Hazard v. Commissioner

7 T.C. 372, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 126
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJuly 16, 1946
DocketDocket No. 8690
StatusPublished
Cited by93 cases

This text of 7 T.C. 372 (Hazard v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hazard v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 126 (tax 1946).

Opinion

OPINION.

Leech, Judge:

The sole question presented is the extent the loss of $6,844.92 sustained by the petitioner, an attorney at law, on the sale of his former residence in Kansas City, is deductible for income tax purposes. Petitioner contends that the total net loss is deductible under section 23 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code as a “* * * [loss] sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise * * The respondent determined the property in question was a capital asset, on the ground that it was not used in petitioner’s trade or business, and therefore restricted the deductible loss on its sale in accordance with the limitations provided in section 117 of the code, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942 the established rule followed by this and other courts over a long period was that residential improvements on real estate converted into income-producing property are property “used in the trade or business of the taxpayer,” regardless of whether or not he engaged in any other trade or business, and are therefore excluded from the definition of “capital assets” as defined by section 117 (a) (1). John D. Fackler, 45 B. T. A. 708 (and cases therein cited); affd., 133 Fed. (2d) 509; N. Stuart Campbell, 5 T. C. 272; George S. Jephson, 37 B. T. A. 1117. The undisputed facts bring the instant case within that rule. Thus, unless the amendments contained in the Revenue Act of 1942 require a change m the rule, the petitioner’s position must be upheld.

While the Revenue Act of 1942 amended section 117 in several respects, those here material are contained in section 151 (a) and (b) of the act,1 made applicable by section 101 to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1941. Section 151 (a) excludes from the definition of capital assets “real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.” The purpose of this amendment was to obviate the difficulty of allocating the capital gains and losses between the land and buildings; the land theretofore having been treated as a capital asset and the improvements as noncapital assets.2 We find nothing in this amendment indicative of an intent by the Congress to change the rule established by the Fackler case, supra. Section 151 (b) of the 1942 Act added the new subsection (j), covering, as its title indicates, “Gains and Losses From Involuntary Conversions and From the Sale or Exchange of Certain Property Used in the Trade or Business.”' This section provides for special treatment where gains exceed losses from involuntary conversions and from the sale of certain property used in a trade or business. Such gains kre treated as capital gains. This is a relief provision for the benefit of such taxpayers as come within its provisions.3 Losses in excess of gains in respect to such property are still treated as ordinary losses allowable in full. We, therefore, find nothing in subsection (j), or any other amendment contained in the 1942 Act, which indicates to us that Congress intended that real estate such as here involved, which at the time of its sale was devoted to producing income, and on which depreciation was allowed under section 23 (1), should be treated as a capital asset, except under the special circumstances contained in section (117) (j), which are not present in the instant case. The respondent refers us to a portion of Regulations 111, section 29.117-1, which provides:

* * * Property held for the production of income, but not used in a trade or business of the taxpayer, is not excluded from the term “capital assets” even though depreciation may have been allowed with respect to such property under section 23 (1) prior to its amendment by the Revenue Act of 1942. * * *

The property here, however, was “used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.” The quoted regulation, by its terms, specifically excludes such from its purview. We conclude that petitioner’s Kansas City real estate, formerly occupied as his residence, was not a “capital asset” at the time of its sale.4 Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to a deduction for the total net loss of $6,844.92, as an ordinary loss under section 23 (e) of the Internal Be venue Code.

The petition also assigns as error the disallowance as a deduction of the sum of $185 paid to the Duquesne Club of Pittsburgh for membership dues. No evidence was offered and petitioner’s brief does not discuss that issue. It is deemed abandoned and the respondent’s dis-allowance of said amount is sustained.

Reviewed by the Court.

Decision will be entered under Rule 50.

Disney and Opper, JJ., did not participate in the consideration of or decision in this report.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Damer v. Comm'r
2009 T.C. Summary Opinion 145 (U.S. Tax Court, 2009)
Cook v. Comm'r
2008 T.C. Memo. 182 (U.S. Tax Court, 2008)
In Re Rashid
97 B.R. 610 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1989)
Miller v. Commissioner
85 T.C. No. 62 (U.S. Tax Court, 1985)
Hoopengarner v. Commissioner
80 T.C. No. 26 (U.S. Tax Court, 1983)
Ohio County & Independent Agriculture Societies v. Commissioner
1982 T.C. Memo. 210 (U.S. Tax Court, 1982)
Curphey v. Commissioner
73 T.C. 766 (U.S. Tax Court, 1980)
Edgar v. Comm'r
1979 T.C. Memo. 524 (U.S. Tax Court, 1979)
Fegan v. Commissioner
71 T.C. 791 (U.S. Tax Court, 1979)
Monfore v. United States
214 Ct. Cl. 705 (Court of Claims, 1977)
Johnson v. Commissioner
59 T.C. No. 78 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Varner v. Commissioner
1973 T.C. Memo. 27 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Schaevitz v. Commissioner
1971 T.C. Memo. 197 (U.S. Tax Court, 1971)
King v. Commissioner
55 T.C. 677 (U.S. Tax Court, 1971)
Parkins v. Commissioner
1965 T.C. Memo. 137 (U.S. Tax Court, 1965)
United States v. Harold M. Ekberg and Secrie Ekberg
291 F.2d 913 (Eighth Circuit, 1961)
Appleby v. Commissioner
35 T.C. 755 (U.S. Tax Court, 1961)
O'Madigan v. Commissioner
1960 T.C. Memo. 212 (U.S. Tax Court, 1960)
Elliott v. Commissioner
32 T.C. 283 (U.S. Tax Court, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
7 T.C. 372, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hazard-v-commissioner-tax-1946.