8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 HAZLICK DANZELL SHARP HODGSON, Case No. 1:26-cv-04861-JLT-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE 14 WARDEN MESA VERDE ICE PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING PROCESSING CENTER, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States without inspection on 22 or about December 12, 2022. (ECF No. 5-1 at 2.1) Petitioner was paroled on December 13, 2022, 23 with the parole set to expire on February 13, 2023. (ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF No. 5-2 at 9.) Petitioner 24 remained in the United States after the expiration of parole. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) 25 On February 8, 2026, Petitioner was encountered by immigration officers at a jail 26 following his arrest for battery (domestic battery by strangulation). The Department of 27 Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued an immigration detainer (Form I-247) the same day. (ECF 1 No. 5-1 at 2.) On March 26, 2026, the charge against Petitioner was dropped. (ECF No. 1 at 39; 2 ECF No. 5 at 3.) 3 On June 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 4 detention on due process grounds. (ECF No. 1 at 9–10.) The Court construed the petition “as also 5 raising claims challenging Petitioner’s re-detention and the statutory authority of Petitioner’s 6 detention.” (ECF No. 4 at 1.) On July 1, 2026, Respondent filed a response. (ECF No. 5.) 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 The Court finds that issuance of findings and recommendation is appropriate despite the 10 time for Petitioner to file a reply to Respondents’ response having not yet expired. 11 A. Statutory Framework and Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) 12 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal 13 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory 14 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of 15 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto- 16 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been 18 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection 19 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 20 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in 21 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’” 22 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under 23 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Avilez, 24 69 F.4th at 529. “When a person is apprehended under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial 25 custody determination,” and the noncitizen “will be released if he ‘demonstrate[s] to the 26 satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and 27 that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1 Although section 1226(a) sets out a discretionary detention scheme, section 1226(c) provides an exception which mandates detention for certain criminal 2 noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Section 1226(c)(1)(E), which was added to the statute in 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, mandates detention for any 3 noncitizen (i) who is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an “alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” and (ii) who “is 4 charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits” to committing certain crimes. 5 Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1115 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1226(c)(1)(E)). Accord J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 7 2938808, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). 8 To avoid “serious due process concerns,” “courts have construed the Laken Riley Act to 9 apply only where an individual is currently charged with or arrested for the enumerated 10 crimes[.]” Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-CV-00546-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 266021, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 11 Feb. 2, 2026). Thus, “mandatory detention is not required when charges are never filed, Helbrum 12 v. Williams Olson, No. 4:25-cv-00349-SHL-SBJ, 2025 WL 2840273, at *6 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 13 2025), or where an individual has been acquitted, E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01789-RFB-BNW, 14 2025 WL 2916264, at *10 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025).” Singh, 2026 WL 266021, at *2. Courts have 15 found serious questions going to the merits as to the application of the Laken Riley Act where 16 noncitizens were arrested but prosecutors ultimately declined to file charges and closed the case. 17 Singh, 2026 WL 266021, at *2; S.E. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 206085 18 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026). 19 Respondent argues that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) due to his February 2026 arrest. (ECF No. 5 at 2–3.) However, the charge 21 was dropped. (ECF No. 1 at 39.) “The statute’s ‘use of the present tense is conspicuous and 22 important.’” Singh v. Wofford, No. 1:26-CV-01161-KES-EPG (HC), 2026 WL 972547, at *2 23 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2026) (quoting Helbrum, 2025 WL 2840273, at *5). “‘By using the present 24 tense, § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) establishes that detention is mandatory only so long as the charges 25 either remain pending or are resolved in a way that triggers one of the other clauses of the 26 statute[,]’ such as by a conviction.” Singh, 2026 WL 972547, at *2 (quoting Helbrum, 2025 WL 27 2840273, at *5–6). Respondent does not contend that one of the other clauses of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) applies, and Respondent acknowledges that the case has been dropped and is no longer 1 pending. Accordingly, the Court recommends finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) is 2 inapplicable and Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention. 3 B. Due Process 4 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 5 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 6 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Even when the government has discretion to detain an 7 individual, its subsequent decision to release the individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she 8 will be re-detained only if she violates the conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, 813 9 F. Supp. 3d. 973, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Morrissey v.
