(HC) Doran v. Brewer

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedSeptember 28, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-02040
StatusUnknown

This text of (HC) Doran v. Brewer ((HC) Doran v. Brewer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(HC) Doran v. Brewer, (E.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JACQUERE J. DORAN, No. 2:22-cv-2040 KJN P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN, FCI-HERLONG, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner is a federal prisoner, proceeding pro se, with an application for writ of habeas 18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. All parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States 19 Magistrate Judge for all proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 15.) Petitioner 20 seeks an order directing application of earned time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”). 21 Respondent’s motion to dismiss is before the court. 22 As discussed below, respondent’s motion is granted. 23 Background 24 Petitioner is an inmate currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution -- Herlong. 25 In April of 2019, in the Eastern District of Missouri, petitioner pled guilty to being a felon 26 in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 18-1 at 2-29.) 27 Petitioner was sentenced to serve 96 months in federal custody. (ECF No. 18-1 at 14-21.) 28 //// 1 Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) records reflect that petitioner’s projected release date is May 2 29, 2025, assuming he receives good conduct credit.1 (ECF No. 18-1 at 31-32.) Respondent 3 confirms that under the FSA, petitioner has earned twelve months of earned time credits. 4 The Petition 5 In his first claim, petitioner alleges respondent unlawfully and secretly refuses to apply 6 petitioner’s earned time and vested diminution credits that reduce his custody where federal law 7 established a mandatory new early release date. (ECF No. 10 at 5.) In his second claim, 8 petitioner contends the BOP is improperly denying him FSA time credits. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) To 9 date, petitioner has earned 407 days of FSA credits, which would reduce his prison release date 10 by one year, and 42 days would be credited towards residential reentry center (“RRC”) 11 placement. Petitioner also claims that after filing the instant petition, he was informed that the 12 BOP instituted a new policy which implemented factors not included in the initial BOP program 13 statement. (ECF No. 10 at 10.) Such new policy provided for the disallowance of FSA earned 14 time credits for a variety of reasons; for example, if a prisoner received a 100 or 200-level 15 incident report within the prior three years, application of FSA earned time credits could be 16 denied. Petitioner argues that the new policy and procedure violates the Due Process and Ex Post 17 Facto Clauses. Petitioner contends that by enacting the FSA, Congress granted inmates a liberty 18 interest in early release, and the BOP was required to provide inmates prior notice of what 19 prohibited conduct would result in such deprivation. (ECF No. 10 at 11.) Petitioner seeks an 20 order requiring the BOP to apply his earned FSA time credits toward his projected release date 21 and RRC placement. 22 Motion to Dismiss 23 Under Rule 4, if a petition is not dismissed at screening, the court “must order the 24 respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response” to the petition. R. Governing 2254 Cases 25 4. A motion to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus is construed as a request for the court 26

27 1 This date was as of March 30, 2023, the date petitioner’s report was run by the BOP. (ECF No. 18-1 at 31.) 28 1 to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 2 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 4, a district court must dismiss a habeas petition if it 3 “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 4 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 5 Respondent’s Position 6 Respondent argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because petitioner lacks Article III 7 standing, his claims are not ripe, and he fails to state a claim under law. First, petitioner is barred 8 from demanding discretionary earned time credits application because his high risk recidivism 9 risk score makes him ineligible. Second, because of the discretionary nature of the FSA earned 10 time credits and the statutory discretion the BOP has to assess both credits and goal achievement, 11 there is no “case or controversy,” petitioner has no standing and there is no ripe dispute for the 12 court to adjudicate. (ECF No. 18 at 4.) Consistent with the FSA and the requirements for use of 13 earned time credits under the FSA, the BOP refuses to apply the discretionary earned time credits 14 because petitioner has a recidivism risk score of high, which renders petitioner ineligible to 15 receive such credits. (ECF No. 18-1 at 37.) Third, petitioner fails to “provide case and 16 controversy as to what he disputes as to BOP discretionary ineligibility (high risk) assessment.” 17 (ECF No. 18 at 5.) This court may not review the BOP’s discretionary high risk assessment, and 18 the claim is not yet ripe because petitioner has over two years remaining on his sentence. (ECF 19 No. 18 at 5.) Finally, “petitioner otherwise fails to state a claim under § 2241 for an order 20 compelling action entrusted by law . . . to BOP discretionary action.” (ECF No. 18 at 6.) 21 Respondent contends petitioner’s demands are speculative and fail to demonstrate any immediate 22 injury that would be redressed by the relief requested and would, in any event, “invade the 23 statutory mandated discretion of the BOP.” (ECF No. 18 at 6.) 24 In support of the motion to dismiss, respondent submitted a declaration of Christopher 25 Liwag, the Sr. Correctional Programs Specialist with the BOP, who reviewed petitioner’s prisoner 26 records. (ECF No. 18-1 at 31.) Mr. Liwag described the three-level administrative review 27 process available to federal inmates challenging BOP actions and confirms that petitioner filed 28 administrative remedies regarding the application of credits toward his sentence at each level, 1 which were denied based on petitioner’s “ineligibility to apply time credits, for among other 2 reasons, his recidivism risk score.” (ECF No. 18-at at 32.) Mr. Liwag described the specific 3 provisions of the First Step Act related to earned time credits for participation in Evidence Based 4 Recidivism Reduction Programs (“EBRRs”) and Productive Activities (“PAs”). (ECF No. 18-1 5 at 33.) Based on his high risk recidivism score, Mr. Liwag states that petitioner is not eligible to 6 apply any FSA credits to petitioner’s sentence. (ECF No. 18-1 at 37.) 7 Petitioner’s Opposition 8 In opposition, petitioner first argues that “irrespective of the BOP having ‘discretion 9 whether to grant a federal prisoner applied FSA credits, petitioner should not be denied the earned 10 time credits simply because his current recidivism risk score happens to be high.” (ECF No. 21 at 11 2.) Petitioner contends he has done everything in his power to reduce his recidivism risk score 12 and his efforts meet the requirements that he make a good faith effort to lower the score. (ECF 13 No. 21 at 3) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3632(d)(4)(C), 3624(g).) Petitioner states he has no control over 14 how fast the BOP calculates his participation and recidivism score and contends the BOP should 15 exercise its discretion in a fair and equitable manner.

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