NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4498-16T1
HECTOR REYES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN STANLEY,
Defendant-Respondent. ______________________________
Argued July 17, 2018 – Decided January 18, 2019
Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-0849-15.
Dominic R. DePamphilis argued the cause for appellant (D'Arcy Johnson Day, attorneys; Richard J. Albuquerque and Dominic R. DePamphilis, on the brief).
Edward N. Romanik argued the cause for respondent (Birchmeier & Powell, LLC, attorneys; Edward N. Romanik, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by VERNOIA, J.A.D.
In this personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident,
plaintiff Hector Reyes appeals from orders barring the testimony of his treating
physician, Dr. Richard B. Islinger, and expert witness, Dr. John L. Gaffney,
denying his motions for reconsideration of those orders and dismissing the
complaint. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging he suffered personal injuries in an
automobile collision caused by defendant John Stanley's negligence. Plaintiff's
auto insurance policy contained a limitation on lawsuits under the Automobile
Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Plaintiff
was therefore required to prove he sustained a permanent injury as defined in
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) to recover noneconomic damages. To satisfy his burden,
plaintiff relied on the opinions of his treating orthopaedic physician, Dr. Richard
B. Islinger, as explained in his de bene esse deposition, and expert Dr. John L.
Gaffney, as set forth in his report.
Defendant filed a motion to bar Dr. Islinger's testimony as to the
permanence of plaintiff's alleged injuries, arguing that his opinion constituted
an inadmissible net opinion. The court granted the motion finding that Dr.
A-4498-16T1 2 Islinger's opinion concerning the permanency of plaintiff's injuries was founded
exclusively on plaintiff's descriptions of, and complaints about, his pain and not
on any objective diagnostic information, "such as MRI or X-ray films." The
court determined Dr. Islinger's testimony constituted an inadmissible net
opinion as to the permanency of plaintiff's injuries and entered a March 3, 2017
order barring admission of the testimony at trial.
Defendant also moved to bar the testimony of Dr. Gaffney, claiming his
opinions concerning the permanency of plaintiff's alleged injuries contained in
his report constituted inadmissible net opinions. The court granted defendant 's
motion, explaining that Dr. Gaffney's opinions as to permanency were based on
plaintiff's complaints during the doctor's physical examination and the doctor's
review of plaintiff's medical history and records from other medical
professionals, including a "CT Scan." The court determined that the report did
not show that Dr. Gaffney's opinions were based on "any documented objective
tests." Moreover, the court noted two of Dr. Gaffney's opinions as to
permanency, which were expressed as a "[thirty-five] percent permanent/partial
disability in reference to the left shoulder" and a "[thirty-two-and-one-half]
percent permanent/partial disability in reference to the left hip," and found that
both were untethered to any explanation as to how they supported a permanency
A-4498-16T1 3 diagnosis under AICRA. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). The court entered an April
13, 2017 order barring Dr. Gaffney's testimony at trial.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint,
arguing plaintiff lacked any competent evidence establishing permanency under
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Plaintiff filed motions for reconsideration of the orders
barring the testimony of Dr. Islinger and Dr. Gaffney. During argument on the
motions, the court denied plaintiff's motions for reconsideration. Plaintiff then
conceded that without the testimony of Dr. Islinger and Dr. Gaffney, he lacked
any evidence establishing permanency. The court entered May 26, 2017 orders
denying the reconsideration motions and dismissing the complaint. This appeal
followed.
II.
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).
We therefore apply a "deferential approach to a trial court's decision to admit
[or preclude] expert testimony, reviewing it against an abuse of discretion
standard." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371
(2011). A trial court's decision to preclude expert testimony is only overturned
"when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
A-4498-16T1 4 from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).
Plaintiff's negligence claim is subject to the "[l]imitation on lawsuit
option" under AICRA that allows maintenance of an action for noneconomic
losses only if he "sustained a bodily injury which results in death;
dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced
fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of
medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).
Here, plaintiff sought to vault the statutory threshold by establishing he suffered
a permanent injury, and was required to prove the injured "body part or organ,
or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function
normally with further medical treatment." Ibid.