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 HAZLICK DANZELL SHARP HODGSON, Case No. 1:26-cv-04861-JLT-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE 14 WARDEN MESA VERDE ICE PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING PROCESSING CENTER, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States without inspection on 22 or about December 12, 2022. (ECF No. 5-1 at 2.1) Petitioner was paroled on December 13, 2022, 23 with the parole set to expire on February 13, 2023. (ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF No. 5-2 at 9.) Petitioner 24 remained in the United States after the expiration of parole. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) 25 On February 8, 2026, Petitioner was encountered by immigration officers at a jail 26 following his arrest for battery (domestic battery by strangulation). The Department of 27 Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued an immigration detainer (Form I-247) the same day. (ECF 1 No. 5-1 at 2.) On March 26, 2026, the charge against Petitioner was dropped. (ECF No. 1 at 39; 2 ECF No. 5 at 3.) 3 On June 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 4 detention on due process grounds. (ECF No. 1 at 9–10.) The Court construed the petition “as also 5 raising claims challenging Petitioner’s re-detention and the statutory authority of Petitioner’s 6 detention.” (ECF No. 4 at 1.) On July 1, 2026, Respondent filed a response. (ECF No. 5.) 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 The Court finds that issuance of findings and recommendation is appropriate despite the 10 time for Petitioner to file a reply to Respondents’ response having not yet expired. 11 A. Statutory Framework and Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) 12 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal 13 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory 14 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of 15 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto- 16 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been 18 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection 19 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 20 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in 21 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’” 22 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under 23 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Avilez, 24 69 F.4th at 529. “When a person is apprehended under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial 25 custody determination,” and the noncitizen “will be released if he ‘demonstrate[s] to the 26 satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and 27 that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1 Although section 1226(a) sets out a discretionary detention scheme, section 1226(c) provides an exception which mandates detention for certain criminal 2 noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Section 1226(c)(1)(E), which was added to the statute in 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, mandates detention for any 3 noncitizen (i) who is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an “alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” and (ii) who “is 4 charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits” to committing certain crimes. 5 Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1115 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1226(c)(1)(E)). Accord J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 7 2938808, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). 8 To avoid “serious due process concerns,” “courts have construed the Laken Riley Act to 9 apply only where an individual is currently charged with or arrested for the enumerated 10 crimes[.]” Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-CV-00546-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 266021, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 11 Feb. 2, 2026). Thus, “mandatory detention is not required when charges are never filed, Helbrum 12 v. Williams Olson, No. 4:25-cv-00349-SHL-SBJ, 2025 WL 2840273, at *6 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 13 2025), or where an individual has been acquitted, E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01789-RFB-BNW, 14 2025 WL 2916264, at *10 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025).” Singh, 2026 WL 266021, at *2. Courts have 15 found serious questions going to the merits as to the application of the Laken Riley Act where 16 noncitizens were arrested but prosecutors ultimately declined to file charges and closed the case. 17 Singh, 2026 WL 266021, at *2; S.E. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 206085 18 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026). 19 Respondent argues that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) due to his February 2026 arrest. (ECF No. 5 at 2–3.) However, the charge 21 was dropped. (ECF No. 1 at 39.) “The statute’s ‘use of the present tense is conspicuous and 22 important.’” Singh v. Wofford, No. 1:26-CV-01161-KES-EPG (HC), 2026 WL 972547, at *2 23 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2026) (quoting Helbrum, 2025 WL 2840273, at *5). “‘By using the present 24 tense, § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) establishes that detention is mandatory only so long as the charges 25 either remain pending or are resolved in a way that triggers one of the other clauses of the 26 statute[,]’ such as by a conviction.” Singh, 2026 WL 972547, at *2 (quoting Helbrum, 2025 WL 27 2840273, at *5–6). Respondent does not contend that one of the other clauses of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) applies, and Respondent acknowledges that the case has been dropped and is no longer 1 pending. Accordingly, the Court recommends finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) is 2 inapplicable and Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention. 3 B. Due Process 4 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 5 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 6 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Even when the government has discretion to detain an 7 individual, its subsequent decision to release the individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she 8 will be re-detained only if she violates the conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, 813 9 F. Supp. 3d. 973, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 10 “Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly.” J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv- 11 01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. Becerra, No. 12 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). “Accordingly, a 13 noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 14 remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 15 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). 16 Respondent fails to contend with the liberty interest created by the fact that Petitioner was 17 paroled into the United States. See Anderson v. Chernut, No. 1:26-cv-01960-DAD-CKD, 2026 18 WL 809990, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026) (“Even though petitioner’s parole authorization 19 expired, petitioner maintains her liberty interest in continued release.”); D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 20 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP, 2026 WL 145646, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026) (“[N]umerous courts 21 in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is paroled under that section, his liberty 22 interest does not expire along with his parole.”). As Respondent has not identified any factual or 23 legal issues in this case that would distinguish it from the Court’s prior decisions that have 24 granted habeas relief in similar circumstances, the Court recommends granting the petition for 25 writ of habeas corpus and ordering Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before 26 a neutral decisionmaker where the government bears the burden to demonstrate that Petitioner is 27 a flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence for the reasons set 1 | 13, 2026), and J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01309-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2938808 (E.D. 2 | Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). 3 Hil. 4 RECOMMENDATION 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 6 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 7 2. Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with an individualized hearing before an 8 immigration judge where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence 9 that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify his detention. 10 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 11 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 12 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 13 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 14 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 15 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 16 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 17 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate 18 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 19 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 20 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 21 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 22 73 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le 24 | Dated: _July 9, 2026 _ eee STANLEY A. BOONE 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28