Hehir v. Shell Oil Co.

72 F.R.D. 18, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1336, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14739
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJune 8, 1976
DocketCiv. A. No. 75-855-M
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 72 F.R.D. 18 (Hehir v. Shell Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hehir v. Shell Oil Co., 72 F.R.D. 18, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1336, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14739 (D. Mass. 1976).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FRANK J. MURRAY, District Judge.

This is an anti-trust action charging an illegal tie-in arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The plaintiff operated a Shell service station under a lease from the defendant Shell Oil Company. As a condition of using Shell trademarks (the alleged tying product), the plaintiff was required under trademark protection provisions of the lease to sell only Shell branded gasoline (the tied product) in connection with the marks. The plaintiff alleges that he brings the action as a class action for a class consisting of all present and former Massachusetts service station operator-lessees of thirteen major oil companies, all of whom are required to purchase only the lessor’s branded gasoline for sale under the lessor’s trademarks. The plaintiff’s motion for certification of a class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) is presently before the court.

Rule 23 establishes the requirements for a class action 2 and the burden is on the plaintiff to show that these requirements are satisfied. Baxter v. Minter, 378 F.Supp. 1213, 1215 (D.Mass.1974); see also 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 23.02-2 at 23-156 (2d ed. 1975). In general, the plaintiff must show that his action meets all the requisites set out in Rule 23(a) and the requisites of one of the three parts of Rule 23(b). In this ease the plaintiff seeks to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) and therefore must show that common questions predominate and that the class action is superior to other available methods of adjudicating the controversy. It appears that the plaintiff’s motion for certification may founder on the [21]*21commonality requirement and the court will address that issue at the outset.

I

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is required to sell only gasoline purchased from his lessor-franchisor in connection with the use of the franchisor’s trademark (Complaint, para. 4), and that defendants’ licensing of their trademarks is dependent on the lessee’s signing contracts of sale or other contractual provisions requiring exclusive purchase and sale of the defendants’ gasoline in connection with the use of the licensed trademarks (Complaint, para. 10).3 Thus it appears the plaintiff will rely on trademark protection provisions of “contracts of sale or other contractual provisions” to establish a tie-in between the franchisors’ trademarks and their gasolines.

The plaintiff argues that since each member of the class is subject to such trademark protection provisions, the common question of whether such provisions violate the Sherman Act predominates. The answers to the plaintiff’s class action interrogatories indicate that such provisions exist in at least thirty-five types of documents. This is a factor which militates against the class action device because even small variations in contractual language can have large antitrust consequences. See Gaines v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. of America, 1972 Trade Cas. ¶ 76,860 (N.D.Ill. 1972). Consideration of this factor has led courts to reject class actions which would have involved examination of over four hundred different contractual forms, Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Penna.1973), forty different forms, Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D.Ga.1975), and twelve different forms with materially different provisions, Abercrombie v. Lum’s Inc., 345 F.Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla.1972). This potential variation among the types of contractual or other forms employed by the defendants to express the alleged policy of tying their gasoline to the license to use their trademarks is sufficient to defeat the contention that common questions predominate with respect to the defendants other than Shell.4

Shell’s answers to the plaintiff’s class action interrogatories identify the source of the Shell policy as the Shell Policy Manual. Presumably, this would apply with equal force to all Shell operator-lessees in Massachusetts. Compare Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 722, 726 (N.D.Calif. 1967). However, the affidavit of J. J. Ubaldi, Shell Manager of Marketing, states that Shell enters into sixteen to thirty contracts with its operator-lessees in Massachusetts, the number varying from dealer to dealer, and that riders or other modifications are often added as a result of negotiations between Shell and the dealer. These facts introduce elements of variety among the class of Shell operator-lessees that militate against certifying this lawsuit as a class action with the class restricted to present and former Shell operator-lessees.

II

A further reason for denying class action, status here is that proof of a tie-in [22]*22requires a showing of coercion by each member of the purported class. The elements of an illegal tie-in are (1) separate tying and tied products, (2) “economic power” or “market power” or “leverage” in the market for the tying product, and (3) an effect on a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce. See generally International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872, 97 L.Ed. 1277 (1953); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 89 S.Ct. 1252, 22 L.Ed.2d 495 (1969). The second element — economic power — has been described more fully as “ . . . sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product”. Northern Pacific, supra, 356 U.S. at 6, 78 S.Ct. at 518. In other words, there is a tie-in where a seller has enough economic power to induce buyers who otherwise would not purchase the tied product to purchase both tying and tied products rather than have neither. Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 20 L.Ed.2d 982 (1968). This definition implies coercion of the buyer by the seller. Where the buyer would voluntarily purchase the tied product from the seller in any case, there is no coercion and no illegal tie-in because the seller has not used his dominance in the market for the tying product to restrain competition in the market for the tied product.- The determination of whether a particular purchase involves coercion or voluntary choice necessarily focuses on the individual purchaser. This circumstance introduces a myriad of individual questions and destroys the predominance required for certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3).

The issue of whether the element of market power requires an individual showing of coercion by each purchaser, thus destroying the utility of the class action device, received extensive discussion by both the district court and the court of appeals in Ungar v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
72 F.R.D. 18, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1336, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14739, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hehir-v-shell-oil-co-mad-1976.