Proof of a permanent injury cannot be based solely on an injured party's
subjective complaints. Ibid.; see also Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 181
(2007). Permanency of the claimed injury must be certified, under penalty of
perjury, by a licensed physician whose "opinion must be based on 'objective
clinical evidence' derived from accepted diagnostic tests and cannot be
'dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.'" Davidson, 189 N.J. at
A-4498-16T1 5 181 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)); see also Agha v. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50, 60-61
(2009); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.7; N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.5.
The requirement that alleged permanent injuries must be verified by valid,
objective diagnostic procedures was "intended to ensure that only honest and
reliable medical evidence and testing procedures would be introduced to prove
that an injury meets the threshold." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 489
(2005); see also Davidson, 189 N.J. at 189. Although subjective complaints of
pain may suffice if "verified by physical examination and observation . . . [of]
objectively demonstrable conditions such as 'swelling, discoloration, and
spasm,' . . .
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4498-16T1
HECTOR REYES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN STANLEY,
Defendant-Respondent. ______________________________
Argued July 17, 2018 – Decided January 18, 2019
Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-0849-15.
Dominic R. DePamphilis argued the cause for appellant (D'Arcy Johnson Day, attorneys; Richard J. Albuquerque and Dominic R. DePamphilis, on the brief).
Edward N. Romanik argued the cause for respondent (Birchmeier & Powell, LLC, attorneys; Edward N. Romanik, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by VERNOIA, J.A.D.
In this personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident,
plaintiff Hector Reyes appeals from orders barring the testimony of his treating
physician, Dr. Richard B. Islinger, and expert witness, Dr. John L. Gaffney,
denying his motions for reconsideration of those orders and dismissing the
complaint. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging he suffered personal injuries in an
automobile collision caused by defendant John Stanley's negligence. Plaintiff's
auto insurance policy contained a limitation on lawsuits under the Automobile
Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Plaintiff
was therefore required to prove he sustained a permanent injury as defined in
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) to recover noneconomic damages. To satisfy his burden,
plaintiff relied on the opinions of his treating orthopaedic physician, Dr. Richard
B. Islinger, as explained in his de bene esse deposition, and expert Dr. John L.
Gaffney, as set forth in his report.
Defendant filed a motion to bar Dr. Islinger's testimony as to the
permanence of plaintiff's alleged injuries, arguing that his opinion constituted
an inadmissible net opinion. The court granted the motion finding that Dr.
A-4498-16T1 2 Islinger's opinion concerning the permanency of plaintiff's injuries was founded
exclusively on plaintiff's descriptions of, and complaints about, his pain and not
on any objective diagnostic information, "such as MRI or X-ray films." The
court determined Dr. Islinger's testimony constituted an inadmissible net
opinion as to the permanency of plaintiff's injuries and entered a March 3, 2017
order barring admission of the testimony at trial.
Defendant also moved to bar the testimony of Dr. Gaffney, claiming his
opinions concerning the permanency of plaintiff's alleged injuries contained in
his report constituted inadmissible net opinions. The court granted defendant 's
motion, explaining that Dr. Gaffney's opinions as to permanency were based on
plaintiff's complaints during the doctor's physical examination and the doctor's
review of plaintiff's medical history and records from other medical
professionals, including a "CT Scan." The court determined that the report did
not show that Dr. Gaffney's opinions were based on "any documented objective
tests." Moreover, the court noted two of Dr. Gaffney's opinions as to
permanency, which were expressed as a "[thirty-five] percent permanent/partial
disability in reference to the left shoulder" and a "[thirty-two-and-one-half]
percent permanent/partial disability in reference to the left hip," and found that
both were untethered to any explanation as to how they supported a permanency
A-4498-16T1 3 diagnosis under AICRA. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). The court entered an April
13, 2017 order barring Dr. Gaffney's testimony at trial.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint,
arguing plaintiff lacked any competent evidence establishing permanency under
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Plaintiff filed motions for reconsideration of the orders
barring the testimony of Dr. Islinger and Dr. Gaffney. During argument on the
motions, the court denied plaintiff's motions for reconsideration. Plaintiff then
conceded that without the testimony of Dr. Islinger and Dr. Gaffney, he lacked
any evidence establishing permanency. The court entered May 26, 2017 orders
denying the reconsideration motions and dismissing the complaint. This appeal
followed.
II.
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).
