HBK MASTER FUND L.P. and HBK MERGER STRATEGIES MASTER FUND L.P. v. MAXLINEAR, INC., KISHORE SEENDRIPU, and STEVEN LITCHFIELD

District Court, S.D. California·Decided July 23, 2026·No. 3:24-cv-01033·Unknown

Opinion

HBK MASTER FUND L.P. and HBK Case No.: 3:24-cv-01033- CAB-VET MERGER STRATEGIES MASTER FUND L.P., ORDER GRANTING IN PART Plaintiffs, CONTINUANCE OF SCHEDULING v. ORDER DEADLINES AND ISSUING AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER MAXLINEAR, INC., KISHORE

SEENDRIPU, and STEVEN LITCHFIELD, [ECF No. 63] Defendants. Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Continuance of Scheduling Order Deadlines (“Joint Motion”). ECF No. 63. Therein, the parties move to continue all case deadlines prior to the Pretrial Motions cutoff by approximately two months. Id. at 2–3. Based on a review of the Joint Motion and the record, and for the reasons described below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Joint Motion but cautions the parties that no further extensions shall be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. In determining whether to modify a scheduling order, the Court considers the “good cause” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4), a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Id. (emphasis added); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the pretrial scheduling order can only be modified upon a showing of good cause”). Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Learjet, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc. (In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.), 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013). “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087. The focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. Id.; Adrian v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 686 F. App’x 403, 405 (9th Cir. 2017) (applied to joint motions); Neidermeyer v. Caldwell, 718 F. App’x 485, 489 (9th Cir. 2017) (moving party did not show good cause when he “offered no explanation for his undue delay”). The required showing of diligence is measured by conduct displayed throughout the period of time already allowed. See, e.g., Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Krohne Fund, LP v. Simonsen, 681 F. App’x 635, 638 (9th Cir. 2017); Lyles v. Dollar Rent a Car, Inc., 849 F. App’x 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2021). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “If [the moving] party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id.; Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 764 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). Civil Local Rule 16.1(b) also requires that all counsel “proceed with diligence to take all steps necessary to bring an action to readiness for trial.” CivLR 16.1(b). Similarly, this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules require that any motion to continue a scheduling order deadline include a showing of good cause, supported by a “declaration from counsel that details steps taken by the parties to meet current deadlines and reasons why the parties can no longer meet those deadlines.” J. Torres Civ. Chambers R. VI.D. The parties represent that they are unable to complete discovery by the current fact discovery deadline of August 31, 2026 despite their diligence in pursuing discovery. ECF No. 63 at 2. The parties have propounded and responded to written discovery and substantially completed their respective document productions. Id. The parties also intend to take approximately ten depositions each but indicate that “summer travel” will impede their ability to complete the depositions before the current fact discovery cutoff. Id. at 2– 3. To date, the pace of discovery has been unnecessarily slow. Discovery opened more than six months ago. See ECF No. 48 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference held on January 8, 2026). Nevertheless, the parties have not completed their document productions, meaning written discovery is not complete. ECF No. 63 at 2. The parties also intend to collectively notice twenty depositions, yet there is no representation that any depositions are scheduled or any plan is in place to ensure all those depositions can be timely noticed and completed. For instance, the parties do not specify whether the depositions consist of fact witness or Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, an important distinction as the latter frequently present scheduling challenges, require meet and confer discussions as to deposition topics, and may involve more than one witness. In other words, this number of depositions requires planning, and it does not appear any such planning has occurred. The parties also reference a need to complete “third party discovery,” see id. at 2, but no information is provided regarding what third party discovery is outstanding or if any has occurred to date. Such discovery can also be time consuming to the extent it requires issuance of Rule 45 subpoenas. In short, it appears the parties have not been diligent in scheduling and completing discovery based on their anticipated discovery needs and do not have a plan moving forward. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that “summer travel” provides good cause for an extension. The Court issued the operative scheduling order on February 2, 2026, meaning the parties knew five months ago that fact discovery would close on August 31, 2026. And despite all the anticipated discovery, the parties seemingly did little to plan accordingly. The Court is also concerned as to how the requested extension impacts remaining deadlines. While the parties do not seek an extension of all remaining deadlines “at this time,” it is difficult to see how the parties can complete expert discovery on January 29, 2027, as they propose, and then be prepared to file dispositive motions and Daubert motions three days later on February 1, 2027. Such a schedule seems unworkable. In short, the Court is not persuaded that the parties have been diligent in pursuing fact discovery. Further, more than 30 days remain in the existing fact discovery period to conduct discovery. Accordingly, to accommodate the large number of anticipated depositions, the Court will grant a 45-day extension of the fact discovery deadline to ensure neither party is prejudiced. The Court will also adjust the expert discovery deadlines to ensure the parties can meet subsequent case deadlines, including the deadline to file pretrial motions, without the need for further extensions. However, the Court advises the parties that no further extensions will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances, and therefore the parties should promptly begin noticing and taking depositions. Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Joint Motion and ISSUES the following Amended Scheduling Order: 1. Counsel1 shall refer to the Judge Bencivengo’s Chambers Rules for Civil Cases, which is accessible via the Court’s website at www.casd.uscourts.gov. For ease of reference, Judge Bencivengo’s rules concerning the procedure for seeking permission to file documents under seal is attached hereto. 2. All fact discovery shall be completed by all parties by October 14, 2026. “Completed” means that all discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30

HBK MASTER FUND L.P. and HBK MERGER STRATEGIES MASTER FUND L.P. v. MAXLINEAR, INC., KISHORE SEENDRIPU, and STEVEN LITCHFIELD, (S.D. Cal. 2026).

HBK MASTER FUND L.P. and HBK MERGER STRATEGIES MASTER FUND L.P. v. MAXLINEAR, INC., KISHORE SEENDRIPU, and STEVEN LITCHFIELD (HBK MASTER FUND L.P. and HBK MERGER STRATEGIES MASTER FUND L.P. v. MAXLINEAR, INC., KISHORE SEENDRIPU, and STEVEN LITCHFIELD) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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