Hearn v. City of Jackson

340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26166, 2003 WL 23841443
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedAugust 7, 2003
DocketCIV.A.3:99CV359LN
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 340 F. Supp. 2d 728 (Hearn v. City of Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26166, 2003 WL 23841443 (S.D. Miss. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, forty-two black police officers employed by the City of Jackson Police Department, brought this action against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 complaining that the procedure used by the City in *731 May 1998 for the selection of individuals for the rank of sergeant in the police department discriminated against black applicants. Plaintiffs assert a disparate impact claim, alleging, in particular, that the written test which was used to qualify applicants to proceed to the second and third rounds of the selection process (simulation exercises and structured interview, respectively), adversely impacted black officers, whose pass rate was significantly below that of the white applicants, and they further charge the City with intentional discrimination in the use of the test results, i.e., disparate treatment, reasoning that an inference of intentional race discrimination arises from the City’s use of the test results for its promotion decisions in the face of knowledge of its discriminatory impact on black applicants. The case was tried to the court, and the court, having considered the evidence and arguments presented by the parties, finds and concludes that plaintiffs have failed to establish their claims and that their complaint is therefore due to be dismissed.

In the spring of 1998, the City conducted a three-part test for the purpose of promoting qualified candidates to the rank of sergeant in the Jackson Police Department. The first stage, a written test, was administered in May 1998 to 147 applicants. A total of 147 persons sat for the test, 106 blacks (72%) and 46 whites (28%). Forty-seven of those tested received a passing score, of whom 26 were white and 21 were black. Those 47 candidates progressed to the second stage, which consisted of simulation exercises and, finally, to the third stage, which consisted of a structured interview. Upon completion of all three parts of the test, the test and its results were submitted for approval to the United States Department of Justice pursuant to consent decrees the City had previously entered in 1974 and 1991. 1 By letter dated December 17, 1998, and faxed to the City on that same date, the Justice Department purported to approve the test and its results, but requested that the City “reconsider the procedure for determining the pass point on the police sergeant written examination [since] [t]he City’s 1998 police sergeant written examination had an adverse impact on African-American candidates.” 2 The promotional list was post *732 ed the following day and promotion exercises were "held in January 1999, at which time fifteen persons, including eight whites and seven blacks, were promoted to sergeant.

On May 22, 1998, shortly after the test as administered, the plaintiffs herein filed an EEOC charge alleging disparate impact. On February 17,1999, not long after the promotion were made, the EEOC issued its notice of right-to-sue letter, and on May 21, 1999, within ninety days of receipt of their right-to-sue notice, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit which first included only their disparate impact claim, but was subsequently amended to include their claim that the City engaged in intentional discrimination by using a test that was known to have a disparate impact on black applicants for the position of sergeant.

DISPARATE IMPACT:

The disparate impact theory is used to challenge a facially neutral. employment policy that falls more harshly on a protected class of employees and cannot be justified on business necessity. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir.1998). In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race ... and the respondent [must fail] to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i). Thus, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that the promotion method in question had an disparate impact on minorities, and if he sustains that burden, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that the method of selection is valid by establishing that it is “job related” and “consistent with business necessity.” Id.; see also Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1525 (5th Cir.1993). If the employer carries its burden by successfully validating the selection method, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that there was another available method of evaluation which was equally valid and less discriminatory that the employer refused to use. 42 U.S.C. . § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii); see also Frazier, 980 F.2d at 1525.

In this case, based on the statistical disparity between the passing rates of blacks and whites, the City has stipulated that the May 1998 written sergeant’s exam had an adverse impact on black applicants. Thus, the City must show that the test is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. Plaintiffs contend that the City has failed to sustain its burden of showing that the examination was job related, but further claim that even if the City has shown the test was valid through an appropriate validation study, plaintiffs have shown that there were equally valid, less discriminatory alternative selection methods which the City refused to use.

At this, what has been termed “the justification stage” of a disparate-impact case, “the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.” Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2126, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989). “The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the challenged practice,” id., which requires proof that the challenged practice was job related, in the sense that *733 it measures traits that are significantly related to the applicant’s ability to perform the job.” Gillespie v. State of Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir.1985) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436, 91 S.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26166, 2003 WL 23841443, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hearn-v-city-of-jackson-mssd-2003.