(HC) Edwards v. Trate

Opinion

GEZO EDWARDS, No. 2:24-CV-0887-DMC-P Petitioner, ORDER v. and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Respondent. Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pending before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 13. Also pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19. A. Petitioner’s Claims Petitioner requests “expungement of [his] prison discipline record germane to Incident Report No. 3613940,” arguing that the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) process violated Petitioner’s due process rights. ECF No. 2, pgs. 7-8. Incident Report No. 3613940 arose from an allegation that Petitioner was in possession of unauthorized food items on April 5, 2022. See id. at 20. Petitioner contends that the UDC was conducted by just one committee member and Petitioner was not provided a timely written decision. See id. at 7. Further, Petitioner argues he was denied the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in defense of himself, “the incident report is deficient on its face,” and the “unreasonable delay in delivering the incident report” hindered his ability to properly appeal. Id. at 8. Finally, Petitioner contends the “combined affects” of his previously asserted claims “prejudiced” Petitioner. Id. at 9. Petitioner asserts these errors violated his right to due process. See ECF No. 21, pg. 4. Petitioner appealed the UDC decision on June 12, 2023, and again on August 22, 2023. See ECF No. 2 at 3. Petitioner acknowledges he is serving a life sentence, which generally would make him ineligible for habeas relief seeking expungement because it does not have the potential to shorten his incarceration. See ECF No. 21, pg. 2. However, Petitioner asserts this Court has jurisdiction and his claim is properly brought under § 2241 because Petitioner is seeking compassionate release and therefore, his disciplinary record may impact his release date. See id. at 2-3. Petitioner argues compassionate release is distinguishable from parole, which Petitioner concedes that courts have established is “too attenuated to invoke” a habeas request for expungement of a disciplinary record. See id. at 2. According to Petitioner, compassionate release under 18 U.S. Code § 3582 requires consideration of “‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’” which Petitioner contends is “inseparably tied to a prisoner’s disciplinary record.” ECF No. 21, pg. 3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(1)). With regard to Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, Petitioner argues that because the government failed to provide Petitioner a copy nor serve Petitioner with their motion to dismiss, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment. See ECF No. 19. Petitioner contends this is in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and due to such failure, Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment should be granted, and the incident should be expunged from his record. See id. Prior to the motion for summary judgment, on February 7, 2025, Petitioner filed a notice informing the Court and government that he had not received a copy of the motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 18, pg. 1 Petitioner asserts that he was informed of the filing on January 14, 2025, when he received a docket sheet from the clerk. See id. / / / B. Respondent’s Position In the answer, Respondent first argues that Petitioner’s disciplinary decision was supported by “physical evidence, direct law enforcement observation, contemporaneous supporting documentation plus memoranda, and subsequent confession,” which is sufficient to meet the standard required by the Supreme Court. See ECF No. 13, pg. 4 (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1985)). Second, Respondent contends that the “Wolff due process safeguards are not implicated” because Petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his prison discipline record. See id. at 5 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). And finally, Respondent asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the length of Petitioner’s prison term is not impacted by the discipline record Petitioner challenges. See id. at 5-6. A. Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment Petitioner requests summary judgment asserting that Respondent failed to properly serve Petitioner with the motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 19. Petitioner additionally provided a statement from the Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist stating that “Mr. Edwards did not receive your letter from the court1 until December 4, 2024, due to a delay in mail processing . . . I am requesting you provide Mr. Edwards with additional time to work on his case.” ECF No. 18 at 3. Petitioner states that he learned of the motion to dismiss when he received “a docket sheet from the Clerk” on January 12, 2025. See id. at 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss included a certificate of service asserting that the motion to dismiss was placed in an envelope with proper postage and address for Petitioner on September 4, 2024. See ECF No. 13, pg. 7. / / /

