IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BRIANA HAZELETT, § § No. 151, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § § Court Below: Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Cr. I.D. No. 2203001161 Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: January 29, 2025 Decided: April 25, 2025
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en banc.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, and following
oral argument, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Defendant-Below, Appellant Brianna Hazelett asks this court to vacate
her convictions because the trial court improperly limited Hazelett’s cross-
examination of the State’s chief investigating officer. Hazelett advances several
arguments in support of this claim. First, she contends that the trial court violated
her constitutional right to present a complete defense and cross-examine her accusers
by “severely restrict[ing]” her right to impeach the chief investigating officer’s
credibility. We reject that argument because the trial court properly applied the four- 1 factor Snowden1 test to determine the scope of impeachment. Second, Hazelett
argues she was constitutionally entitled to challenge the credibility of the chief
investigating officer’s testimony regarding her alleged turn-signal violation. This
argument fails because the trial court did not preclude Hazelett from arguing that the
State had not proved the statutory elements of a turn-signal violation beyond a
reasonable doubt. Rather, the court precluded her from arguing that the traffic stop
was illegal. Third, Hazelett asserts that the trial court erred when it suggested that
defense counsel had a responsibility to disclose impeachment material to the State
before cross-examination. The trial court’s error in this respect was harmless and
did not affect the jury’s verdict. We therefore affirm Hazelett’s convictions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
(2) On March 2, 2022, Corporal Leonard Moses of the Wilmington Police
Department (“WPD”) was conducting proactive patrol at the corner of Madison and
5th Streets in Wilmington, Delaware.2 He noticed a black Volkswagen Passat with
four occupants making “furtive movements throughout the vehicle” and began to
follow.3 When the vehicle turned onto the 600 block of West 6th Street without
using a turn signal, Corporal Moses initiated a traffic stop.4
1 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Del. 1996). 2 App. to Opening Br. at A18. 3 Id. at A19–21. 4 Id. at A20–21.
2 (3) As Corporal Moses and his partner, Officer Chris Rosaio, walked
toward the stopped vehicle, Corporal Moses smelled a strong odor of marijuana
coming from it.5 The driver, Briana Hazelett, stuck her hands through the open car
window and informed the approaching officers that her firearm and a removed
magazine were on the dashboard.6 Corporal Moses saw the firearm on the dashboard
and noticed a burning marijuana blunt near the center console.7
(4) Corporal David Schulz was called to assist and arrived at the scene after
the traffic stop was underway.8 Corporal Schulz detected a strong odor of burnt
marijuana coming from the vehicle.9 He searched the vehicle at the scene and later
conducted an inventory search at the police station.10 Corporal Schulz located
marijuana near the vehicle’s emergency brake lever, baggies containing marijuana
in the front and back seat areas, and a burnt marijuana blunt by the gear shift.11
Corporal Schulz collected Hazelett’s gun, an extended magazine, and nine rounds of
ammunition that were inside the magazine.12 During the inventory search, Corporal
5 Id. at A21. 6 Id. at A21–22. 7 Id. at A21. 8 Id. at A34. 9 Id. at A35. 10 Id. at A39. 11 Id. at A35–37; App. to Answering Br. at B2 (Corporal Schulz’s Body-Worn Camera Video at 11:20). 12 App. to Opening Br. at A38–39
3 Schulz recovered a “cross body bag” on the passenger-side floor containing a pill
bottle with Hazelett’s name on it.13 The pills inside the bottle were later determined
to be methamphetamine.14
(5) On November 21, 2022, a grand jury indicted Hazelett for Possession
of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Illegal Possession of a Controlled
Substance, Possession of Marijuana, Driving a Vehicle While License is Suspended
or Revoked, and Failure to Use a Turn Signal.15 Hazelett’s two-day jury trial began
on May 1, 2023.16 The State called Corporal Moses, Corporal Schulz, Officer
Rosaio, Anna Wyckoff,17 and Hugh Stephey18 during its case-in-chief.19 After the
State rested, Hazelett testified in her own defense.20
(6) During Corporal Moses’s cross-examination, Hazelett’s counsel sought
to impeach him with his inconsistent sworn statements in a 2016 case involving a
different defendant, Daryus Whittle.21 In State v. Whittle, Corporal Moses authored
13 Id. at A39–40. 14 Id. at A49–50. 15 Id. at A1, A6-10. 16 See id. at A12. 17 Wyckoff testified in her professional capacity as an Analytical Chemist II with the Delaware Division of Forensic Science. Id. at A46. 18 Stephey testified in his professional capacity as an employee of the firearms and ballistics section of the forensic services unit at the WPD. Id. at A51. 19 Id. at A12. 20 Id. 21 Id. at A32.
