8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 ANTHONY E. MYERS, Case No. 1:20-cv-00472-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 13 v. PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
14 FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
15 Respondents.
16 17 Petitioner is a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 18 corpus. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is currently confined at the Fresno County jail. (ECF No. 1 at 2).1 In the instant 22 federal habeas petition, Petitioner raises a speedy trial claim with respect to his Fresno County 23 criminal proceeding, which involves resisting an executive officer in violation of California 24 Penal Code sections 69. (Id. at 2, 3). Petitioner also alleges that he was unlawfully arrested, 25 subject to assault and sexual assault while in detention, had his legal documents confiscated, and 26 was denied penicillin. (Id. at 4, 12, 17, 19). The petition also includes allegations regarding 27 cryptocurrency and various technologies. (Id. at 12–19). 1 II. 2 DISCUSSION 3 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases2 requires preliminary review of a 4 habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 5 to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 6 petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” 7 A. Younger Abstention 8 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that when there is a 9 pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state 10 prosecution. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 11 (2013). See also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (“The doctrine of Younger v. 12 Harris . . . reinforces our federal scheme by preventing a state criminal defendant from asserting 13 ancillary challenges to ongoing state criminal procedures in federal court.”). “Younger 14 abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and 15 federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of 16 San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 The Ninth Circuit has held that the “logical implication” of Younger “is that abstention 18 principles likewise prohibit a federal court from considering a pre-conviction habeas petition that 19 seeks preemptively to litigate an affirmative constitutional defense unless the petitioner can 20 demonstrate that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ warrant federal intervention.” Brown v. Ahern, 21 676 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980)). 22 Extraordinary circumstances include “cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by 23 state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” or situations “where 24 irreparable injury can be shown.” Brown, 676 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted) 25 (quoting Carden, 626 F.2d at 84). 26 ///
27 2 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases also apply to § 2241 habeas petitions. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not 1 “[T]he rule of this circuit is that abstention principles generally require a federal district 2 court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a habeas petition in which the petitioner raises 3 a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause as an affirmative defense to state prosecution.” Brown, 4 676 F.3d at 903 (emphasis added). However, a petitioner seeking “only to demand enforcement 5 of the [State]’s affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial,” and having 6 exhausted all available state remedies toward that end, may go forward with a federal habeas 7 petition. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–90 (1973). See 8 Coleman v. Ahlin, 542 F. App’x 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Braden “[p]lac[ed] great 9 weight on the fact that ‘petitioner made no effort to abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the 10 orderly functioning of state judicial processes,’ and that he came ‘to federal court, not in an effort 11 to forestall a state prosecution, but to enforce the Commonwealth’s obligation to provide him 12 with a state court forum.’” (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 491)). 13 Here, Petitioner requests “release from unlawful custody.” (ECF No. 1 at 9). Although 14 unclear, it appears that Petitioner raises a speedy trial claim as an affirmative defense to state 15 prosecution, which would require the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. However, it 16 is possible that Petitioner seeks only to demand enforcement of the State’s obligation to bring 17 him promptly to trial. Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court whether he raises a speedy trial 18 claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution or whether he seeks only to demand 19 enforcement of the State’s obligation to bring him promptly to trial. 20 B. Exhaustion 21 It also appears that Petitioner may have failed to exhaust the claims that he appears to 22 raise in the instant petition. “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust 23 all available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. 24 Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 25 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 26 (2006)). “The rule of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of 27 federal-state comity.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). The “comity 1 include “attack[s] . . . on the failure of state prosecutorial authorities to afford [petitioners] a 2 speedy trial.” Id. (citing Braden, 410 U.S. 484). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion 3 requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each 4 claim before presenting it to the federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); 5 Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 6 If Petitioner has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court, the Court will not 7 proceed to the merits of his claims as a prudential matter. The petition states that Petitioner 8 sought review in the California Supreme Court and the result is pending in case number 9 19905355. (ECF No. 1 at 7). However, that case number corresponds to Petitioner’s Fresno 10 County Superior Court proceeding. (ECF No. 1 at 2).
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 ANTHONY E. MYERS, Case No. 1:20-cv-00472-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 13 v. PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
14 FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
15 Respondents.
16 17 Petitioner is a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 18 corpus. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is currently confined at the Fresno County jail. (ECF No. 1 at 2).1 In the instant 22 federal habeas petition, Petitioner raises a speedy trial claim with respect to his Fresno County 23 criminal proceeding, which involves resisting an executive officer in violation of California 24 Penal Code sections 69. (Id. at 2, 3). Petitioner also alleges that he was unlawfully arrested, 25 subject to assault and sexual assault while in detention, had his legal documents confiscated, and 26 was denied penicillin. (Id. at 4, 12, 17, 19). The petition also includes allegations regarding 27 cryptocurrency and various technologies. (Id. at 12–19). 1 II. 2 DISCUSSION 3 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases2 requires preliminary review of a 4 habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 5 to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 6 petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” 7 A. Younger Abstention 8 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that when there is a 9 pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state 10 prosecution. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 11 (2013). See also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (“The doctrine of Younger v. 12 Harris . . . reinforces our federal scheme by preventing a state criminal defendant from asserting 13 ancillary challenges to ongoing state criminal procedures in federal court.”). “Younger 14 abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and 15 federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of 16 San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 The Ninth Circuit has held that the “logical implication” of Younger “is that abstention 18 principles likewise prohibit a federal court from considering a pre-conviction habeas petition that 19 seeks preemptively to litigate an affirmative constitutional defense unless the petitioner can 20 demonstrate that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ warrant federal intervention.” Brown v. Ahern, 21 676 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980)). 22 Extraordinary circumstances include “cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by 23 state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” or situations “where 24 irreparable injury can be shown.” Brown, 676 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted) 25 (quoting Carden, 626 F.2d at 84). 26 ///
27 2 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases also apply to § 2241 habeas petitions. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not 1 “[T]he rule of this circuit is that abstention principles generally require a federal district 2 court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a habeas petition in which the petitioner raises 3 a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause as an affirmative defense to state prosecution.” Brown, 4 676 F.3d at 903 (emphasis added). However, a petitioner seeking “only to demand enforcement 5 of the [State]’s affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial,” and having 6 exhausted all available state remedies toward that end, may go forward with a federal habeas 7 petition. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–90 (1973). See 8 Coleman v. Ahlin, 542 F. App’x 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Braden “[p]lac[ed] great 9 weight on the fact that ‘petitioner made no effort to abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the 10 orderly functioning of state judicial processes,’ and that he came ‘to federal court, not in an effort 11 to forestall a state prosecution, but to enforce the Commonwealth’s obligation to provide him 12 with a state court forum.’” (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 491)). 13 Here, Petitioner requests “release from unlawful custody.” (ECF No. 1 at 9). Although 14 unclear, it appears that Petitioner raises a speedy trial claim as an affirmative defense to state 15 prosecution, which would require the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. However, it 16 is possible that Petitioner seeks only to demand enforcement of the State’s obligation to bring 17 him promptly to trial. Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court whether he raises a speedy trial 18 claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution or whether he seeks only to demand 19 enforcement of the State’s obligation to bring him promptly to trial. 20 B. Exhaustion 21 It also appears that Petitioner may have failed to exhaust the claims that he appears to 22 raise in the instant petition. “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust 23 all available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. 24 Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 25 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 26 (2006)). “The rule of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of 27 federal-state comity.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). The “comity 1 include “attack[s] . . . on the failure of state prosecutorial authorities to afford [petitioners] a 2 speedy trial.” Id. (citing Braden, 410 U.S. 484). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion 3 requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each 4 claim before presenting it to the federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); 5 Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 6 If Petitioner has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court, the Court will not 7 proceed to the merits of his claims as a prudential matter. The petition states that Petitioner 8 sought review in the California Supreme Court and the result is pending in case number 9 19905355. (ECF No. 1 at 7). However, that case number corresponds to Petitioner’s Fresno 10 County Superior Court proceeding. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court 11 whether each of his claims has been presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, 12 provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court that includes 13 the claims now presented and a file stamp showing that the petition was indeed filed in the 14 California Supreme Court. 15 C. Conditions of Confinement 16 A claim falls within the “core of habeas corpus” when a prisoner challenges “the fact or 17 duration of his confinement” and “seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the 18 shortening of its duration.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The Ninth Circuit 19 recently adopted a rule that a “state prisoner’s claim [that] does not lie at ‘the core of habeas 20 corpus’ . . . must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934 21 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 22 535 n.13 (2011)). Therefore, if “success on [Petitioner]’s claims would not necessarily lead to his 23 immediate or earlier release from confinement, [Petitioner]’s claim does not fall within ‘the core 24 of habeas corpus,’ and he must instead bring his claim under § 1983.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935 25 (quoting Skinner, 562 U.S. at 535 n.13). 26 In addition to his speedy trial claim, Petitioner also alleges that he was subject to assault 27 and sexual assault while in detention, had his legal documents confiscated, and was denied 1 | challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 933 (citing 2 | Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, Petitioner will be 3 | required to show cause why the Court has habeas jurisdiction over his conditions of confinement 4 | claims. 5 Ii. 6 ORDER 7 Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within THIRTY (30) days 8 | from the date of service of this order why the petition should not be dismissed based on Younger 9 |v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), failure to exhaust state judicial remedies, and failure to state 10 | cognizable federal habeas corpus claims. 11 Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in a recommendation 12 | for dismissal of the petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (a petitioner’s 13 | failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action). 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. OF. ee 16 | Dated: _April 6, 2020 __ Ee _ 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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