1 It is unclear what the December 4, 2025, letter indicated in the attached statement was, and whether it was Respondent’s motion to dismiss. However, this fact does not impact whether service was effectuated here. Local Rule 135 requires that individuals not registered for electronic filing, such as a prisoner or pro se litigant, be “conventionally served” in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See L. R. 135. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 (b)(2)(C) permits service by “mailing it to the person's last known address—in which event service is complete upon mailing.” Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 5 (b)(2)(C). Here, Respondent’s motion to dismiss included proof of service that stated a copy of the motion to dismiss was mailed to Petitioner’s last known address on September 4, 2024. See ECF No. 13, pg. 7. Service of the motion to dismiss was complete upon such mailing on September 4, 2024. See L. R. 135; Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 5 (b)(2)(C). Thus, the undersigned recommends Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19, be denied. B. Eligibility for Habeas Relief Respondent argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because expunging the incident from Petitioner’s discipline record “would not shorten petitioner’s confinement.” ECF No. 13, pg. 5. Petitioner contends that he is eligible for habeas relief because of the impact his disciplinary record may have on his motion for compassionate release. See ECF No. 21, pg. 2. This Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable because it does not fall within the core of habeas corpus and therefore, Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted. When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody – either the fact of confinement or the duration of confinement – and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). If a petitioner’s claim does not lie at “‘the core of habeas corpus,’” as established in Preiser, “it may not be brought in habeas corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)); C.f. Blair v. Martel, 645 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2011). Respondent analogizes Petitioner’s claim to the Ninth Circuit case Nettles, where a prisoner sought §2254 habeas relief in the form of expungement of a disciplinary record. See ECF No, 13, pg. 6. This Court finds the analysis in Nettles instructive. Nettles argued that his disciplinary record “delayed his parole hearing and constituted grounds for future denial of parole,” and his claim falls within habeas because expungement of that record would “accelerate his eligibility for parole.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927. There, the Court determined that because parole determination was “in the discretion of the parole board . . . [and] success on Nettles’s claims would not even necessarily lead to an earlier parole hearing . . . Nettles's claims would not necessarily lead to his immediate or earlier release from confinement.” Id. at 935. Based on that analysis, the Court held that Nettles’s claim “does not fall within ‘the core of habeas corpus,’” and Nettles was therefore ineligible for habeas relief. See id. Here, Petitioner asserts that he is seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S. Code § 3582, which requires consideration of “the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(1). Petitioner contends that consideration is “inseparably tied to a prisoner’s disciplinary record” and, in support of that contention, Petitioner provides a string of citations to cases where courts consider disciplinary records when determining eligibility for compassionate release. ECF No. 21, pg. 3. The Court disagrees with Petitioner and finds compassionate release to be analogous to parole eligibility, as addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Nettles. As the Ninth Circuit found with parole, compassionate release is discretionary, expungement of a disciplinary record “would not even necessarily result” in compassionate release, and therefore, Petitioner’s “claims would not necessarily lead to his immediate or earlier release from confinement.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935. While Petitioner is correct that a disciplinary record may be considered when determining whether compassionate release is appropriate, the existence of Petitioner’s disciplinary record would not dispositively impact Petitioner’s compassionate release motion and, in turn, his release date. Petitioner may still be eligible for compassionate release with his disciplinary record, as nothing in the statute requires that prisoners have a clear record to be eligible. Further, even if Petitioner’s record were expunged, a clear disciplinary record is not decisive for compassionate release. As such, Petitioner’s claim “does not fall within ‘the core of habeas corpus,’” and is therefore not cognizable. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935. Thus, the undersigned will recommend that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted. C. Recharacterizing Petitioner’s Claim When a habeas corpus action is filed which may state claims cognizable under § 1983, the district court may recharacterize the action as a civil rights action where the action is amenable to such recharacterization. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 936 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). A habeas action is amendable to recharacterization when it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief. See id. If the district court is inclined to recharacterize a habeas action as a civil rights action, it may only do so after “notifying and obtaining informed consent from the prisoner.” Id. The undersigned recommends that the District Judge decline to recharacterize Petitioner’s claim as a civil rights action because Petitioner named the warden as Defendant, not the individuals involved in Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing. See ECF No. 2, pg. 1. / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / Ill. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ordered and recommended as follows: 1. It is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to randomly assign a District Judge to this case. 2. It is RECOMMENDED Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19, be denied. 3. It is RECOMMENDED Respondent’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 13, be granted. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). Dated: August 5, 2025 Ss..c0_, M7 DENNIS M. COTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE