Haywood Williams, Jr. v. Elliot L. Richardson, Etc.

481 F.2d 358, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9062

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: June 29, 1973
• Docket: 72-1534
• Status: Published

Opinions

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, Haywood Williams, Jr., and six other individuals brought this class action for a writ of habeas corpus and for declaratory and injunctive relief against Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; Richard Kleindienst, Attorney General; Dr. P. J. Ciccone, Director of the United States Medical Center; Norman Carlson, Director of United States Bureau of Prisons; and Wayne Colburn, Director of United States Marshal Services. Petitioners allege infringement of their constitutional rights and the constitutional rights of others of the class. The class encompassed by this action consists of all inmates and patients of the United States Medical Center (the Center) who have been committed to the Center under the provisions of §§ 4244 through 4248 of Title 18, United States Code. The district court held the case inappropriate for class action and dismissed it. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioners contend that respondents have failed to provide “constitutionally adequate medical and psychiatric care and treatment for petitioners and to provide that petitioners be free from cruel and unusual punishment and conditions of confinement and transportation while in respondents’ custody.” ¹

In rejecting the complaint, the district court approved the memorandum proposed by the United States Magistrate which stated in part:

The practice of joining a number of petitioners in one habeas corpus case is not believed by this Court to be practical or desirable. Individual inmates having complaints about the conditions of their confinement can bring habeas corpus actions on forms provided for them free of charge and the Federal Public Defender will be appointed to represent them. If individual cases indeed present common questions of law and fact they can be joined for purposes of trial.

The precise question presented by this appeal is whether inmates of the Center may as a group attack their conditions of confinement and treatment while they are committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4248.

By way of background, it should be noted that challenges to conditions of confinement are cognizable in habeas corpus. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1972). We have repeatedly expressed our view that the Center is a penal institution and one who is confined there suffers incarceration, e. g., Henry v. Ciccone, 440 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1971); Guy v. Ciccone, 439 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion), and such holdings are particularly relevant in light of allegations in the complaint that “unsentenced, untried, mentally ill patients” are being confined at the Center without proper medical treatment. Additionally, we note the increasing tendency of federal courts to insist upon adequate medical treatment as a constitutional prerequisite to detention of the mentally ill. United States v. Pardue, 354 F.Supp. 1377 (D.Conn.1973), 13 Cr.L.Rep. 2008 (April 4, 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala.1972); United States v. Walker, 335 F.Supp. 705 (N. D.Cal.1971); United States v. Jackson, 306 F.Supp. 4 (N.D.Cal.1969). See Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. , 373 F.2d 451 (1966); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F.Supp. 822 (W.D.Mo.1970).

In regard to the class action issue, as we read the district court’s adopted opinion, a class action is never appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding. Contrary to the district court’s holding that a class action would not be “practical or desirable,” we think that under certain circumstances a class action provides an appropriate procedure to resolve the claims of a group of petitioners and avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial efforts in considering multiple petitions, holding multiple hearings, ánd writing multiple opinions. See Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1169-73 (1970). Considering the caseload burden of the federal courts, a considerable proportion of which is attributable to criminal appeals, we think that a method by which the common claims of a large group of petitioners may be properly litigated without endangering the individual rights of the class should not be summarily foreclosed unless clearly inappropriate under the circumstances. Even the government’s counsel conceded on oral argument that a habeas corpus class action is not always improper.

The Ninth Circuit has recently held in Mead v. Parker, supra, 464 F.2d 1108, that a habeas corpus petition may seek relief for an appropriate class:

Nor can we agree that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can never be treated as a class action. Certainly the usual habeas corpus ease relates only to the individual petitioner and to his unique problem. But there can be cases, and this is one of them, where the relief sought can be of immediate benefit to a large and amorphous group. In such cases, it has been held that a class action may be appropriate. [Id. at 1112-1113.]

The Mead court, while not deciding the class action issue, held that it was error for the district court to decide the question without a hearing. At least one district court has permitted six prisoners to bring a habeas corpus class action on behalf of all similarly situated prisoners in Florida. Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D.Fla.1968).

The class action procedure may very well represent the most appropriate manner of litigating the general claims alleged in the complaint. Thus we hold as error the dismissal of the complaint in the instant action.

In remanding this case to the district court, we adopt the following additional comment from Mead, supra, 464 F.2d at 1112.

it may be that the [district] court will ultimately decide that it is unnecessary to treat this as a class action, perhaps on the theory that, if the petitioners are entitled to relief, the relief will benefit all inmates, whether made parties or not. Or, the court might decide to treat the case as a class action on one or more of the grounds stated in Rule 23(b). A court has considerable latitude in deciding how best to proceed.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 . The petitioners make the following specific complaints regarding treatment afforded members of the class at the Center:

(a) Respondents have failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care and treatment contemplated by Congress in enacting §§ 4244-4248, Title 18, United States Code.

(b) Petitioners are denied adequate psychiatric treatment and care by confinement to the custody of the Attorney General in a penal institution and are denied psychiatric treatment and care received by other individuals committed to the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene.

(c) There is an insufficient number of qualified psychiatric personnel to administer adequate treatment to petitioners and the personnel-patient ratio for psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, psychologists, social workers and psychiatric therapists fails to conform to minimum standards for adequate treatment.

(d) Psychiatric technicians, attendants and orderlies are not employed in sufficient number to maintain the Medical Center in a clean and sanitary manner required by psychiatric patients.

(e) Psychiatric care for petitioners confined at the Medical Center is virtually non-existent and there are no individualized treatment plans, but treatment consists of the administration of tranquilizers and drugs administered solely by lay custodial personnel to keep petitioners amenable to their conditions of confinement. The supervision of the administration of said drugs is totally inadequate.

(f) The confinement of unsentenced, untried, mentally ill patients at the Medical Center is purely penal and the conditions of their confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

(g) Petitioners and the members of their class suffer the infliction of unnecessarily harsh physical force beyond that required for self-defense or prevention of violence. Tear gas, chemical Mace and other chemicals are used against petitioners when not required to protect life or property or to prevent violence. Petitioners are confined in “strip” cells which are completely enclosed, lack any furniture or mattresses and are without toilet, sink or running water.

(h) Petitioners and the members of the class they represent are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by the United States Marshals Service for complaining of the conditions of their confinement during transportation from court to the United States Medical Center. Petitioners are punished for requesting psychiatric care and other necessary medical attention while being transported. Petitioners are punished for requesting emergency air transportation and for refusing to allow their hair to be cut.