4 an arrest warrant in which he swore under oath that he and a fellow officer
“observed” Whittle remove a firearm from his waistband and place it inside a bundle
of newspapers.22 Corporal Moses then stated under oath that he “observed” Whittle
hide the firearm under a broken cement stairway.23 At a preliminary hearing in
Whittle’s case, Corporal Moses testified that he “observed” Whittle hide the
firearm.24 And when he testified at Whittle’s trial, Corporal Moses reiterated that he
“saw” Whittle pull the firearm from his waistband.25 After additional cross-
examination, however, Corporal Moses revealed that neither he nor his partner
personally saw Whittle handle or hide the firearm before they arrested him.26
Rather, [Wilmington Police Department] received a call from Downtown Visions advising them that a Downtown Visions surveillance camera recorded a man matching Whittle’s description hiding a firearm in the manner previously described. Without viewing the video recording, Corporal Moses and his partner then drove to the area, arrested Whittle, and recovered the gun. Corporal Moses testified that he eventually watched the video, but not until after he authored the arrest warrant.27
22 Mobley v. State, 2024 WL 5316320, at *2 (Del. Dec. 5, 2024) (discussing Corporal Moses’s inconsistent sworn statements in State v. Whittle). 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id.
5 The Superior Court struck Corporal Moses’s identification testimony as hearsay and
granted Whittle’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence.28
(7) In Hazelett’s trial, the State objected when her counsel attempted to
impeach Corporal Moses by asking questions regarding his inconsistent sworn
statements in the Whittle case. The State argued that the issue was previously
addressed by the Superior Court in State v. Mobley.29 The judge in Hazelett’s trial
deferred ruling on the objection until she could research the Mobley matter.30 The
judge instructed Hazelett to move on to a different line of questioning in the
meantime.31
(8) The trial judge returned to the issue after the lunch recess.32 Armed
with an understanding of the Mobley ruling, the court permitted “cross-examination
on the impeachment line of questioning.”33 During the lunch recess, Hazelett also
28 Id. at *3. 29 App. to Opening Br. at A32 ([State]: “If it's the case that I'm thinking of, this issue was raised . . . [in] State v. Terrell Mobley, [and the trial judge] specifically considered this issue and made no findings regarding incorrect testimony.”). 30 Id. at A34. 31 Id. at A34. 32 Id. at A41. 33 Id.
6 provided the State with 195 pages of Corporal Moses’s prior testimony, and the court
granted the State’s request to review the voluminous materials overnight.34
(9) Later in the day, the court again raised Corporal Moses’s potential
testimony and inquired into Hazelett’s counsel’s proposed line of questioning.35
Hazelett’s counsel indicated that she planned to ask about Corporal Moses’s
probable cause affidavit, his preliminary hearing testimony, and his trial testimony
from Whittle.36 She also stated that she planned to ask Corporal Moses about the
importance of truthfulness, but did not intend to delve deeply into the facts
underlying Whittle.37
(10) The trial court applied the factors that this Court articulated in Snowden
v. State38 as a guidepost for a trial judge considering proposed limitations on cross-
examination.39 Although the court concluded that impeaching Corporal Moses’s
credibility would have limited utility because most of the observations to which he
testified were captured on body-worn camera, the court reiterated that it would allow
34 Id. at A42–43. After expressing consternation that Hazelett’s counsel did not raise the impeachment material before trial, the trial judge concluded that it was fair to allow the State to review the materials overnight. Id. Defense counsel did not object. Id. at A43. 35 Id. at A54–55. 36 Id. at A55. 37 Id. The trial court agreed that “delving too deeply into the facts” of Whittle was not relevant. Id. 38 672 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996) 39 App. to Opening Br. at A55.