We therefore apply a "deferential approach to a trial court's decision to admit
[or preclude] expert testimony, reviewing it against an abuse of discretion
standard." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371
(2011). A trial court's decision to preclude expert testimony is only overturned
"when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
A-4498-16T1 4 from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).
Plaintiff's negligence claim is subject to the "[l]imitation on lawsuit
option" under AICRA that allows maintenance of an action for noneconomic
losses only if he "sustained a bodily injury which results in death;
dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced
fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of
medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).
Here, plaintiff sought to vault the statutory threshold by establishing he suffered
a permanent injury, and was required to prove the injured "body part or organ,
or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function
normally with further medical treatment." Ibid.
Proof of a permanent injury cannot be based solely on an injured party's
subjective complaints. Ibid.; see also Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 181
(2007). Permanency of the claimed injury must be certified, under penalty of
perjury, by a licensed physician whose "opinion must be based on 'objective
clinical evidence' derived from accepted diagnostic tests and cannot be
'dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.'" Davidson, 189 N.J. at
A-4498-16T1 5 181 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)); see also Agha v. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50, 60-61
(2009); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.7; N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.5.
The requirement that alleged permanent injuries must be verified by valid,
objective diagnostic procedures was "intended to ensure that only honest and
reliable medical evidence and testing procedures would be introduced to prove
that an injury meets the threshold." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 489
(2005); see also Davidson, 189 N.J. at 189. Although subjective complaints of
pain may suffice if "verified by physical examination and observation . . . [of]
objectively demonstrable conditions such as 'swelling, discoloration, and
spasm,' . . . a physician's 'observations' of a patient's subjective responses
[cannot be transmuted] into objective clinical evidence." Agha, 198 N.J. at 61
n.5 (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 320 (1992), superseded by statute,
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), as recognized in DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 481). "Thus,
subjective tests, such as those that evaluate range of motion, shall not suffice. "
Id. at 60.
Measured against these standards, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
court's order barring Dr. Islinger's testimony concerning permanency. Dr.
Islinger's opinion concerning permanency is based solely on plaintiff's
A-4498-16T1 6 subjective complaints. For example, when asked if plaintiff suffered a
permanent injury resulting from the accident, Dr. Islinger testified:
I mean, in my opinion, [plaintiff] still complained of pain and discomfort so I do believe it was a permanent injury. Not unlike, you know, a muscle injury that you can sustain, such as a pulled hamstring, even though you've returned back to normal activities, it can still remain, it still remains painful and uncomfortable.
Dr. Islinger was also asked if he expected plaintiff's "permanent injuries .
. . to heal or get better on their own." His response and opinion were again based
exclusively on plaintiff's subjective complaints:
I mean, I would say anything is possible. But when I last saw [plaintiff], it was two years after the injury. [Plaintiff] was still complaining of similar, although like we said less significant symptoms [than] he did on the first, first visit. So, in my opinion, after two years, if it's not resolved completely, it's probably not going to go away.
Most simply stated, Dr. Islinger's testimony was not based on any
objective clinical evidence obtained from accepted diagnostic tests, and thus is
inadmissible as evidence establishing permanency under AICRA. See
Davidson, 189 N.J. at 181. The court did not abuse its discretion by barring the
testimony at trial.
We reject plaintiff's contention that Dr. Islinger should have been
permitted to testify concerning permanency because he was plaintiff's treating
A-4498-16T1 7 physician. Dr. Islinger could properly testify as plaintiff's treating physician
concerning issues related to plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment without being
qualified as an expert. See, e.g., Delvecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 224 N.J.
559, 577 (2016) (explaining that a treating physician may testify concerning the
cause of a patient's injury or illness even though not otherwise qualified as a
witness). But Dr. Islinger's testimony was not barred because he lacked the
qualifications necessary to offer an opinion concerning permanency or due to a
failure to designate or qualify him as an expert witness. His testimony was
barred, and properly so, because his opinion concerning permanency was not
based on objective clinical evidence as required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).
We next consider plaintiff's argument that the court erred by barring Dr.
Gaffney's testimony concerning the permanency of plaintiff's alleged injuries.
