H.E.A., A.M.I., R.M.J., and S.M.J. v. Marco A. Rubio, Secretary of the United States Department of State; and Susan M. Burns, United States Embassy in Kenya, Head of Consular Affairs

Opinion

1 2

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

7 H.E.A., A.M.I., R.M.J., and S.M.J., 8 CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02046-RSL Plaintiffs, 9 v. 10 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MARCO A. RUBIO, Secretary of the MOTION TO DISMISS 11 United States Department of State; and SUSAN M. BURNS, United States 12 Embassy in Kenya, Head of Consular 13 Affairs,

14 Defendants. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 9); 17 plaintiffs’ response (Dkt. 14); and defendant’s reply (Dkt. 15). Having reviewed these 18 19 filings, the related declaration (Dkt. 10), and the record herein, the Court GRANTS the 20 motion to dismiss for the reasons explained below. 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff H.E.A. is a United States Citizen and native of Somalia. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 1–2. 23 She came to the U.S. as a refugee on Nov. 10, 2012, leaving behind her five children. Id. 24 25 “After her arrival, H.E.A. filed I-730 petitions for her five children with the United States 26 Citizenship and Immigration Services (‘USCIS’) of the Department of Homeland Security ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 (‘DHS’) in order to reunite with her five children.” Id. The I-730 petition process can lead 2 to the children of a refugee being allowed to join the refugee in the U.S. See 3 https://www.uscis.gov/i-730 (last visited April 2, 2026). 4 5 On March 15, 2019, H.E.A. married her husband, A.M.I., who is also a plaintiff. 6 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2. A.M.I. was born in Somalia in January 1977 and presently lives in Kenya. Id. 7 at ¶ 4. In July 2021, in a second effort at family reunification, H.E.A. “filed separate I-130 8 petitions for her husband and each of her five children” with USCIS. Id. at ¶ 2. The I-130 9 10 petition process can lead to individuals with qualifying relationships to a U.S. citizen being 11 allowed to come to the U.S. to apply for permanent residency. See 12 https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (last visited April 2, 2026). Between July 26, 2022, and Aug. 13 4, 2022, all six of the I-130 petitions filed by plaintiff were approved. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2. On 14 15 April 20, 2023, “H.E.A.’s husband and four younger children attended I-130 interviews at 16 the U.S. embassy in Nairobi Kenya.” Id. 17 Two of H.E.A.’s children have since joined H.E.A. in the United States. Dkt. 1 at 18 ¶ 3. H.E.A.’s oldest child is presently “waiting for her priority date to become current 19 under the F-2B visa category.” Id. H.E.A.’s two youngest children, plaintiffs R.M.J. and 20 21 S.M.J., “continue to wait for the embassy to finish adjudicating their immigrant visas.” Id. 22 Both R.M.J. and S.M.J. were born in Somalia and presently live in Kenya. Id. at ¶¶ 5–6. 23 Defendants state that the visa applications for plaintiffs A.M.I, R.M.J., and S.M.J. “were 24 refused in April 2023” during the interviews conducted at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, 25 26 Kenya. Dkt. 9 at 1, 3. “Plaintiff-Applicants have since submitted further documentation in ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 support of their applications, but to date, their applications remain refused.” Id. at 3–4 2 (citing Dkt. 1). 3 Plaintiffs allege that for 30 months (as of Oct. 21, 2025) plaintiffs R.M.J. and S.M.J. 4 5 have been enduring hardship due to separation from their mother, while H.E.A. and A.M.I. 6 “have been deprived of the companionship of their spouse.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8. In this lawsuit 7 plaintiffs are pursuing claims under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 8 706, and 555(b); the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361; and the Declaratory Judgments 9 10 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Id. at ¶¶ 9–43. 11 II. Discussion 12 A. Pleading Standard Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 13 The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in the 14 15 complaint sufficiently state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 16 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In the context of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must 17 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 18 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 19 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court’s review is generally limited 20 21 to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 22 1996). “We are not, however, required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits 23 attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that 24 are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 25 26 Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege 2 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” []Twombly, 550 U.S. [at 570]. A plausible claim includes “factual content 3 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 4 liable for the misconduct alleged.” U.S. v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 5 Under the pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2), a party must make a “short and 6 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). . . . A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, 9 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th 10 Cir. 2004). 11 12 Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2021). In addition, the 13 factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007). 15 B. Plaintiffs’ APA and Mandamus Act Claims 16 17 1. “Clear, Certain, and Mandatory Duty” 18 Where a complaint “seeks relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA and there is 19 an adequate remedy under the APA, we may elect to analyze the APA claim only.” Vaz v. 20 Neal, 33 F.4th 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 21 22 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997)). In this matter, plaintiffs cite several sections of the APA in 23 arguing that this Court should compel agency action under the APA with regard to A.M.I., 24 R.M.J., and S.M.J. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 29–31 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702, 706, 555(b)). As relevant 25 here, under the APA “a court may compel agency action . . . when the agency (1) has ‘a 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 clear, certain, and mandatory duty,’ and (2) has unreasonably delayed in performing such 2 duty.” Khosravi v. Rubio, No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 3 Mar. 14, 2025) (citing Plasket v. Wormuth, 18 F.4th 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2021)). 4 5 Like the plaintiffs in Khosravi, plaintiffs here point to Section 555(b) of the APA, 6 which states: “With due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their 7 representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a 8 matter presented to it.” Id. See also Dkt. 1 at ¶ 31. Defendants here, like the defendants in 9 10 Khosravi, do not dispute that they had a mandatory duty with regard to plaintiffs’ visa 11 applications but argue that the mandatory duty was performed when plaintiffs’ visa 12 applications were refused in April 2023. Compare No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 13 821885, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025) (“Defendants argue that assuming a duty 14 15 exists, they have fulfilled that duty by reviewing Khosravi’s application and issuing a 16 ‘refusal.’”), with Dkt. 9 at 1, 3–4, 5:19–6:4 (“Here . . . the only mandatory, 17 nondiscretionary duty owed to [plaintiffs] has already been performed.”) (citing 22 C.F.R. 18 § 42.81(a)). The Court is thus presented with the following question: Given that plaintiffs’ 19 visa applications were refused by a consular officer who then “apparently decided that 20 21 post-refusal administrative processing might help [the applicants] establish eligibility,” 22 Dkt. 9 at 6:6–11, have defendants met their mandatory duty to conclude the matter of 23 plaintiffs’ visa applications? 24 This is not an unusual question in the district courts, and in this district, as in others, 25 26 courts have provided differing answers. Compare Bloomberg v. Rubio, No. C25-1420- ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 JLR, 2025 WL 3513923, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2025) (“[C]ourts in this district and 2 beyond regularly hold that the Government has no mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to 3 readjudicate a visa application that was refused . . . .”) (collecting cases), with Khosravi, 4 5 No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025) 6 (acknowledging that “courts have come to opposing conclusions on this issue” but 7 concluding that “the more persuasive [view] . . . is that the initial refusal of a visa 8 application pending ‘administrative processing’ does not discharge the consular duty to 9 10 adjudicate a visa application.”) (collecting cases).1 It appears that the Ninth Circuit has not 11 squarely addressed this issue. See Sheikhalizadehjahed v. Gaudiosi, No. 2:24-CV-1136 12 SCR, 2024 WL 4505648, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2024). See also Dkt. 15 at 2:12. 13 As the Khosravi court explained, recent decisions in this district finding no 14 15 mandatory duty to readjudicate a refused visa application have relied on Karimova v. 16 Abate, 2024 WL 3517852 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024), an unpublished opinion. No. 2:24- 17 CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *4 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025).2 But “several 18 decisions issued by the District Court of the District of Columbia have expressly declined 19 to follow Karimova.” Id. (Citing Hajizadeh v. Blinken, No. CV 23-1766, 2024 WL 20 21

22 1 Plaintiffs cite Khosravi for the proposition that this is the “majority view.” Dkt. 14 at 3:16. Similarly, a court in this district has described Khosravi’s analysis as aligning with “the majority of district courts.” Wasae v. Rubio, No. 23 C24-1714-KKE, 2025 WL 1413781, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2025). However, as used by the Khosravi court the phrase “majority view” appears to refer only to the majority view among district courts in the District of Columbia. 24 No. 2:24-CV-1227, 2025 WL 821885, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025) (citing R2 Technologies Corp. v. Rubio, 2025 WL 436306, at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024)). 25 2 See also Bloomberg, No. C25-1420-JLR, 2025 WL 3513923, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2025) (relying on Karimova to find no mandatory duty); Beygi v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. C24-0504-TSZ, 2024 WL 4871377, at *2 26 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2024) (same); Hosseininejad v. Blinken, No. C24-0794-TSZ, 2024 WL 4858444, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2024) (same). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 3638336, at *3 n.3 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2024) (“Karimova is an unpublished opinion, and ‘a 2 panel’s decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no 3 precedential value in that disposition.’ D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2). This court has considered 4 5 Karimova but declines to follow it.”). The Khosravi court also declined to follow 6 Karimova and pointed out that Khosravi’s application, “[w]hile nominally ‘refused,’” was, 7 “by most other indications, still in the adjudicative process.” No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 8 WL 821885, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025). “As one district court in this circuit 9 10 recently stated, ‘[r]ather than simply accepting the label of “Refused,” courts should 11 consider “what is actually happening” in a specific case to determine whether an agency 12 has discharged its duty.’” Id. at *5 (quoting Momeni v. Blinken, No. 2:24-CV-04879-ODW 13 (AGRX), 2024 WL 5112234, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2024)). 14 15 In Khosravi, the indications that Khosravi’s application was still in the adjudicative 16 process included (1) improper notice of refusal; (2) clear and repeated messages that “the 17 application—while purportedly ‘refused’—was in fact still in process”; and (3) a statement 18 on a government website that “Khosravi’s visa application is currently ‘undergoing 19 [administrative] processing’ and that Khosravi ‘will receive another adjudication once such 20 21 processing is complete.’” Id. Here, plaintiffs do not allege improper notice of refusal. Dkt. 22 1; Dkt. 14 at 3:9–4:19. That makes this case unlike Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 932 (9th 23 Cir. 1997), where the notice of refusal had been improper and the Government admitted 24 the visa application was in fact being held in abeyance. However, plaintiffs here did 25 26 receive a clear message on Oct. 23, 2025, that the applications of A.M.I., R.M.J., and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 S.M.J “are still refused under Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for 2 mandatory administrative processing.” Dkt. 14-2 (emphasis added). In addition, 3 defendants have filed statements from a government website telling plaintiffs that their 4 5 applications are refused, but also telling plaintiffs that “[i]f you were informed by the 6 consular officer that your case was refused for administrative processing”—which appears 7 to be the case here, see Dkt. 14-2—“[y]ou will receive another adjudication once such 8 processing is complete.” Dkt. 10, Ex. A, B, C. This is close enough to the situation in 9 10 Khosravi for this Court to find that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that defendants have 11 not met their mandatory duty to adjudicate the applications of A.M.I., R.M.J., and S.M.J. 12 No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025). Accord 13 Momeni, No. 2:24-CV-04879-ODW (AGRX), 2024 WL 5112234, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14 15 13, 2024) (Joining the “prevailing position among California district courts” by finding, in 16 a case involving an I-130 petition, that “a soft refusal for administrative processing is not a 17 final decision, and therefore does not discharge an agency’s mandatory non-discretionary 18 obligation to adjudicate a visa application.”). 19 2. Unreasonable Delay 20 21 As discussed supra (II.B.1), Section 555(b) of the APA requires an agency to 22 adjudicate matters presented to it “within a reasonable time.” In addition, Section 706(1) 23 allows a court to “compel agency action” where that action has been “unreasonably 24 delayed.” In the Ninth Circuit, courts use a six-factor balancing test when determining 25 26 whether an agency’s delay is unreasonable. Vaz, 33 F.4th at 1137 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79–80 (D.C. Cir. 2 1984)). The test’s six factors, known as the “TRAC” factors, are: 3 (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of 4 reason[”;] 5 (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed 6 with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; 7

8 (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; 9 10 (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 11 (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests 12 prejudiced by delay; and 13 (6) the court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude 14 in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’ ” 15 Id. The first factor is the most important, “though it, like the others, is not itself 16 determinative.” Vaz, 33 F.4th at 1137 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing A Cmty. Voice v. EPA, 878 17 18 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2017)). Although the second factor can in theory help inform a 19 court’s evaluation of the first factor, the second factor is of no help in this matter because, 20 as plaintiffs state, “Congress has not designated a specific time period in which the action 21 [of adjudicating these applications] must be completed.” Dkt. 14 at 5:20–21. See also 22 23 Khosravi, No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *6 n.7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 24 2025). “Absent a congressionally supplied yardstick, courts typically turn to case law as a 25 guide.” Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 70 (D.D.C. April 21, 2022) (citing Sarlak v. 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 Pompeo, No. 20-cv-35 (BAH), 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020)). District 2 Courts “have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, [and] seven 3 years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not 4 5 unreasonable.” Id. See also Chang v. United States Dep’t of State, No. C23-01918-RSM, 6 2024 WL 3161895, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2024) (“[I]n the immigration context, it is 7 commonplace for courts to hold that a delay of less than four years is not unreasonable.”). 8 Here, plaintiffs allege a delay of 30 months (as of Oct. 21, 2025), which as of the date of 9 10 this order is an alleged delay of about 37 months. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8. See also Dkt. 9 at 9:11. 11 While this alleged delay is getting close to the outer limits of acceptable delay, under 12 relevant caselaw it is not there yet. Arab, 600 F. Supp. 3d at 70 (D.D.C. April 21, 2022) 13 (citing Sarlak, No. 20-cv-35 (BAH), 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020)); 14 15 Chang, No. C23-01918-RSM, 2024 WL 3161895, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2024). In 16 addition, plaintiffs offer no caselaw in support of their argument that defendants must 17 show that any delays are occurring on a “first-in, first-out” basis in order to satisfy the first 18 factor’s rule of reason. Dkt. 14 at 5:22–23. Thus, the first and second factors do not weigh 19 in favor of plaintiffs. 20 21 The third and fifth factors, which consider the effects of the delay on “human health 22 and welfare” and other interests, are typically considered together. Khosravi, No. 2:24-CV- 23 1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025). While this Court does 24 not doubt the hardship of family separation, this difficulty is “nearly always presented by 25 26 delays in processing immediate-family visa applications.” Id. Thus, the third and fifth ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 factors do not tip the balance toward plaintiffs in this matter. Id. See also Chang, No. C23- 2 01918-RSM, 2024 WL 3161895, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2024). 3 On the fourth factor, plaintiffs do not provide a compelling argument that this Court 4 5 should interfere in defendants’ “discretion in prioritizing [their] activities and allocating 6 [their] resources” with regard to the adjudication of applications that have been refused for 7 administrative processing. Vaz, 33 F.4th at 1138 (9th Cir. 2022). See also Dkt. 14 at 8:19– 8 9:9; Dkt. 15 at 4:11–19. Finally, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that the sixth factor is 9 10 neutral. Dkt. 14 at 9:12. Thus, when balancing all of the “TRAC” factors, the Court finds 11 they do not support a finding of unreasonable delay in this matter. Therefore, plaintiffs 12 have failed to plausibly allege unreasonable delay.3 13 Thus, while the Court acknowledges the hardship and deprivation described by 14 15 plaintiffs in their complaint (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8) and does not take lightly the ongoing impacts of 16 hardship and deprivation, the Court will dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a 17 claim. See Khosravi, No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18 14, 2025). This dismissal is without prejudice and the Court will repeat what other district 19 courts have stated in similar situations: “Though judicial intervention is not warranted at 20 21 this juncture, the Court’s calculus could change if the delay continues for a more extended 22 period.” Infracost Inc. v. Blinken, 732 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1258 (S.D. Cal. 2024). See also 23 24

25 3 Because the Court has found that plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged (1) defendants’ failure to meet a mandatory duty and (2) unreasonable delay by defendants, plaintiffs’ claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. 26 § 2201, is also dismissed. Khosravi, No. 2:24-CV-1227-BJR, 2025 WL 821885, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025) (citing Plasket, 18 F.4th at 1082 (9th Cir. 2021)). See also Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 9–10. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 Wasae v. Rubio, No. C24-1714-KKE, 2025 WL 1413781, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2 2025). 3 III. Conclusion 4 5 For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss 6 (Dkt. 9). 7

8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated this 26th day of May, 2026. 11 12

13 Robert S. Lasnik 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO