(HC) Walker v. Cates

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 13, 2025
• Docket: 1:21-cv-01412
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DOUGLAS WALKER Case No. 1:21-cv-01412-JLT-CDB (HC)

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINE TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF 14 BRIAN CATES, Warden APPEALABILITY1

15 Respondent. 14-DAY DEADLINE

16 (Doc. 1)

18 On September 23, 2021, Petitioner Douglas Walker (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 19 proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging four grounds for relief 20 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1). Because three of the four grounds were unexhausted, the district court 21 dismissed the unexhausted grounds on May 23, 2022. (Doc. 17; see Doc. 15). On July 21, 2022, 22 Respondent filed an answer (Doc. 19), arguing Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on his 23 sole remaining ground, and lodged the state court record in support (Docs. 12, 12-1 through 12-5,2 24 20, 20-1 through 20-12). Petitioner did not file a traverse or any other response and the time to do 25 so has expired. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the district 26 court deny the Petition and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c)(17) (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Following a court trial, Petitioner was convicted in the Fresno County Superior Court of 3 (1) inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant in violation of Penal Code § 273.5(a); (2) three 4 counts of attempting to dissuade a witness/victim from reporting that victimization to law 5 enforcement and judicial officers in violation of Penal Code § 136.1(b)(2); and (3) misdemeanor 6 contempt of court for violation of a criminal protective order pursuant to Penal Code § 166(c)(1).3 7 (Doc. 20-2 at 81; Doc. 12-2 at 2).4 The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 8 19 years determinate, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life pursuant to the three strikes law. 9 (Doc. 12-2 at 2; Doc. 12-1). 10 On appeal, the Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal summarized the pertinent facts of 11 the underlying offenses:5

12 K.A. was the victim in this case, and she was living on Andrews Avenue in an apartment building on the night of the incident, 13 February 25, 2014. K.A.’s neighbor, Rain, was living with his spouse and child in an apartment next door to K.A. At around 14 midnight on February 25, Rain heard banging on the front door. When Rain opened the door, K.A. appeared and she was crying, 15 upset and frantic. Rain and his spouse allowed K.A. to come into their apartment and tried to calm her down. K.A. kept repeating that 16 she was scared and fearful, and she expressed concern about her mother who was still in K.A.’s apartment. Rain heard K.A. say, 17 “he’s going to kill me.” Rain and his spouse assumed K.A. was afraid of her husband, but K.A. said it was not her husband; Rain 18 thought K.A. said it was her boyfriend, although she never identified a boyfriend. K.A. had a bloody nose, and she kept telling 19 them someone was going to come to the door and that they should not open it. To help calm K.A., Rain and his spouse turned off the 20 lights in the front of the apartment and locked the door and did not open it again until the police arrived and identified themselves. 21 K.A. had a small bottle of alcohol with her, but the bottle was 22 empty, and she threw it away while she was in Rain’s apartment. Rain’s spouse called 911, and while his spouse was speaking with 23 the dispatcher, K.A. was making statements in the background. K.A. can be heard on the 911 recording saying, “his name is Doug,” 24 she identifies herself as K.A., she can be heard saying, “[n]o” to the 25

26 3 Petitioner was found not guilty on an additional dissuading a witness charge and a charge of making criminal threats. (Doc. 12-2 at 2). 27 4 Record citations herein are to the CM/ECF-assigned pages. 5 These facts are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Crittenden v. 1 question whether she needed an ambulance, and referencing, “my mom” and “my house.” 2 Another of K.A.’s neighbors, Cecelia B., testified at trial. Cecelia 3 had been living on Andrews Avenue with her daughter, Asia, in an apartment that shared a wall with K.A.’s apartment. Cecelia was on 4 friendly terms with K.A., who had frequently visited Cecelia at Cecelia’s and Asia’s apartment. Cecelia had seen injuries on K.A. 5 in the past, and in the two weeks before February 25, she had seen K.A. “beat all up,” “like, … maybe her jaw could have been 6 broken”; Cecelia also observed redness on K.A.’s face and big bruises. 7 Cecelia was familiar with defendant. K.A. had told her defendant 8 was living with K.A., Cecelia had seen him coming out of that apartment at times with K.A., and she thought they were in a dating 9 relationship as she had seen them holding hands and coming and going from the apartment together. 10 Cecelia had seen defendant earlier that day somewhere else. That 11 night, she heard bumping and fighting through the wall shared with K.A.’s apartment. Later, when Cecelia was coming out of her 12 apartment, she saw K.A. getting out of a police car, and then K.A. approached Cecelia and asked to use her cell phone. This was not 13 unusual in one respect because K.A. had often asked to borrow Cecelia’s cell phone to make calls. To Cecelia, K.A. seemed 14 nervous.

15 K.A. made a call with the phone in speaker mode, and Cecelia listened to the entire conversation while an officer stood by. Cecelia 16 heard the man on the call say he was at a bus stop, and K.A. asked him for the location. K.A. accused the man of acts of violence, and 17 she told him he should not have used a bat; he responded she should not have done something, that she should not have gone 18 “in[to] his pocket or something.” Cecelia recognized the voice on the phone as defendant because K.A. was using his name, but also 19 because Cecelia had spoken to defendant before in passing. Moreover, in the early hours of the next morning, around 2:00 or 20 3:00 a.m., the same male voice called Cecelia’s cell phone and asked to speak with K.A.; at that time, he identified himself as 21 “Dougie.”

22 Asia Brown testified she knew K.A. as the “cool” neighbor who would come over to the apartment Asia shared with Cecelia, and 23 they would talk quite often. K.A. lived in the unit next to Asia and her mother, which had a common wall. Asia was familiar with 24 defendant, and she knew him as K.A.’s boyfriend. Asia believed they were in a relationship and lived at K.A.’s apartment because 25 K.A. had told them so. Defendant was there every day, and she had seen him coming and going out of the apartment at all hours of the 26 day.

27 On the night of the incident, Asia heard noises through the wall shared with K.A., including bumping noises; she could not identify 1 wrestling, tussling, and maybe screaming. In the two weeks before the incident, she had seen K.A. with physical injuries, including her 2 face appearing “really big and bruised.” K.A.’s arm or hand seemed affected too, the bruising on her face encompassed nearly her entire 3 face, and Asia thought perhaps there was an open cut above one of K.A.’s eyebrows. 4 On the night of the incident, Asia was aware that her mother loaned 5 K.A. a cell phone, and Asia was present when K.A. was speaking on the speaker phone outside the apartment door while the police 6 were there. Asia could tell it was defendant on the other end of the line because she knew his voice from the other times they had 7 spoken, which she estimated included more than 10 brief interactions; additionally, she heard K.A. calling him “Doug” while 8 they were on the phone. According to Asia, K.A. was trying to lure Doug back to the apartment. K.A. accused him of being violent 9 toward her, and she said, “[w]hy did you hit me?” or “[w]hy did you hurt me[?]” or words to that effect. Asia also heard K.A. say, 10 “[y]ou hit me with a baseball bat,” and Asia believed defendant responded that he did not mean it, or words to that effect. Asia did 11 not remember defendant saying to K.A. that she should not have gone through his pockets; instead, Asia recalled he apologized with 12 the words, “I’m sorry.”

13 Officer Matthew Paley testified that he was working as patrol on the night of the incident with Officer Ronnie Pack. They were 14 dispatched to Andrews Avenue based on a domestic violence call. Paley was the assisting officer, so while Pack was making contact 15 with K.A., Paley was interviewing witnesses and canvassing.

16 Paley spoke with Asia and Cecelia, and he was also present for a cell phone conversation projected by speakerphone between K.A. 17 and a man. Palely testified he was trying to ascertain the location of the suspect, and he was encouraging K.A. to elicit some clue as to 18 where the suspect was located so the police could find him. Paley had never contacted defendant before; K.A. identified the person on 19 the phone as her boyfriend. Paley did not recall if he was present for the entire conversation. After the call, Paley reported driving 20 around the area looking at some bus stops to see if anyone there matched the description of the suspect. Paley testified he did not 21 recall whose idea it was to contact the suspect by cell phone; he reiterated he did not hear much of the conversation—his primary 22 focus was the suspect’s location; he remembered hearing a man’s voice, but not what the man was saying, and he did not stay nearby 23 for the entirety of the call.

24 Officer Pack testified he was dispatched with Paley to Andrews Avenue based on a report that a female was screaming that she had 25 been assaulted by her boyfriend. Pack contacted K.A. around the corner from her apartment; she was fearful and “just kind of all 26 over the place emotionally.” Pack was able to get a statement from her, but it was difficult because she was jumping around in her 27 narrative, so the information came from her in bits and pieces. During the interview, K.A. appeared afraid and her facial 1 way she slurred her speech, and Pack detected an odor of alcohol emanating from her. Pack noted K.A. had a black eye on her left 2 side, and she had red marks near her right eye, and some redness on her chin. During the interview, he went into K.A.’s apartment 3 looking for her elderly mother who was living with her, as K.A. was concerned that her mother might have been harmed; when they 4 located K.A.’s mother in the apartment, however, she was safe.

5 Pack testified K.A. demonstrated how her attacker raised a wooden dowel in his right hand—she held the dowel in her right hand, 6 above her head and shoulders, onehanded. The dowel was used as a security device on the sliding glass doors in the apartment; Pack did 7 not collect the dowel as evidence, and it was not investigated. Pack showed K.A. a picture of defendant, and K.A. identified him as the 8 person who assaulted her.

9 Officer Scott Payn testified that he was dispatched to Andrews Street the day after the incident because police had received an 10 anonymous phone call that the suspect, defendant, was at that location. When he arrived at the location, two other officers were 11 already there, and they spent about 30 minutes attempting to make contact with anyone in the apartment by knocking and announcing 12 their presence. They obtained keys from the manager, entered the apartment, and arrested defendant. 13 Justin Williamson, an investigator with the district attorney’s office, 14 met with Rain on March 6 to discuss the incident. According to Williamson, Rain told him that K.A. kept repeating over and over, 15 “he’s going to kill me.” K.A. also indicated to Rain that she was scared because her mother was still in her apartment. Rain told 16 Williamson that K.A. stated whomever she was afraid of had a baseball bat or a pole and that he had already hit her once. Rain also 17 told Williamson that he and his spouse had turned off the lights in the front room and locked the doors, just in case someone was 18 looking for K.A. To Williamson, Rain seemed upset when recounting the incident and recalling what happened. 19 Williamson testified he also spoke with K.A. on March 6 about the 20 incident. He observed K.A. emanated fear and anger, and he sensed she was recanting her original story. She became emotional when 21 they discussed the court process and what to expect as a victim of domestic violence. He observed K.A. had bruising on her face that 22 appeared to be in the healing process. Williamson also spoke with Cecelia and Asia that same day. On the night of the incident, Asia 23 reported she heard K.A. say something through the wall to the effect of, “[p]lease, don’t. No.” Cecelia and Asia recounted that 24 K.A. had used Cecelia’s cell phone to contact defendant that night. When K.A. was on the phone with defendant, Cecelia said she 25 heard K.A. indicate defendant had tried hitting her with a bat, and that defendant replied that K.A. should not have gone through his 26 pockets. Cecelia also reported she knew it was defendant on the phone because defendant called her later that night and identified 27 himself as “Dougie.” 1 On February 28, defendant was charged with causing corporal injury to a cohabitant/dating partner in violation of section 273.5, 2 subdivision (a). On March 7, appellant was served with a protective order that precluded “any contact personal, electronic, telephonic, 3 or written” with K.A. After defendant was arrested, he made several recorded phone calls from the jail to K.A., encouraging her to avoid 4 coming to court, to avoid service of a trial subpoena upon her, and to recant her story that defendant injured her on February 25. 5 Specifically, on March 10, at approximately 5:58 p.m., defendant called her and told her not to talk to the attorney with the district 6 attorney’s office or anyone else. K.A. also told defendant she could “play it off as … you know I was f***in’ pissed and then I f***in’ 7 came home and you’re gone. You f***in’ left. I go oh f*** he’s over there f***in’ this b**** now. Oh hell no. It’s like alright 8 mother f*****, you’re going down now. I didn’t realize that how how serious it was gonna be. You know?” 9 Later the same day, on March 10, defendant called K.A. and, during 10 the course of the conversation asked her, “why don’t you dodge the next subpoena? Just don’t answer the door whatever and just you 11 know what I mean?”

12 On March 11, defendant again called K.A. and they discussed her not being available to accept a subpoena: 13 “[K.A.]: I, If they come uh if they come trying to subpoena 14 me again[,] they ain’t getting in the door.

15 “[Defendant]: No don’t. Don’t even answer the door. Just act like you’re not even there babe. [¶] … [¶] Don’t answer the 16 door. Don’t even accept a subpoena. You know what I mean?”

17 On March 16, defendant again called K.A. and they discussed K.A. recanting her story at the preliminary hearing and attempting to 18 evade a trial subpoena.

19 “[Defendant]: …listen, listen. There’s a guy in here right now right … [¶] … [¶] …that’s already had, that’s already had 20 two domestics. [¶] … [¶] The, and he beat both of them[,] right? [¶] … [¶] Right, and… [¶] … [¶] …he already told me how to 21 go about it, right? [¶] … [¶] This is what we’re gonna do. This is what we’re gonna do. This is what we’re gonna do, listen. He 22 told me if she’s recanting her story and saying you didn’t do it or nothing, right. [¶] … [¶] He goes have her come to the 23 preliminary hearing, which that’s the fourth. He goes have her get on the stand and recant her story and everything and tell ‘em 24 you didn’t do it. He goes then if they still bound you over for trial, the judge don’t throw it out right then, and they bound you 25 uh for trial… [¶] … [¶] …when it comes trial time, for you to go to court for trial. [¶] … [¶] He goes, and they try and 26 subpoena her or whatever, he goes have her just get ghost and don’t show up for the trial. He goes then they have to throw it 27 out because there’s no witness and he goes and, and to top it off, she already came to the preliminary hearing and told them you 1 she’s not there, if she don’t show up for court, they have to throw it out and let you out. [¶] … [¶] He goes, I already beat 2 two domestics doing it like that. [¶] … [¶] And what I’m gonna do is, I’m gonna have f***in’ Shy come pick you up and take 3 you to Calwa if I have to. You know what I mean? [¶] … [¶] To stay over there during the trial so they don’t try and f***in’ uh, 4 uh, uh, put an attachment to you. Put somebody with you or something. You know what I mean to make sure you come… 5 [¶] … [¶] Okay but, but I’m telling you, if we go to trial I need you to be gone because the DA will try and come get you. Then 6 he’ll send cops to come get you, all that, [¶] … [¶] And then we can’t have, they might. They might try to, yeah. [¶] … [¶] So 7 that’s why I need you to be gone. You know what you do? You know, you know what you do that week of trial, right? [¶] … [¶] 8 Just go stay at your f***in’, go stay at your daughter’s for a couple of days, alright? And then, but what they’ll do, they’ll 9 postpone it, they’ll postpone the trial, until they try and locate you. You know what I mean? [¶] … [¶] So you’re just gonna 10 have to, you’re gonna … just have to not be answering your phone. You’re gonna, just gonna have to stay gone, alright? [¶] 11 … [¶] That, all that don’t matter. You [know] you just … make sure you’re gone. Don’t don’t accept no subpoena, nothing. You 12 know what I mean? [¶] … [¶] I want you to recant your story and everything.” 13 14 (Doc. 12-2 at 4-10 (footnote omitted)). The state appellate court “remanded to allow the trial 15 court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the prior serious felony enhancement 16 pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 … and to allow the trial court to consider whether consecutive 17 or concurrent sentences should be imposed as to counts 4 and 5.” (Id. at 33). The court otherwise 18 affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (Id. at 34). On July 10, 2020, the California Supreme Court 19 summarily denied review. (Doc. 12-4). On remand, the trial court declined to modify the 20 previously imposed sentence. (Doc. 12-5). 21 Petitioner’s sole remaining claim before this Court challenges the sufficiency of the 22 evidence to support his conviction on count one for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant. 23 (Doc. 1 at 4). 24 II. STANDARD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF 25 A federal court’s statutory authority to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state 26 custody is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 27 Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to 1 first “exhaust[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State.”6 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 2 Where the state court adjudicates the claim on the merits, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas 3 relief unless the adjudication (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 4 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 5 of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 6 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 7 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 8 “Deciding whether a state court’s decision ‘involved’ an unreasonable application of 9 federal law or was ‘based on’ an unreasonable determination of the facts requires the federal 10 habeas court to ‘train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state 11 courts rejected a state prisoner’s federal claims.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). 12 When the state court’s decision “does not come accompanied with [its] reasons” for the decision, 13 a federal court “should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court 14 decision that does provide a relevant rationale.” Id. However, when there is no reasoned decision 15 to “look through,” it may be presumed—in “the absence of any indication or state-law procedural 16 principles to the contrary”—that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits and the 17 petitioner must show “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 18 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011). 19 Under 2254(d)(1), a decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state 20 court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case 21 law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially 22 indistinguishable facts. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003). A state court decision 23 involves an “unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s precedents if the state court 24 correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies the facts of the petitioner’s case in an 25 objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005), or “if the state 26 court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new 27 context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new 1 context where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “A state court’s 2 determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-minded 3 jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 62 U.S. at 4 101. The petitioner must show that the state court decision “was so lacking in justification that 5 there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 6 fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. 7 Under § 2254(d)(2), “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely 8 because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” 9 Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). “State courts are accorded substantial deference. If 10 reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question, on habeas 11 review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s determination.” Marks v. Davis, 106 12 F.4th 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brumfield v. 13 Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015)). 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 Petitioner exhausted his sufficiency of the evidence claim by presenting it to the state 16 courts on direct review and Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner has exhausted this claim. 17 Accordingly, the claim must be evaluated under the deferential AEDPA standard. Because the 18 California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s request for review, this Court looks to 19 the opinion of the Fifth Appellate District as the last reasoned decision. See Wilson, 584 U.S. at 20 125. 21 A. Background 22 At trial, the judge summarized the evidence he concluded supported Petitioner’s 23 conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant. (Doc. 20-6 at 19-23). As to the 24 relationship between Petitioner and K.A., the judge found it was “clearly established” based on 25 transcripts of jail calls between Petitioner and K.A. and testimony from other individuals that the 26 two were “in contact on a regular basis prior to the date of these injuries being reported.” (Id. at 27 20). As to whether K.A. “was struck and did the actions of [Petitioner] cause traumatic 1 the background of a 9-1-1 call, and concluded these statements were “sufficiently credible to at 2 least get to a prima facia showing that [Petitioner], someone named Dougie, who is known to her, 3 struck her and caused the injuries.” (Id. at 20-21). The judge specifically addressed K.A.’s 4 credibility, concluding “some of the circumstances of that report lend credibility to the report,” 5 including K.A.’s unwillingness to provide Petitioner’s full name, her fear, and her repeated 6 instructions not to open the door. (Id. at 21). Overall, the judge concluded K.A.’s behavior was 7 “not consistent with somebody falsely attributing a domestic violence incident to someone who is 8 not guilty of doing so.” (Id. at 22). The court relied on photographs of the injuries as well as 9 testimony from witnesses to support that K.A.’s injuries were a traumatic condition. (Id. at 22- 10 23). 11 Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in support of this conviction on 12 appeal. The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s argument and concluded substantial evidence 13 supported his conviction. (Doc. 12-2 at 20-23). The appellate court explained:

14 There was ample evidence from witnesses who overheard some of the interactions between defendant and K.A. and who were able to 15 speak with K.A. immediately following the incident and observe her injuries and condition. For example, Asia and Cecelia testified 16 they heard fighting through their shared apartment wall with K.A. When K.A. sought help from the neighbors immediately following 17 the incident, she was very frightened to the extent Rain testified they locked the door and shut off the lights to calm her down. K.A. 18 was also very frightened for her mother, who was still in her apartment. During the 911 call, K.A. identified her assailant as a 19 man named Doug, and she told Rain the person who she was frightened of was “going to kill [her].” K.A. had a bloody nose, and 20 Rain gave her frozen strawberries to apply to the swelling on her face. Officer Pack noted K.A.’s left eye was black, she had red 21 marks on her right eye, and some redness on her chin. K.A. identified a photograph of defendant as the person who had 22 assaulted her. She appeared to Pack to be fearful, and she was worried defendant had harmed her mother, who was still in the 23 apartment.

24 When K.A. made the call to defendant on Cecelia’s cell phone, she accused defendant of hitting her and he adopted the admission by 25 not refuting her statement and saying words to the effect that she should not have gone through his things, and he was sorry. K.A.’s 26 reaction to the incident, her fear of defendant, her frightened behavior in fleeing her apartment and seeking help from the 27 neighbors, her worry for her mother (who remained in the apartment), K.A.’s identification of defendant as her assailant, and 1 which it can be reasonably inferred defendant struck her intentionally and willfully. While there was some doubt about how 2 defendant had struck her—the court did not believe her injuries were consistent with being struck by a dowel or a bat—that he 3 intentionally struck her and caused her traumatic injury was supported by the evidence. 4 … 5 Here, the victim herself made statements and exhibited injuries and 6 behavior from which reasonable inferences arose that defendant willfully caused her traumatic injury. K.A. was frightened when she 7 sought help from the neighbors, and she appeared frightened when interviewed by the officers; she was worried about her mother, who 8 was still in the apartment; she identified defendant as her assailant to officers and in the 911 call; and K.A. had observable injuries on 9 her face. Had defendant’s conduct been unintentional or defensive in nature, it is unlikely K.A. would have exhibited such fear and 10 agitation. Defendant also made adoptive admissions over the phone that indicated he intentionally and willfully injured K.A. 11 Considering the entire record, there was substantial evidence to support defendant’s conviction on count 1 under section 273.5, 12 subdivision (a). (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357 [“A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears 13 “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict.” ].) 14 15 (Id. at 20-23). 16 B. Law and Analysis 17 “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 18 beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 19 charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 20 (1979), which sets forth the federal standard for determining a sufficiency of the evidence claim, 21 such a claim “can only succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 22 prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 23 a reasonable doubt.” Johnson v. Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation 24 and citation omitted). Federal courts look to state law for the elements of the specific offense at 25 issue. Maquiz v. Hedgpeth, 907 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2018). When a federal habeas court 26 reviews an insufficiency claim previously rejected on the merits by the state court, “a second 27 level of deference applies under AEDPA” such that, to prevail, a petitioner must show that the “state court’s determination that a rational jury could have found each required element proven 1 beyond a reasonable doubt was not just wrong but was objectively unreasonable.” Johnson, 899 2 F.3d at 1056-57. 3 Penal Code § 273.5 punishes “[a] person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in 4 a traumatic condition” upon “someone with whom the offender has, or previously had, an 5 engagement or dating relationship.” Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a)-(b). For purposes of the statute, 6 a ‘“[d]ating relationship’ means frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the 7 expectation of affectional or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations.” Cal. 8 Penal Code § 243(f)(10). “Corporal injury” is “defined using its ordinarily understood language 9 and plain meaning” such that it requires hurt, damage, or loss sustained by the body. People v. 10 Reid, 105 Cal. App. 5th 446, 456 (2024). “[T]raumatic condition” is statutorily defined as “a 11 condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury, including, but not limited 12 to, injury as a result of strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused 13 by physical force.” Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(d). 14 Here, Petitioner fails to present any argument as to how the state court’s decision was 15 wrong or objectively unreasonable. In fact, Petitioner’s entire argument consists of two 16 sentences: (1) the initial ground two listed as “[t]here was insufficient evidence to prove all 17 elements of the offense as charged in violation of Petitioner’s rights to Due Process and a fair 18 trial;” and (2) the supporting facts, baldly asserting “[t]here was insufficient evidence prodeuced 19 [sic] to establish that the elements of inflicting a traumatic injury on a spouse, as charged in count 20 one, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” (Doc. 1 at 4). 21 However, “[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do 22 not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Petitioner has 23 not shown he is entitled to relief. 24 Further, a review of the record reveals that sufficient evidence supported Petitioner’s 25 conviction. At trial,7 the parties stipulated to the admission of recorded calls between Petitioner 26 and K.A. which contained declarations of love, use of pet names, and discussions implying a 27 sexual relationship. (See Doc. 20-1 at 239-40, 244, 248, 257, 262-63). Additionally, witnesses 1 testified to seeing Petitioner and K.A. together. (Doc. 20-4 at 29-30, 63). As to the events of 2 February 25, 2014, K.A.’s neighbors testified to hearing “bumping and fighting” from K.A.’s 3 apartment. (Id. at 32, 65). K.A. borrowed a cell phone from a neighbor, called Petitioner on 4 speakerphone, and while on the phone told him “You shouldn’t have used a bat,” to which 5 Petitioner responded that she should not have gone in his pockets, or he did not mean to. (Doc. 6 20-4 at 40, 75, 82-84). A separate neighbor testified that K.A. came to his apartment frantic and 7 beaten up, talking hysterically, crying, expressing fear that her mother was still in her apartment, 8 and asking to close and lock the doors. (Doc. 20-5 at 46-50). A recorded 9-1-1 call included 9 statements from K.A. that “his name is Doug” and asking to lock the doors. (Doc. 20-2 at 73-77; 10 see Doc. 20.5 at 49-50). Officer Pack testified that during his interaction with K.A., he asked her 11 to show him how Petitioner used a wooden dowel during the incident and “[s]he took the dowl in 12 her right hand and held it up above her shoulders and above her head” at an angle, “like it was in 13 like a striking motion.” (Doc. 20-5 at 21). K.A. identified Petitioner as the suspect to Officer 14 Pack. (Id. at 22). K.A. “was very upset” and “seemed very scared” during her interactions with 15 police. (Id. at 24, 30). Pictures of K.A.’s injuries were also admitted as evidence. (See Doc. 20- 16 5 at 11-17). 17 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact 18 could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner and K.A. were in a relationship, 19 Petitioner willfully inflicted bodily harm on K.A., and K.A. suffered an injury as a result. As 20 such, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was not contrary 21 to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it 22 based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The undersigned recommends that the 23 Petition be denied. 24 IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 25 “[A] state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 26 district court’s denial of his application.” Miller-El v. Cockell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule 27 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires a court to “issue or deny a certificate of 1 will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 2 right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this showing for claims rejected on procedural grounds, 3 a movant must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition 4 states a valid claim of denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 5 debatable whether the district was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 6 473, 484 (2000). When a claim is rejected on the merits, the petitioner “must demonstrate that 7 reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 8 or wrong” to warrant a certificate of appealability. 9 Because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 10 right, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 11 V. RECOMMENDATION 12 For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED: 13 1. Petitioner be DENIED all relief on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1); 14 and 15 2. Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 17 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the 18 United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of service of this 19 recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and recommendations 20 with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections 21 to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without 22 leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the 23 Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the 24 exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise 25 reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be 26 disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 27 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 1 | time may waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 2 | 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 | IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _Mareh 12, 2025 | Word bo 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15