7 inquiry into the Whittle matter.40 The court, however, placed limitations on the scope
of cross-examination. Specifically, the court prohibited the defense from arguing
that the traffic stop was illegal41 and precluded counsel from asking or implying that
Whittle was dismissed due to Corporal Moses’s contradictory statements.42 As to
that point, the court emphasized that the Whittle court made no specific finding of
dishonesty and dismissed the case for insufficient evidence.43
(11) The following day, May 2, 2023, the State re-called Corporal Moses.44
Defense counsel re-examined him, asking questions related to truthfulness and his
prior contradictory sworn statements in Whittle.45 After concluding her other
questions, defense counsel renewed her request to question Corporal Moses
regarding the dismissal of the Whittle case.46 The court denied that request, finding
that the proposed questions could tend to confuse the jury.47
40 Id. at A57. 41 Id. at A64. 42 Id. at A57. 43 Id. 44 State’s Answering Br. at 9. 45 App. to Opening Br. at A72. 46 Id. at A74. 47 Id. The judge told defense counsel that the court was willing to entertain a question about the resolution of the Whittle matter if it did not mislead the jury. Id.
8 (12) The case was submitted to the jury later that day.48 The jury convicted
Hazelett on all counts.49 On March 15, 2024, Hazelett was sentenced to three-and-
a-half years of incarceration, suspended for probation and a fine.50
(13) On appeal, Hazelett contends that the trial court violated her
constitutional right to present a complete defense and cross-examine her accusers by
“severely restrict[ing]” her right to impeach Corporal Moses.51 Hazelett argues that
the trial court’s rulings regarding her counsel’s cross-examination of Corporal
Moses constituted error in a number of ways, including by (i) improperly suggesting
that a defendant must notify the State of an impeachment strategy; (ii) incorrectly
interpreting what occurred in Whittle and therefore precluding Hazelett from
inquiring into the dismissal; and (iii) limiting Hazelett’s ability to challenge the
truthfulness of Corporal Moses’s testimony about the turn-signal violation.52 The
State responds that the court correctly exercised its discretion to place reasonable
limitations on cross-examination.53
48 Id. at A4. 49 Id. at A4. 50 Id. Ex. B (Sentence Order). 51 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9. 52 See id. at i–ii. 53 See State’s Answering Br. at 11.
9 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
(14) This court reviews constitutional limits on cross-examination de novo.54
Non-constitutional restrictions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.55
III. ANALYSIS
A. The trial court’s ruling did not violate Hazelett’s constitutional rights.
(15) The United States Constitution “guarantees criminal defendants ‘a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense’”56 Although “cross-
examination is the ‘principal means by which the believability of a witness and the
truth of his testimony are tested,’”57 “the right of cross-examination is not without
limits.”58 “Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns
about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”59
54 Wilson v. State, 950 A.2d 634, 638 (Del. 2008) (reviewing, de novo, claim that evidentiary ruling unconstitutionally restricted right to effectively cross-examine). 55 Garden v. Sutton, 683 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Del. 1996) (addressing cross-examination of police officer in civil suit, without constitutional implications). 56 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 57 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Del. 1996) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)). 58 Id. 59 Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).
10 (16) In Snowden v. State, we identified several factors that should guide a
trial court when it is asked to limit the scope of cross-examination: “(1) whether the
testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial; (2) the logical relevance of the
specific impeachment evidence to the question at bar; (3) the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues and undue delay; and (4) whether the evidence is
cumulative.”60
(17) Here, the trial court applied each of the four Snowden factors. As to the
first factor, the court determined that although Corporal Moses was the chief
investigating officer, his testimony was not as crucial as it might otherwise have
been because of the other officers’ consistent testimony and the body-worn camera
footage.61 The court explained that the only evidence to which Corporal Moses
testified that was not captured on body-worn camera was his initial observation of
the Volkswagen Passat and the turn-signal violation.62 Corporal Moses’s testimony
as to those events, however, was corroborated by Officer Rosaio, making
impeachment of Corporal Moses somewhat less critical.63
(18) As to the second Snowden factor, the trial court similarly determined
that the specific impeachment evidence was logically relevant only to the portions
60 Id. at 1025. 61 See App. to Opening Br. at A55. 62 Id. 63 Id.
11 of Officer Moses’s testimony that were not captured on body-worn camera.64
Concerning factor three, the court held that, due to the risk of confusion, “some brief
and limited cross-examination” on the Whittle matter should be permitted, but “the
defense [was] not allowed to give the impression that there was any sort of finding
of dishonesty” in the Whittle case.65 Finally, regarding factor four, the court ruled
that the evidence was “certainly not cumulative here because it is the first of its kind
that will be potentially introduced.”66 Applying those factors, the trial court
permitted Hazelett’s counsel to inquire into the areas that counsel indicated she
intended to explore during cross-examination, other than the dismissal of the Whittle
case.
