Haynes v. Pryor High School

1977 OK 1, 566 P.2d 852, 1976 Okla. LEXIS 660
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 30, 1976
Docket48872
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 1977 OK 1 (Haynes v. Pryor High School) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haynes v. Pryor High School, 1977 OK 1, 566 P.2d 852, 1976 Okla. LEXIS 660 (Okla. 1976).

Opinion

DOOLIN, Justice.

State Industrial Court en banc affirmed an order awarding compensation for permanent partial disability (40%) to body as a whole, necessary medical expenses and disfigurement from surgery, found to have resulted from aggravation of a heart condition. Petitioners, hereafter respondents, bring this proceeding for review and vacation of the order and award.

Claimant, a teacher and football coach at respondent high school, had a history of cervi-sternal chest pain with relation to the neck, which had become more pronounced during year prior to incident related. Pain associated with exertion, such as lawn mowing or walking up hill, accompanied by sweating and breathing difficulty, was relieved by rest. On October 18, 1974 claimant completed a busy schedule teaching and finalizing preparations for taking the football team to an out-of-town game.

At game half-time claimant left the field and trotted uphill 50-100 yards with the team, but experienced severe chest pain and had to stop. The team doctor examined claimant briefly, the pain stopped after 10 minutes and claimant was directed to come to a clinic on Monday for examination. Clinical testing was performed and claimant was advised to see a Tulsa specialist for further testing. Extensive examination and testing was administered and a tread *853 mill test was grossly positive, which was basis for diagnosis of organic heart disease.

Claimant was hospitalized and a right and left catheterization and coronary angi-ography was performed. This established claimant was suffering arteriosclerotic heart disease with severe three vessel coronary disease. Right coronary artery was completely occluded at the orifice. In the left coronary the circumflex artery showed mild diffuse lesion in proximal portion, 80-90% lesion in middle one-third, and 50% lesion at origin of obtuse marginal branch. Left anterior descending showed 80-90% lesion at junction of proximal and middle third; distal left anterior was small with evidence of diffuse 50% disease.

Basic diagnosis was severe three vessel coronary artery disease, with recommendation of “triple jump aortocoronary sapho-nous vein bypass grafts to distal right, circumflex and left anterior descending arteries.” Surgery was performed October 29, 1974, post operative history was mainly uneventful, and after three months claimant underwent multi-stage treadmill test which was negative for ischemic heart disease. Claimant’s physician (Dr. R.) expressed no opinion as to cause of his condition.

Deposition testimony of Dr. M.T.B., based upon history and physical examination conducted January 10, 1975 was introduced by claimant. The doctor found no evidence of myocardial infarction, but was of the opinion claimant suffered from arteriosclerotic artery disease which was aggravated, accelerated and probably caused by strain, tension and exertion as football coach. The doctor was unable to testify any permanent damage to claimant’s heart resulted from occurrences at the football game. The doctor recognized coronary artery disease is a degenerative process, but thought accelerated pulse, tension, and related events caused pain which initiated a sequence of events which resulted in surgery.

Respondents introduced a report from Dr. Me., who examined claimant February 18, 1975, after taking extensive history. The physician was of the opinion claimant was suffering arteriosclerotic heart disease due to obesity and smoking, but the heart condition had not resulted in myocardial infarction. Claimant was 25% permanently partially disabled to body as a whole, but no disability was job related.

Petitioners’ contention is that heart disease which progresses to a point requiring corrective surgery is not compensable as an accidental injury under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 85 O.S.1971 § 1, et seq., since it is uncontroverted claimant did not suffer a heart attack.

Claimant’s position is that decisional law establishes compensability of heart ailments aggravated by job related activity, but without defining the degree of severity to which the condition must advance before becoming compensable. Upon this basis claimant insists employment related exertion, which lights upon and aggravates a prior heart condition, causing pain and initiating onset of events requiring corrective surgery must be compensable.

It is unnecessary at this time to determine whether work-related activity inducing onset of pain, later determined to result from disease of the coronary artery necessitating corrective surgery, constitutes accidental injury within meaning of 85 O.S.1971 § 3(7). The statute provides:

“Injury or personal injury” means only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally result therefrom and occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment as herein defined.”

Numerous decisions have defined accidental injury within meaning of the statute, supra, and further declare the term must be given a broad and liberal construction with a view to compensating injured employees. Likewise, consistent application of the Act has required claimants to assume the burden of proving an injury arose out of and in course of employment. The latter rule is basis for the settled requirement that where disability is of a character to require skilled professional men to determine cause and extent thereof, the question *854 is one of science and necessarily must be proved by expert testimony. Thus, where nature of injury for which compensation is sought depends upon expert medical evidence, the record must contain competent evidence of accidental injury causing disability. Where there is no competent evidence to support finding that disability resulted from employment an order of State Industrial Court must be vacated. 1

Probative value of medical evidence is for State Industrial Court, which may accept all or part of the evidence, or reject such evidence entirely. 2 On review Supreme Court does not weigh expert testimony, but examines record only to ascertain whether any competent evidence supports the order reviewed. Application of these rules requires examination only of medical evidence tendered by claimant to support claim for accidental injury.

Careful examination of Dr. M.T.B.’s deposition discloses only an opinion the events related caused pain, and aggravated claimant’s coronary disease sufficiently to “frighten him” into seeing a doctor. Arte-riosclerotic heart disease from which claimant suffered was not caused by tension and excitement. The doctor expressed no opinion this episode of pain was in the nature of a heart attack, or that the event occasioned permanent heart damage. Rather acceleration of pulse from tension and related events initiated a sequence of events which resulted in surgery. The incident of pain did not cause permanent damage to claimant’s heart or coronary artery, but permanent disability resulted from pain which led to surgery.

The physician’s testimony reflects opinion claimant’s arteriosclerotic coronary artery disease was aggravated, accelerated and probably caused by strain and exertion of employment and pain therefrom.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Death of Gray
2004 OK 63 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2004)
Gray v. Ultramar Diamond, Shamrock Corp.
2004 OK 63 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2004)
Johnson v. City of Woodward
2001 OK 85 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2001)
Weekley v. AAON, Inc.
2001 OK CIV APP 148 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2001)
Black v. Renshaw Painting
1991 OK CIV APP 1 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1991)
Fenwick v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary
1990 OK 47 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1990)
Bostick Tank Truck Service v. Nix
1988 OK 128 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1988)
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Harlow
1983 OK CIV APP 27 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1983)
Special Indemnity Fund v. Stockton
1982 OK 119 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1982)
Peabody Galion Corp. v. Workman
1982 OK 42 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1982)
Matter of Death of Ward
1982 OK CIV APP 12 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1982)
Burns v. Yuba Heat Transfer Corp.
615 P.2d 1029 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1980)
Wilson & Co. v. Reed
1979 OK CIV APP 53 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1979)
Refrigerated Transport Inc. v. Creek
1979 OK 11 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1977 OK 1, 566 P.2d 852, 1976 Okla. LEXIS 660, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haynes-v-pryor-high-school-okla-1976.