Heidi Valdes v. City of Marathon, Florida, etc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 10, 2024
• Docket: 2023-1484
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 10, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1484 Lower Tribunal No. 21-155-M ________________

Heidi Valdes, Petitioner,

vs.

City of Marathon, Florida, etc., et al., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Timothy J. Koenig, Judge.

deBeaubien, Simmons, Knight, Mantzaris & Neal, LLP, and Lindsay A. Moczynski, Bart R. Valdes, and P. Hayden Haskins (Tampa), for petitioner.

Smith ̸ Hawks, PL, and Christopher B. Deem and Barton Smith, for respondent Florida Keys Animal Encounters, LLC; Steven T. Williams, City Attorney, for respondent City of Marathon.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.

LOGUE, C.J. In this second-tier certiorari case, Heidi Valdes petitions for a writ of

certiorari to overturn a decision of the Circuit Court denying Valdes’ petition

for certiorari seeking to quash Marathon City Resolution 2021-75 and related

decisions.

The City Resolution and the related decisions concern a property

owned by the respondent, Florida Keys Animal Encounters, LLC, fronting the

US 1 corridor in the City of Marathon. The property was being used as a

commercial “amusement and sealife park” and “marine educational facility”

with a 2,800 square foot building serving as an “Animal Encounter Center.”

The Resolution at issue grants a conditional use variance to allow expansion

and modification of the use to include an additional 24,806 square foot

building to serve as offices, classrooms, laboratories, and warehouse space

for aquariums which will, according to a staff report, support among other

things “coral propagation, [and] manatee rehabilitation.” Valdes

characterizes this change as actually serving little more than an expansion

of a “commercial aquarium fish enterprise.”

To accommodate the new use, Florida Keys Animal Encounters had to

obtain a conditional use variance. The primary focus when determining

whether a conditional use should be allowed is the “compatibility of the use

in its proposed location . . . .” Marathon, Fla., Municipal Code, app. A, ch.

2 102, art. 102-13, § 102.71 (2024). Valdes argues that the provisions of the

Marathon Code governing the granting of a conditional use permit were not

properly followed, including the requirement that the staff state in writing that

the “proposed use is substantially similar to a described permitted or

conditional use in that particular zoning district.” Id.

The property at issue is in a “mixed-use” zoning district “designed to

accommodate a wide variety of commercial and retail activities that will result

in the most efficient and attractive use of the City’s historic business district

and the US 1 corridor, in an effort to recognize the role of US 1 as the City

of Marathon’s ‘Main Street.’” Marathon, Fla., Municipal Code, app. A, ch.

103, art. 103-2, § 103.09(A) (2024). It is surrounded on the north by

residential condominiums, on the south by a restaurant and a fishing/party

boat charter, and on the west by an auto store and vacant State land.

Rule 9.030(b)(2)(B) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,

provides that this Court has “certiorari jurisdiction” to “review . . . final orders

of circuit courts acting in their review capacity.” This “second-tier” of certiorari

jurisdiction is not an opportunity to re-do the first level of appellate review: it

does not provide “a second appeal.” Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658

So. 2d 523, 529 (Fla. 1995). Instead, “[a]s a case travels up the judicial

ladder, review should consistently become narrower, not broader.” Id. at 530.

3 Accordingly, on second-tier certiorari, the “‘inquiry is limited to whether the

circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court

applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential

requirements of law.” Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d

1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 530).

There are several notable aspects to this sort of limited review. First,

second-tier certiorari is a review of the circuit court’s decision, not the

decision of the underlying tribunal. For this reason, second-tier certiorari

does not address whether the underlying tribunal’s decision is supported by

substantial competent evidence: “The standard of review for certiorari in the

district court effectively eliminates the substantial competent evidence

component.” Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 530.

Finally, somewhat counterintuitively, the departure from the essential

requirements of law necessary for granting second-tier certiorari “is

something more than a simple legal error,” it must involve the violation of “a

clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”

Custer Med. Ctr., 62 So. 3d at 1092. “Ordinary legal errors, or application of

the correct law incorrectly under the facts, are not sufficient grounds for a

district court to grant second-tier certiorari.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

v. CC Chiropractic, LLC, 245 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting

4 Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr., Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 103 So.

3d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). Nevertheless, “[t]his standard, while

narrow, also contains a degree of flexibility and discretion” because it often

involves “a reviewing court [ ] drawing new lines and setting judicial policy as

it individually determines those errors sufficiently egregious or fundamental

to merit the extra review and safeguard provided by [second-tier] certiorari.”

Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 530–31.

Applying this law to the instant case, Valdes challenged the City’s

actions in the quasi-judicial proceedings before the City Commission, and

then obtained review of the City’s actions before the Circuit Court serving as

an appellate court. She is not entitled to a “second appeal.” The Circuit Court

decision under review did not ignore the sections of the City Code relied upon

by Valdes, but rather specifically addressed them in a thoughtful twelve-page

opinion. Even if we were to conclude that the Circuit Court erred in analyzing

those provisions, which we do not, we still could not conclude that the Circuit

Court denied Valdes procedural due process or failed to apply the correct

law in a manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Denied.