(19) Hazelett argues that the trial court erred because it failed to address two
additional factors discussed in Snowden: “‘(1) if the jury was exposed to facts
sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if
defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue . . . .’” 67 Hazelett
misreads Snowden; these two factors are what an appellate court considers in
64 Id. at A56. 65 Id. at A57. 66 Id. at A55. 67 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21–22 (quoting Smith v. State, 913 A.2d 1197, 1233 (Del. 2006)).
12 determining whether a trial court’s restrictions on cross-examination violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.68
(20) Those two factors confirm that Hazelett’s constitutional rights were not
violated by the restrictions placed on Corporal Moses’s cross-examination. First,
the jury was exposed to sufficient facts to draw inferences regarding Corporal
Moses’s reliability as a witness. Hazelett’s counsel identified her proposed line of
questioning,69 was able to ask Corporal Moses each of the questions that she
proposed without objection or restriction,70 and elicited the relevant information
from Corporal Moses. Counsel asked questions related to the importance of telling
the truth in both sworn documents and testimony, as well as Corporal Moses’s
specific acts and contradictory testimony in the Whittle case.71 “To properly evaluate
68 Smith, 913 A.2d at 1233 (quoting Snowden, 672 A.2d at 1025) (“‘When the cross-examination relates to impeachment evidence, the test for determining if the trial judge’s limitation on cross- examination violated the defendant's confrontation right is whether the jury had in its possession sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness. . . . More specifically, we look to the cross-examination permitted to ascertain (1) if the jury was exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased . . . .’”). 69 “My intent is to ask about what he swore in the affidavit, I plan on using his own language, what he testified to in the preliminary hearing, using his own language, and what he testified to at the trial, in his own language, and leave it at that. Obviously, I will be asking him questions about the importance of telling the truth and the fact that he did swear to tell the truth in all of those proceedings. But I’m not planning on getting deep into the facts of each of the cases, or that case specifically. I don’t think delving too deeply into the facts is relevant.” App. to Opening Br. at A55. 70 See id. at A71–72. 71 Id.
13 a witness, a jury must have sufficient information to make discriminating appraisal
of a witness’s motives and bias.”72 Hazelett’s jury received that evidence.
(21) Moreover, defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue
bias. Counsel had all Corporal Moses’s inconsistent statements, including
transcripts of Whittle and Mobley, as well as his testimony in this trial. The only
restriction placed on cross-examination was inquiry into the outcome of the Whittle
trial. The court properly restricted this line of questioning because Whittle was
dismissed for insufficient evidence, and any other explanation would have been
confusing and potentially devolved into a trial-within-a-trial. The trial court did not
preclude Hazelett’s defense counsel from urging the inference that Corporal Moses
was dishonest or misleading in prior testimony—it simply held that Hazelett could
not argue that there was a previous finding of dishonesty or that the Whittle case was
dismissed because Corporal Moses was dishonest.73
B. The trial court did not err in precluding Hazelett from arguing that the traffic stop was illegal. (22) Hazelett contends that she was entitled to challenge the credibility of
Corporal Moses’s testimony regarding the alleged turn-signal violation and that the
trial court improperly restricted her from doing so.74 The trial court noted that the
72 Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)). 73 App. to Opening Br. at A57. 74 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 20.
14 initial traffic stop was not captured on body-worn camera, and impeachment
testimony related to Whittle would be particularly relevant to this portion of Corporal
Moses’s testimony.75
(23) Regarding the turn-signal violation, the court stated:
I see your point, [State], about the turn -- it is not exactly arguing a motion to suppress, because that too is not allowed, there will be no tolerance for any argument that the stop should not have been made, because this is not a motion to suppress, but there is a turn signal violation that is before the jury and that is [for] their consideration.76
Although the court’s ruling could have been clearer in hindsight, counsel could
reasonably understand that Hazelett could not challenge the justification for the
stop—akin to a motion to suppress—but could argue that the State had not met its
burden to prove the elements of the turn-signal violation beyond a reasonable doubt.
