1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERAUCHI GOLSTON, No. 2:22-cv-0116 KJM AC P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 RON GODWIN, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and paid the filing fee. 19 I. Petition 20 In 1999, petitioner was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to 21 fifteen years to life in prison. ECF No. 1 at 1. He now challenges the September 30, 2020 22 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) denying him parole. Id. at 4-25. He asserts that 23 his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under both the California and United 24 States Constitutions has been violated by the denial of parole, which rendered his sentence 25 unconstitutionally excessive. Id. 26 II. Discussion 27 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 28 requires the court to summarily dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition 1 and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” As set 2 forth below, the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and will be dismissed. 3 As an initial matter, to the extent petitioner claims that his rights under the California 4 constitution have been violated, he fails to state a claim for relief. A petitioner may seek federal 5 habeas relief from a state-court conviction or sentence “only on the ground that he is in custody in 6 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 7 Similarly, any claim that the BPH violated state law by failing to give proper weight to his status 8 as a youth offender also fails to state a viable claim for relief. “[I]t is not the province of a federal 9 habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions,” Estelle v. McGuire, 10 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (habeas 11 relief “is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law”), and 12 matters relating solely to the interpretation or application of state law are not cognizable on 13 federal habeas review, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief 14 does not lie for errors of state law.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner is 15 alleging that the state failed to follow or inappropriately applied state laws, his claims for relief 16 fail. 17 With respect to petitioner’s claim that the denial of parole violated his rights under the 18 United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has overruled a line of Ninth Circuit 19 precedent that had supported habeas review of parole denials in California cases. Swarthout v. 20 Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). The Supreme Court held that federal habeas jurisdiction does 21 not extend to review of the evidentiary basis for state parole decisions. Id. Because habeas relief 22 is not available for errors of state law, and because the Due Process Clause does not require 23 correct application of California’s “some evidence” standard for denial of parole, federal courts 24 may not intervene in parole decisions as long as minimum procedural protections are provided. 25 Id. at 219-20. The protection afforded by the federal Due Process Clause to California parole 26 decisions consists solely of the “minimum” procedural requirements set forth in Greenholtz v. 27 Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Cooke, 562 U.S. at 28 220. Specifically, that petitioner was provided with “an opportunity to be heard and . . . a 1 statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). 2 The transcript attached to the petition makes clear that petitioner was present at the 3 hearing, represented by counsel, and provided a statement of the reasons parole was denied. ECF 4 No. 1 at 29, 78-87. “[T]he beginning and the end of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry” is 5 whether petitioner received “the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection.” 6 Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that after Cooke, substantive 7 challenges to parole decisions are not cognizable in habeas. Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 8 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). It is indisputable that petitioner received all the process he was due, and his 9 challenge to the denial of parole is therefore not cognizable. 10 Finally, petitioner’s contention that the failure to release him violates the Eighth 11 Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because his sentence has been 12 rendered excessive also fails to state a claim. A criminal sentence that is “grossly 13 disproportionate” to the crime for which a defendant is convicted may violate the Eighth 14 Amendment. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 15 (1980). However, outside of the capital punishment context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits 16 only sentences that are extreme and grossly disproportionate to the crime. United States v. Bland, 17 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) 18 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Such instances are “exceedingly rare” and occur in only “extreme” 19 cases. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. “A punishment within legislatively 20 mandated guidelines is presumptively valid.” United States v. Mejia–Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 21 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272). “Generally, so long as the sentence imposed 22 does not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds.” 23 Id. (quoting United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990)). 24 The United States Supreme Court has held that a life sentence is constitutional, even for a 25 non-violent property crime. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66 (upholding a life sentence with the 26 possibility of parole, imposed under a Texas recidivist statute, for a defendant convicted of 27 obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, an offense normally punishable by imprisonment for two to 28 ten years); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 994-96 (upholding a sentence of life without the 1 possibility of parole for a defendant convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, 2 although it was his first felony offense). Accordingly, a sentence of fifteen years to life for 3 attempted first-degree murder, such as was committed by petitioner, would not constitute cruel 4 and unusual punishment as a matter of law.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERAUCHI GOLSTON, No. 2:22-cv-0116 KJM AC P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 RON GODWIN, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and paid the filing fee. 19 I. Petition 20 In 1999, petitioner was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to 21 fifteen years to life in prison. ECF No. 1 at 1. He now challenges the September 30, 2020 22 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) denying him parole. Id. at 4-25. He asserts that 23 his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under both the California and United 24 States Constitutions has been violated by the denial of parole, which rendered his sentence 25 unconstitutionally excessive. Id. 26 II. Discussion 27 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 28 requires the court to summarily dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition 1 and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” As set 2 forth below, the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and will be dismissed. 3 As an initial matter, to the extent petitioner claims that his rights under the California 4 constitution have been violated, he fails to state a claim for relief. A petitioner may seek federal 5 habeas relief from a state-court conviction or sentence “only on the ground that he is in custody in 6 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 7 Similarly, any claim that the BPH violated state law by failing to give proper weight to his status 8 as a youth offender also fails to state a viable claim for relief. “[I]t is not the province of a federal 9 habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions,” Estelle v. McGuire, 10 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (habeas 11 relief “is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law”), and 12 matters relating solely to the interpretation or application of state law are not cognizable on 13 federal habeas review, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief 14 does not lie for errors of state law.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner is 15 alleging that the state failed to follow or inappropriately applied state laws, his claims for relief 16 fail. 17 With respect to petitioner’s claim that the denial of parole violated his rights under the 18 United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has overruled a line of Ninth Circuit 19 precedent that had supported habeas review of parole denials in California cases. Swarthout v. 20 Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). The Supreme Court held that federal habeas jurisdiction does 21 not extend to review of the evidentiary basis for state parole decisions. Id. Because habeas relief 22 is not available for errors of state law, and because the Due Process Clause does not require 23 correct application of California’s “some evidence” standard for denial of parole, federal courts 24 may not intervene in parole decisions as long as minimum procedural protections are provided. 25 Id. at 219-20. The protection afforded by the federal Due Process Clause to California parole 26 decisions consists solely of the “minimum” procedural requirements set forth in Greenholtz v. 27 Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Cooke, 562 U.S. at 28 220. Specifically, that petitioner was provided with “an opportunity to be heard and . . . a 1 statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). 2 The transcript attached to the petition makes clear that petitioner was present at the 3 hearing, represented by counsel, and provided a statement of the reasons parole was denied. ECF 4 No. 1 at 29, 78-87. “[T]he beginning and the end of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry” is 5 whether petitioner received “the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection.” 6 Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that after Cooke, substantive 7 challenges to parole decisions are not cognizable in habeas. Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 8 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). It is indisputable that petitioner received all the process he was due, and his 9 challenge to the denial of parole is therefore not cognizable. 10 Finally, petitioner’s contention that the failure to release him violates the Eighth 11 Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because his sentence has been 12 rendered excessive also fails to state a claim. A criminal sentence that is “grossly 13 disproportionate” to the crime for which a defendant is convicted may violate the Eighth 14 Amendment. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 15 (1980). However, outside of the capital punishment context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits 16 only sentences that are extreme and grossly disproportionate to the crime. United States v. Bland, 17 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) 18 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Such instances are “exceedingly rare” and occur in only “extreme” 19 cases. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. “A punishment within legislatively 20 mandated guidelines is presumptively valid.” United States v. Mejia–Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 21 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272). “Generally, so long as the sentence imposed 22 does not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds.” 23 Id. (quoting United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990)). 24 The United States Supreme Court has held that a life sentence is constitutional, even for a 25 non-violent property crime. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66 (upholding a life sentence with the 26 possibility of parole, imposed under a Texas recidivist statute, for a defendant convicted of 27 obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, an offense normally punishable by imprisonment for two to 28 ten years); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 994-96 (upholding a sentence of life without the 1 possibility of parole for a defendant convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, 2 although it was his first felony offense). Accordingly, a sentence of fifteen years to life for 3 attempted first-degree murder, such as was committed by petitioner, would not constitute cruel 4 and unusual punishment as a matter of law. 5 To the extent petitioner appears to suggest that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), 6 required the BPH to consider and grant parole based on his youth at the time of the offense (ECF 7 No. 1 at 13-14), such a claim provides no basis for relief. Miller prohibits mandatory sentences 8 of life without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense. Petitioner 9 was over the age of eighteen1 at the time of the offense and did not receive a sentence of life 10 without possibility of parole, mandatory or otherwise. 11 III. Conclusion 12 For all these reasons, it is clear from the face of the petition that petitioner is not entitled 13 to relief. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for writ 14 of habeas corpus be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 15 in the United States District Courts. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 17 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 18 after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 19 objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 20 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections 21 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 22 Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 If petitioner files objections, he may also address whether a certificate of appealability 24 should issue and, if so, why and as to which issues. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 25 Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 26 enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability may issue only “if the 27 1 Petitioner states in his petition that he was twenty-three years old (ECF No. 1 at 4), but other 28 records attached to the petition indicate he was twenty-four years old (id. at 36, 112). 1 || applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 2 | § 2253(c)(2). 3 || DATED: October 19, 2022 ~ 4 ttt0n— ALLISON CLAIRE 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28