Head v. Platte County, Mo.

749 P.2d 6, 242 Kan. 442, 1988 Kan. LEXIS 9

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lockett, J.:

Plaintiff, Phyllis Head, a Kansas resident, filed a personal injury action against Platte County, Missouri, and Tom Thomas, Sheriff of Platte County, alleging negligence in the the arrest and false imprisonment of the plaintiff in Kansas. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that employees of Platte County negligently prepared the arrest warrant in Missouri. The Kansas district court, applying Missouri sovereign immunity law, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings, determining that when agents of a sister state or its subdivision enter this state, neither the public policy of Kansas nor principles of judicial comity require us to recognize the sister state’s attributes of sovereign immunity. State v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 Pac. 251 (1911).

Plaintiff is a resident of Overland Park, Kansas. Platte County, Missouri, is a political subdivision of the State of Missouri. Tom Thomas, Sheriff of Platte County, is a resident of Platte County, Missouri.

On May 2, 1984, Mr. Harry House of Parkville, a Missouri merchant, completed a bad check complaint form and presented it to the prosecuting attorney of Platte County, Missouri. On the form, Mr. House provided the following description of the suspect:

Name: Phyllis Marshall, d/b/a/ Empire Marketing

Address: Unknown

Date of Birth: Unknown

Driver’s license number: Unknown

Sex: Female

Race: White

Physical description: Overweight, bleached blond hair, capped teeth

Suspect’s vehicle: 1983 Dodge convertible

Other information as to whereabouts of suspect: 5705 Metcalf,

Shawnee Mission, Kansas.

The Office of the Prosecuting Attorney for Platte County, Missouri, received and reviewed the information provided by Mr. House. Determining that there was probable cause, a complaint was prepared for a state warrant, then forwarded to a circuit judge who determined there was probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for a Phyllis Marshall. On May 4, 1984, the Platte County Sheriff s Department received from the Office of the Deputy Circuit Clerk of Platte County, Missouri, a warrant for the arrest of a Phyllis Marshall and another document entitled “Information for Platte County Sheriff s Department” which had been prepared by an unidentified employee of the office of the Deputy Circuit Clerk of Platte County, Missouri. That document contained some of the information provided by Mr. House and also added the suspect’s date of birth as 1-10-58 and her alternate residence as 7806 Aberdeen, Prairie Village, Kansas. The additional facts in the information sheet corresponded to the date of birth and former residence of the plaintiff.

Subsequently, the warrant was forwarded to Kansas and law enforcement officials in Prairie Village, Kansas, attempted to execute the warrant at 7806 Aberdeen. They were informed that this was the former address of Phyllis Marshall, that she had married and now was Phyllis Head, and resided at 12647 West 105th Street, Overland Park, Kansas. The Prairie Village dispatcher contacted the Overland Park Police Department and requested them to serve the warrant on “Phyllis Marshall a/k/a Phyllis Head, 12647 West 105th Street, white female, d/o/b 1-10-58, height 5'7", weight 120 pounds, brown hair, and green eyes.” That description matched the plaintiff, but not the suspect described in the original complaint. The source of the second description is not clear.

Overland Park police officers arrested Phyllis Head at her home. Mrs. Head denied that she was the person who had written the check. The warrant was confirmed by the Platte County Sheriffs Department. Mrs. Head’s husband was required to come home from work to take care of their baby and Phyllis Head was handcuffed and transported to the Overland Park jail where she was booked, held, and eventually released. The following day, plaintiff and Mr. House met. House immediately informed the Platte County prosecutor’s office that the wrong woman had been arrested.

Head filed suit in Johnson County, Kansas, against Platte County, Missouri; the Sheriff of Platte County; the prosecuting attorney of Platte County; and the City of Overland Park. (The latter two parties were dismissed and are not involved in this appeal.) Head alleged that defendants negligently failed to adequately train and supervise their employees and failed to establish and implement policies concerning the filing and execution of arrest warrants. Plaintiff contends that she was falsely arrested and imprisoned as a result of the negligent training of employees of Platte County, Missouri, who provided the false identifiers to Kansas law enforcement officials.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motion, defendants contended they were immune from suit pursuant to Missouri sovereign immunity law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600 (1978). The district court first determined that it had personal jurisdiction of the parties. The district court then ruled, “As a matter of sound public policy, governmental agencies ought to be able to rely upon their State’s laws on immunity in order to adequately insure against alleged wrongful acts on the part of those agencies and its employees,” and granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals, contending Missouri sovereign immunity law does not apply to tortious injuries occurring in Kansas.

The issue of whether another state’s sovereign immunity law applies in Kansas is an issue of first impression. However, in State v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, this court recognized that when a sister state engages in activities in Kansas, it does not exercise sovereign power over the citizens of this state.

In Holcomb, the City of Kansas City, Missouri, claimed a right to exemption from Kansas taxation of a water plant owned by that city and situated in Wyandotte County, Kansas. Kansas had laws making itself, political subdivisions, and the federal government exempt from taxation. Kansas City, Missouri, claimed it was entitled to the same consideration, since it was also a sovereign. In rejecting this argument, the Holcomb court observed that “[a] state is sovereign only within its own boundaries and its laws have no extraterritorial force.” 85 Kan. at 181. It also held that when a state or any of its municipalities comes within the boundaries of another state, it does not carry with it any of the attributes of sovereignty, and it is subject to the laws of such other state the same as any other proprietor. 85 Kan. at 184-85.

Holcomb was relied upon by the California Supreme Court in Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 Cal. 3d 522, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355, 503 P.2d 1363 (1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 820 (1973).

In Hall, California plaintiffs brought a negligence action in a California state court against the University of Nevada and the State of Nevada for injuries sustained when an automobile operated by defendants’ agent caused an accident in California. Service was made pursuant to a California statute providing a method for service over nonresidents who had operated motor vehicles in the state. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco entered an order quashing service of summons on the basis of Nevada’s sovereign immunity.

The Supreme Court of California, relying on Holcomb, reversed and remanded the case for trial, concluding that “[w]hen the sister state enters into activities in this state, it is not exercising sovereign power over the citizens of this state and is not entitled to the benefits of the sovereign immunity doctrine as to those activities unless this state has conferred immunity by law or as a matter of comity.” 8 Cal. 3d at 524. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).

On remand, Nevada filed a pretrial motion to limit the amount of damages pursuant to a Nevada statute which placed a limit of $25,000 on any award in a tort action against the State pursuant to its statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution required enforcement of the Nevada statute by the California courts. This motion was denied, the case went to trial, and plaintiffs were awarded damages of $1,150,000. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. Hall v. University of Nevada, 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977). After the California Supreme Court denied review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 436 U.S. 925 (1978), to consider whether a state may enforce its sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of another state.

In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 59 L. Ed. 2d 416, 99 S. Ct. 1182, reh. denied 441 U.S. 917 (1979), in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the California decision, holding that there was no constitutional bar to California’s assertion of jurisdiction over Nevada. The Court reasoned that nothing in Art. Ill authorizing the judicial power of the United States or in the Eleventh Amendment limitation on that power provided any basis to limit the judicial powers that California had exercised.

More significantly, the Court held that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (Art. IV, § 1) does not require a state to apply another state’s law in violation of its own legitimate public policy. 440 U.S. at 422. In Hall, California had provided by statute for jurisdiction in its courts over residents and nonresidents alike to allow those negligently injured on its highways to secure full compensation for their injuries in California courts. The United States Supreme Court held that full faith and credit did not require California to abandon this public policy by surrendering jurisdiction to Nevada or limiting respondents’ recovery to the $25,000 Nevada statutory maximum. The Court recognized that certain constitutional provisions may place limitations upon the sovereignty of the states. However, the Court concluded that such provisions do not imply that any one state’s immunity from suit in the courts of another state is anything more than a matter of comity, and, further, that nothing in the Constitution authorized or obligated the Court to frustrate California’s policy of fully compensating those negligently injured on its highways. 440 U.S. at 425-26.

By holding in Nevada v. Hall that nothing in the Constitution requires one state to apply a sister state’s sovereign immunity in tort suits against the sister state, the United States Supreme Court left Kansas free to recognize Missouri’s sovereign immunity as a matter of Kansas public policy. In the case at bar, the district court held that Kansas public policy favored the application of Missouri sovereign immunity to defendants. We disagree. Our decision in Holcomb firmly established that a sister state has no right to exercise its sovereign immunity within the borders of this state.

Further, it has long been the public policy of Kansas to compensate its citizens and those within its borders for injuries occurring in Kansas which result from negligent acts outside of this state. This policy can be determined by the state’s statutes governing the liability of residents, nonresidents, and Kansas governmental entities for tortious acts that injure an individual in this state. The statutory policy is stated by (1) K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2), which allows a plaintiff to bring suit in Kansas to recover damages for injuries occurring in this state which resulted from negligent conduct outside Kansas, and (2) the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., which holds Kansas governmental entities liable for damages caused by their employees’ acts or omissions within this state subject to specified exceptions.

Following Nevada v. Hall, we are also free to recognize Missouri sovereign immunity as a matter of comity. Judicial comity is a principle by which the courts of one state or jurisdiction give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect. In re Miller, 228 Kan. 606, Syl. ¶ 3,620 P.2d 800 (1980). Comity is not binding on the forum state, but is a courtesy extended to another state out of convenience and expediency. Philadelphia v. Austin, 86 N.J. 55, 64, 429 A.2d 568 (1981).

We believe that, when considering comity, Kansas courts should give primary regard to the rights of its own citizens and persons who are within the protection of this state. To hold that Missouri could not be sued in Kansas would result in granting greater immunity to our sister state than the immunity which our citizens through the legislature have bestowed upon our state government. If Missouri has sovereign immunity within our borders, a Kansas resident would be denied all recovery for injury caused by Missouri agents in this state, even though if agents of the State of Kansas had committed the same act, recovery could be permitted under our Tort Claims Act. No state should give effect to the law of another on principles of comity when the effect would be deleterious to the public policy of the forum state.

We hold that the public policy of this state is that a sister state is sovereign only within its own boundaries, and its immunity laws have no extraterritorial force.

Since the other issues raised by the parties were not determined by the trial court, they will not be considered for the first time on appeal.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.