(24) The court later clarified:
Well, I asked [defense counsel] at the . . . beginning of one of our discussions this afternoon . . . what she was planning to explore on this line of questioning, and . . . she answered very limited. And so . . . obviously there can't be any argument that it was an improper illegal stop. But . . . it’s a turn signal violation here, and it was testified to that that was the basis of the stop . . . whatever inferences can be appropriately argued, I expect that all parties will stay within that.77
75 App. to Opening Br. at A57. 76 Id. 77 Id. at A64.
15 To the extent that Hazelett’s counsel was unsure whether this ruling permitted or
barred certain questions, Hazelett did not seek clarification. Counsel did not identify
for the trial court—and has not identified on appeal—what additional questions
regarding Corporal Moses’s credibility that Hazelett should have been permitted to
ask to challenge the turn-signal evidence. The trial court correctly held that Hazelett
could not argue that the stop was illegal, and it was incumbent on counsel to clarify
any confusion she had regarding the parameters of the court’s ruling. In the context
of a fast-moving trial, the trial judge can reasonably expect that trial counsel will
speak up if they do not understand an evidentiary ruling.
C. Any error in the trial court’s rulings was harmless. (25) Finally, Hazelett urges that the trial court erred in stating or implying
that defense counsel ambushed the State by not apprising it of Hazelett’s intent to
raise the Whittle matter in impeachment.78 The State concedes that the trial court
erred when it suggested that defense counsel was obligated to turn over impeachment
material before cross-examination.79 Any implication that defense counsel engaged
78 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 16–19. 79 State’s Answering Br. at 17.
16 in trial by ambush80 was not consistent with our discovery rules.81 There was,
however, no “chilling effect” caused by the trial court’s ruling.82
(26) When reviewing claims of harmless error, this Court “‘considers the
probability that an error affected the jury’s decision. To do this, [we] must study the
record to ascertain the probable impact of error in the context of the entire trial.’” 83
In Hazelett’s trial, the court’s error regarding defense counsel’s obligation to
disclose impeachment evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict. As discussed above,
defense counsel created a record from which she could argue that the jury should not
believe Corporal Moses. Moreover, Corporal Moses’s testimony was corroborated
by Officer Rosaio, Officer Schulz, and body-worn camera footage.
(27) For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not violate Hazelett’s
constitutional right to present a complete defense and cross-examine her accusers—
80 App. to Opening Br. at A58. 81 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16; see e.g. United States v. Robertson, 2020 WL 6786186, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 18, 2020) (“discovery obligations are not symmetrical. The government must turn over any requested documents . . . it ‘intends to use . . . in its case-in-chief at trial’ or if the item is ‘material to preparing the defense.’ The defense, by contrast, must only turn over documents . . . it ‘intends to use . . . in the defendant’s case-in-chief at trial.’”); United States v. Medearis, 380 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004) (“reciprocal pre-trial disclosure . . . includes only documents [] the defendant intends to introduce during his own case-in-chief”); United States v. Moore, 208 F.3d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding document used only for impeachment is not excludable under Rule 16); United States v. Gray-Burriss, 791 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same). 82 See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3–4 (citing People v. Carter, 86 A.D.2d 451, 457–58 (N.Y. 1982); State v. Foster, 1990 WL 174008 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1990)). The cases Hazelett cites are not analogous to what occurred in this case. Unlike the cited cases, there was no suggestion by trial court here that defense counsel was acting unethically or could be disciplined. 83 Harris v. State, 113 A.3d 1067, 1078 (Del. 2015) (quoting Hansley v. State, 104 A.3d 833, 837 (Del. 2014)).
17 it properly applied the four-factor Snowden test to limit the scope of impeachment.
Furthermore, the trial court did not err in precluding Hazelett from arguing that the
initial traffic stop was illegal. Any error in the trial court’s ruling that defense
counsel was obligated to turn over impeachment material before cross-examination
was harmless and did not affect the jury’s verdict.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice