(HC) Lyons v. Cooper

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedNovember 12, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-02875
StatusUnknown

This text of (HC) Lyons v. Cooper ((HC) Lyons v. Cooper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(HC) Lyons v. Cooper, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 BART LORAN LYONS, No. 2:24-cv-2875 CSK P 11 Petitioner, 12 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 JIM COOPER, et al., 14 Respondent. 15 16 Petitioner, a county prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. For the 18 following reasons, this Court recommends that this action be dismissed. 19 Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 20 the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 21 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 22 I. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS 23 Petitioner identifies himself as a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The petition contains 24 four claims. In claim one, petitioner alleges that he is being denied the Keto diet in violation of 25 his constitutional rights. (Id. at 8.) Petitioner alleges that a non-Keto diet causes him irreparable 26 harm due to petitioner suffering from a rare auto-immune disorder. (Id.) In claim two, petitioner 27 alleges that a breakdown in the Public Defender’s Office prejudiced petitioner’s case. (Id.) 28 Petitioner alleges that his first public defender had over 140 active cases. (Id.) Petitioner was left 1 without representation for weeks after the Public Defender’s Office went on strike. (Id.) In claim 2 three, petitioner alleges that his Eighth and Fifth Amendment rights have been violated. (Id.) 3 Petitioner alleges that for about two months, petitioner was held without bail. (Id.) Petitioner 4 alleges that during the hearing on petitioner’s bail, the judge failed to consider petitioner’s ability 5 to pay. (Id.) Petitioner is homeless and cannot pay $7,500 for release on bail. (Id.) In claim 6 four, petitioner alleges that his counsel allowed the district attorney to act as both bailiff and 7 prosecutor. (Id. at 9.) Petitioner also alleges that the prosecutor lied about reading “over 20 fail 8 to appears.” (Id.) As relief, petitioner requests that this Court assign a lawyer to represent 9 petitioner, dismiss all pending charges or order realistic bail. (Id.) Petitioner also seeks money 10 damages for violations of his civil rights. (Id.) 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. Claims Related to Validity of Pretrial Detention 13 This Court first finds that petitioner’s claims related to the validity of petitioner’s pretrial 14 detention, i.e., claims two, three and four, are properly raised in a habeas corpus petition brought 15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in state 16 custody upon the legality of that custody, and [ ] the traditional function of the writ is to secure 17 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). While 18 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “confers jurisdiction on a district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 19 of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[,]” a habeas petitioner attacking 20 his pretrial detention should seek relief under § 2241. Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885-86 21 (9th Cir. 2004). 22 For the following reasons, this Court finds that petitioner failed to exhaust his state court 23 remedies as to claims two, three and four. Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement 24 for a pretrial detainee petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, principles of federalism and 25 comity require that this Court abstain and not entertain a pretrial habeas challenge unless the 26 petitioner has exhausted his available state-judicial remedies and “special circumstances” warrant 27 federal intervention. See Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83-84 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1980). As the 28 Ninth Circuit explained, 1 As an exercise of judicial restraint, however, federal courts elect not to entertain habeas corpus challenges [under § 2241] to state court 2 proceedings until habeas petitioners have exhausted state avenues for raising federal claim. [¶] Where a petitioner seeks pre-conviction 3 habeas relief, this exhaustion prerequisite serves two purposes: (1) to avoid isolating state courts from federal constitutional issues by 4 assuring those courts an ample opportunity to consider constitutional claims; and (2) to prevent federal interference with state 5 adjudication, especially state criminal trials. 6 Carden, 626 F.2d at 83. 7 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must “present his claim to the state 8 supreme court even if that court’s review is discretionary.” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 9 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion requires that the petitioner “‘fairly present’ the substance of his claim 10 to the state court.” Id. at 887 (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). A claim has 11 not been fairly presented unless the petitioner has described in the state-court proceedings both 12 the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Duncan v. 13 Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 14 After reviewing the petition, it is clear that petitioner did not exhaust claims two, three 15 and four by first presenting them to the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, claims two, 16 three and four should be dismissed. 17 B. Claim Challenging Conditions of Confinement 18 In claim one, petitioner raises claims challenging his conditions of confinement, for which 19 petitioner apparently seeks damages. For the following reasons, this Court recommends that the 20 court decline to offer petitioner the option to convert claim one to a civil rights action pursuant to 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 992, 936 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (district 22 court may construe a petition for writ of habeas corpus to plead a cause of action under Section 23 1983). A habeas corpus action and a prisoner civil rights suit differ in a variety of respects, such 24 as the proper defendants, type of relief available, filing fees and the means of collecting them, and 25 restrictions on future filings. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (quoting Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 26 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011)). For example, unlike in a habeas action, a civil rights action would 27 require petitioner to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee, even if he is given leave to 28 proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In a Section 1983 civil rights action, 1 petitioner would be responsible for an initial partial filing fee and thereafter payments from his 2 trust account would be forwarded to the clerk of court any time the amount in the account 3 exceeded $10 until the filing fee was paid. See 28 U.S.C.

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Related

Picard v. Connor
404 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Steven Donald Stow v. Albert Murashige
389 F.3d 880 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Jose Munoz Santos v. Linda Thomas
830 F.3d 987 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
(HC) Lyons v. Cooper, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hc-lyons-v-cooper-caed-2024.