade or business. Gertrude D. Walker, 20 B. T. A. 937; affd., 63 Fed. (2d) 351; certiorari denied, 289 U. S. 746. In Marion Stone Burt Lansill, 17 B. T. A. 413, 425; aff'd., 58 Fed. (2d) 512, the Board said:

How can it be said that these petitioners were carrying on a trade or business? They were the passive recipients of royalties which inured to them by reason of their ancestor’s will and the court’s decree. They carried on no activity in which they were employed and there was nothing to “occupy their time, labor or attention for the purpose of livelihood or profit,” as the term “business” has been sometimes broadly defined. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. See also Charles L. Suhr, 4 B. T. A. 1198; Albert M. Briggs, 7 B. T. A. 409; Ignats Schwinn, 9 B. T. A. 1304; B. H. Kizer, 13 B. T. A. 395. It is not enough to say that by virtue of their contract with the attorneys this percentage was a “charge against the income when derived,” because, while such charges may be treated as deductible expenses if incident to a trade or business, as in La Monte v. Commissioner, 32 Fed. (2d) 220; American Cemetery Co. v. United States, 28 Fed. (2d) 918, the statutory language expressly restricts the charge to that of trade or business. This also [1202]*1202distinguishes Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, in which the attorneys’ fees were incurred as an incident of litigation of an undisputed business.

Article 121 of Regulations 741 can not expand the statute, and it does not purport to. It deals only with business expenses, and enumerates some of them, including management expenses and commissions. Expenses and commissions outside of business are beyond the scope of the article, as they are of the statute. The Commissioner has made this determination, and defends it as a matter of law. Upon the law, it must be decided; and since there is nothing in the statute permitting the deduction, its disallowance must be upheld. It may be added that had Congress, instead of confining the deduction to business expenses, intended to broaden it as it is now suggested that the statute should be construed, it could plainly have described the deduction to include the expenses incident to the earning or receipt of income irrespective of trade or business.

Reviewed by the Board.

Judgment will be entered for the respondent.

Leech dissents.

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Related

Roebling v. Commissioner
37 B.T.A. 82 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1938)
Heilbroner v. Commissioner
34 B.T.A. 1200 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1936)

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Bluebook (online)
34 B.T.A. 1200, 1936 BTA LEXIS 585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heilbroner-v-commissioner-bta-1936.