(HC) Hernandez v. Merlak

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 26, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-01172·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RODOLFO HERNANDEZ, Case No. 1:19-cv-01172-JDP 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS, DISMISS THE PETITION, AND DECLINE TO GRANT A CERTIFICATE OF 14 STEVEN MERLAK, APPEALABILITY 15 Respondent. OBJECTIONS DUE IN THIRTY DAYS 16 ECF No. 18 17 ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 18 ECF No. 17 19 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 20 ASSIGN CASE TO DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 Petitioner Rodolfo Hernandez, a federal prisoner without counsel, petitioned for a writ of 23 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner claims that the court of his 24 conviction, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, “lost jurisdiction” over his 25 case because it failed to state petitioner’s term of imprisonment and its reasoning for imposing 26 such a term in open court, in alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). ECF No. 1 at 3. 27 Respondent moved to the dismiss the petition. ECF No. 18. Petitioner has not opposed the 28 1 motion, and the time to do so has passed. See Local Rule 230(l) (“Failure of the responding party 2 to file an opposition or to file a statement of no opposition may be deemed a waiver of any 3 opposition to the granting of the motion.”). Respondent moves for an extension of time to file his 4 responsive pleading. ECF No. 17. 5 Discussion 6 Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, we are to dismiss a habeas 7 petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 8 entitled to relief.” Here, it plainly appears that petitioner is not entitled to relief. The reason is 9 simple: we have no jurisdiction over the petition. ECF No. 1. A “challenge [to] the manner, 10 location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241,” Hernandez 11 v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000), while “§ 2255 is the exclusive means by which a 12 federal prisoner may test” the legality of his detention or sentence, Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 13 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, petitioner claims that the trial court’s alleged failure to announce 14 his sentence in open court has resulted in a discrepancy between the trial court’s sentence and the 15 Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) calculation of his sentence. Petitioner’s claim, although fashioned in 16 part as a claim against the BOP’s execution of his sentence, is properly construed as a challenge 17 to the legality of the sentence imposed by the district court. Therefore, the appropriate vehicle for 18 petitioner’s claim is a § 2255 motion filed in the court of his conviction.1 This court lacks 19 jurisdiction to consider the petition, and the petition therefore must be dismissed. 20 As a side note, even if we had jurisdiction over the petition, petitioner’s claim would fail. 21 Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics in two separate criminal cases, the 22 proceedings of which ran parallel to each other and were overseen by the same judge.2 See 23 1 Although a habeas petitioner may challenge the legality of his sentence under § 2241 in limited 24 circumstances, petitioner has failed to show that he should be afforded this opportunity. “Under the savings clause of § 2255 . . . a federal prisoner may file a habeas corpus petition pursuant 25 to § 2241 to contest the legality of a sentence where his remedy under § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’” Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865 (citing 28 U.S.C. 26 § 2255). To take advantage of this so-called “escape hatch,” a petitioner must make a claim of 27 actual innocence and show that he has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim. Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. Petitioner has made no such a claim of actual innocence. 28 2 Petitioner entered guilty pleas in both cases on January 17, 2008. See Hernandez I, at ECF No. 1 Hernandez v Rodolfo, Case No. 7:01-CR-00134-DC (W.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2001) [hereafter 2 Hernandez I]; Hernandez v Rodolfo, Case No. 7:07-CR-00216-RAJ-2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2007) 3 [hereafter Hernandez II]. Here, petitioner disputes the legality of his 60-month sentence in 4 Hernandez I.3 5 The Hernandez I transcript reveals that the petitioner discussed the presentence 6 investigation report with his counsel prior to the sentencing hearing. ECF No. 18-1 at 27. The 7 trial court reviewed the report, found it accurate and correct, and adopted the sentencing 8 guidelines contained therein. Id. at 31. The court stated that the applicable sentencing guideline 9 range was “a mandatory minimum of 60 months to 71 months.” Id. at 32. The court announced 10 petitioner’s sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. Id. 33. Petitioner was given the opportunity 11 to speak on his behalf during sentencing, which he declined to do. Id. at 32. The trial court then 12 explained that petitioner had the right to appeal his sentence. Id. at 34. 13 Petitioner’s contention that the trial court violated § 3553(c) in failing to state its reasons 14 for imposing the sentence is without merit. Under § 3553(c), “a statement in open court of the 15 reasons for choosing a sentence within the sentencing range” is required “if that range exceeds 24 16 months.” United States v. Upshaw, 918 F.2d 789, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1990). However, where the 17 range is less than 24 months, § 3553(c) requires only that the district court state, “in open court, 18 its general reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” United States v. Lockard, 910 19 F.2d 542, 546 (9th Cir. 1990). “This requirement is satisfied by an explanation of how the district 20 court determined the relevant guideline range.” Id. Here, the relevant guideline range was 60 to 21 71 months—less than a 24-month range—and therefore the court was only required to state 22 general reasons for the sentence. In arriving at the guideline range, the court considered 23 102; Hernandez II, at ECF No. 170. Petitioner was sentenced in both cases on April 3, 2018—to 24 60 months in the first case and 210 months in the second. See Hernandez I, at ECF No. 109; Hernandez II, at ECF No. 237. 25 3 Along with the instant petition, petitioner filed the written judgment from Hernandez I and the transcripts of the sentencing hearing from Hernandez II. ECF No. 1 at 10-21; ECF No. 6 at 2. 26 Respondent then filed a full copy of the transcripts of the sentencing proceeding in Hernandez I, 27 which we will consider here. ECF No. 18-1 at 26-33.

28 1 petitioner’s offense level and criminal history category. ECF No. 18-1 at 31-32. The court then 2 stated that it “considered . . . the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . in arriving 3 at a reasonable sentence—and I do find the guideline range in this case to be fair and reasonable.” 4 Id. at 33. No further statement of reasons was required. See Lockard, 910 F.2d at 546 (noting 5 that a district court met the requirements of § 3553(c) when it “explained and determined the 6 relevant guideline range”—the court was “not required to give any further explanation” where the 7 applicable guideline range was less than 24 months). We recommend that respondent’s motion to 8 dismiss be granted and that the case be dismissed.

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