(HC) Barnes v. Lynch

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 25, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00820·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTOINE BARNES, No. 2:23-cv-0820 TLN KJN P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN LYNCH, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, a state prisoner, proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis with an application for a 18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner’s amended petition is before the 19 court. As discussed below, this petition should be dismissed. 20 Standard of Review 21 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 22 corpus relief: 23 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 24 with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - 25 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 26 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 27 States; or 28 //// 1 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 2 presented in the State court proceeding. 3 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of a 4 person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 5 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 6 2254(a). An application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state 7 custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court must “specify all the grounds for relief which are 8 available to the petitioner . . . and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the 9 grounds thus specified.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 10 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to 11 a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. 12 Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir.1970)). 13 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” consists of 14 holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. Thompson v. 15 Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44-45 16 (2011)); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 17 362, 412 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly 18 established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 19 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). 20 Petitioner’s Claims 21 Petitioner states he was convicted on February 21, 1995, in Santa Clara County, and 22 sentenced to ten years for violation of California Penal Code Section 211 second degree robbery. 23 (ECF No. 10 at 1.) In his first claim, petitioner claims “illegal wrongful arrest” denying him 24 freedom under the First Amendment. (ECF No. 10 at 4.) In superior court case No. C2307029, 25 he sustained a violation of double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment because 26 enhancements for prison priors were illegally imposed. He states he was “railroaded” by not 27 being transferred to the San Jose County Jail, Case No. C2307029. (ECF No. 10 at 4.) 28 //// 1 In his second claim, petitioner states he was denied discovery motions by not placing all 2 evidence due to false arrest on imposing illegal enhancements. Petitioner then lists various state 3 legislation which he appears to claim supports dismissal of Case No. C2307029. (ECF No. 10 at 4 4.) Petitioner states he filed a writ to the superior court No. 177485, “court of appeal shall 5 expedite consider or release petitioner on own recognizance,” and he is entitled to resentencing 6 under a variety of state legislation. (ECF No. 10 at 4.) Petitioner’s writing at the end of the 7 second claim runs into the claim three part of the petition form, so it is unclear whether petitioner 8 intends a third claim based on resentencing issues. 9 In the fourth claim, petitioner claims a deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities 10 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, alleging petitioner has already served 11 his sentence. (ECF No. 10 at 5.) 12 Discussion 13 Challenge to 1995 Conviction 14 To the extent petitioner is attempting to challenge the enhancements to his 1995 15 conviction, petitioner is barred from seeking federal review. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney 16 v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In Lackawanna, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a 17 § 2254 habeas petitioner could collaterally attack an earlier state conviction used to enhance the 18 sentence for a later state conviction. The Court held that if a prior conviction is no longer open to 19 review, then the defendant cannot collaterally attack the prior conviction through a § 2254 20 petition: 21 [W]e hold that once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to 22 pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as 23 conclusively valid. [Citation.] If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not 24 challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. 25 26 Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04. 27 The Supreme Court recognized two possible exceptions to the bar. A petitioner in these 28 circumstances may seek habeas relief if: 1) he challenges an enhanced sentence on the grounds 1 that the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to 2 appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; or 2) a defendant obtains compelling 3 evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted and could not have 4 uncovered such evidence in a timely manner. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 405. 5 Given the foregoing, Lackawanna bars any litigation in this court of the 1995 conviction 6 for the following reasons. 7 First, the 1995 conviction is no longer open to attack in state court because his conviction 8 would have become final over twenty years ago. As the United States Supreme Court noted, 9 “[t]hese vehicles for review . . . are not available indefinitely and without limitation.” 10 Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 402-03. 11 Second, in his amended petition, petitioner refers to two separate state court proceedings. 12 Santa Clara County Superior Court No. 177485 13 Criminal case No. 177485 was commenced on December 27, 1994, by the filing of an 14 information, and petitioner was sentenced on May 25, 1995, and now “inactive.” People v. 15 Barnes, No.

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