Dr. Gaffney's report included three separate opinions concerning the
permanency of injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered from the accident. He opined
that plaintiff suffered: (1) a "[thirty-five] percent permanent/partial disability
. . . to the left shoulder:" (2) a "[thirty-two-and-one-half] percent
permanent/partial disability to . . . the left hip;" and (3) a "[forty-seven-and-one-
half] percent permanent/partial disability . . . to the cervical spine." The court
A-4498-16T1 8 determined Dr. Gaffney could not properly testify as to his permanency
determinations because his opinions constituted inadmissible net opinions.
The net opinion rule bars admission of "an opinion lacking in . . .
foundation and consisting of bare conclusions unsupported by factual evidence."
Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002) (citations
omitted). Rule 703 requires that an expert's opinion be based on "facts, data, or
another expert's opinion, either perceived by or made known to the expert, at or
before trial." Ibid.; see N.J.R.E. 703. An expert must provide "the why and
wherefore" of an opinion rather than solely issuing conclusions. Rosenberg, 352
N.J. Super. at 401 (quoting Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540
(App. Div. 1996)). "The net opinion rule . . . mandates that experts 'be able to
identify the factual bases for their conclusions, [and] explain their
methodology.'" Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55 (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.,
127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992)). Importantly, the reliability of the factual bases and
the methodology must also be demonstrated. Ibid.
Dr. Gaffney's report includes a description of the findings he made based
on his examination of plaintiff, a list of the records 1 he reviewed and conclusory
1 Dr. Gaffney's report refers to his review of a report of a CT Scan. Because he did not explain the why and wherefore supporting his opinion plaintiff suffered
A-4498-16T1 9 assertions that plaintiff suffered three "permanent/partial disabilit[ies]," but he
fails to describe or explain the why or wherefore for his opinions. His report is
bereft of any explanation concerning the methodology he used to determine that
the information he gleaned from his physical examination and review of the
records supports his conclusion that plaintiff's alleged injuries constitute
"permanent/partial disabilit[ies]." See ibid. The report's failure to offer any
explanation for his conclusion that plaintiff's alleged injuries are permanent,
other than Dr. Gaffney's declaration that they were, rendered the opinions
expressed in the reports inadmissible net opinions. See, e.g., Riley v. Keenan,
406 N.J. Super. 281, 295-96 (App. Div. 2009) (finding expert testimony may
not be based on "standards personal to" the witness). We therefore affirm the
three injuries that resulted in different percentages of "partial/permanent disability," it is not possible to determine if his opinion was based in whole or in part on the CT Scan report. Although not necessary to our determination that Dr. Gaffney's report otherwise contained inadmissible net opinions, he could not properly testify in reliance on the CT Scan report because he did not actually review the CT Scan. See Brun v. Cardoso, 390 N.J. Super. 409, 421 (App. Div. 2006) (noting that "on objection, interpretation of an MRI may be made only by a physician qualified to read such films, and that the MRI report could not be bootstrapped into evidence through [the treating physician's] testimony"); accord Agha, 198 N.J. at 62-65. Moreover, Dr. Gaffney's opinions are otherwise not "derived from accepted diagnostic tests" and are founded on range-of- motion measurements that alone do not establish permanency under N.J. S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Agha, 198 N.J. at 60 (quoting Davidson, 189 N.J. at 181). A-4498-16T1 10 court's order barring Dr. Gaffney's testimony based on the opinions expressed
in his report.
Because we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr.
Gaffney's testimony as an inadmissible net opinion, we agree with the motion
court it is unnecessary to determine if Dr. Gaffney's testimony is also
inadmissible because he offered his opinions under the standard for permanency
under our Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to 15-128, and more
particularly N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, rather than under AICRA, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).
See generally Colon v. Coordinated Transp., 141 N.J. 1, 11 (1995) ("find[ing] it
unwise to tack on to workers' compensation law [the] interpretation of statutory
requirements governing automobile insurance law" under AICRA); Rakip v.
Madison Ave. Food Town, 272 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 1994)
(suggesting, but not deciding, that a finding of a permanent partial disability
under the Workers' Compensation Act does not equate to a finding the plaintiff
suffered a permanent injury satisfying the N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) threshold).
We affirm the court's dismissal of the complaint because plaintiff
presented no competent evidence proving he suffered a permanent injury under
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Plaintiff's claim the court erred by denying his motions
A-4498-16T1 11 for reconsideration are without sufficient merit to warrant a discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-4498-16T1 12