Heath v. Baldauf

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided October 2, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-01186·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

SHAWNTELLE HEATH,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:22-cv-1186 v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson WARDEN TERI BALDAUF, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24). For the following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion be GRANTED and the case be DISMISSED without prejudice. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Ohio Reformatory for Women (“ORF”) and a paraplegic/amputee above the knee, initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants ORF Warden Teri Baldauf and Lt. Kramer. (Doc. 1 at 6–7). On an initial screening, the Court liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint as also bringing claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and/or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“Rehabilitation Act”). (See Doc. 7). And the Court found that Plaintiff should be able to proceed only on the following claims against Defendant Baldauf, in her official capacity for alleged violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and in her individual capacity for alleged retaliation in violation of the First Amendment: Count III: Due to the building not being accessible, Plaintiff was only allotted one day a week for the class when the regular class was allotted five days a week. Plaintiff was given a “special discharge.” Count IV: When on another occasion Plaintiff was asked to model for a student in cosmetology, she had to be carried up to the third floor and back down. Count V: Plaintiff put in a cash slip to get her hair done in July but “it was never answered because of [her] disability.” Count VI: When Plaintiff ordered a “box” from the “vault,” she had to ask another inmate to get it for her because the basement was not accessible. As a result, if there was anything wrong with the box, Plaintiff could not return it. . . . Count VIII: Plaintiff asked for a new shower chair for over six months but did not receive one. The shower chair she used collapsed several times, resulting in injury and other inmates having to pick her up. Count IX: Plaintiff did not have proper fitting Depends underwear for approximately eleven months and developed an open wound on her inner thigh. Count X: When Plaintiff’s personal wheelchair broke, the loaner chair she received was hard to use and did not come with a cushion, so Plaintiff had to borrow one from another inmate. . . . Count XII: In December 2021, Plaintiff was housed in the infirmary against her will for eight days “because [she had] made too many complaints and it got to central office.” This count alleges that Warden Baldauf in an individual capacity retaliated against Plaintiff when she exercised her First Amendment Rights and in violation of the ADA.

(Doc. 7 at 9–10) (citations omitted); (see Doc. 18) (adopting recommendation that Plaintiff be allowed to proceed on these counts only). Now, Defendant brings the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, saying this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claims, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Plaintiff has not opposed the Motion, and the deadline for doing so has passed. Consequently, the Motion is ripe for consideration. II. STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, (1986)).

III. DISCUSSION Defendant says she is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for any of the claims brought in this litigation. (Doc. 24 at 10–18). “Exhaustion of administrative remedies ‘is mandatory under the [PLRA] and . . . unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.’” Murray v. Ohio Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:14-CV- 168, 2019 WL 485214, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2019) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007)). Relevant here, the “‘PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.’” Murray, 2019 WL 485214, at *13 (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)). The Ohio inmate grievance procedure involves three consecutive steps. First, “the inmate shall file an informal complaint to the direct supervisor of the staff member, or department most directly responsible for the particular subject matter of the complaint.” Ohio Admin. Code § 5120- 9-31(J)(1). Second, “[i]f the inmate is dissatisfied with the informal complaint response, or the informal complaint process has been waived, the inmate may file a notification of a grievance with the inspector of institutional services.” Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-31(J)(2). Third, “[i]f the

inmate is dissatisfied with the disposition of grievance, the inmate may file an appeal with the office of the chief inspector.” Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-31(J)(3). Further, “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant.” Anderson v. Shelby Cty. Gov’t, No. 03-2650-P, 2009 WL 3241676, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007)). “Once Defendant[ ] puts forth evidence of [his] affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Plaintiff [is] required to present ‘significant probative evidence’ to

defeat the motion for summary judgment.” Pullen v. Combs, No. 1:17CV255, 2020 WL 1451564, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2020) (quoting Napier v. Laurel Cty., Ky., 636 F.3d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 2011)). The Undersigned finds that, because Defendant has adduced evidence that Plaintiff fully appealed only two grievances unrelated to the claims underlying this action, she has carried her burden to demonstrate the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust. Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion, and even construing all evidence in her favor, lacks significant probative evidence to defeat Defendant’s argument.

Plaintiff failed to escalate grievances relevant to the claims at issue here to the final step of the grievance process.

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Heath v. Baldauf, (S.D. Ohio 2023).

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Napier v. Laurel County
636 F.3d 218 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp.
651 F.3d 482 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)